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Abstract
The complexity of today’s large, multi-component systems and missions presents a
growing risk of failure because of emergent system-level properties. Furthermore, the
interconnectivity of systems to other systems creates additional security problems. Yes-
terday’s safety and security risk analysis methodologies are no longer effective. To manage
this complexity, what is needed is a holistic, thorough, systematic, system-level, and for-
mally verified approach to risk analysis to ensure stakeholder-required needs are met,
asset losses are mitigated, and the system or mission operates with its intended function-
ality. Furthermore, these system and mission risks need to be thoroughly documented to
increase the visibility of risks so that decision makers have a solid foundation upon which
to base risk-mitigating decisions. Finally, the results of the analysis and decisions need
to be formally verified and documented for the purpose of auditing and accountability.
This thesis presents a solution to this problem, System-theoretic and Technical Opera-
tional Risk Management (STORM). STORM is a methodology for designing trustworthy
systems and missions that conform to industry standards of trustworthiness, namely the
NIST SP 800-160 System Security Engineering Framework. It is also comformable to the
Risk Management Framework (NIST SP 800-37).
Components of STORM have been successfully demonstrated on automated systems.
But testing STORM on a non-automated, human-centered system has yet to be done.
This paper demonstrates STORM analysis on the U.S. Army Ranger patrol base opera-
tions, an example of such a system. Following the example, this thesis discusses STORM
in light of conformance to NIST SP 800-160. It also discusses improvements to STORM
that could extend it to a more comprehensive system and mission assurance methodology.
This could be done by explicitly adding components of the risk management framework
(RMF NIST SP 37 and 800-53) and upgrading its documentation requirements based on
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1.1 The Need for A Comprehensive Mission
Assurance Methodology
Without adequate assurance methodologies, costly or embarrassing system flaws can go
to market such as the Meltdown [12] and Spectre [13] flaws. These flaws had the
potential to allow unauthorized access of private information such as passwords. For
military missions, missions could fail, resources could be squandered, lives could be lost.
System and mission assurance is critical.
Building assured systems presents major problems in today’s systems because today’s
systems are growing in both size and complexity. Furthermore, everything is connected
to everything else. Consider the following problem excerpt from the STPA Handbook
[3].
Some Navy aircraft were ferrying missiles from one point to another. One
pilot executed a planned test by aiming at the aircraft in front (as he had
1
been told to do) and firing a dummy missile. Apparently nobody knew that
the “smart” software was designed to substitute a different missile if the one
that was commanded to be fired was not in a good position. In this case,
there was an antenna between the dummy missile and the target, so the
software decided to fire a live missile located in a different (better) position
instead. What aircraft component(s) failed here?
All components performed their function correctly, but the system as a whole (including
the pilot and the pilot’s training) failed. What this emphasizes is the need for a an
assurance methodology that tackles the problem at a system-level. The system-theoretic
approach to assuring systems is tackled by STPA/STPA-Sec, a component of STORM.
Furthermore, this assurance methodology should bring together the needs of the policy
makers, who define the mission and system functionality and requirements, and the
technical crew who design and develop the system from the mission’s concepts of
operations (CONOPS). This is also what STPA/STPA-Sec does.
Once developed, these CONOPS should be verified to be trustworthy using formal
theorem proving methods so that the trustworthiness of the CONOPS can be verified
and documented for accountability. CSBD, the second component of STORM, does this.
Finally, a comprehensive mission assurance methodology is also needed to meet the
multiple Department of Defense (DoD) component needs as stated in the Mission
Assurance (MA) Strategy by the U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense in 2012 [14].
STORM should be a part of this strategy.
As the complexities of systems and organizations grow, a systems-level and overall
comprehensive strategy is necessary to help decision makers meet their mission
assurance goals.
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This thesis introduces STORM and applies the STORM methodology to an example of
a non-automated, human-centered system. This system is the U.S. Army patrol base
operations as described in the U.S. Army Ranger Handbook [?]. Until this thesis,
STORM had not been applied to this type of mission. After demonstrating STORM on
the patrol base operations, this thesis demonstrates how STORM conforms to the SSE
Framework. Afterwards, it discusses how components of the Assurance Case (AC)
Methodology could improve STORM’s trustworthiness component. Afterwards, this
thesis suggests explicitly adding components of the Risk Management Framework
(RMF) to STORM. Finally, this thesis suggests how STORM could be developed into a
more comprehensive mission assurance strategy that could satisfy the needs of the
DoD’s Mission Assurance Strategy Framework as outline in [14].
1.2 Related Work
There are other efforts to develop system and mission assurance strategies. This thesis
does not present a comprehensive review of the literature in this area. However, one
such methodology showed promise. Kawakami et. al. did a thorough search of literature
and found a need for an assurance methodology in computer architecture. They
presented their solution to the problem called the Assurance Case Methodology. This
methodology describes security goals, breaks them down into subgoals, presents a
rationale for meeting the security goal, and then finally provides evidence that the
security goal was met. While the AC Methodology is not a holistic and thorough
methodology, aspects of the methodology suggest areas of improvement for STORM,
specifically with respect to documentation. A comparison of STORM and the AC
Methodology is discussed in Chapter 10. Lessons learned from the AC Methodology are
suggested as upgrades to STORM’s documentation.
More generally, numerous works by NIST define standards and frameworks for various
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fields of science and technology fields. Those most relevant to this thesis are the NIST
SP 800-160 and 800-37. These are discussed with respect to STORM in Part III of this
thesis.
1.3 Patrol Base Operations
Analyzing system and mission security properties with components of STORM has been
successfully demonstrated prior to this work. For example, CSBD has been applied to
automated credential verification in financial systems for JP Morgan [15] and to verify
the command and control systems in the U.S. Air Force F16 Viper.1 STPA-Sec is
currently U.S. Air Force doctrine. Nonetheless, demonstrating STORM on a purely
non-automated and human-centered system has been uncharted territory. This thesis
demonstrates STORM on such a system, analyzing the mission’s safety and security
features and proving properties of complete mediation (i.e., actions are taken if and
only if they are authenticated and authorized). The analysis is a top-level analysis of an
abstracted model of the patrol base operations intended to assess the efficacy of
STORM on such a system.
The theorems proved in the CSBD portion of this paper demonstrate the logical
soundness of the patrol base operations concepts of operation CONOPS. In particular,
they prove that actions are taken if and only if those actions are both issued by an
authenticated person and authorized by the mission’s policy.
For example, if the Platoon Leader has completed the planning phase of the mission
and is ready to cross the line of discrimination, the Platoon Leader issues the command
1Quote from professor Shiu-Kai Chin: "AFRL: UAV payload controller and secure memory loader
verifier (SMLV) for F-16 Viper" not published, tech papers only.
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PlatoonLeader says crossLD
Satisfying the access-control policy means that the Platoon Leader must be
authenticated by some means designated in the access-control policy. The access-control
policy must also state which commands the Platoon Leader is authorized to issue. In
the access-control logic (ACL) discussed in chapter 4, this is represented as
PlatoonLeader controls crossLD
Satisfying both of these conditions combined with the Platoon Leader’s request to cross
the line of discrimination results in the following logical sequence and conclusion.
if PlatoonLeader says crossLD and
PlatoonLeader controls crossLD, then
crossLD is justified
The CSBD uses formal theorem proving methods to demonstrate and verify this
property. Furthermore, it also demonstrates and verifies the converse.
if crossLD is justified
then PlatoonLeader says crossLD and
PlatoonLeader controls crossLD
This theorem demonstrates the property of complete mediation, namely that access and
modification of all security-sensitive objects is monitored and controlled. Verifying
complete mediation is key because it demonstrates that the system is trustworthy with
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respect to access-control. Documenting complete mediation is also the key to
accountability. The CSBD provides verifiable and reproducible proof of complete
mediation to serve this purpose.
STPA/STPA-Sec demonstrates a thorough analysis of the patrol base operations safety
and security vulnerabilities. It identifies the vulnerabilities and unsafe and insecure
actions that the patrol base operations may encounter. It also suggests measures to
mitigate or avoid these unsafe or insecure actions.
For example, if the Platoon Leader does not complete the planning in a timely manner,
the patrol base operations may conduct the wrong mission (go after the wrong
objective) or the mission may fail. In addition, if the proper equipment, back-up
support, and contingency planning are not conducted at the right time then the
Platoon mission may fail and lives could be lost.
To mitigate these unacceptable events, the analysis considers possible scenarios that
could cause them. For example, the Platoon Leader may have too many obligations.
One solution to this is to limit the Platoon Leader’s span of control and delegate work
to subordinates.
Ineffective communication could also cause the planning phase to be incomplete or not
conducted in a timely manner. This could be caused by faulty equipment or a lack of
communication regarding communications protocols. To mitigate this, check-lists could
be used to verify which equipment is needed for the various types of missions and how
that equipment should be tested prior to mission. In addition, communications
protocols such as key words and communications channels could be established before
commencement of the mission.
Discovering these hazards and vulnerabilities requires a thorough and systematic
methodology to analyze what could go wrong in the mission. This is what the
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STAP/STPA-Sec prescribes, using a methodology that is founded on the philosophy
that hazards and vulnerabilities are caused by unsafe or insecure control actions.
This thesis tests the STORM methodology on a system that it had yet been applied to.
It applies the methodology on an example of a non-automated, human-centered system.
It also makes suggestions on how additional components could be added to STORM to
bring it further into conformance with the Risk Management Framework (NIST Special
Publication 800-37). It also suggests adding evidence (AC Methodology) to step 4 of
the STPA/STPA-Sec analysis to strengthen the trustworthiness component of
conformance to the System Security Engineering Framework (NIST SP 800-160).
This thesis begins with an introduction to STORM and its components in part I.
Following this, STORM is applied to the patrol base operations in part II. Finally, in
part III, STORM is discussed in the context of conformance to the SSE Framework.
Improvements to STORM based on the RMF and AC Methodology are also discussed.








This chapter provides some background on System-Theoretic and Technical Operational
Risk Management (STORM) and its components. STORM aligns itself with the SSE
Framework which is demonstrated explicitly and discussed in more detail in chapter 10.
STORM is a system and mission assurance methodology that applies hazard and
security analysis tools and formal theorem proving methods to design and verify
trustworthy systems. It conforms to the System Security Engineering Framework (see
Chapter 10). STORM assists the analyst in developing concepts of operations
(CONOPS) that are secure and trustworthy.
STORM begins with an analysis of organizational and stakeholder needs and their
definition of assets and asset losses. It identifies unacceptable asset losses. It defines the
system and then describes the system’s functional processes and process models. From
here, it identifies system or mission hazards and vulnerabilities and then develops
constraints. The process is iterated and further refined. Causal models of hazards and
vulnerabilities are investigated and rationale are identified to mitigate them. This
analysis is then developed into a CONOPS. Access-control policies are developed for the
CONOPS which are then formally verified and documented.
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STORM is the result of the collaborative effort of Professor Shiu-Kai Chin of the
College of Engineering and Computer Science at Syracuse University, Erich Devendorf,
PhD of the U.S. Air Force Research Laboratory, and Col. William Young, PhD of the
U.S. Air Force 53rd Electronic Warfare Group.
STORM is composed of two components which implement the steps described above.
The first is System-theoretic process analysis modified for security (STPA-Sec). The
second is certified security by design (CSBD). System-Theoretic Process Analysis
(STPA) is the culmination of years of research in safety engineering by Massachusetts
Institute of Technology (MIT) professor Nancy Leveson and MIT researcher John
Thomas, PhD. It is a response to the failure of legacy methods to manage the
complexities that arise in today’s complex systems. System-Theoretic Process Analysis
for Security (STPA-Sec) is a modified version of STPA that focuses on security. It is the
work of Dr. Young, who presented it as his PhD thesis in 2014 at MIT. STPA-Sec is
currently U.S. Air Force doctrine.
Certified Security by Design (CSBD) is derived from the work of Professor Shiu-kai
Chin and Professor Susan Older (also of the College of Engineering and Computer
Science at Syracuse University). CSBD has been successfully used in industry. It was
used in the design of JP Morgan Company’s SWIFT protocols [15] and on F-16 Viper
secure memory loader verifier (not published).





The complexity of today’s multicomponent and multi-connected systems required a
relook into accident and security analysis. This formed the basis for research that
ultimately culminated in the System-theoretic process analysis (STPA). STPA-Sec is a
modification to STPA for security analysis. The full details of STPA can be found in
the STPA Handbook [3]. This section describes the philosophy underlying STPA
(STAMP accident model) and the overall process.
3.0.1 STAMP
Figure 3.1 shows the relationship between STPA-Sec, STPA, and System-Theoretic
Accident Model and Processes (STAMP).
STAMP is a way of thinking about how accidents occur. It assumes both a traditional
and a system-theoretic view. In the traditional view, accidents are caused by unsafe
chains of events. In the system theoretic view, accidents are also caused by dynamic
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and complex interactions.
Figure 3.1: Relationship between STPA-Sec, STPA, and STAMP. (Image from Dr.
William Young and Reed Prada 2017 STAMP Conference presentation in Boston, MA
on March 27, 2017 [2])
The underlying philosophy of STAMP is that the current practice of analyzing
individual component reliability and chain-of-causality failures does not capture the full
breadth of hazards associated with today’s complex systems. These systems require a
system-theoretic approach to hazard analysis. System theory focuses on the system as a
whole rather than merely a collection of subcomponents. The need for a system theory
approach is epitomized in the notion that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts.
From the complex interactions of individual components arise emergent properties.
These properties can be thought of as a higher order that is not predictable from the
behavior of the individual components.
STAMP forms the foundation of a different type of systems-theoretic safety analysis
techniques. Several approaches to safety engineering are built upon the STAMP
foundation. System-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) is one these analysis
techniques. In addition to STPA, several other analysis techniques are built on top of
the STAMP foundation. These include Causal Analysis based on Systems Theory
(CAST), STPA for security (STPA-Sec), STPA for privacy (STPA-Priv), STPA-SafeSec
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[16], and SAFE (a refinement focused on hardware and software subsystems [16]).
STAMP is the subject of yearly conferences world wide promoted by the Partnership for
Systems Approaches to Safety and Security (PSASS)1. When compared to other
accident models, STAMP is more effective.2 It also cost less to implement [3].
3.0.1.1 Core Components
At STAMP’s core is a top-down model that views accidents as dynamic control
problems. It focuses on safety constraints, hierarchical control structures, and process
models [4].
safety constraints STAMP views constraints, rather than events, as the
safety-critical processes. A lack of constraints can lead to a hazardous system state
which will lead to an accident in the worst-case scenario.
hierarchical control structures Figure 3.2 is an example of a hierarchical control
model. The flow of control is from top to bottom; higher-level control structures control
lower-level control structures. Downward pointing arrows indicate instructions to lower
level controllers or controlled processes. Upward pointing arrows indicate feedback from
lower components.
At the top of the model are the high-level controllers. These controllers send commands
to and receive feed back from controlled processes below. In the model in figure 3.2, the
Human Controller(s) is at the top. This controller sends commands to both the
Actuator(s) and the Automated Controller. The Human Controller(s) receives feedback
1See https://psas.scripts.mit.edu/home/other-stamp-meetings/.
2See, for example, Paul Stukus’ thesis dissertation on how STAMP outdid other techniques when
analyzing a U.S. Coast Guard Buoy Tender Integrated Control System [17]
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from the Automated Controller and the Sensor(s). The Physical Process is a controlled
process. It is controlled by the Actuator(s) and sends feedback via the Sensor(s).
Figure 3.2: Example of a control model. (Image captured from the STPA Handbook
[3].)
The cause of accidents is inadequate control at higher levels, which trickle down to
lower levels causing hazardous conditions.
Inadequate Or Unsafe Controls STAMP considers four types of inadequate or
unsafe controls on constraints:
• insufficient or missing constraints
• wrong constraints
• out-of-order or under-timed constraints
• constraints that are imposed for too long.
These will translate into the four types of unsafe control actions in step 3 of the STPA
analysis (described next).
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process models Figure 3.3 shows a controller with a process model. Each controller
has its own process model. The process model describes the controller’s understanding
of how the system works (i.e., internal algorithms) as well as knowledge about the state
of the system (i.e., interpretation of feedback from other systems).
If the controller’s process model is somehow flawed or inconsistent with the system’s
state, it could cause a hazardous condition which could cause unacceptable losses in the
worst-case scenario.
Figure 3.3: Controller with process model. (Image captured from the Engineering a
Safer World Handbook [4].)
3.0.2 STPA/STPA-Sec
STPA/STPA-Sec is a four step process that defines organizational and stakeholder
needs, identifies assets and unacceptable asset losses, and identifies hazards or
vulnerabilities. It constructs a functional control model and uses this to identify unsafe
control actions and rationale for mitigating those actions. It is an iterative process that
refines and updates itself based on new findings.
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3.1 STPA/STPA-Sec Overview: Four Steps
Figure 3.4 diagrams these four steps [3].
Figure 3.4: Four step process of STPA. (Image captured from the STPA Handbook [3].))
Step 1: Define The Purpose of The Analysis This step begins with a definition
of the organizational and stakeholder needs. It then defines assets and unacceptable
asset losses. These unacceptable losses identify the stakeholder’s definition of security.
This critical step in the analysis ties the mission or system to its purpose. It defines
what the "right mission" is. It links the stakeholders needs to the safety and security
technical aspects of mission or system.
This step also defines the system and its inputs. In addition, system-level hazards and
vulnerabilities are also identified. These can be refined throughout the process.
System-level constraints are also defined. These constraints are also refined.
This step requires knowledge of the purpose of the system, the stakeholders involved,
and the organizational needs.
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Step 2: Model The Control Structure This step develops the functional control
model, control processes, controlled processes, and process models. Figure 3.5 shows a
generic functional control model for a system or mission with an adversary (controller
2).
Figure 3.5: Control structure with potential system-level vulnerabilities/hazards and
security considerations. (Image captured from Systems thinking for safety and security
[5].)
(1) and (3) type vulnerabilities/hazards are caused by representation flaws. These
include missing or incorrect information or feedback and flaws involving the controller’s
model of the system. (2) type vulnerabilities/hazards are caused by algorithm flaws
(algorithms implement the controller’s process model). (4) type vulnerabilities/hazards
are caused by component failures.
This step requires knowledge of the system or mission.
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Step 3: Identify Unsafe Control Actions (UCAs) The next step identifies
unsafe control actions. These are the inadequate or unsafe controls described in the
STAMP model. The four types of UCAs are
• Not applying the control action
• Applying the wrong control action
• Applying the control action in the wrong order
• Applying the control action for to long or not long enough.
Control actions are actions that a controller issues to another controller or controlled
process. In the analysis, each possible action is analyzed for all four UCAs for each
possible state of the controller and controlled process. This process is lengthy but
thorough. It requires a system or mission expert.
Step 4: Identify Loss Scenarios This last step identifies scenarios that could cause
the UCAs in the previous step in the worse-case. It also provides rationale to avoid or
mitigate the scenario.
This step requires a system or mission expert.
Chapter 6 demonstrates an STPA/STPA-Sec analysis on the patrol base operations.




Certified Security by Design (CSBD)
Certified Security by Design (CSBD) is a method for formally verifying and
documenting the security properties of a system. It satisfies the principle of complete
mediation. It uses an access-control logic (ACL) to reason about access to security
sensitive objects. It uses computer-aided reasoning such as the Higher Order Logic
(HOL) Interactive theorem prover to formally verify and document these security
properties. The outcomes of CSBD are consistent with the Systems Security
Engineering (Systems Security Engineering (SSE)) Framework described in National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) SP 800-160 [8]. They serve as a
reproducible and auditable documentation of trustworthiness.
4.1 Access Control Logic
This section describes the access-control logic (ACL) for the CSBD. It begins with the
basic concepts of the ACL. Then, it describes the ACL implementation in the Higher
Order Logic (HOL) Interactive Theorem Prover. The explanation here is a simplified
version of the ACL and describes only what is necessary to understand how the ACL is
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used to perform the analysis on the patrol base operations.
The ACL is a formal propositional logic that specifically reasons about security-related
objects. Security in this sense means confidentiality, integrity, and availability (CIA).
The formal proofs generated by the ACL demonstrate that a system does (or does not)
satisfy the security properties of the system. A full discussion of the ACL is the subject
of the text Access Control, Security, and Trust: A Logical Approach by Syracuse
University professors Shiu-Kai Chin and Susan Older. This section describes ACL in
sufficient detail to gain a basic understanding of what the proofs mean and the logic
from which they are derived.
At its most basic, the ACL is composed of principals that make requests to access
objects. These principals are given authority or jurisdiction over objects. These
principals must be authenticated before they can access or modify objects over which
they have authority. The following sections describe the components and logical rules of
the ACL.
Principals, Requests, Authority, and Jurisdiction
Principals should be thought of as actors in the access-control logic. Principals can
make statements or requests. They can be assigned privileges or authority over objects
or actions. More formally, principals are defined as
Princ ::= PName / Princ & Princ / Princ |Princ
To reason about access-control and trust, the ACL uses propositional variables,
requests, authority, and jurisdiction to make statements.
Principals can make requests. In the ACL principals make requests using the says
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operator. Requests have the form P says ', where P represents some principal and '
represents some assertion (proposition, propositional variable). For example,
Commander says dropLeft. In this example, the Commander is issuing a command (or
request) for the munitions system to drop the left weapon.
Principals can have authority over assertions. The ACL conveys authority using the
controls operator. Statements of authority have the form P controls ', where P
represents some principal and ' represents some assertion. For example, Commander
controls dropLeft. This states that the Commander has the authority over the command
(or request) for the munitions system to drop the left weapon.
Principals can also have jurisdiction over assertions. Both authority and jurisdiction use
the controls operator. Statements of jurisdiction have the same form as statements of
authority. Statements of authority are typically defined in an organization’s policy.
Statements of jurisdiction are statements that are readily believed given the context.
For example, PresidentOfUS controls (Commander controls dropLeft). In this example,
the President of the United States, per the U.S. Constitution, has jurisdiction over the
authority invested in the Commander. This is readily believed and does not require any
further proof than "because the Constitution says so."
Additional concepts such as one principal speaking for another and one principal
representing another on some assertion are also covered in the ACL. In addition, the
concept of assigning integrity and security levels (such as the system used to assign U.S.
security clearances to individuals) to principals and objects is covered by the ACL.
However, these are not employed in our simple proof-of-concept version. They are
further elaborated on in the text.
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Syntax: Well-Formed Formulas
Well-formed formulas (WFFs) define the syntax (or grammatical structure) of the
propositional logic. They are syntactically valid statements in the ACL. All ACL
statements must be formulated as WFFs. The syntax is defined as follows.
Form ::= PropVar / ¬ Form / (Form _ Form) /
(Form ^ Form) / (Form   Form) / (Form ⌘ Form) /
(Princ ) Princ) / (Princ says Form) / (Princ controls Form) /
(Princ reps Princ on Form1)
Semantics: Kripke Structures and Evaluation Function
Whereas WFFs define the syntax of the propositional logic, Kripke semantics with the
evaluation function describes the semantics (or meaning).
A Kripke structure primarily deals with three things: worlds, propositions, and
principals. The worlds can be thought of as possible states or configurations of some
system. Propositions are just statements that are either true or false. And, principals
are just actors. A Kripke structure M = hW, I, Ji is defined as a three-tuple consisting
of the following: a set of worlds W ; a function I called the assignment function that
maps propositions to worlds, and ; a function J that maps principals to relations on
worlds, where the relation is called the accessibility relation. Formally, these are defined
as follows
• W is a nonempty set, whose elements are called worlds.
• I : PropVar ! P(W ) is an interpretation function that maps each propositional
variable to a set of worlds.
1The last line is from [7].
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Figure 4.1: Kripke semantics. Image taken from Access Control, Security, and Trust: A
Logical Approach[6]
• J : PName ! P(W ⇥W ) is a function that maps each principal name to a
relation on worlds.
The Kripke semantics define the meanings of WFFs for Kripke structures. The
semantics can be thought of as an evaluation function for a particular Kripke M =
hW, I, Ji. Figure 4.1 shows the Kripke semantics. The subscript M signifies that the
evaluation function is defined for a particular Kripke structure. This means there is a
separate evaluation function for each Kripke structure.
Satisfies and Soundness Properties
The "satisfies" condition applies to a particular Kripke structure M = hW, I, Ji. It is
said that M satisfies some proposition ' if the evaluation function "M['] = W (the set
of all worlds) for M. In other words, ' is true in all worlds of M. Symbolically, this is
denoted as M |= '. The statement M does not satisfy ' is denoted as M 6|= '.
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Whereas "satisfies" describes a property of a Kripke structure M, "soundness"
describes a property of all Kripke structures.
Soundness refers to the logical consistency of inference rules. Inference rules consist of a
set of hypothesis {H1, H2, . . . , Hn} and a conclusion.
H1, H2, . . . , Hn
C
An inference rule is said to be sound if for every Kripke structure M that satisfies all
the hypotheses, the conclusion is true. In other words, the inference rule is sound if and
only if 8Hi,M |= Hi  ! M |= C.
Soundness is verified by formal proofs that employ axioms, tautologies, and sound
inference rules that are already proved.
Inference Rules
The inference rules for the ACL are shown in figure 4.2. All the inference rules are
sound. Details of proofs of soundness can be found in Access Control, Security, and
Trust: A Logical Approach[6].
The primary rule applied in the formal proofs for this project is the Controls rule,
shown in figure 4.2 and shown again here in figure 4.3.
This rule has two hypotheses and one conclusion. The left hypothesis is an
authorization.2 The principal P controls (is authorized on) some assertion '. The right
hypothesis is a request.3 The principal P requests some assertion '. The conjunction of
the authorization and the request of P on ' results in the assertion '. That is, if P
2or a control in the C2 calculus
3or a command in the C2 calculus
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Figure 4.2: The ACL inference rules. Image taken from Access Control, Security, and
Trust: A Logical Approach[6]
Figure 4.3: The Controls inference rule. Image taken from Access Control, Security, and
Trust: A Logical Approach[6]
controls ' and P says ' then ' is true. For example, if Commander controls dropLeft
and Commander says dropLeft then dropLeft is justified.
Higher Order Logic (HOL)
This section describes how the access-control logic (ACL) is implemented in the Higher
Order Logic (HOL) Interactive Theorem Prover.
Figure 4.4 shows the HOL representations for principals (Princ).
The definitions here correspond to the Princ defined above. The first line corresponds
to PropVar , the second corresponds to Princ & Princ, and the third corresponds to
Princ |Princ. In HOL, the infix & operator is represented with the prefix meet
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Figure 4.4: The HOL implementation of principle (Princ). Image from Certified Security
by Design Using Higher Order Logic[7]
.
operator. The infix |operator is represented with the prefix quoting operator.
In the definition for Princ, Name is called the type constructor. The result of the
constructor and a concrete type or type variable results in something of type Princ.
Examples of principals in HOL are:
Name Commander, or
(Name Commander) ` meet ` (Name MunitionsAvailable), or
(Name Commander) ` quoting ` (Name MunitionsAvailable).
The top declaration is the only one used in this project.
The HOL representation of WFFs is shown in figure 4.5.
Form is the datatype definition. TT and FF are the ACL representations of true and
false, respectively. notf, andf, orf, impf, eqf, says, speaks_for, controls,
and reps are all the prefix versions of the infix operators defined above. The additional
elements of the Form (from domi to the end) refer to integrity and security levels,
which are not used for this project.
The type definitions that follow the operator are relevant and show-up everywhere in
the code. It is useful to dissect one of them. Consider the andf operator.
(andf) ((’aavar, ’apn, ’il, ’sl) Form)
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Figure 4.5: The definition for Form in HOL. Certified Security by Design Using Higher
Order Logic[7]
((’aavar, ’apn, ’il, ’sl) Form).
((’aavar, ’apn, ’il, ’sl) Form) is the type signature for another Form.
The component types of a Form are a proposition (’aavar), a principal (’apn), an
integrity level (’il), and a security level (’sl). The prefix operator andf then takes
two Forms each of type ((’aavar, ’apn, ’il, ’sl) Form). For the example
used in this project, type ((’aavar, ’apn, ’il, ’sl) Form) looks like type
((command option, principal, ’d, ’e) Form).
The Kripke structure in HOL is shown in figure 4.6.
In figure 4.6, the first set of parenthesis represents the assignment function. It takes a
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Figure 4.6: The HOL implementation of a Kripke structure (Princ). Image from Certi-
fied Security by Design Using Higher Order Logic[7]
.
proposition and world as arguments. If the proposition is true in that world, then the
function returns true, otherwise it returns false. The second pair of parenthesis is
similar to the accessibility function. It takes a principal, a world, and another world.
The function returns true if the second world is accessible from the first for this
particular principal, otherwise it returns false. The last two pairs of parentheses
represent integrity and security levels. These are not used in this thesis.
In the HOL code provided for this project, Kripke structures are either abbreviated as
follows
(M,Oi,Os)
Or, unabbreviated as follows
M:(’prop, ’world,’pName, ’Int, ’Sec)Kripke, (Oi: ’Int po), (Os:’Sec po)
The actual Kripke structure is represented by M and the integrity and security levels
are represented by Oi and Os.
The ACL formulas in HOL are shown in figure 4.7
Triangular brackets enclose propositions. Thus, a proposition codes as follows:
prop command
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Figure 4.7: The ACL formulas in HOL. Image taken from Access Control, Security, and
Trust: A Logical Approach[6]
A request in HOL is coded as:
(Name PlatoonLeader) says (prop command)
A statement of authority is coded as:
(Name PlatoonLeader) controls (prop command)
The other formulas are not used for this project.
The Kripke semantics evaluation function is shown in figure 4.8. This function is
lengthy. Therefore, this figure shows only part of the function definition. The reader
should note that the definition is defined for all Kripke structures as 8 Oi Os M.
The implementation of the "satisfies" property is shown in figure 4.9. The definition
reads "f is true for the Kripke structure if and only if it evaluates to all worlds." The
fact that is is defined for all Kripke structures 8 M Oi Os makes it sound.
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Figure 4.8: A partial description of the HOL implementation of the Kripke seman-
tics (evaluation function). Image from Certified Security by Design Using Higher Order
Logic[7]
Figure 4.9: The HOL implementation of the "satisfies" property. Image from Certified
Security by Design Using Higher Order Logic[7]
This section described only the ACL and HOL implementation that are used in this
project. The reader can find additional information in the Certified Security by Design
Using Higher Order Logic[7].
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Chapter 5
Secure State Machine Model
This section describes the secure state machine (SSM) and its implementation in HOL.
It begins with a description of a state machine and then describes a secure state
machine as a security-enhanced version of the state machine. This section concludes
with a description of the HOL implementation of the secure state machine used for this
UAV described in the previous chapter.
State Machines
A state machines is a transition model of a system that behaves in a well-defined way
that is readily automated. There are various models of state machines. The model used
for this project describes a state machine as a system with a finite number of states,
commands (or inputs) to transition from one state to another, and an output the
follows each transition. The state machine is modeled with next-state (NS) and
next-output (NOut) functions. These functions define how the state machine should
change states and outputs, respectively, given a specific command.
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In addition, the state machine defines a configuration which consists of (1) the current
state, (2) a list of commands (an input stream), and (3) a list of outputs (an output
stream). The configuration also defines the state machines behavior. A configuration





Where CFG is the constructor for the configuration type1, input::inputList is the input
consed (prepended) to the remainder of the input stream (list), CURRENT_STATE is
the current state, and outList is the output stream (list).
A transition relation (TR) defines the state machines behavior based on the command










(NOut input CURRENT_STATE )::outList
The TR takes an input, an initial configuration, and a final configuration as inputs. It
returns true if the final configuration results from applying the input to the initial
configuration. Otherwise, it returns false.
1Constructors are necessary for datatypes and used in HOL which is a strongly typed language. In
essence, it announced that what follows is a list of the parameters for the CFG (configuration) datatype.
32
The second configuration results from the transition from the current state (or
configuration) to the next state (or configuration). This transition is defined by the
next-state (NS) and next-output (NOut) functions. In the second configuration, these
are denoted as NS input CURRENT_STATE and NOut input CURRENT_STATE,
respectively. Both of these functions take the current command (or input) and the
current state and return the next state and next output, respectively. The input is the
input from the initial configuration. The input has been "used-up" and is removed from
the input stream in the second configuration. Thus, the input for the second
configuration is just inputList.
Secure State Machines
A secure state machine is a state machine with a security component attached. In
particular, a secure state machine includes a security monitor which checks transitions
for authentication and authorization. Figure 5.1 shows how the state machine relates to
the secure state machine.
Figure 5.1: State machine versus secure state machine with a monitor. Image taken
from Certified Security by Design Using Higher Order Logic [7].
In contrast to a state machine, a secure state machine requires an entity to request a
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transition from one state (or configuration) to another. If this entity (referred to as a
principal) is not properly cleared, then the security monitor does not allow the
transition. In particular, there are three types of actions that the monitor allows: (1)
execute (exec) the transition, (2) trap (trap) the transition, or (3) discard (discard) the
command (input). The monitor allows a transition to be executed if and only if the
principal is both authenticated and authorized on a particular transition. The monitor
traps a transition if the principal is authenticated but not authorized. The monitor
discards a command (or input) if the principal is not authenticated. Note that if the
principal is not authenticated then the monitor does not need to check if the principal is
authorized. Thus, the command, rather than the transition, is discarded.
In addition to the next-state and next-output functions defined for the state machine,
the secure state machine also defines an authentication function, a state-based
authorization function, and a global authorization function. The authentication
function returns true if the principal is authenticated. The state-based authorization
function defines the state-based security (access-rights) policy. The global authorization
function defines security (access-rights) for the entire secure state machine. With these








Where authenticationTest, stateInterpretation, and securityContext are the
authentication function, state-based authorization function, and global authorization
function, respectively.
The TR for the secure state machine functions the same as that for the state machine.
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The only difference is that the configurations are for the secure state machine. The TR














(NS (trType input) CURRENT_STATE)
(NOut (trType input) CURRENT_STATE )::output
To enforce security, the monitor must interpret the meaning of the configuration using
the access-control logic. It does this with a configuration interpretation function
(CFGConfig). This function interprets the authentication and authorization functions
using the rules of the ACL. It applies these rules to the initial configuration and
generates a list of propositions that the configuration satisfies. The CFGInterpret












(M,Oi,Os) satisfies (securityContext, input, and stateInterpretation)
Where the <==> is the symbol for a biconditional (if and only if) and (M,Oi,Os) is a
Kripke structure.2
The Parametrizable Secure State Machine in HOL
A parametrizable secure state machine is implemented in HOL for this project. To use
this for a specific secure state machine, the secure state machine must define a
next-state and next-output function, an authentication function, a state-based and
global authorization function, and a list of principals, commands, and outputs. With
these defined, the specific secure state machine can used the function and pre-proved
theorems of the parametrizable secure state machine to ease the process of working with
HOL.
The transition rules (TR rules) defined in HOL are shown in figure 5.2.
The interpretation of figure 5.2 follows from the discussion above. elementTest is
defined for the specific secure state machine. It returns a list of true/false values for
each user-defined principal. authenticationTest returns the conjunction of all the list
elements. context is the same as securityContext defined above.
For the parametrizable secure state machine, the TR rule to execute a transition is
shown in figure 5.3. The use of Kripke structures allows HOL to prove that any
2The Kripke structure is not defined because the rules for satisfies apply to all Kripke structures.
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Figure 5.2: Transition rules in HOL. Image taken from Certified Security by Design
Using Higher Order Logic [7]
inference rule derived from this is sound using the ACL. On the top line, TR takes a
Kripke structure and a command. The command is preceded by the transition type
(trType) exec. The next line is the initial configuration. The subsequent three lines are
the final configuration. Following the biconditional symbol <==> is the application of
the security monitor. This is the authentication function and (conjunction) the
configuration interpretation function applied to the initial configuration. The rule states
that the transition should be executed if and only if the principal is authenticated and
the initial configuration satisfies the CFGInterp relation. This later relation allows HOL
to transform the initial configuration into a list that the ACL can use to draw
conclusions about authentication. The rule for trap is similar.
The TR rule for the exec is used to prove that a transition should be executed if and
only if the request is authenticated and authorized. This rule is named
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Figure 5.3: TR rule for the exec transition rule in HOL.
TR_exec_cmd_rule. It is shown in figure 5.4.
The top line states that this theorem should be true for any authentication function
(elementTest), global authorization function (context), state-based authorization
function (stateInterp), input (x ), input stream (ins), state (s), and output stream
(outs). The antecedent of the first implication (preceding the first ==> symbol) applies
the CFGInterp function to the initial configuration. The conclusion (and the antecedent
of the second implication) extracts the propositions (or requests) from the input x. The
conclusion of the second implication applies the TR relation shown in figure 5.2. This is
parametrized by the next-state (NS ) and next-output (NOut) functions and the Kripke
structure. The conclusion of the biconditional is conjunction of the authentication
function and the CFGInterp function applied to the initial configuration. The theorem
proves that the configuration interpretation implies the input which implies the
transition is executed if and only if the input is authenticated and authorized. The rule
for trap is similar.
The TR rule for discard leads directly to the theorem TR_discard_cmd_rule. The
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Figure 5.4: TR_exec_cmd_rule for the exec transition rule in HOL.
rules is shown in figure 5.5.
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Figure 5.5: TR_discard_cmd_rule for the discard transition rule in HOL.
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Part II
STORM on Patrol Base Operations
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Chapter 6
STPA/STPA-Sec on Patrol Base
Operations
This chapter applies the STPA/STPA-Sec analysis to the patrol base operations. The
patrol base operations are analyzed at a high level of abstraction and only the actions of
the Platoon Leader (PL) and the platoon as a whole are considered. The limited scope
of the analysis serves to demonstrate the STPA component of System-Theoretic and
Technical Operational Risk Management (STORM) on the system of interest.
This chapter describes each of the four steps of the STPA/STPA-Sec analysis. The
results are discussed in the text and presented in tables. For a review on the four steps
read section 3.0.2.
6.1 Step 1: Define The Purpose of The Analysis
Stakeholders At the highest level, the stakeholders are the U.S. Government and the
Citizens of the United States. Below that are the U.S. Army and the U.S. Army
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Rangers. Depending on the mission, other nations and their citizens may also hold a
stake in the activities. The enemy is also a stakeholder with an adversarial agenda.
Purpose The purpose of this thesis is to demonstrate STPA (STORM) on a
non-automated, human-centered system. Therefore, the analysis need only be conducted
to the extent that all the steps are explored at least once. STPA is an iterative process,
thus an analysis for a different purpose would entail refinements as needed.
Organization FMA The two most immediate organizations for the patrol base
operations are the U.S. Army Rangers and the U.S. Army. Their goals are stated in
table 6.1.
Organization Goals
U.S. Army U.S. Army Rangers
"The U.S. Army’s mission is to fight
and win our Nation’s wars by providing
prompt, sustained land dominance across
the full range of military operations and
spectrum of conflict in support of combat-
ant commanders." [18]
"The Rangers’ primary mission is to en-
gage the enemy in close combat and
direct-fire battles. This mission includes
direct action operations, raids, person-
nel and special equipment recovery, in
addition to conventional or special light-
infantry operations." [9]
Table 6.1: Organization goals.
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Patrol Base Operations FMA The functional mission analysis for the patrol base
operations is shown in table 6.2. This describes what the patrol base operations are,
how they are conducted (broadly), and why they are conducted.
Patrol Base Operations FMA
What establish a security perimeter when a squad or platoon halts for anextended period of time
How planning, reconnaissance, security, control, and common sense
Why
avoid detection:
• hide a unit during a long,
• detailed reconnaissance;
• perform maintenance on weapons,
• equipment, eat, and rest;
• plan and issue orders;
• reorganize after infiltrating an enemy area;
• establish a common base from which to execute several con-
secutive or concurrent operations.
Table 6.2: Patrol Base Operations Functional Mission Analysis from the U.S. Ranger
Handbook [9].
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Assumptions about The System This analysis relies on the following assumptions
about the model of patrol base operations.
• Mission is decided by higher up leaders and is provided as an input to the patrol
base operations.
• Mission is not changeable by the patrol base itself (exceptions are
mission-specific).
• Soldiers are deemed fit for duty before the mission commences. (There may be
exceptions.)
• Soldiers are battle ready, but may not be fully mission capable (i.e., soldiers may
require additional equipment and preparation that is mission-specific and
determined after the mission is received).
• The patrol base operations begin when the platoon (or patrol) leader receives
order that there will be a mission.
• The patrol base operations end when the patrol returns to the larger unit and has
completed any debriefing required by the mission.
• Other inputs to the system are intelligence from the larger unit (higher-up HQ),
intelligence from other units (if applicable), and intelligence gathered during the
mission from the mission itself.
• Feedback is received from the platoon regarding carrying out orders and from the
operations themselves regarding completion of tasks, etc.
• Adversary also may input information to the platoon leader (by interfering with
communications from higher-up HQ), to the platoon soldiers (by interfering with
intra-patrol communications), and to the operations themselves (by disrupting the
operations in various forms, including contact).
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System Entities The following entities are defined in the U.S. Ranger Handbook for
the patrol base operations.
• HQ: PL, PSG, Medic, FO, RTO, HWSQ
• Squad Leaders




The platoon leader (Platoon Leader –PL) is the only entity specifically referred to in
this limited-scope analysis. The platoon sergeant (PSG) is the assistant to the platoon
leader. The patrol base head quarters (HQ) consists of the PL, PSG, Medic, forward
observer (FO), radio telephone operator (RTO), and the heavy weapons squad leader
(HWSQL). Below the HQ are four squad leaders.1 Each squad is comprised of two fire
teams. Each fire team is compose of two or more buddy teams. Each buddy team is
composed of two soldiers (buddies).
1This is only true for platoon sized patrol base operations. Squad-sized patrol base operations consist
of only one squad.
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L1 MIA, KIA, WIA, CIA
L2 Wrong mission (i.e., mission not clearly communicated causing wrongobjectives accomplished)
L3 Mission Failure (i.e., right mission, but objectives not achieved)
L4 Negative publicity/exposure/unwanted attention
L5 Equipment loss/damage/capture by enemy
L6 Civilian casualties/disruption to local population
L7
Insufficient communications with high-up HQ (i.e., causing inability for
high-ups to monitor and coordinate actions with other missions and re-
sources or to keep key stakeholders informed of progress.)
Table 6.3: System accidents/losses.
Note the following definitions: MIA = missing in action; KIA = killed in action; WIA =
wounded in action; CIA = captured in action.
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System-level Hazards/Vulnerabilities And Constraints Table 6.4 describes the
system-level hazards/vulnerabilities and associated system-level constraints. The
system-level hazards/vulnerabilities are described in the second column. The associated
accidents/losses for each hazard are shown in the next column. These are linked to
system-level constraints in the last column.
Hazards/Vulnerabilities and constraints
System-level Hazards/Vulnerabilities Accidents/Losses System-level Constraints
H1 Insufficient planning L1, L2, L3, L4, L5,L6, L7 SC1 Plan sufficiently
H2 Insufficient reconnais-sance/intelligence
L1, L2, L3, L4, L5,
L6, L7 SC2 Reconnoiter sufficiently
H3 Insufficient security L1 ,L3, L4, L5, L6 SC3 Provide sufficient secu-rity




L1, L2, L3, L4, L5,
L6, L7 SC5 Use common sense
H6 Insufficient leadership L1, L2, L3, L4, L5,L6, L7 SC6
Establish sufficient lead-
ership
H7 Insufficient communica-tion with higher-HQ





H8 Insufficient haste L1, L3 SC8 Maintain appropriatepace
H9 Disregard for Rules ofEngagement L4, L6 SC9
Follow Rules of Engage-
ment
Table 6.4: System-level hazards/vulnerabilities and constraints.
A more in-depth analysis would return to this table and generate refined
hazards/vulnerabilities and constraints. For example, H1 could be refined to H1.1
insufficient reconnaissance, H1.2 mission objectives not clear, H1.3 insufficient time for
completing plan, etc.. For the constraints, SC1.1 reconnoiter efficiently, SC1.2 confirm
mission objectives, SC1.3 use time efficiently, etc..
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6.2 Step 2: Model The Control Structure
This section first divides the patrol base operations into phases. It then describes the
system controllers and their process models. It then describes the control actions for
each controller. Finally, it presents a diagram of the functional control model.
Phases of The Patrol Base Operations Figure 6.5 shows the patrol base
operations divided into six phases. This is a simplified first approximation of the patrol
base operations and is very abstract. For the purposes of this analysis, transitions
among phases of the operations are indicated by the Platoon Leader who is responsible
for the success of the mission as a whole.
Table 6.5: Scenarios for UCA E1A3. Diagram by Captain Jesse Nathaniel Hall.
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Controllers And Process Models The controllers and their process models are
shown in table 6.6. There are three controllers: the Platoon Leader, the platoon, and
Controllers And Process Model














Adversary Threat Model To bedetermined to be determined
Table 6.6: Controllers and process model.
the adversary (enemy). The Platoon Leader is the top controller. She issues orders to
the subordinates (the platoon) based on her knowledge of the status and policy of the
operations. The platoon authenticates the Platoon Leader and either executes the
orders or discards the commands.
Each controller has one or more models of the patrol base operations that governs her
decisions and actions. Each model has a variable that can take on one of several values.
For example, the Platoon Leader has a model of the Patrol Base Status. The status is
the State of the system. For example, the State could be PLAN_PB or
MOVE_TO_ORP.
The Platoon Leader’s Policy model defines which conditions and which commands are
authorized. For example, for most instances of the patrol base operations, the planning
phase should be completed before moving to the objective rally point (ORP).2
Therefore, the Platoon Leaders policy would include the condition that planning phase
2The most likely variation is for the platoon to move to the ORP and then receive orders. Regardless,
it is unlikely that the platoon will move to the patrol base operations before completing planning.
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complete implies move to the ORP. The Authorization variable for the Policy model
would be true if the phase is PLAN_PB and this phase is complete.
The platoon’s Authentication Model defines how the platoon authenticates commands.
For example, the platoon may authorize commands by visual confirmation of the leader
issuing the command. Then, whenever the Platoon Leader issues the command in the
line of sight of the platoon, the Authentication variable would take the value True. The
platoon may also authenticate the platoon leader via a password. To simplify the
analysis for this thesis, the platoon leader is assumed to be authenticated by recognition
by the platoon.
The adversary’s process model is the threat model. It is determined from METT-TC3
analysis. It may or may not be known or complete. The more known and complete the
model, the more capable the platoon is at anticipating threats from the enemy. But,
knowledge of a specific enemy should not guide the system design. The design should
build a defensible mission that aims to protect stakeholder assets regardless of the
enemy’s capabilities (if possible). To simplify this analysis, the threat model is not
explored.
3mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available-time available, and civil consid-
erations factors.
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Control Actions Each controller has its own set of actions (commands, etc.) that it
can issue. The control actions for each principal are listed below.
• Platoon Leader
– PL says planComplete (same as crossLD)
– PL says conductORP
– PL says moveToPB
– PL says completePB
– PL says reactToContact
– PL says returnToBase
– PL says changeMission
• Platoon








For example, the Platoon Leader may determine (based on policy, etc.), that the
planning phase is complete. She may then indicate this with the statement PL says
planComplete.4 Similarly, the platoon may respond to this command with
4crossLD = cross line of discrimination. Depending on the model, this would occur after planning.
It would transition the patrol into the MOVE_TO_ORP phase of the operations. A description of this
works is reserved for chapter 7.
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exec(planComplete). If the platoon is in the PLAN_PB phase, it would then move to
the next phase MOVE_TO_ORP.
The discard(anyCommand) indicates that the command, whatever it is, should be
discarded.
Functional Control Structure The functional control structure diagrams the
command and control structure with feedback. It is shown in figure 6.1.
Figure 6.1: Control structure for patrol base operations.
The blue background encapsulates the command and control structure of the operations.
The yellow background encapsulates the access-control structures. The green is the
adversarial realm with both command and control and access-control capabilities.
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Downward pointing arrows indicate the direction of commands and upward pointing
arrows indicate feedback. The adversary is an exception. These arrows are directed out
towards the controllers (PL and platoon) and the controlled actions (patrol base
operations). Feedback to the adversary is not modeled. However, modeling feedback
may shine light on avenues of attack or counter-attack on the adversary. For example,
reacting to contact with the enemy would be modeled as a feedback from the patrol
base operations to the adversary. Feedback from the platoon or platoon leader could be
deceptive counterintelligence messages misleading the enemy as to the patrol base
operations locations or objectives. Modeling this feedback would provide another
analysis consideration for the analyst.
The Platoon Leader is the legitimate controller in the command and control structure.
She sends commands to the platoon. The commands are shown in the grey box. The
Platoon Leader receives feedback from the platoon (i.e, discard command, confirm
orders, etc.). The Platoon Leader also receives orders or intelligence from higher-up
headquarters, the operations, and potentially from other sources.
The platoon receives orders from the Platoon Leader and either executes them or
discards them. Execution of an order implies that the Platoon Leader’s command was
authenticated. Discarding means that the command was not authenticated. The
platoon also receives information from the operations as to what phase it is in, etc..
The adversary can interfere with the operations in numerous ways. It can attack the
Platoon Leader or platoon. It can send conflicting messages, such as send
unauthenticated commands in the hope that the platoon or Platoon Leader will
authenticate it. The adversary can attack or sabotage the platoon. The capabilities of
the adversary to interrupt the operations should be analyzed as soon as possible to
develop an accurate threat model.
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6.3 Step 3: Identify Unsafe Control Actions (UCAs)
This section determines unsafe control actions (unsafe control actions (UCA)) for the
patrol base operations. It uses the Thomas Method5 to identify UCAs. This method
considers all possible combinations of values of the process model variables.
All possible process model values are analyzed for each control action. This means that
for any control action the possible combinations of process model values is 7 (seven
states) ⇥ 2 (Authorized: True or False) ⇥ 2 (Authenticated: True or False) = 28.
There are 7 possible control actions (commands) for the Platoon Leader and 2⇥ 7
possible control actions for the platoon. In total, there are 7 + 2⇥ 7 = 21 possible
control structures. To analyze each control structure requires 21⇥ 28 = 588 possible
UCAs.
Fortunately, many UCAs are similar or can be grouped. Nevertheless, to limit this
analysis for its demonstrative purposes only three control actions are analyzed: PL says
planComplete, exec(planComplete), and discard(anyCommand). Notice that the last
control action covers all 7 discard commands because discarding any command is the
same for all commands.
The UCAs are analyzed using the tables 6.7, 6.8, and 6.9 in the next section. In each of
these tables, each control action is analyzed for each combination of process model
value and for each of the four types of UCAs. The four UCAs described in section 3.0.2
of the previous chapter are repeated in the list below.
• Not applying the control action
5John P. Thomas, PhD is coauthor with Nancy Leveson, PhD on the STPA Handbook. The Thomas
Method was noted in one of my readings on the subject. But I have not been able to find a citation for
the paper. It was noted only in one sentence which referred to the systematic way in which the UCAs
are documented in this thesis.
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• Applying the wrong control action
• Applying the control action in the wrong order
• Applying the control action for two long or not long enough.
To make the tables more manageable, for each combination of control action and
process model value the table indicates if there is an UCA by marking the appropriate
box with a code. The code will be used in step 4 to describe scenarios. If the box is
empty, then no UCA is determined for those set of values.
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6.3.1 Unsafe Control Actions (UCAs): Thomas Model
PL says planComplete Table 6.7 analyzes the UCAs for the control action PL says
planComplete. Indexing the UCAs with keys such as "P1A1" and "P1B1" helps to
manage the size and complexity of the tables. These keys are referenced in step 4 of the
analysis where the scenarios for each UCA are examined and explained in detail.
Table 6.7: Unsafe control actions UCAs for control action "PL says planComplete."
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exec(planComplete) Table 6.8 analyzes the UCAs for the control action
exec(planComplete).
Table 6.8: Unsafe control actions UCAs for control action "exec(planComplete)."
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discard(anyCommand) Table 6.9 analyzes the UCAs for the control action
discard(anyCommand).
Table 6.9: Unsafe control actions UCAs for control action "discard(anyCommand)."
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6.4 Step 4: Identify Loss Scenarios
This section describes the scenarios associated with each UCA identified in the previous
step.
6.4.1 Scenarios
The scenarios are described in a series of tables. The top row of each table indicates
which control action is analyzed. The next row describes the process model variable
values. It may also contain other useful information.
The first column, labeled "Scenarios", identifies the UCA by its code (from the tables in
the previous section. It also describes the unsafe scenario. The next column, labeled
"Associated Causal Factors", describes factors that could cause the unsafe scenario.
The third column describes the rationale for mitigating or avoiding the causal factors.
The last two columns contain lists of alternating black and blue entries. Alternating
with these colors associates an Associated Causal Factor in one column with a
Rationale in the adjacent column. For example, the top blue Associated Causal Factor
corresponds to the top blue Rationale in the next column. The next black entry




The next set of tables describes scenarios for the PL says planComplete control action.
P1B1/P1C1: state = PLAN_PB, Authorized = Yes, Authenticated = Yes
Tables 6.10 and 6.11 present the scenarios for the P1B1 and P1C1 UCAs.
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Table 6.10: Scenarios for UCA P1B1. (GOTWA = "(G) where I’m Going, (O) Others
I’m taking, (T) Time of my return, (W) What to do if I don’t return, (A) Actions to take
if I’m hit or Actions to take if you’re hit (5 point contingency plan)" [10]).
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Table 6.11: Scenarios for UCA P1B1/P1C1. (METT-TC = mission, enemy, terrain,
troops available, time, and civilian considerations [11]).
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P1A1: state = PLAN_PB, Authorized = Yes, Authenticated = Yes Table
6.12 presents the scenarios for the P1A1 UCA.
Table 6.12: Scenarios for UCA P1A1.
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P1A2: state = any state, Authorized = Yes, Authenticated = No Table 6.13
presents the scenarios for the P1A2 UCA.
Table 6.13: Scenarios for UCA P1A2.
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P1A3: state = any state, Authorized = No, Authenticated = Yes Table 6.14
presents the scenarios for the P1A3 UCA.
Table 6.14: Scenarios for UCA P1A3.
P1A4: state = any state, Authorized = No, Authenticated = No Table 6.15
presents the scenarios for the P1A4 UCA.
Table 6.15: Scenarios for UCA P1A4.
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exec(planComplete)
The next set of tables describes scenarios for the exec(planComplete) control action.
E1B1/E1C1: state = PLAN_PB, Authorized = Yes, Authenticated = Yes
Table 6.16 present the scenarios for the E1B1 and E1C1 UCAs.
Table 6.16: Scenarios for UCAs E1B1 and E1C1.
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E1A1: state 6= PLAN_PB, Authorized = Yes, Authenticated = Yes Table
6.17 present the scenarios for the E1A1 UCAs.
Table 6.17: Scenarios for UCA E1A1.
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E1A2: state = any state, Authorized = Yes, Authenticated = No Table 6.18
present the scenarios for the E1A2 UCAs.
Table 6.18: Scenarios for UCA E1A2.
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E1A3: state = any state, Authorized = No, Authenticated = Yes Table 6.19
present the scenarios for the E1A3 UCAs.
Table 6.19: Scenarios for UCA E1A3.
E1A4: state = any state, Authorized = No, Authenticated = No Table 6.20
present the scenarios for the E1A4 UCAs.
Table 6.20: Scenarios for UCA E1A4.
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discard(anyCommand)
Table 6.21 describes scenarios for the discard(planComplete) control action.
Table 6.21: Scenarios for UCA for discard on all commands (D1A1 through D1A4).
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6.5 Discussion And Conclusions
This chapter describes the STPA/STPA-Sec analysis on an abstract model of the patrol
base operations. From this analysis, numerous recommendations regarding safety and
security are derived (step 4). These recommendations ("Rationale" in the tables) would
be passed to the systems engineers to inform the security aspects of the system design.
The reader who is familiar with the patrol base operations and military procedures in
general may recognize the implementation of some of the rationale. For example,
contingency plans are a standard for many phases of the operations. The Ranger
Handbook explains basic repair techniques for communications equipment. METT-TC
analysis is standard analysis for the patrol base operations. GOTWA is standard when
a leader leaves the platoon. Some of the recommendation are common sense. For
example, discourage mutiny and build confidence in leadership. Train soldiers to be
disciplined. Secure equipment.
A more thorough analysis should find more recommendations that are specific to
particular actions. For example, the troop leading procedures comprise an eight step
planning phase. Each step could be analyzed using STPA/STPA-Sec to identify unsafe




The patrol base operations are modeled as a modularized hierarchy of secure state
machines to demonstrate CSBD on a non-automated, human-centered system. Once the
operations are modeled as SSMs the parametrized SSMs in HOL can be used to verify
that the model satisfies the principle of complete mediation.
This model is a collaborative effort between the author of this thesis and a subject
matter expert Captain Jesse Nathaniel Hall from the U.S. Army. But, the details with
regards to translating the Ranger Handbook into the model is the work of Captain
Jesse Nathaniel Hall.
This chapter describes the model and the SSMs.
7.1 Patrol Base Operations
Patrol base operations are described in the United States Army Ranger Handbook [9] in
chapter 7 (2017 edition). The mission activity specification for the patrol base
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operations are shown in table 7.1
Patrol Base Operations: Mission Activity Specification
Purpose A system to establish a security perimeter when a squad or pla-toon halts for an extended period of time
Method by means of planning, reconnaissance, security, control, andcommon sense
Goal in order to
• avoid detection
• hide a unit during a long, detailed reconnais-
sance
• perform maintenance on weapons, equip-
ment, eat, and rest
• plan and issue orders
• reorganize after infiltrating an enemy area
• establish a base from which to execute sev-
eral consecutive or concurrent operations
Table 7.1: Mission Activity Specification for Patrol Base Operations. Adapted from the
U.S. Army Ranger Handbook 2017 [9].
7.2 Overview of The Model
Each level of the hierarchy of secure state machine (SSM)s represents a level of
abstraction of the patrol base operations. The most abstract level of the hierarchy is the
top level SSM. A diagram of this most abstract level is shown in figure 7.1.
The diagram describes a chronological order of abstract phases (modeled as states) of
the patrol base operations. (1) The operations begin with the planning phase. (2) Next,
they move to the Objective Rally Point (ORP). (3) At the ORP, operations commence.
(4) When these are complete, the patrol base operations move to the actual patrol base.
(5) At the patrol base, operations proceed. (6) Finally, the patrol base operations are
complete. The last phase is an end phase (actual withdraw, etc. of the operations are
74
Figure 7.1: A diagram of the most abstract level in the hierarchy of secure state machines.
Image generated by Jesse Nathaniel Hall.
included in the 5th phase).
The next level of abstraction in the hierarchy of SSM represents a horizontal slice
through the patrol base operations. This slice describes the patrol base operations at a
lower level of abstraction. It expands each of the states in the top level (except for the
last state PB Complete). For example, the planning phase (1) in figure 7.1 is expanded
into an SSM of its own. This is called ssmPlanPB. It consists of several states (see
section 7.3.6.1) which detail activities conducted during the planning phase of the
patrol base operations.
At yet another lower level of abstraction is the sub-sub (3rd) level. This expands on the
states in the level above it. This is the last level of the hierarchy that is modeled in
detail.1
To demonstrate complete mediation on all levels of the hierarchy, a vertical slice is also
modeled. Each SSM expands upon only one state in the level above it, starting from
the top level Move to ORP state and ending in a lower level state.
1It is not necessary to model the entire system. To do so, is beyond the scope of this work
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In addition to the horizontal and vertical slices, an escape level is also modeled. This
level models actions that require the patrol base operations to abort. This is a floating
module and can be reached from any state in the model.
7.3 Hierarchy of Secure State Machines
Figure 7.2: Diagrammatic description of patrol base operations as a modularized hierar-
chy of secure state machines. (Generated by Jesse Nathaniel Hall.)
7.3.1 Diagrammatic Description in Visio
The enormity of the hierarchy of SSMs is evident in figure 7.2. This is a squashed
version of the Visio diagram for the hierarchy of SSMs. The diagram is included as a
Visio file with the files for this project (LaTeX/figures/diagram.vis).
Levels of The Hierarchy The straight, colored lines that span the diagram in figure
7.2 delineate levels of the hierarchy of SSM. The top lines are obscured by the size of
this squashed version of the diagram. The most visible bright yellow line delineates the
sub-sub-sub (4th) level of the hierarchy, for example.
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Each level represents a different degree of abstraction with a set of principal responsible
for actions at that level.
• Red—escape level:
Unacceptable losses that require the mission to abort. This is a floating module
that can be reached by any level.
• Dark blue–top level:
Describes the patrol base operations as five phases (plus an end phase). The
Platoon Leader (PL) is responsible at this level.
• Blue grey–sub-level:
This level takes the previous level’s states to a lower level of abstraction. The
Platoon Leader and Platoon Sergeant (PSG) are responsible for this level.
• Grey green–sub-sub-level:
This level takes the previous level’s states to a lower level of abstraction. The
responsible principals are the patrol base headquarters: Platoon Leader, Platoon
Sergeant, Radio Telephone Operator (RTO), Forward Observer (FO), Medic, and
Heavy Weapons Squad Leader (HWSQL).
• Bright yellow–4th level:
This level takes the previous level’s states to a lower level of abstraction. The
responsible principals are the squad leaders (SQL).
• Orange–5th level:
This level takes the previous level’s states to a lower level of abstraction. The
responsible principals are the Team Leaders (TL).
• Olive–6th level:
This level takes the previous level’s states to a lower level of abstraction. The
responsible principals are the Squads. That is, the squad behavior is described at
this level and the squad indicates readiness.
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• Dark green–7th level:
This level takes the previous level’s states to a lower level of abstraction. The
responsible principals are the Fire Team (FT), Recon Team (RT), Buddy Team
(BT) and Security Team (ST).
• Beige–8th level:
This level takes the previous level’s states to a lower level of abstraction. The
responsible principals are the individual soldiers themselves.
The diagram is only a partial model of the patrol base operations. The horizontal slice
is the second to last row that expands across the diagram. The vertical slice is in the
middle of the diagram and expands several modules to the lowest level of abstraction.
States and Transitions in The Hiearchy The small, colored dots in figure 7.2
represent states (phases) of the patrol base operations. The labels for these states are
not readable in this diagram because of limited space, but each dot contains a
description of the state. The dots are color coded, with a different color for dots (states)
at each level.
The lines connecting one dot to another represent transition requests. These lines are
annotated, but are also unreadable in this diagram.
The following sections describe modules from this diagram. The descriptions of the
states and transitions are discussed and a readable diagram for each model is provided.
7.3.2 Descriptions of Individual Modules
Each module is described diagrammatically in the following sections. They all follow a
similar pattern. The general pattern is discussed in this section. Exceptions are
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discussed along with the diagrammatic descriptions for each individual module. (Note
also that "module" and "SSM" are used interchangeably in the following sections.)
The advantage of modularity is that it simplifies managing complexity. It is easier to
breakdown each state into a less abstract secure state machine than to model all
possible transitions at one level. This also makes it easier to code in HOL (if doing it by
hand). It also simplifies modifying the model. Specifically, making changes to one SSM
does not require changes to any other SSM. To maintain this modularity, an entity
named OMNI was used to communicate information from one module to another. In
this way, information needed in one module could be communicated via OMNI without
requiring the module using that information to have any information about how the
module sending the information did this. While OMNI is an abstraction of the model,
in the real system it would represent the principal communicating the information from
one module to the other.
Flow Each module follows a sequential pattern.2 It starts at one state and then flows
sequentially to the end of the module. Each module has a set of principals who are
authorized on some set of transitions (or commands). Each module has its own security
policy that dictates the conditions under which transition requests are granted.
Requests And Security Policies Principals make requests to transition from one
state to another. Requests are of the form Principal says command.
There are two approaches to the policy. The first allows transition within each module
with no regard to completion of lower level modules. For example, transition from the
planning phase to the move to ORP phase in the top level does not require any specific
information about completion of the planning module in the level below.
2The patrol base operations are modeled as sequential activities. However, not all operations follow
a definite sequential pattern.
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The second approach requires confirmation of completion of the lower level module
before transitions at the top level are allowed. For example, before transitioning from
the planning phase to the move to ORP phase, the planning phase must confirm that
the planning module is complete. This isn’t necessarily true of the real patrol base
operations. For example, the patrol may move to the ORP before receiving it’s mission.
But, modeling it this way demonstrates integration modules at different levels of the
hierarchy.
For this second approach, an "all knowing" principal (essentially a signal relay)
communicates when a lower level module is complete. This principal is called OMNI.
OMNI allows for encapsulation of each module by communicating information about
one module to another and eliminating the need for principals in one module to "know"
what is happening in another module. This is necessary to reason with the ACL in
HOL. It is a feature of the model and not the operations.
Diagrammatic Description The colors of the states in the diagrams correspond to
their colors in the overall compressed diagram shown in figure 7.2.
All lines represent allowable transitions with an arrow indicating the direction of the
transition. Each line is annotated with the appropriate ACL request (or command).
The last line in each module is an exception. It connects the COMPLETE state to the
initial state. This line is not annotated. In SSMs that integrate modules, this could be
thought of as feedback from OMNI.
Naming conventions What follows are the naming conventions for the diagrams.
They also apply to the HOL implementation of the SSM.
state: all capital letters with underscores representing spaces. Examples include:
MOVE_TO_ORP, PLAN_PB, etc.
80
commands (or requests): first letter is lower case. The remaining letters toggle with
a capital letter for each new word. Examples include: moveToORP,
receiveMission, etc. Furthermore, all commands take the name of the next state.
For example, the transition from the state MOVE_TO_PB to CONDUCT_PB
is conductPB. The transition from the state COMPLETE_PLAN to
ISSUE_OPORD is issueOPORD. The only exception is the transition from the
top level state PLAN_PB to the next state MOVE_TO_ORP. The command for
this transition is crossLD and not moveToORP.
principals: all begin with a capital letter then follow the convention for commands (or
requests). Examples include: PlatoonLeader, PlatoonSergeant, etc.
ACL transition requests: all are of the form Principal says command. Examples
include: PlatoonLeader says moveToORP, PlatoonSergeant says actionsIn, etc.
7.3.3 OMNI-Level
OMNI is not represented in the Visio diagram. The main purpose of this entity is to
relay messages from one SSM to another. This allows for greater encapsulation of the
modules. To add OMNI to the diagram would over complicated and already
complicated model.
In all SSM, OMNI is a principal who has authority over OMNI level commands. These
commands communicate the completion of a lower-level SSM. For example, at the top
level, before the Platoon Leader can transition from the PLAN_PB state to the
MOVE_TO_ORP state, he must receive the command OMNI says
ssmPlanPBComplete. The top level security policy contains the clause OMNI controls
ssmPlanPBComplete. The Controls rule discussed in section 4.1 then allows the
Platoon Leader to conclude that the lower-level SSM is complete.
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7.3.4 Escape
A diagram of the escape level is shown in figure 7.3. The purpose of the escape level is
to model situations wherein the patrol base operations must be aborted.
Figure 7.3: Escape level diagram.
The square boxes in the diagram represent communication from outside the module.
They represent external signals from OMNI. The only state is the ABORT_MISSION
state.
The abortable conditions are returnToBase, changeMission, resupply, and
reactToContact.3
The security policy for the escape level contains the clauses OMNI controls
returnToBase, OMNI controls changeMission, etc. Given a request OMNI says
returnToBase and the security policy, returnToBase is believed.
The security policy also contains a clause that allows the Platoon Leader to transition
to the ABORT_MISSION state if returnToBase (changeMission, etc.) is believed and
the Platoon Leader requests the transition.
3React to contact in this description refers to unwanted contact that requires the mission to be aborted.
It does not refer to planned contact in combat missions or contact that does not require mission abortion.
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7.3.5 Top Level
The top level for the hierarchy is shown in figure 7.4. This is a linearized version of
figure 7.1.
Figure 7.4: Top level diagram.
This SSM represents the phases shown in figure 7.1. There are six states: PLAN_PB,
MOVE_TO_ORP, CONDUCT_ORP, MOVE_TO_PB, CONDUCT_PB, and
COMPLETE_PB (an end state).
Commands to transition from one state to another are named after the next state. For
example, to transition from MOVE_TO_ORP to CONDUCT_ORP, the command is
conductORP. The transition from the PLAN_PB state to the MOVE_TO_ORP state
is the only exception. This command is crossLD.
Transitions are initiated by a request from and authenticated and authorized principal.
These requests have the form PlatoonLeader says crossLD.
This SSM integrates with the lower level modules. This means that transitions are
allowed when the appropriate lower level module is complete. This requires the aid of
the OMNI principal.
The Platoon Leader is the only authenticated principal at this level. Authentication is
assumed to be visual or other recognition (i.e., does not require anything complicated
such as a cryptographic key.)
The security policy is state dependent. It requires a signal from OMNI that the lower
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level module is complete. Once this is believed, the Platoon Leader is authorized to
make a transition to the next state.
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7.3.6 Horizontal Slice
The horizontal slice is an expansion of the states in the top level SSM. Each state (save
for the COMPLETE_PB state) is expanded into an SSM. These SSMs are described
next.
7.3.6.1 ssmPlanPB
The top level PLAN_PB state is expanded into the ssmPlanPB SSM and shown in
figure 7.5.
Figure 7.5: Horizontal slice: PlanPB diagram.
This is the largest SSM and models the eight steps of the troop leading procedures.
There are states: RECEIVE_MISSION, WARNO, TENTATIVE_PLAN,
INITIATE_MOVEMENT, RECON, REPORT1, COMPLETE_PLAN,
ISSUE_OPORD, SUPERVISE, REPORT2, and COMPLETE.
Transition commands follow the same pattern as in the other SSMs. The exception is
discussed below.
All transitions are sequential. However, the original module contains three
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non-sequential states. These are represented in the diagram as the white circle. These
states are TENTATIVE_PLAN, INITIATE_MOVEMENT, and RECON. To
transition from WARNO to REPORT1 requires that all three of these states be
completed, but not in any specific order. To solve this problem, the three states are not
represented as states. The completion of these "tasks" is indicated by the following
three statements: PlatoonLeader says tentativePlan, PlatoonSergeant says
initiateMovement, and PlatoonLeader says recon. Thus, the transition from WARNO to
REPORT1 now requires four statements: PlatoonLeader says tentativePlan,
PlatoonSergeant says initiateMovement, PlatoonLeader says recon, AND PlatoonLeader
says report1. The latter-most statement is the actual request. The security policy
enforces this transition by including the clause tentativePlan andf initiateMovement
andf recon impf PlatoonLeader controls report1.
ssmPlanPB has two principals: PlatoonLeader and PlatoonSergeant. Only the
PlatoonLeader is authorized to make transitions among states. The PlatoonSergeant
controls the InitiateMovement command (but, it is not a state and therefore there is no
transition).
This SSM does not integrate and thus does not require the OMNI principal. The
security policy authorizes the Platoon Leader to make transitions as described in
previous sections, with the exception as described above.
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7.3.6.2 ssmMoveToORP
The top level MOVE_TO_ORP state is expanded into the ssmMoveToORP SSM and
shown in figure 7.6.
Figure 7.6: Horizontal slice: MoveToORP diagram.
This SSM has three states: FORM, MOVE, and SECURE_HALT.
The Platoon Leader is the only authorized principal.
This is an integrating SSM, and requires a signal from OMNI that the lower level SSM
is complete.
The security policy allows for transitions if requested to do so from the Platoon Leader.
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7.3.6.3 ssmConductORP
The top level CONDUCT_ORP state is expanded into the ssmConductORP SSM and
shown in figure 7.7.
Figure 7.7: Horizontal slice: ConductORP diagram.
This SSM has four states: SECURE, ACTIONS_IN, WITHDRAW, and COMPLETE.
There are two principals. The Platoon Leader is authorized on all commands except for
the actionsIn command. The PlatoonSergeant is only authorized on the actionsIn
command.
In contrast to ssmMoveToORP, this is not an integrating SSM, therefore there is no
OMNI principal.




The top level MOVE_TO_PB state is expanded into the ssmMoveToPB SSM and
shown in figure 7.8.
Figure 7.8: Horizontal slice: MoveToPB diagram.
This SSM is the same as ssmMoveToORP. It has three states: FORM, MOVE, and
SECURE_HALT.
The Platoon Leader is the only authorized principal.
In contrast to ssmMoveToORP, this is not an integrating SSM, therefore there is no
OMNI principal.
The security policy allows for transitions if requested to do so from the Platoon Leader.
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7.3.6.5 ssmConductPB
The top level CONDUCT_PB state is expanded into the ssmConductPB SSM and
shown in figure 7.9.
Figure 7.9: Horizontal slice: ConductPB diagram.
This SSM is the same as ssmConductORP. It has four states: SECURE,
ACTIONS_IN, WITHDRAW, and COMPLETE.
There are two principals. The Platoon Leader is authorized on all commands except for
the actionsIn command. The PlatoonSergeant is only authorized on the actionsIn
command.
In contrast to ssmMoveToORP, this is not an integrating SSM, therefore there is no
OMNI principal.




The vertical slice is an expansion of one state at each level of the hierarchy. It is the
middle section in the overall, squished diagram in figure 7.2. This is the only section of
the patrol base operations that are modeled through to the lowest level of abstraction.
The vertical slice starts at the top level state MOVE_TO_ORP. This state is expanded
into the ssmMoveToORP SSM. In this sub level, the state SECURE_HALT is
expanded into the ssmSecureHalt SSM. In this sub-sub-level SSM, the state
ORP_RECON is expanded into the ssmORPRecon SSM. In this SSM, the state
MOVE_TO_ORP is expanded into the ssmMoveToORP4L SSM. In this SSM, the
state FORM_RT is expanded into the ssmFormRT SSM.
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7.3.7.1 ssmSecureHalt
The sub-sub-level SECURE_HALT state is expanded into the ssmSecureHalt SSM and
shown in figure 7.10.
Figure 7.10: Vertical slice: SecureHalt diagram.
This SSM has four states: SECURE, ORP_RECON, WITHDRAW, and COMPLETE.
The Platoon Leader is the only authorized principal.
This is not an integrating SSM. Therefore there is no OMNI principal.
The security policy allows for transitions if requested to do so from the Platoon Leader.
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7.3.7.2 ssmORPRecon
The sub-sub-sub-level ORP_RECON state is expanded into the ssmORPRecon SSM
and shown in figure 7.11.
Figure 7.11: Vertical slice: ORPRecon diagram.
This SSM has six states: CONTINGENCY_PLAN, MOVE_TO_ORP,
CONDUCT_ORP, FORM_ST, RETURN_TO_UNIT, and COMPLETE.
The Platoon Leader is the only authorized principal.
This is not an integrating SSM. Therefore there is no OMNI principal.
The security policy allows for transitions if requested to do so from the Platoon Leader.
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7.3.7.3 ssmMoveToORP4L
The 4th level MOVE_TO_ORP state is expanded into the ssmMoveToORP4L SSM
and shown in figure 7.12. Recall that there is no module at the 5th level.
Figure 7.12: Vertical slice: MoveToORP4L diagram.
This SSM has four states: FORM_RT, RT_MOVE, RT_HALT, and COMPLETE.
The Platoon Leader is the only authorized principal.
This is not an integrating SSM. Therefore there is no OMNI principal.
The security policy allows for transitions if requested to do so from the Platoon Leader.
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7.3.7.4 ssmFormRT
The 6th level FORM_RT state is expanded into the ssmFormRT SSM and shown in
figure 7.12. (Note that there is no module at the 5th level for this slice. Also, the 8th
level is not modeled.)
Figure 7.13: Vertical slice: FormRT diagram.
This SSM has four states: RT_POSITION, RT_ORIENT, RT_ALERT, and
COMPLETE.
The Platoon Leader is the only authorized principal.
This is not an integrating SSM. Therefore there is no OMNI principal.
The security policy allows for transitions if requested to do so from the Platoon Leader.
7.4 Discussion
The modularized hierarchy of SSMs eased the analysis process. This lead us to think
about the operations in a non-standard way. If forced us to look at the command and
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control structure, which is the goal of CSBD. For each action, we determined who was
responsible either implicitly or explicitly.
The hierarchy also demonstrated the chain of command. For example, responsibility at
the top level was delegated to the platoon leader who is ultimately responsible for
completing the mission and bring his troops home safely.
The areas where we found difficulties were in maintaining modularity when actions at
one level affected actions at another level in a non- modularizable way. But the basic
solution was the OMNI-level principal who had authority in all SSMs.
The next chapter describes how a representative selection of the SSMs described in this
chapter are implemented in HOL.
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Chapter 8
Patrol Base Operations as Secure State
Machines
This chapter details a representative subset of the SSMs described in the previous
chapter. The code for all of the SSMs can be found in the appendices.
Many of the SSMs are similar and differ only in the names of the states, commands,
and principals. The first SSM, ssmPB, is a typical example from the hierarchy that uses
the OMNI principal and one other principal. All transitions are sequential. The next
example, ssmConductORP, uses two principals and the OMNI principal. The third
example is ssmPlanPB, which contains the non-sequential conjunction of states. It does
not use the OMNI principal. All other SSMs fit into one of these three patterns.
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8.1 ssmPB: A Typical Example from the Hierarchy
ssmPB is the top level SSM. It is an example of a typical one-principal1 SSM that also
uses the Omni principal. A diagram of ssmPB is shown in figure 8.1.
Figure 8.1: Top level diagram.
ssmPB runs sequentially from the initial state PLAN_PB to the final state
COMPLETE_PB. State transitions require notification from the Omni principal that
the state is complete and a request from the Platoon Leader to change states. Thus, a
transition request is a list and has the form2
Omni says stateComplete;
PlatoonLeader says moveToNextState
The security context reflects this two input requirement. It authorizes the Platoon
Leader on moveToTheNextState if the current state is complete. A clause in the
security context has the form3
stateComplete impf
PlatoonLeader controls moveToNextState
1For the purposes of transitions, the Omni principal isn’t thought of as a principal, but a relay.
However, for the purposes of defining principals in HOL, Omni is included as a principal.
2
stateComplete and moveToNextState are place holders for the actual commands which are defined
later.
3
impf is the ACL-HOL equivalent of "implies"
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This clause is state dependent because stateComplete is specific for the current state.
Thus, there are five statements in the state-dependent security context because there
are six states.
There is also a state-independent security context. This has one clause authorizing the
Omni principal on all omniCommands. It has the form
Omni controls stateComplete
The HOL implementation of the datatypes, functions, and theorems are included below.
8.1.1 Principals
The principal datatype is defined in OMNITypeScript.sml. It has a constructor and one
datatype variable.
principal = SR ’stateRole
SR is the type constructor and ’stateRole is the type variable. Each SSM defines its
own principal as a stateRole. In ssmPB, the stateRole datatype has two principals.
stateRole = PlatoonLeader | Omni
8.1.2 States
States are also defined in OMNITyrpeScript.sml.
state = ESCs escState | SLs ’slState
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Outputs are defined in OMNITyrpeScript.sml.
output = ESCo escOutput | SLo ’slOutput














OMNITyrpeScript.sml defines datatypes for all the SSMs.
command = ESCc escCommand | SLc ’slCommand
SLc ’slCommand is further defined in each SSM. ssmPB defines two datatypes for the
slCommand.
slCommand = PL plCommand | OMNI omniCommand















Each SSM defines its own next-state function. This is the formalization of the
next-state diagram shown in figure 8.1.
[PBNS_def]
` (PBNS PLAN_PB (exec x) =
if getPlCom x = crossLD then MOVE_TO_ORP else PLAN_PB) ^
(PBNS MOVE_TO_ORP (exec x) =
if getPlCom x = conductORP then CONDUCT_ORP
else MOVE_TO_ORP) ^
(PBNS CONDUCT_ORP (exec x) =
if getPlCom x = moveToPB then MOVE_TO_PB else CONDUCT_ORP) ^
(PBNS MOVE_TO_PB (exec x) =
if getPlCom x = conductPB then CONDUCT_PB else MOVE_TO_PB) ^
(PBNS CONDUCT_PB (exec x) =
if getPlCom x = completePB then COMPLETE_PB
else CONDUCT_PB) ^ (PBNS s (trap v0) = s) ^
(PBNS s (discard v1) = s)
PBNS takes a state and a transition (exec, trap, or discard) command list (x ) as
parameters.
The next-state function for ssmPB uses pattern matching and if-then-else statements.
The function first matches the state. Then, it uses the getPlCom function to extract the
plCommand from the command list x. It compares this command to the command on
the right. If they are equal, then the transition occurs. Otherwise, the state does not
change.
For the trap and discard transition types (last two lines in the definition), no transition
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occurs regardless of the command. Therefore, the command is not checked. The
original state s is returned.
8.1.6 Next-Output Function
Each SSM defines its own next-state function.
[PBOut_def]
` (PBOut PLAN_PB (exec x) =
if getPlCom x = crossLD then MoveToORP else PlanPB) ^
(PBOut MOVE_TO_ORP (exec x) =
if getPlCom x = conductORP then ConductORP else MoveToORP) ^
(PBOut CONDUCT_ORP (exec x) =
if getPlCom x = moveToPB then MoveToORP else ConductORP) ^
(PBOut MOVE_TO_PB (exec x) =
if getPlCom x = conductPB then ConductPB else MoveToPB) ^
(PBOut CONDUCT_PB (exec x) =
if getPlCom x = completePB then CompletePB else ConductPB) ^
(PBOut s (trap v0) = unAuthorized) ^
(PBOut s (discard v1) = unAuthenticated)
The next-output function behaves similarly to the next-state function. But, instead of
returning the next state, it returns the next output. The trap and discard transition
types return unAuthorized and unAuthenticated, respectively, for any command list x.
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8.1.7 Authentication
The authenticationTest function is defined in the parametrizable ssm. It takes a
function as an input and that function takes an input list as an input. The first
function is named elementTest in ssm. It is named inputOK 4 in the SSMs.
In HOL, inputOK uses the wild card denoted by an underscore "_". This causes HOL
to generate a lot of additional code when it evaluates the definition. Both the HOL
definition and the HOL-generated output for this function are shown below.
val inputOK_def =
Define ￿
( inputOK ( ( (Name PlatoonLeader ) says prop (cmd : ( ( slCommand command) opt ion ) ) )
: ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , ' d , ' e )Form) = T) /\
( inputOK ( ( (Name Omni) says prop (cmd : ( ( slCommand command) opt ion ) ) )
: ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , ' d , ' e )Form) = T) /\
( inputOK _ = F) ￿
inputOK authenticates only the Platoon Leader and Omni on state-level commands
(slCommands) and on no other commands. No other principals are authenticated for
any command.
The HOL definition for inputOK uses pattern matching. The first call to inputOK
matches the input to
(((Name PlatoonLeader) says prop (cmd:((slCommand command)option))).
If it matches, the function returns T for true. The second call to inputOK matches the
input to
(((Name Omni) says prop (cmd:((slCommand command)option))).
If it matches, it returns true. The last call to inputOK uses the wild card. This returns
false for any other input.
4The function elementTest should be thought of as a parameter where inputOK specializes that
parameter.
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The first two calls to inputOK authenticate the PlatoonLeader and Omni principals on
any slCommand .
HOL Generated Output for inputOK [inputOK_def]
` (inputOK (Name PlatoonLeader says prop cmd) () T) ^
(inputOK (Name Omni says prop cmd) () T) ^
(inputOK TT () F) ^ (inputOK FF () F) ^
(inputOK (prop v) () F) ^ (inputOK (notf v1) () F) ^
(inputOK (v2 andf v3) () F) ^ (inputOK (v4 orf v5) () F) ^
(inputOK (v6 impf v7) () F) ^ (inputOK (v8 eqf v9) () F) ^
(inputOK (v10 says TT) () F) ^ (inputOK (v10 says FF) () F) ^
(inputOK (v133 meet v134 says prop v66) () F) ^
(inputOK (v135 quoting v136 says prop v66) () F) ^
(inputOK (v10 says notf v67) () F) ^
(inputOK (v10 says (v68 andf v69)) () F) ^
(inputOK (v10 says (v70 orf v71)) () F) ^
(inputOK (v10 says (v72 impf v73)) () F) ^
(inputOK (v10 says (v74 eqf v75)) () F) ^
(inputOK (v10 says v76 says v77) () F) ^
(inputOK (v10 says v78 speaks_for v79) () F) ^
(inputOK (v10 says v80 controls v81) () F) ^
(inputOK (v10 says reps v82 v83 v84) () F) ^
(inputOK (v10 says v85 domi v86) () F) ^
(inputOK (v10 says v87 eqi v88) () F) ^
(inputOK (v10 says v89 doms v90) () F) ^
(inputOK (v10 says v91 eqs v92) () F) ^
(inputOK (v10 says v93 eqn v94) () F) ^
(inputOK (v10 says v95 lte v96) () F) ^
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(inputOK (v10 says v97 lt v98) () F) ^
(inputOK (v12 speaks_for v13) () F) ^
(inputOK (v14 controls v15) () F) ^
(inputOK (reps v16 v17 v18) () F) ^
(inputOK (v19 domi v20) () F) ^
(inputOK (v21 eqi v22) () F) ^
(inputOK (v23 doms v24) () F) ^
(inputOK (v25 eqs v26) () F) ^ (inputOK (v27 eqn v28) () F) ^
(inputOK (v29 lte v30) () F) ^ (inputOK (v31 lt v32) () F)
It is straight forward to prove that any command that is not issued by a principal is
rejected. This follows directly from the definition of inputOK.
[inputOK_cmd_reject_lemma]
` 8 cmd. ¬inputOK (prop (SOME cmd))
8.1.8 Authorization
There are two functions for authorization in the parametrizable ssm. One is
state-dependent, the other is not.
State-dependent Authorization In ssmPB, the state-dependent authorization
function is named secContext. secContext uses both pattern matching and if-then-else
statements. It takes a state and an input list as parameters.
[secContext_def]
` (8 xs.
secContext PLAN_PB xs =
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if getOmniCommand xs = ssmPlanPBComplete then
[prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI ssmPlanPBComplete))) impf
Name PlatoonLeader controls
prop (SOME (SLc (PL crossLD)))]
else [prop NONE]) ^
(8 xs.
secContext MOVE_TO_ORP xs =
if getOmniCommand xs = ssmMoveToORPComplete then
[prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI ssmMoveToORPComplete))) impf
Name PlatoonLeader controls
prop (SOME (SLc (PL conductORP)))]
else [prop NONE]) ^
(8 xs.
secContext CONDUCT_ORP xs =
if getOmniCommand xs = ssmConductORPComplete then
[prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI ssmConductORPComplete))) impf
Name PlatoonLeader controls
prop (SOME (SLc (PL moveToPB)))]
else [prop NONE]) ^
(8 xs.
secContext MOVE_TO_PB xs =
if getOmniCommand xs = ssmConductORPComplete then
[prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI ssmMoveToPBComplete))) impf
Name PlatoonLeader controls
prop (SOME (SLc (PL conductPB)))]
else [prop NONE]) ^
8 xs.
secContext CONDUCT_PB xs =
if getOmniCommand xs = ssmConductPBComplete then
[prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI ssmConductPBComplete))) impf
Name PlatoonLeader controls
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prop (SOME (SLc (PL completePB)))]
else [prop NONE]
Running through an example, if the patrol base operations are in the PLAN_PB state
and if the Platoon Leader says ssmPlanPBComplete, then secContext concludes that
the Platoon Leader controls crossLD. If, however, the patrol base operations are in the
PLAN_PB state and the Platoon Leader does not say ssmPlanPBComplete, then
secContext returns NONE. The same logic follows for the remaining states.
secContext uses a helper function named getOmniCommand to extract the
omniCommand from the input list. It compares this command to the expected
command. If it matches, it returns an implication (impf ) of the form described in
section 8.1.
HOL Definition for getOmniCommand getOmniCommand also uses the wildcard
"_". For brevity, only the HOL definition is presented.
val getOmniCommand_def =
Define ￿
(getOmniCommand ( [ ] : ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form l i s t )
= invalidOmniCommand : omniCommand) /\
(getOmniCommand ( ( (Name Omni) says prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI cmd ) ) ) ) : : xs )
= (cmd : omniCommand) ) /\
(getOmniCommand ( ( x : ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form ) : : xs )
= (getOmniCommand xs )) ￿
getOmniCommand uses pattern matching and recursion. The first pattern matches the
input against the empty list. This returns invalidOmniCommand. The second pattern
matches against a statement of the form Omni says cmd. It returns cmd. The final
pattern is a recursive call to getOmniCommand. Thus, if no valid command is present
then invalidOmniCommand is returned, otherwise the valid cmd is returned.
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State-independent Authorization The state-independent authorization function
secAuthorization takes an input list as a parameter. It uses a helper function called








[Name Omni controls prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI cmd)))]
8.1.9 Proved Theorems
These theorems with their helper lemmas prove the property of complete mediation for
each transition in the SSM.
PlatoonLeader_PLAN_PB_exec_justified_thm This threorem proves that
transition from the PLAN_PB state to the MOVE_TO_ORP state is justified for the
following assumptions:
• The current state is PLAN_PB
• Omni says ssmPlanPBComplete
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• PlatoonLeader says crossLD
Most proofs are similar to this. Therefore, this first example is described in detail and
should be used as a reference for other proofs.
PlatoonLeader_PLAN_PB_exec_justified_thm begins by specializing
TR_exec_cmd_rule described in chapter 5. That rule is repeated here for reference.
[TR_exec_cmd_rule]
` 8 elementTest context stateInterp x ins s outs.
(8M Oi Os.
CFGInterpret (M,Oi,Os)
(CFG elementTest stateInterp context (x::ins) s
outs) )
(M,Oi,Os) satList propCommandList x) )
8NS Out M Oi Os.
TR (M,Oi,Os) (exec (inputList x))
(CFG elementTest stateInterp context (x::ins) s outs)
(CFG elementTest stateInterp context ins
(NS s (exec (inputList x)))
(Out s (exec (inputList x))::outs)) ()
authenticationTest elementTest x ^
CFGInterpret (M,Oi,Os)
(CFG elementTest stateInterp context (x::ins) s outs) ^
(M,Oi,Os) satList propCommandList x
Specializing requires use of the ISPECL rule. This rule takes a list of parameters (lists




[ ￿ ￿ inputOK : ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form  > bool ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ s e cAuthor i za t i on : ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form l i s t  >
(( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form l i s t ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ secContext : ( s l S t a t e )  >
(( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form l i s t  >
(( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form l i s t ￿ ￿ ,
￿ ￿ [ (Name Omni) says ( prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI ssmPlanPBComplete ) ) ) )
: ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form ;
(Name PlatoonLeader ) says ( prop (SOME (SLc (PL crossLD ) ) ) )
: ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form] ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ i n s : ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form l i s t l i s t ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿(PLAN_PB) ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ outs : s lOutput output l i s t trType l i s t ￿ ￿ ] TR_exec_cmd_rule
thPlanPB is a temporary function used to store an intermediate value. In it, the
following values are substituted into the TR_exec_cmd_rule.
• inputOK : substitutes for elementTest
• secAuthorization: substitutes for context
• secContext : substitutes for stateInterp
• an input list: substitutes for s
• the current state: substitutes for x
• an output list: substitutes for outs
The TR_exec_cmd_rule is already proved in the parametrizable ssm. It is an
implication with a hypothesis and a conclusion. But, with the specialization, it is
necessary to prove that the theorem is valid after the authentication and authorization
are applied to the input list. To do this, the thPlanPB is deconstructed into a
hypothesis and conclusion. The hypothesis and conclusion are proved as lemmas. The
lemmas are then used to prove the overall theorem.
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The first lemma begins with the hypothesis of thPlanPB. It extracts the hypothesis
using the dest_imp to destroy the implication and the fst function to retain the first
part of the result.
f s t ( dest_imp ( conc l thPlanPB ) ) )
The result is a HOL term which is used in a tactical proof (backwards proof).
val PlatoonLeader_PLAN_PB_exec_lemma =
TAC_PROOF(
( [ ] , f s t ( dest_imp ( conc l thPlanPB ) ) ) ,
REWRITE_TAC[ CFGInterpret_def , secContext_def , secAuthor izat ion_def , secHelper_def ,
propCommandList_def , extractPropCommand_def , inputList_def ,
getOmniCommand_def ,
MAP, extractInput_def , satList_CONS , sa tL i s t_n i l , GSYM satL i s t_con j ] THEN
PROVE_TAC[ Controls , Modus_Ponens ] )
The proof consists of a call to the REWRITE_TAC with several definitions passed as
parameters (in brackets). REWRITE_TAC5 rewrites the lemma using the appropriate
definition shown in brackets. The definitions in brackets are defined earlier in this and
other chapters. The last line of the proof uses PROVE_TAC, an automatic prover,
with the Controls and Modus_Ponens rules. These rules are described in the HOL
representation of ACL in chapter 4.
This lemma is saved as PlatoonLeader_PLAN_PB_exec_lemma. The HOL-generated
output is shown below.
[PlatoonLeader_PLAN_PB_exec_lemma]
` 8M Oi Os.
CFGInterpret (M,Oi,Os)
(CFG inputOK secContext secAuthorization
([Name Omni says
prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI ssmPlanPBComplete)));
5See https://hol-theorem-prover.org/kananaskis-11-helpdocs/help/HOLindex.
html for details on HOL tactics and functions.
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Name PlatoonLeader says





prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI ssmPlanPBComplete)));
Name PlatoonLeader says prop (SOME (SLc (PL crossLD)))]
The next lemma works on the conclusion of thPlanPB. It extracts the conclusion using
the dest_imp and snd rules.
snd ( dest_imp ( conc l thPlanPB ) ) )
It is also a tactical proof that uses PROVE_TAC. PROVE_TAC takes two parameters.
The first is the previous lemma and the second is TR_exec_cmd_rule.
val PlatoonLeader_PLAN_PB_exec_justified_lemma =
TAC_PROOF(
( [ ] , snd ( dest_imp ( conc l thPlanPB ) ) ) ,
PROVE_TAC[ PlatoonLeader_PLAN_PB_exec_lemma , TR_exec_cmd_rule ] )
This lemma is saved as PlatoonLeader_PLAN_PB_exec_justified_lemma. The
HOL-generated output is shown below.
[PlatoonLeader_PLAN_PB_exec_justified_lemma]





prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI ssmPlanPBComplete)));
Name PlatoonLeader says
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prop (SOME (SLc (PL crossLD)))]))
(CFG inputOK secContext secAuthorization
([Name Omni says
prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI ssmPlanPBComplete)));
Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL crossLD)))]::ins) PLAN_PB outs)





prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI ssmPlanPBComplete)));
Name PlatoonLeader says





prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI ssmPlanPBComplete)));
Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL crossLD)))]))::outs)) ()
authenticationTest inputOK
[Name Omni says
prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI ssmPlanPBComplete)));
Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL crossLD)))] ^
CFGInterpret (M,Oi,Os)
(CFG inputOK secContext secAuthorization
([Name Omni says
prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI ssmPlanPBComplete)));
Name PlatoonLeader says
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prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI ssmPlanPBComplete)));
Name PlatoonLeader says prop (SOME (SLc (PL crossLD)))]
With this last lemma, the main theorem is proved using a simple forward proof. The
proof uses the REWRITE_RULE with several theorems including the previous lemma.
val PlatoonLeader_PLAN_PB_exec_justified_thm =
REWRITE_RULE[ inputList_def , extractInput_def , MAP, propCommandList_def ,
extractPropCommand_def , PlatoonLeader_PLAN_PB_exec_lemma ]
PlatoonLeader_PLAN_PB_exec_justified_lemma
The HOL-generated output is shown below.
[PlatoonLeader_PLAN_PB_exec_justified_thm]
` 8NS Out M Oi Os.
TR (M,Oi,Os)
(exec
[SOME (SLc (OMNI ssmPlanPBComplete));
SOME (SLc (PL crossLD))])
(CFG inputOK secContext secAuthorization
([Name Omni says
prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI ssmPlanPBComplete)));
Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL crossLD)))]::ins) PLAN_PB outs)
(CFG inputOK secContext secAuthorization ins
(NS PLAN_PB
(exec
[SOME (SLc (OMNI ssmPlanPBComplete));
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SOME (SLc (PL crossLD))]))
(Out PLAN_PB
(exec
[SOME (SLc (OMNI ssmPlanPBComplete));
SOME (SLc (PL crossLD))])::outs)) ()
authenticationTest inputOK
[Name Omni says
prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI ssmPlanPBComplete)));
Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL crossLD)))] ^
CFGInterpret (M,Oi,Os)
(CFG inputOK secContext secAuthorization
([Name Omni says
prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI ssmPlanPBComplete)));
Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL crossLD)))]::ins) PLAN_PB
outs) ^
(M,Oi,Os) satList
[prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI ssmPlanPBComplete)));
prop (SOME (SLc (PL crossLD)))]
This theorem demonstrates the logical soundness of the CONOPs for this mission in
this state, namely that transition from the PLAN_PB state to the MOVE_TO_ORP
state is executed if and only if the command was both authentication and authorized.
In other words, this theorem proves that if the command was executed then it was
authenticated and authorized and vis-a-vis.




PlatoonLeader_PLAN_PB_trap_justified_thm proves the trap transition is justified in
the following case
• current state is PLAN_PB
• Omni says someOmniCommand and someOmniCommand 6= ssmPlanPBComplete
• PlatoonLeader says crossLD
This is a trap because both Omni and PlatoonLeader are authenticated. But,
PlatoonLeader is not authorized to transition to the next state unless Omni says
ssmPlanPBComplete.
PlatoonLeader_PLAN_PB_trap_justified_thm follows the same pattern of
implications destruction and lemma proofs. The difference is that the
TR_trap_cmd_rule is specialized instead of the TR_exec_cmd_rule. The two lemmas
and theorem are shown below as pretty-printed HOL-generated output.
[PlatoonLeader_PLAN_PB_trap_lemma]
` omniCommand 6= ssmPlanPBComplete )
(s = PLAN_PB) )
8M Oi Os.
CFGInterpret (M,Oi,Os)
(CFG inputOK secContext secAuthorization
([Name Omni says prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI omniCommand)));
Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL crossLD)))]::ins) PLAN_PB
outs) )
(M,Oi,Os) sat prop NONE
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[PlatoonLeader_PLAN_PB_trap_justified_lemma]
` omniCommand 6= ssmPlanPBComplete )
(s = PLAN_PB) )





prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI omniCommand)));
Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL crossLD)))]))
(CFG inputOK secContext secAuthorization
([Name Omni says prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI omniCommand)));
Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL crossLD)))]::ins) PLAN_PB outs)





prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI omniCommand)));
Name PlatoonLeader says





prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI omniCommand)));
Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL crossLD)))]))::outs)) ()
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authenticationTest inputOK
[Name Omni says prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI omniCommand)));
Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL crossLD)))] ^
CFGInterpret (M,Oi,Os)
(CFG inputOK secContext secAuthorization
([Name Omni says prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI omniCommand)));
Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL crossLD)))]::ins) PLAN_PB
outs) ^ (M,Oi,Os) sat prop NONE
[PlatoonLeader_PLAN_PB_trap_justified_thm]
` omniCommand 6= ssmPlanPBComplete )
(s = PLAN_PB) )
8NS Out M Oi Os.
TR (M,Oi,Os)
(trap
[SOME (SLc (OMNI omniCommand));
SOME (SLc (PL crossLD))])
(CFG inputOK secContext secAuthorization
([Name Omni says prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI omniCommand)));
Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL crossLD)))]::ins) PLAN_PB outs)
(CFG inputOK secContext secAuthorization ins
(NS PLAN_PB
(trap
[SOME (SLc (OMNI omniCommand));




[SOME (SLc (OMNI omniCommand));
SOME (SLc (PL crossLD))])::outs)) ()
authenticationTest inputOK
[Name Omni says prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI omniCommand)));
Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL crossLD)))] ^
CFGInterpret (M,Oi,Os)
(CFG inputOK secContext secAuthorization
([Name Omni says prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI omniCommand)));
Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL crossLD)))]::ins) PLAN_PB
outs) ^ (M,Oi,Os) sat prop NONE
PlatoonLeader_Omni_notDiscard_slCommand_thm This theorem proves
that if the PlatoonLeader issues an omniCommand and Omni issues a plCommand, the
command is not discarded. The reason for this is that plCommand and omniCommand
are both slCommands and inputOK authenticates both principals for slCommands.
What this means more generally is that both the PlatoonLeader and Omni are
authenticated on any state-level command.
This proof specializes the TR_discard_cmd_rule. This follows a different pattern with
no lemmas. The HOL-generated output is shown below.
[PlatoonLeader_Omni_notDiscard_slCommand_thm]
` 8NS Out M Oi Os.
¬TR (M,Oi,Os)
(discard
[SOME (SLc (PL plCommand));
SOME (SLc (OMNI omniCommand))])
(CFG inputOK secContext secAuthorization
120
([Name Omni says prop (SOME (SLc (PL plCommand)));
Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI omniCommand)))]::ins) PLAN_PB
outs)
(CFG inputOK secContext secAuthorization ins
(NS PLAN_PB
(discard
[SOME (SLc (PL plCommand));
SOME (SLc (OMNI omniCommand))]))
(Out PLAN_PB
(discard
[SOME (SLc (PL plCommand));
SOME (SLc (OMNI omniCommand))])::outs))
Theorems for each transition are possible. For the most part, they are formed by
copying and pasting the theorems above with a few keywords changed. They are
repetitive and no new information is gained by showing them here. For completeness,
however, they are included in the appendices and file folders as described in the
introduction to this chapter.
8.2 ssmConductORP: Multiple Principals
ssmConductORP is an example of a SSM with more than one principal authorized to
execute transitions among states. The diagram is shown in figure 8.2.
Other than the number of principals, ssmConductToORP follows the same structure as
ssmPB described in the previous section.
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Figure 8.2: Horizontal slice: ConductORP diagram.
8.2.1 Principals
The principals are defined in the datatype stateRole. There are three principals
including Omni.
stateRole = PlatoonLeader | PlatoonSergeant | Omni
8.2.2 States




























psgCommand defines the PlatoonSergeant commands.
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psgCommand = actionsIn | psgIncomplete






The next-state function follows the same pattern as for ssmPB. The only difference is
that one of the transitions requires a psgCommand instead of a plCommand. This is the
transition from SECURE to ACTIONS_IN.
[conductORPNS_def]
` (conductORPNS CONDUCT_ORP (exec x) =
if getPlCom x = secure then SECURE else CONDUCT_ORP) ^
(conductORPNS SECURE (exec x) =
if getPsgCom x = actionsIn then ACTIONS_IN else SECURE) ^
(conductORPNS ACTIONS_IN (exec x) =
if getPlCom x = withdraw then WITHDRAW else ACTIONS_IN) ^
(conductORPNS WITHDRAW (exec x) =
if getPlCom x = complete then COMPLETE else WITHDRAW) ^
(conductORPNS s (trap x) = s) ^
(conductORPNS s (discard x) = s)
The next-state function requires two helper functions just as the next-state function for
ssmPB. These are getPlCom and getPsgCom. The former extracts PlatoonLeader
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commands and the later extracts PlatoonSergeant commands. They both use the "_"
as a wild card. The HOL definition for both functions is shown below.
val getPlCom_def =
Define ￿
( getPlCom ( [ ] : ( ( slCommand command) opt ion ) l i s t )
= pl Incomplete : plCommand) /\
( getPlCom (SOME (SLc (PL cmd ) ) : ( slCommand command) opt ion : : xs )
= cmd : plCommand) /\
( getPlCom (_: : ( xs : ( slCommand command) opt ion l i s t ) )
= ( getPlCom xs )) ￿
val getPsgCom_def =
Define ￿
( getPsgCom ( [ ] : ( ( slCommand command) opt ion ) l i s t )
= psgIncomplete : psgCommand) /\
( getPsgCom (SOME (SLc (PSG cmd ) ) : ( slCommand command) opt ion : : xs )
= cmd : psgCommand) /\
( getPsgCom (_: : ( xs : ( slCommand command) opt ion l i s t ) )
= ( getPsgCom xs )) ￿
8.2.6 Next-Output Function
The next-output function follows the same pattern as the next-state function. It returns
outputs instead of states.
[conductORPOut_def]
` (conductORPOut CONDUCT_ORP (exec x) =
if getPlCom x = secure then Secure else ConductORP) ^
(conductORPOut SECURE (exec x) =
if getPsgCom x = actionsIn then ActionsIn else Secure) ^
(conductORPOut ACTIONS_IN (exec x) =
if getPlCom x = withdraw then Withdraw else ActionsIn) ^
(conductORPOut WITHDRAW (exec x) =
if getPlCom x = complete then Complete else Withdraw) ^
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(conductORPOut s (trap x) = unAuthorized) ^
(conductORPOut s (discard x) = unAuthenticated)
8.2.7 Authentication
Authentication uses the inputOK function. It is the same function as the ssmPB





( (Name PlatoonLeader ) says ( prop (cmd : ( slCommand command) opt ion ) )
: ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , ' d , ' e )Form) = T) /\
( inputOK
( (Name PlatoonSergeant ) says ( prop (cmd : ( slCommand command) opt ion ) )
: ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , ' d , ' e )Form) = T) /\
( inputOK
( (Name Omni) says ( prop (cmd : ( slCommand command) opt ion ) )
: ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , ' d , ' e )Form) = T) /\
( inputOK _= F) ￿
This function only allows the Platoon Leader, Platoon Sergeant, and Omni as
authenticated entities for state-level commands. Furthermore, it restricts them from
being authenticated on any other commands. It also denies authentication to any other
principal on any other command.
It is straight forward to prove that any command that is not issued by a principal is
rejected. This follows directly from the definition of inputOK.
[inputOK_cmd_reject_lemma]
` 8 cmd. ¬inputOK (prop (SOME cmd))
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8.2.8 Authorization
As in ssmPB and all SSMs, there is a state-dependent and state-independent
authorization function.
State-dependent Authorization Like ssmPB, the state-dependent authorization
function is named secContext. It takes a state and an input list as parameters. It
returns an authorization statement. It follows the same logic as secContext in ssmPB.
[secContext_def]
` (8 xs.
secContext CONDUCT_ORP xs =
[Name PlatoonLeader controls
prop (SOME (SLc (PL secure)))]) ^
(8 xs.
secContext SECURE xs =
if getOmniCommand xs = ssmSecureComplete then
[prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI ssmSecureComplete))) impf
Name PlatoonSergeant controls
prop (SOME (SLc (PSG actionsIn)))]
else [prop NONE]) ^
(8 xs.
secContext ACTIONS_IN xs =
if getOmniCommand xs = ssmActionsInComplete then
[prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI ssmActionsInComplete))) impf
Name PlatoonLeader controls
prop (SOME (SLc (PL withdraw)))]
else [prop NONE]) ^
8 xs.
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secContext WITHDRAW xs =
if getOmniCommand xs = ssmWithdrawComplete then
[prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI ssmWithdrawComplete))) impf
Name PlatoonLeader controls
prop (SOME (SLc (PL complete)))]
else [prop NONE]
secContext in ssmConductORP uses the exact same getOmniCommand function. It is
repeated here as a reference.
val getOmniCommand_def =
Define ￿
(getOmniCommand ( [ ] : ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form l i s t )
= invalidOmniCommand : omniCommand) /\
(getOmniCommand ( ( (Name Omni) says prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI cmd ) ) ) ) : : xs )
= (cmd : omniCommand) ) /\
(getOmniCommand ( ( x : ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form ) : : xs )
= (getOmniCommand xs )) ￿
State-independent Authorization Like ssmPB, the state-independent
authorization function is named secAuthorization. It takes only an input list as a
parameter. This is the exact same secAuthorization as in ssmPB. It also uses the exact
same secHelper function as ssmPB. It is repeated here as a reference.
[secAuthorization_def]




[Name Omni controls prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI cmd)))]
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8.2.9 Proved Theorems
These theorems follow those in section 8.1.9 for ssmPB. There are few changes and thus
detailed explanation of the proof is omitted. The pretty-printed HOL-generated output
is included here.
PlatoonSergeant_SECURE_exec_justified_thm This theorem justifies
transition from the SECURE state to the ACTIONS_IN state. The authenticated
principal is the PlatoonSergeant. This theorem specializes the TR_exec_cmd_rule.
The two lemmas and theorem are shown below.
[PlatoonSergeant_SECURE_exec_lemma]
` 8M Oi Os.
CFGInterpret (M,Oi,Os)
(CFG inputOK secContext secAuthorization
([Name Omni says
prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI ssmSecureComplete)));
Name PlatoonSergeant says





prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI ssmSecureComplete)));
Name PlatoonSergeant says
prop (SOME (SLc (PSG actionsIn)))]
[PlatoonSergeant_SECURE_exec_justified_lemma]
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prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI ssmSecureComplete)));
Name PlatoonSergeant says
prop (SOME (SLc (PSG actionsIn)))]))
(CFG inputOK secContext secAuthorization
([Name Omni says
prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI ssmSecureComplete)));
Name PlatoonSergeant says
prop (SOME (SLc (PSG actionsIn)))]::ins) SECURE
outs)





prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI ssmSecureComplete)));
Name PlatoonSergeant says





prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI ssmSecureComplete)));
Name PlatoonSergeant says





prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI ssmSecureComplete)));
Name PlatoonSergeant says
prop (SOME (SLc (PSG actionsIn)))] ^
CFGInterpret (M,Oi,Os)
(CFG inputOK secContext secAuthorization
([Name Omni says
prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI ssmSecureComplete)));
Name PlatoonSergeant says





prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI ssmSecureComplete)));
Name PlatoonSergeant says
prop (SOME (SLc (PSG actionsIn)))]
[PlatoonSergeant_SECURE_exec_justified_thm]
` 8NS Out M Oi Os.
TR (M,Oi,Os)
(exec
[SOME (SLc (OMNI ssmSecureComplete));
SOME (SLc (PSG actionsIn))])
(CFG inputOK secContext secAuthorization
([Name Omni says
prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI ssmSecureComplete)));
Name PlatoonSergeant says
prop (SOME (SLc (PSG actionsIn)))]::ins) SECURE
outs)
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(CFG inputOK secContext secAuthorization ins
(NS SECURE
(exec
[SOME (SLc (OMNI ssmSecureComplete));
SOME (SLc (PSG actionsIn))]))
(Out SECURE
(exec
[SOME (SLc (OMNI ssmSecureComplete));
SOME (SLc (PSG actionsIn))])::outs)) ()
authenticationTest inputOK
[Name Omni says
prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI ssmSecureComplete)));
Name PlatoonSergeant says
prop (SOME (SLc (PSG actionsIn)))] ^
CFGInterpret (M,Oi,Os)
(CFG inputOK secContext secAuthorization
([Name Omni says
prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI ssmSecureComplete)));
Name PlatoonSergeant says
prop (SOME (SLc (PSG actionsIn)))]::ins) SECURE
outs) ^
(M,Oi,Os) satList
[prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI ssmSecureComplete)));
prop (SOME (SLc (PSG actionsIn)))]
PlatoonLeader_ACTIONS_IN_exec_justified_thm This theorem justifies
transition from the ACTIONS_IN state to the WITHDRAW state. The authenticated
principal is the PlatoonLeader. This theorem specializes the TR_exec_cmd_rule. The
two lemmas and theorem are shown below.
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[PlatoonLeader_ACTIONS_IN_exec_lemma]
` 8M Oi Os.
CFGInterpret (M,Oi,Os)
(CFG inputOK secContext secAuthorization
([Name Omni says
prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI ssmActionsInComplete)));
Name PlatoonLeader says





prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI ssmActionsInComplete)));
Name PlatoonLeader says prop (SOME (SLc (PL withdraw)))]
[PlatoonLeader_ACTIONS_IN_exec_justified_lemma]





prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI ssmActionsInComplete)));
Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL withdraw)))]))
(CFG inputOK secContext secAuthorization
([Name Omni says
prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI ssmActionsInComplete)));
Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL withdraw)))]::ins) ACTIONS_IN
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outs)






(SOME (SLc (OMNI ssmActionsInComplete)));
Name PlatoonLeader says






(SOME (SLc (OMNI ssmActionsInComplete)));
Name PlatoonLeader says




prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI ssmActionsInComplete)));
Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL withdraw)))] ^
CFGInterpret (M,Oi,Os)
(CFG inputOK secContext secAuthorization
([Name Omni says
prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI ssmActionsInComplete)));
Name PlatoonLeader says






prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI ssmActionsInComplete)));
Name PlatoonLeader says prop (SOME (SLc (PL withdraw)))]
[PlatoonLeader_ACTIONS_IN_exec_justified_thm]
` 8NS Out M Oi Os.
TR (M,Oi,Os)
(exec
[SOME (SLc (OMNI ssmActionsInComplete));
SOME (SLc (PL withdraw))])
(CFG inputOK secContext secAuthorization
([Name Omni says
prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI ssmActionsInComplete)));
Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL withdraw)))]::ins) ACTIONS_IN
outs)
(CFG inputOK secContext secAuthorization ins
(NS ACTIONS_IN
(exec
[SOME (SLc (OMNI ssmActionsInComplete));
SOME (SLc (PL withdraw))]))
(Out ACTIONS_IN
(exec
[SOME (SLc (OMNI ssmActionsInComplete));
SOME (SLc (PL withdraw))])::outs)) ()
authenticationTest inputOK
[Name Omni says
prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI ssmActionsInComplete)));
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Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL withdraw)))] ^
CFGInterpret (M,Oi,Os)
(CFG inputOK secContext secAuthorization
([Name Omni says
prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI ssmActionsInComplete)));
Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL withdraw)))]::ins) ACTIONS_IN
outs) ^
(M,Oi,Os) satList
[prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI ssmActionsInComplete)));
prop (SOME (SLc (PL withdraw)))]
The above theorem formally proves the soundness of the CONOPs with respect to the
Platoon Leader’s command to withdraw from the ACTIONS_IN state. This theorem
proves that execution of the transition from ACTIONS_IN to the next state happens if
and only if the Platoon Leader issues the command ssmActionsInComplete.
PlatoonLeader_ACTIONS_IN_trap_justified_thm This theorem justifies
trapping the transition from the ACTIONS_IN state to the WITHDRAW state. The
authenticated principal is the PlatoonLeader. But, in this case, Omni does not issue the
command ssmActionsInComplete. Therefore, the transition is not authorized. This
theorem specializes the TR_trap_cmd_rule. The two lemmas and theorem are shown
below.
[PlatoonLeader_ACTIONS_IN_trap_lemma]
` omniCommand 6= ssmActionsInComplete )




(CFG inputOK secContext secAuthorization
([Name Omni says prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI omniCommand)));
Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL withdraw)))]::ins) ACTIONS_IN
outs) )
(M,Oi,Os) sat prop NONE
[PlatoonLeader_ACTIONS_IN_trap_justified_lemma]
` omniCommand 6= ssmActionsInComplete )
(s = ACTIONS_IN) )





prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI omniCommand)));
Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL withdraw)))]))
(CFG inputOK secContext secAuthorization
([Name Omni says prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI omniCommand)));
Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL withdraw)))]::ins) ACTIONS_IN
outs)





prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI omniCommand)));
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Name PlatoonLeader says





prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI omniCommand)));
Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL withdraw)))]))::
outs)) ()
authenticationTest inputOK
[Name Omni says prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI omniCommand)));
Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL withdraw)))] ^
CFGInterpret (M,Oi,Os)
(CFG inputOK secContext secAuthorization
([Name Omni says prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI omniCommand)));
Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL withdraw)))]::ins) ACTIONS_IN
outs) ^ (M,Oi,Os) sat prop NONE
[PlatoonLeader_ACTIONS_IN_trap_justified_thm]
` omniCommand 6= ssmActionsInComplete )
(s = ACTIONS_IN) )
8NS Out M Oi Os.
TR (M,Oi,Os)
(trap
[SOME (SLc (OMNI omniCommand));
SOME (SLc (PL withdraw))])
(CFG inputOK secContext secAuthorization
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([Name Omni says prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI omniCommand)));
Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL withdraw)))]::ins) ACTIONS_IN
outs)
(CFG inputOK secContext secAuthorization ins
(NS ACTIONS_IN
(trap
[SOME (SLc (OMNI omniCommand));
SOME (SLc (PL withdraw))]))
(Out ACTIONS_IN
(trap
[SOME (SLc (OMNI omniCommand));
SOME (SLc (PL withdraw))])::outs)) ()
authenticationTest inputOK
[Name Omni says prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI omniCommand)));
Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL withdraw)))] ^
CFGInterpret (M,Oi,Os)
(CFG inputOK secContext secAuthorization
([Name Omni says prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI omniCommand)));
Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL withdraw)))]::ins) ACTIONS_IN
outs) ^ (M,Oi,Os) sat prop NONE
As with ssmPlanPB, the other theorems are included in the appendices and files.
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8.3 ssmPlanPB: Non-sequential Transitions
The ssmPlanPB SSM does not use the Omni principal but does use a "sort-of"
non-sequential progression through states. To minimize the complexity of the model,
the three states that are non-sequential are represented as "virtual states" whose
completion is noted as input to the command to transition from the state before them
to the state after them. Figure 8.3 is a diagram of this SSM.
Figure 8.3: Horizontal slice: PlanPB diagram.
The three non-sequential states are hidden in the white circle in the diagram. They are
TENTATIVE_PLAN, INITIATE_MOVEMENT, and RECON. These three states may
be completed in any order, but all three must be completed before progressing to the
next state REPORT1.
To handle this, the three non-sequential states are combined into one "virtual state."
Completion of these states must preceded transition from the WARNO state to the





when combined with a request from the PlatoonLeader to transition to the REPORT1










The remaining details of this implementation follow.
8.3.1 Principals
The planning phase SSM has two principals: PlatoonLeader and PlatoonSergeant.
These are defined in the stateRole datatype.
stateRole = PlatoonLeader | PlatoonSergeant
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8.3.2 States
There are 12 states. But, TENTATIVE_PLAN, INITIATE_MOVEMENT, and














There are 14 outputs. But, PlanPB, TentativePlan, InitiateMovement, and Recon are
not used in the next-output function. The unAuthorized output is returned for trapped

















The slCommand datatype for this SSM is defined below.
slCommand = PL plCommand | PSG psgCommand
The two datatypes for plCommand and psgCommand represent the PlatoonLeader and

















Providing each principal with her own set of commands simplifies the authentication
and authorization functions.
8.3.5 Next-State Function
The next-state function is defined similarly to those defined for previously described
SSMs.
[planPBNS_def]
` (planPBNS WARNO (exec x) =
if
(getRecon x = [SOME (SLc (PL recon))]) ^
(getTenativePlan x = [SOME (SLc (PL tentativePlan))]) ^
(getReport x = [SOME (SLc (PL report1))]) ^




(planPBNS PLAN_PB (exec x) =
if getPlCom x = receiveMission then RECEIVE_MISSION
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else PLAN_PB) ^
(planPBNS RECEIVE_MISSION (exec x) =
if getPlCom x = warno then WARNO else RECEIVE_MISSION) ^
(planPBNS REPORT1 (exec x) =
if getPlCom x = completePlan then COMPLETE_PLAN
else REPORT1) ^
(planPBNS COMPLETE_PLAN (exec x) =
if getPlCom x = opoid then OPOID else COMPLETE_PLAN) ^
(planPBNS OPOID (exec x) =
if getPlCom x = supervise then SUPERVISE else OPOID) ^
(planPBNS SUPERVISE (exec x) =
if getPlCom x = report2 then REPORT2 else SUPERVISE) ^
(planPBNS REPORT2 (exec x) =
if getPlCom x = complete then COMPLETE else REPORT2) ^
(planPBNS s (trap v0) = s) ^ (planPBNS s (discard v1) = s)
Five functions are defined (see below) to extract the command from the input list.
These are getRecon, getTentativePlan, getReport, getInitMove, and getPlCom. Each of
these functions takes an input list as a parameter and returns a command with its
option type. For the sake of brevity, only getRecon is shown below. The other functions
are similar.
HOL Definition for getRecon ...
val getRecon_def = Def ine ￿
( getRecon ( [ ] : ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form l i s t ) =
[NONE] ) /\
( getRecon ( (Name PlatoonLeader ) says ( prop (SOME (SLc (PL recon ) ) ) )
: ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form : : xs )
= [SOME (SLc (PL recon ) ) : ( slCommand command) opt ion ] ) /\
( getRecon (_: : xs ) = getRecon xs ) ￿
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8.3.6 Next-Output Function
The next-output function is defined similarly to those defined for previously described
SSMs.
[planPBOut_def]
` (planPBOut WARNO (exec x) =
if
(getRecon x = [SOME (SLc (PL recon))]) ^
(getTenativePlan x = [SOME (SLc (PL tentativePlan))]) ^
(getReport x = [SOME (SLc (PL report1))]) ^




(planPBOut PLAN_PB (exec x) =
if getPlCom x = receiveMission then ReceiveMission
else unAuthorized) ^
(planPBOut RECEIVE_MISSION (exec x) =
if getPlCom x = warno then Warno else unAuthorized) ^
(planPBOut REPORT1 (exec x) =
if getPlCom x = completePlan then CompletePlan
else unAuthorized) ^
(planPBOut COMPLETE_PLAN (exec x) =
if getPlCom x = opoid then Opoid else unAuthorized) ^
(planPBOut OPOID (exec x) =
if getPlCom x = supervise then Supervise
else unAuthorized) ^
(planPBOut SUPERVISE (exec x) =
if getPlCom x = report2 then Report2 else unAuthorized) ^
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(planPBOut REPORT2 (exec x) =
if getPlCom x = complete then Complete else unAuthorized) ^
(planPBOut s (trap v0) = unAuthorized) ^
(planPBOut s (discard v1) = unAuthenticated)
8.3.7 Authentication
Authentication for this SSM is the same as for the previously described SSMs.
val inputOK_def = Def ine
￿( inputOK
( ( (Name PlatoonLeader ) says ( prop (cmd : ( ( slCommand command) opt ion ) ) ) )
: ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form) = T) /\
( inputOK
( ( (Name PlatoonSergeant ) says ( prop (cmd : ( ( slCommand command) opt ion ) ) ) )
: ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form) = T) /\
( inputOK _ = F) ￿




( [ ] ,
￿ ￿ !cmd . ~(inputOK
( ( prop (SOME cmd ) ) : ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form)) ￿ ￿) ,
PROVE_TAC[ inputOK_def ] )
8.3.8 Authorization
The two authorization functions are defined below.
val secContext_def = Def ine ￿
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secContext ( s : s l S t a t e ) ( x : ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form l i s t ) =
i f ( s = WARNO) then
( i f ( getRecon x = [SOME (SLc (PL recon ) )
: ( slCommand command) opt ion ] ) /\
( getTenat ivePlan x = [SOME (SLc (PL tenta t i veP lan ) )
: ( slCommand command) opt ion ] ) /\
( getReport x = [SOME (SLc (PL repor t1 ) )
: ( slCommand command) opt ion ] ) /\
( getInitMove x = [SOME (SLc (PSG init iateMovement ) )
: ( slCommand command) opt ion ] )
then [
PL_WARNO_Auth
: ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form ;
(Name PlatoonLeader ) c on t r o l s prop (SOME (SLc (PL recon ) ) ) ;
(Name PlatoonLeader ) c on t r o l s prop (SOME (SLc (PL tenta t i v eP lan ) ) ) ;
(Name PlatoonSergeant ) c on t r o l s prop (SOME (SLc (PSG init iateMovement ) ) ) ]
else [ ( prop NONE) : ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form ] )
else i f ( ( getPlCom x) = invalidPlCommand )
then [ ( prop NONE) : ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form ]
else [PL_notWARNO_Auth ( getPlCom x ) ] ￿
secContext uses PL_WARNO_Auth and PL_notWARNO_Auth. These are defined
below.
val PL_WARNO_Auth_def = Def ine ￿
PL_WARNO_Auth =
^( impfTermList
[ ￿ ￿( prop (SOME (SLc (PL recon ) ) ) )
: ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form￿ ￿ ,
￿￿( prop (SOME (SLc (PL tenta t i veP lan ) ) ) )
: ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form￿ ￿ ,
￿￿( prop (SOME (SLc (PSG init iateMovement ) ) ) )
: ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form￿ ￿ ,
￿￿(Name PlatoonLeader ) c on t r o l s prop (SOME (SLc (PL repor t1 ) ) )
: ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form￿ ￿ ]
￿ ￿ : ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form￿￿)￿
val PL_notWARNO_Auth_def = Def ine ￿
PL_notWARNO_Auth (cmd : plCommand) =
i f (cmd = repor t1 ) (∗ repor t1 e x i t s WARNO s t a t e ∗)
then
( prop NONE) : ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form
else
( (Name PlatoonLeader ) says ( prop (SOME (SLc (PL cmd ) ) )
148
: ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form) impf
( ( (Name PlatoonLeader ) c on t r o l s prop (SOME (SLc (PL cmd ) ) ) )
: ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form) ) ￿
8.3.9 Proved Theorems
Theorems proving complete mediation follow the same format as those for previously
described SSMs.
PlatoonLeader_notWARNO_notreport1_exec_plCommand_justified_-
thm This theorem proves that if the state is not WARNO and the plCommand is not
report1 then execution of any plCommand is justified. It uses two lemmas and a
theorem and follows the same pattern as the the other three-part proofs. The
pretty-printed HOL-generated output is shown below.
[PlatoonLeader_notWARNO_notreport1_exec_plCommand_lemma]
` s 6= WARNO )
plCommand 6= invalidPlCommand )
plCommand 6= report1 )
8M Oi Os.
CFGInterpret (M,Oi,Os)
(CFG inputOK secContext secContextNull
([Name PlatoonLeader says





prop (SOME (SLc (PL plCommand)))]
[PlatoonLeader_notWARNO_notreport1_exec_plCommand_justified_-
lemma]
` s 6= WARNO )
plCommand 6= invalidPlCommand )
plCommand 6= report1 )





prop (SOME (SLc (PL plCommand)))]))
(CFG inputOK secContext secContextNull
([Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL plCommand)))]::ins) s outs)















prop (SOME (SLc (PL plCommand)))] ^
CFGInterpret (M,Oi,Os)
(CFG inputOK secContext secContextNull
([Name PlatoonLeader says




prop (SOME (SLc (PL plCommand)))]
[PlatoonLeader_notWARNO_notreport1_exec_plCommand_justified_thm]
` s 6= WARNO )
plCommand 6= invalidPlCommand )
plCommand 6= report1 )
8NS Out M Oi Os.
TR (M,Oi,Os) (exec [SOME (SLc (PL plCommand))])
(CFG inputOK secContext secContextNull
([Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL plCommand)))]::ins) s outs)
(CFG inputOK secContext secContextNull ins
(NS s (exec [SOME (SLc (PL plCommand))]))
(Out s (exec [SOME (SLc (PL plCommand))])::outs)) ()
authenticationTest inputOK
[Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL plCommand)))] ^
CFGInterpret (M,Oi,Os)
(CFG inputOK secContext secContextNull
([Name PlatoonLeader says
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prop (SOME (SLc (PL plCommand)))]::ins) s outs) ^
(M,Oi,Os) satList [prop (SOME (SLc (PL plCommand)))]
PlatoonLeader_psgCommand_notDiscard_thm This next theorem proves
that if the PlatoonLeader issues a psgCommand then that command is not discarded.
The reason for this is that the psgCommand is an slCommand. In inputOK, the
PlatoonLeader is authenticated on all slCommands. (Only unauthenticated requests are
discarded.) This theorem has no lemmas.
[PlatoonLeader_psgCommand_notDiscard_thm]
` 8NS Out M Oi Os.
¬TR (M,Oi,Os) (discard [SOME (SLc (PSG psgCommand))])
(CFG inputOK secContext secContextNull
([Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PSG psgCommand)))]::ins) s outs)
(CFG inputOK secContext secContextNull ins
(NS s (discard [SOME (SLc (PSG psgCommand))]))
(Out s (discard [SOME (SLc (PSG psgCommand))])::
outs))
PlatoonSergeant_trap_plCommand_justified_thm This next theorem proves
that if the PlatoonLeader issues a psgCommand then that command is trapped. It
specializes the TR_trap_cmd_rule with two lemmas and a theorem.
[PlatoonLeader_trap_psgCommand_lemma]
` 8M Oi Os.
CFGInterpret (M,Oi,Os)
(CFG inputOK secContext secContextNull
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([Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PSG psgCommand)))]::ins) s outs) )
(M,Oi,Os) sat prop NONE
[PlatoonLeader_trap_psgCommand_justified_lemma]





prop (SOME (SLc (PSG psgCommand)))]))
(CFG inputOK secContext secContextNull
([Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PSG psgCommand)))]::ins) s outs)














prop (SOME (SLc (PSG psgCommand)))] ^
CFGInterpret (M,Oi,Os)
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(CFG inputOK secContext secContextNull
([Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PSG psgCommand)))]::ins) s outs) ^
(M,Oi,Os) sat prop NONE
[PlatoonSergeant_trap_plCommand_justified_thm]
` 8NS Out M Oi Os.
TR (M,Oi,Os) (trap [SOME (SLc (PL plCommand))])
(CFG inputOK secContext secContextNull
([Name PlatoonSergeant says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL plCommand)))]::ins) s outs)
(CFG inputOK secContext secContextNull ins
(NS s (trap [SOME (SLc (PL plCommand))]))
(Out s (trap [SOME (SLc (PL plCommand))])::outs)) ()
authenticationTest inputOK
[Name PlatoonSergeant says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL plCommand)))] ^
CFGInterpret (M,Oi,Os)
(CFG inputOK secContext secContextNull
([Name PlatoonSergeant says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL plCommand)))]::ins) s outs) ^
(M,Oi,Os) sat prop NONE
PlatoonLeader_WARNO_exec_report1_justified_thm This theorem proves
that transition from the WARNO to the REPORT1 is justified if the following four
statements are supplied.
• PlatoonLeader says tentativePlan
• PlatoonSergeant says initiateMovement
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• PlatoonLeader says recon
• PlatoonLeader says report1
The above theorem formally proves the soundness of the CONOPs with respect to the
Platoon Leader’s command to transition from the WARNO state to the REPORT1
state. This theorem proves that execution of this transition happens if and only if the
following four commands are issued: PlatoonLeader says tentativePlan, PlatoonSergeant
says initiateMovement, PlatoonLeader says recon, and PlatoonLeader says report1.
It specializes the TR_exex_cmd_rule and requires the standard two lemmas and a
theorem.
[PlatoonLeader_WARNO_exec_report1_lemma]
` 8M Oi Os.
CFGInterpret (M,Oi,Os)
(CFG inputOK secContext secContextNull
([Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL recon)));
Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL tentativePlan)));
Name PlatoonSergeant says
prop (SOME (SLc (PSG initiateMovement)));
Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL report1)))]::ins) WARNO outs) )
(M,Oi,Os) satList
propCommandList
[Name PlatoonLeader says prop (SOME (SLc (PL recon)));
Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL tentativePlan)));
Name PlatoonSergeant says
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prop (SOME (SLc (PSG initiateMovement)));
Name PlatoonLeader says prop (SOME (SLc (PL report1)))]
[PlatoonLeader_WARNO_exec_report1_justified_lemma]





prop (SOME (SLc (PL recon)));
Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL tentativePlan)));
Name PlatoonSergeant says
prop (SOME (SLc (PSG initiateMovement)));
Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL report1)))]))
(CFG inputOK secContext secContextNull
([Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL recon)));
Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL tentativePlan)));
Name PlatoonSergeant says
prop (SOME (SLc (PSG initiateMovement)));
Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL report1)))]::ins) WARNO outs)






prop (SOME (SLc (PL recon)));
Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL tentativePlan)));
Name PlatoonSergeant says
prop (SOME (SLc (PSG initiateMovement)));
Name PlatoonLeader says





prop (SOME (SLc (PL recon)));
Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL tentativePlan)));
Name PlatoonSergeant says
prop (SOME (SLc (PSG initiateMovement)));
Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL report1)))]))::outs)) ()
authenticationTest inputOK
[Name PlatoonLeader says prop (SOME (SLc (PL recon)));
Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL tentativePlan)));
Name PlatoonSergeant says
prop (SOME (SLc (PSG initiateMovement)));
Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL report1)))] ^
CFGInterpret (M,Oi,Os)
(CFG inputOK secContext secContextNull
([Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL recon)));
Name PlatoonLeader says
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prop (SOME (SLc (PL tentativePlan)));
Name PlatoonSergeant says
prop (SOME (SLc (PSG initiateMovement)));
Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL report1)))]::ins) WARNO outs) ^
(M,Oi,Os) satList
propCommandList
[Name PlatoonLeader says prop (SOME (SLc (PL recon)));
Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL tentativePlan)));
Name PlatoonSergeant says
prop (SOME (SLc (PSG initiateMovement)));
Name PlatoonLeader says prop (SOME (SLc (PL report1)))]
[PlatoonLeader_WARNO_exec_report1_justified_thm]
` 8NS Out M Oi Os.
TR (M,Oi,Os)
(exec
[SOME (SLc (PL recon)); SOME (SLc (PL tentativePlan));
SOME (SLc (PSG initiateMovement));
SOME (SLc (PL report1))])
(CFG inputOK secContext secContextNull
([Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL recon)));
Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL tentativePlan)));
Name PlatoonSergeant says
prop (SOME (SLc (PSG initiateMovement)));
Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL report1)))]::ins) WARNO outs)
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(CFG inputOK secContext secContextNull ins
(NS WARNO
(exec
[SOME (SLc (PL recon));
SOME (SLc (PL tentativePlan));
SOME (SLc (PSG initiateMovement));
SOME (SLc (PL report1))]))
(Out WARNO
(exec
[SOME (SLc (PL recon));
SOME (SLc (PL tentativePlan));
SOME (SLc (PSG initiateMovement));
SOME (SLc (PL report1))])::outs)) ()
authenticationTest inputOK
[Name PlatoonLeader says prop (SOME (SLc (PL recon)));
Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL tentativePlan)));
Name PlatoonSergeant says
prop (SOME (SLc (PSG initiateMovement)));
Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL report1)))] ^
CFGInterpret (M,Oi,Os)
(CFG inputOK secContext secContextNull
([Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL recon)));
Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL tentativePlan)));
Name PlatoonSergeant says
prop (SOME (SLc (PSG initiateMovement)));
Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL report1)))]::ins) WARNO outs) ^
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(M,Oi,Os) satList
[prop (SOME (SLc (PL recon)));
prop (SOME (SLc (PL tentativePlan)));
prop (SOME (SLc (PSG initiateMovement)));
prop (SOME (SLc (PL report1)))]
PlatoonSergeant_trap_plCommand_justified_thm This final theorem proves
that the PlatoonSergeant is trapped on all plCommands. This is for the same reason
that the PlatoonLeader is trapped on all psgCommands.
[PlatoonSergeant_trap_plCommand_lemma]
` 8M Oi Os.
CFGInterpret (M,Oi,Os)
(CFG inputOK secContext secContextNull
([Name PlatoonSergeant says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL plCommand)))]::ins) s outs) )
(M,Oi,Os) sat prop NONE
[PlatoonSergeant_trap_plCommand_justified_lemma]





prop (SOME (SLc (PL plCommand)))]))
(CFG inputOK secContext secContextNull
([Name PlatoonSergeant says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL plCommand)))]::ins) s outs)















prop (SOME (SLc (PL plCommand)))] ^
CFGInterpret (M,Oi,Os)
(CFG inputOK secContext secContextNull
([Name PlatoonSergeant says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL plCommand)))]::ins) s outs) ^
(M,Oi,Os) sat prop NONE
[PlatoonSergeant_trap_plCommand_justified_thm]
` 8NS Out M Oi Os.
TR (M,Oi,Os) (trap [SOME (SLc (PL plCommand))])
(CFG inputOK secContext secContextNull
([Name PlatoonSergeant says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL plCommand)))]::ins) s outs)
(CFG inputOK secContext secContextNull ins
(NS s (trap [SOME (SLc (PL plCommand))]))




prop (SOME (SLc (PL plCommand)))] ^
CFGInterpret (M,Oi,Os)
(CFG inputOK secContext secContextNull
([Name PlatoonSergeant says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL plCommand)))]::ins) s outs) ^
(M,Oi,Os) sat prop NONE
8.4 Discussion
Once the SSMs were described (as in the previous chapter) there were no problems
verifying them in HOL. Parametrizing the SSMs made it easier to verify them in HOL.
Nevertheless, it was much easier to generate HOL code automatically using the
HOL-generator. The by-hand generated HOL proofs for one SSM took several days to a
week each to code and debug, even with the parametrizable SSM. Whereas, six SSMs
where generated and tested in less than four hours using the HOL-generator.
The next part of this thesis discusses the application of STORM to the patrol base








STORM Conformance to SSE
Framework
The purpose of this thesis is to demonstrate STORM on an example of a
non-automated, human-centered system. This section extends beyond the original goal
of this thesis and examines STORM itself.
Conformance to the System Security Engineering Framework described in NIST SP
800-160 requires a closer look. The SSE Frameworks is shown in figure 9.1. This chapter
discusses how STORM conforms to the SSE Framework. The Framework has three
components each with various activities that the analyst should perform. These are:
• Problem
– Define Security Objectives
– Define Security Requirements
– Define Success Measures
– Define Life-Cycle Security Concepts
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– Produce Evidence for Security Aspects of the Problem
• Solution
– Define the Security Aspects of the Solution
– Realize the Security Aspects of the Solution
– Produce Evidence for Security Aspects of the Solution
• Trustworthiness
– Develop Assurance Case for Acceptable Security
– Demonstrate Assurance Case Is Satisfied
STPA/STPA-Sec focuses primarily on the problem and solution components. CSBD
focuses primarily on the Trustworthiness component.
9.1 Problem
Define Security Objectives STORM conforms to this activity in step 1 of the
STPA/STPA-Sec analysis. In this step, the purpose of the analysis is defined. The goal
of complete mediation in CSBD also defines security objectives.
Define Security Requirements STORM conforms to this activity in step 1 of the
STPA/STPA-Sec analysis. In this step, the stakeholder needs are defined and the
analysis proceeds by defining asset losses and unacceptable asset losses with respect to
these needs.
Define Success Measures STORM conforms to this activity in step 1 of the
STPA/STPA-Sec analysis and in CSBD. In step 1 of the STPA/STPA-Sec analysis,
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Figure 9.1: Systems security engineering Framework. (Image from NIST Special Publica-
tion 800-160 Vol 1: Systems Security Engineering Considerations for a Multidisciplinary
Approach in the Engineering of Trustworthy Secure Systems.[8])
system-level constraints are a measure of success. These are the top-level security goals.
They are realized in step 4 and linked to the losses through the system-level hazards. If
the system satisfies these constraints then the system or mission analysis is successful.
In addition, complete mediation is a requirement of CSBD.
Define Life Cycle Security Concepts STORM does not explicitly define life-cycle
concepts. That is, it is not explicitly discussed in any of the STPA or CSBD steps. But
a thorough analysis would include consideration of life-cycle concepts with regards to
worst-case scenarios in step 4. Adding the risk management framework discussed in the
next chapter would explicitly account for system-life cycle processes in the analysis.
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Produce Evidence for Security Aspects of the Problem STORM produces
evidence for the security aspects of the problem in the STPA/STPA-Sec analysis and
CSBD. Evidence is the stakeholder’s definition of assets and asset losses. These are
made more and more explicit in the delineation of losses and hazards and
vulnerabilities. The structure of the CONOPS developed into an SSM is also evidence
of the security aspect of the problem.
9.2 Solution
Define the Security Aspects of the Solution STORM conforms to this activity in
several areas. First, it defines the system-level and refined constraints corresponding to
each hazard or vulnerability in step 1 of the analysis. Second, the rationales in step 4 of
the analysis also define the security aspects of the solution. Third, complete mediation
solutions are defined in the structure of the SSM and the authentication and
access-control policy of the CSBD.
Realize the Security Aspects of the Solution STORM conforms to this activity
with regards to complete mediation via CSBD. But STORM only realizes the solution
with regards to the concept and design phase and not implementation. The HOL proofs
of complete mediation realize the concept and design phase solution for complete
mediation. But the rationales determined in step 4 of the STPA/STPA-Sec analysis do
not realize the design. To do this, the analysis should include evidence that the rationale
is designed into the system. The next chapter discusses the AC Methodology and how
components of it can be added to STORM to supplement its documentation. This
documentation would also serve to realize more of the security aspects of the solution.
Realization of the security aspects should be followed through in the implementation
phase. The implementation phase is a component of the risk management framework
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and is described in the next chapter.
Produce Evidence for Security Aspects of the Solution STORM conforms to
this activity with regards to complete mediation. The HOL generated proofs are
reproducible, auditable documentation demonstrating complete mediation. What makes
this evidence strong is that the HOL proofs are formal methods that use
computer-aided reasoning to demonstrate proof of complete mediation.
Nevertheless, evidence for the rationale of the STPA/STPA-Sec analysis could also be
documented. The next chapter discusses the AC Methodology and how its use of citing
evidence can be added to step 4 of the STPA/STPA-Sec analysis to improve
documentation.
Documentation from the implementation phase of the risk management framework
would provide evidence of the security aspects of the solution beyond the concept and
design phase.
9.3 Trustworthiness
Develop Assurance Case for Acceptable Security STORM does this for the
CSBD proofs of complete mediation. The assurance case is that the system satisfies the
property of complete mediation. It is also implicit in the structure of the SSMs. With
regards to the constraints and the rationale in the STPA/STPA-Sec, assurance cases
could be built. The AC Methodology and its approach to assurance case development
could be added to STORM.
Demonstrate Assurance Case is Satisfied The verification of the CSBD proofs of
complete mediation demonstrate that the assurance cases are satisfied. This could also
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be done for the constraints and rationale of the STPA/STPA-Sec via the example of the
AC Methodology.
STORM does conform to the SSE Framework. But it could be improved to extend it
beyond just demonstrating complete mediation.
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Chapter 10
Extending STORM to A
Comprehenisive Assurance
Methodology
The DoD and the U.S. government as a whole are demonstrative of the type of complex,
multi-component systems that STORM aims to address. The problem of both
ineffective and redundant mission assurance practices in the DoD is the driving force
behind the 2012 Mission Assurance Strategy written by the U.S. Secretary of Defense
[14]. This chapter describes two means toe make STORM more comprehensive and
more trustworthy.
10.1 STORM on The Risk Management Framework
Note that the STPA/STPA-Sec analysis focuses on hazards or vulnerabilities. But from
the perspective of decision makers, these are more generally categorized as risks. Risks
are anything that can potentially cause a loss to the stakeholder. This includes other
170
types of risk such as privacy and financial risks. There is an STPA analysis for privacy
called STPA-Priv. This could be integrated into STORM. But financial and other types
of risk should be assessed in another part of the system development process. The
exception is the financial impact to the stakeholders of hazard, safety, and possibly
privacy risks covered in the STORM analysis.
Steps 1 through 4 of STPA/STPA-Sec identify risks. Step 4 also generates risk-reducing
solutions. But decision makers need to be informed of the potential impact to the
stakeholder of each risk. Therefore, what is missing is a methodology for prioritizing
risks. What follows is a discussion of how this could be done based on the Risk
Management Framework (NIST SP 800-53).
10.1.1 Risk Management Framework (NIST SP 800-37)
The Risk Management Framework is discussed in NIST SP 800-37. It is composed of
six components.
• Categorize Risks (vulnerabilities)







Throughout each phase of the STPA/STPA-Sec analysis, the potential impact of a
discovered risk should be assessed based on predefined categories. These category
definitions should be defined by the stakeholders. The best practice would be to use
categories that are informed by industry standards. For example, NIST SP 800-60,
Revision 1, Guide for Mapping Types of Information and Information Systems to
Security Categories, (Volumes 1 and 2) provides category guidelines for Federal
information systems. Such practices highlight conformance to industry norms and profit
from the wisdom of experts.
Category definitions should be defined by the stakeholders and passed to the analysts.
But if they are not, then defining these categories should be an early step in the
STORM analysis. One approach would be to add a third component of STORM that
precedes the STPA/STPA-Sec analysis. Another means of accomplishing this would be
to add it to Step 1 of the STPA/STPA-Sec analysis.
A risk is assigned a risk label based on an appropriately selected category. The risk
categories categorize types of risks based on how they effect the organization. Each
category may impose some level of acceptable security for managing the risk. For
example, risks may be low, moderate, or high or they could be low, injurious, or fatal.
Higher risks may require more stringent safety and security controls. For example,
higher risks may require consultation with a lawyer or presidential authorization.
Although not demonstrated in this thesis, CSBD also manages risk categories. It does
so by using security and integrity levels. Security levels, for example, can be defined as
unclassified, classified, and top secret. Principals are granted access to read or modify
information based on their assigned risk level and the risk level of the object they wish
to access. In the SSMs that were verified for the patrol base operations, the assignment
of commands to principals can also be thought of as assigning risk labels.
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The hazards, vulnerabilities, and unsafe control actions in the STPA/STPA-Sec could
also be assigned risk labels. Safety and security controls should then reflect the level of
risk.
The risk labels also help analysts prioritize risks. This is particularly useful for missions
which require rapid development of CONOPS because the higher-level risk actions will
take center stage. For larger projects with more lengthy analysis time, risk labels help
decision makers calculate and decide which risks are acceptable and which are not.
10.1.1.2 Control Selection
After risks are categorized, decision makers must select which risk-mitigating controls to
implement. The categories guide the selection. The industry, stakeholders, and mission
also guide the selection.
CSBD selects controls by the access-control policy, that is the authentication and
authorization functions.
STPA/STPA-Sec should select security controls based on the type of mission. For
example, if the type of mission could result in loss of life, then risks that could result in
loss of life should be labeled as such. Controls for such risks may include bringing extra
survival gear to avoid loss of life, performing extra drills to avoid loss of life, organizing
for additional rescue support to be available during the mission, and so on.
Selecting controls should be integrated into the constraints section of step 1 and the
rationale section of step 4 of the STPA/STPA-Sec analysis.
With the risk categories predefined and risk labels assigned to risks, selecting controls is
faster because it narrows the choices. It is also potentially more reliable because each
control already has well-defined actions. These actions will likely be peer-reviewed and
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optimized. They could be readily adapted to fit the mission.
Before moving to the next activity CSBD should verify the CONOPS on the mission.
10.1.1.3 Implementation
Implementation refers to finalizing the CONOPS.
10.1.1.4 Assess
An assessment strategy should reflect stakeholder needs and compliance requirements
and should be informed by the STPA/STPA-Sec and CSBD analysis. If the CONOPS
are assessed and deemed acceptable, then they will be handed to the decision makers
for authorization. Otherwise, improvements will be suggested and analysis revisited.
10.1.1.5 Authorize
Authorization to make the system operational should be informed by the analysis, risk
calculations, and assessment strategy. If the risks are acceptable, then the system or
mission should be made operational. Otherwise, that analysis should be revisited,
rationale updated, and controls re-selected to bring the risk to an acceptable level.
10.1.1.6 Monitor
A monitoring strategy should be designed during the analysis to set performance goals
and acceptable measures of success. These should be defined in step 1 of the
STPA/STPA-Sec analysis. Monitoring the system or mission validates the CONOPS. It
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also provides insight for future missions and demonstrates that stakeholder needs were
met.
Explicitly adding the six risk steps of the risk management framework would add
another level of NIST conformance to STORM. It would make it better by making it
more applicable to missions and systems that require conformance to the Risk
Management Framework. It would improve its range of applicability. It would also
make STORM more effective.
The next section discusses an addition to STORM that would extend the
documentation and thus demonstration of trustworthiness.
10.2 STORM Documentation Upgrade: The
Assurance Case Methodology
The need for trustworthy systems is driving current research endeavors in all areas of
systems and mission assurance analysis. This is also true of computer architecture. In
"Hardware Security Evaluation Using Assurance Case Models" published in "2015 10th
International Conference on Availability, Reliability, and Security," Kawakami, et. al.
describe a methodology for designing assured computer architectures [1]. The
methodology lacks in some areas where STORM excels. But it does have an advantage
in its documentation practices that could enhance STORM. A comparison is made of
the two methodologies. Lessons learned from the AC methodology are suggested as an
improvements to STORM.
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10.2.1 STORM Compared to The AC Methodology
A comparison is helpful to understanding the pros and cons of each methodology.
The AC methodology also presents a four step process. The steps are not clearly stated
in the paper. This is a best interpretation of the steps.
• Step 1: State the global desired system security property.
• Step 2: Expand the goal from the previous step. (This step breaks the goal into
smaller steps.)
• Step 3: Show how strategies derive the subgoals.
• Step 4: List evidence that each goal is satisfied or where the goal needs to be
satisfied.
Recall again the four steps from STORM’s STPA-Sec analysis (repeated here for ease of
reading).
• Step 1: Define the purpose of the analysis.
• Step 2: Model the control structure.
• Step 3: Identify unsafe control actions.
• Step 4: Identify loss scenarios.
Goals Must Match Stakeholder Needs The AC methodology does not make the
stakeholder needs explicit in the analysis. It describes a goal-by-goal process. Goals are
determined based on the analyst’s experience. On the other hand, the STPA/STPA-Sec
analysis of STORM describes a system-level process. It begins at the top-level of the
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system and derives the goals explicitly based on stakeholder needs and the concept of
assets and asset loss minimization. To put this in more down to earth terms, I may
have achieved the goal of preventing the ship from sinking. But, what happens if I am
on a plane?
A Philosophy for How Hazards And Vulnerabilities Occur Is Necessary to
Identify Them The AC methodology provides no guidance for how to identify
hazards and vulnerabilities. It lacks a clear philosophy of what causes them.
STPA/STPA-Sec, on the other hand, is founded on the STAMP philosophy that
hazards and vulnerabilities are caused by unsafe control actions in addition to process
model failures and component failures. This philosophy is founded on years of research
by MIT Professor Nancy Leveson who is an expert in accident analysis.
A System-level Model Is Necessary to Identify Hazards and Vulnerabilities
The AC Methodology provides no system-level model. But a model is necessary to
envision how parts of the system interact and to search for hazards and vulnerabilities.
STPA does this. Step 2 diagrams a functional control model that is based on the
STAMP philosophy. This model focuses on the component processes (component-level
analyses) and process interactions (system-level analyses).
The Analysis Must Be Thorough And Consider All Potential Hazards And
Vulnerabilities The AC Methodology identifies hazards and vulnerabilities based on
goals that are derived from the analyst’s experiences. But any large-scale analysis is
multi-faceted and complex. Humans in all their greatness still require guidance to
ensure thoroughness. STPA/STPA-Sec delineates a comprehensive set of categories of
unsafe control actions. This guides the analyst to think about each type of action and
how it could cause a hazard or vulnerability in the worse-case scenario. Furthermore,
the Thomas method systematically addresses all combinations of system state and
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action that could cause an UCA.
Documentation Is Important! What the AC Methodology does and does well is
document that each assurance case is satisfied. It does so by stating explicitly a goal
and its subgoals and then documents evidence that the goal is met (the assurance case
is satisfied) or that the goal requires attention (assurance case needs to be satisfied).
STORM also documents the goal and subgoals in steps 1 through 4. But it does not
explicitly state evidence that a subgoal is met (a rationale implemented) or needs to be
met. CSBD does this, but only for the security triad confidentiality, integrity, and
availability (CIA).
Adding this evidence requirement to the STPA/STPA-Sec component of STORM would
complete its documentation. This could be done by adding another column in the step
4 tables. This column would document evidence wherein the rationale is satisfied or not
and possibly assign responsibility to an analyst.
Demonstrating Compliance And Stakeholder Needs Are Met Is Important
What the AC Methodology also does well is demonstrate compliance easily using a goal
tree structure, which maps the goal from the top-level through each subgoal and to the
evidence. It is organized and easy to see that a goal is satisfied. This is often necessary
to demonstrate explicitly that the system satisfies stakeholder needs or complies with
regulations. The STPA/STPA-Sec analysis of STORM satisfies the goal and each goal
can be traced through the top-level analysis through to the subgoals. But the direct
link connecting each top goal to evidence of rationale is not documented explicitly. It
requires the analyst to sort through the many tables and pick out the specific subgoals
and rationale that satisfy each goal.
Generating a goal tree in the STPA/STPA-Sec for each top-level goal would explicitly
demonstrate that stakeholder needs are met and that the system complies with
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regulations. This would be straight forward if the STPA/STPA-Sec analysis were
automated because the goal (losses or system-level constraints) could be selected where
the automation process would select all subgoals (unsafe control actions) and
rationale/evidence and generate a goal tree.
Otherwise, the analyst should explicitly draw-out the goal tree to document that the
system requirements are met. This could be done in a limited capacity. For example,
goal trees could be drawn for high level risks, risks with stringent compliance
regulations, or for stakeholder needs that are of greatest value.
These two documentation activities would solidify the overall trustworthiness of the
system or mission by developing and demonstrating the assurance cases. It would also
help analysts see the connections between the goal and the solution, and generate
greater confidence in the CONOPS. It may even shine light on weaknesses of the
analysis. If rationale were assigned to individuals, these two activities would aid in
accountability. The system or mission would also be easier to audit because assurance
cases would be explicit and easy to read.1
STORM is an effective methodology for developing CONOPS that meet stakeholder
needs and conform to the SSE Framework. But it could be made better. The
suggestions here would extend STORM to a more comprehensive system and mission
assurance methodology by bringing it into compliance with the NIST SP 800-37 risk
management framework and strengthening the trustworthiness component of the SSE
Framework.
The next chapter discusses future work on the patrol base operations and STORM.




This chapter suggests some ideas for future work on the material discussed in this thesis.
11.1 Patrol Base Operations
Any thorough analysis of any system or mission requires not only someone who
understands the analysis methodology but also someone who understands the system or
mission. This thesis began as a demonstration of STORM on a non-automated,
human-centered system. The CSBD was partially worked through with a subject
matter expert in military operations. The STPA analysis was not. It would be useful to
work through the analysis rigorously with an expert and a purpose (i.e., to identify
mission improvements) and to extend the analysis through to develop new CONOPS. It
is likely that CONOPS in the mission could be improved, as hinted at by the subject
matter expert on this project. However, at this time, no such analysis is planned.
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11.2 CSBD on Patrol Base Operations
At the time of this thesis CSBD has three parametrizable SSMs. The simplest one was
demonstrated in this thesis. The other two add a vertical refinement to the model and
are discussed next.
11.2.0.1 Authentication
Authentication for our model of the patrol base operations is assumed through visual
recognition of an authority. This was done to simplify the analysis. But CSBD has a
parametrizable SSM that allows for a cryptographic authentication function. This
function requires that transitions are executed if and only if symmetric or asymmetric
keys are verified. Such keys could be used on future models of the patrol base
operations.
11.2.0.2 Roles
Authentication for our model of the patrol base operations also assumed authorities
with names such as Platoon Leader and Platoon Sergeant. But these are roles and it is
the actual people acting in these roles that are issuing commands (i.e., Captain Jane
Smith acting as Platoon Leader). A parametrized version of an SSM which accounts for
people acting in roles also exits and could be used on future models of the patrol base
operations.
11.3 STORM
STORM could be made more user friendly through automation.
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11.3.1 Automation
Pen and paper analysis are cumbersome, especially for large projects. They are also
difficult to collaborate on and to disseminate. But automation solves that task. A
STORM user application would facilitate analysis by queuing analysts for specific
information, verifying assurance proofs, and generating documentation. Furthermore,
all the data would be contained in a database that could be easily searched by humans
or artificial intelligence algorithms and easily shared on the cloud with other analysts,
stakeholders, and auditors.
Efforts to automate STPA/STPA-Sec and CSBD have already been undertaken. An
automated version of STPA, STPA-Sec, and STPA-Priv (for privacy) were developed by
Asim Abdulkhaleq and Stefan Wagner [19]. Their tool called XSTAMPP allowed the
user to generate lists for losses and vulnerabilities, draw a functional model of the
system, describe unsafe control actions, and input rationale. Parts of the analysis were
automated.
CSBD has been partially automated. Fully automated theorem proving remains a hard
problem in computer science. However, the parametrization of secure state machines in
HOL makes automation for this subset of theorem proving problems straight forward.
Some of the proofs in this thesis were verified with HOL script files automatically
generated in Haskell.
With the components of STORM built into a computer application, analysts could open
up an app on their computer or iPad, draw their system, functional control model, and
SSM. They would be prompted by a form that asks for information about stakeholders,
assets, losses, hazards, vulnerabilities, and unsafe control actions. Additional prompts
would ask for rationale on how to mitigate the problem. The form could also ask for
evidence to demonstrate the problem is solved or assign such a task to other team
members. In addition, a form would require information about access-control policies
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and controllers. The application would then link information to the diagrams and
generate proofs of complete mediation. Upon request, a variety of forms could be
generated to demonstrate compliance or to dissiminate the CONOPS to leaders and
team members.
The information could be saved in a database on the web which could be searched and
disseminated. Anyone with an internet connection and access rights could access the
information, allowing for cross-organizational collaboration and thus greater visibility.
Such an application would eliminate redundancy because analysts could search the cloud
for previously analyzed or developed CONOPS and reuse or modify and reuse them.
Furthermore, the application could automatically generate requests for mission approval
and resources. Any number of things could be done once the system is automated. This
would save time, resources, and effort and lead to more accurate reporting.
Automating STORM and adding components of the RMF and AC Methodology would
make STORM a more comprehensive and analyst friendly system and mission assurance
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| (eqn) num num
| (lte) num num
| (lt) num num
Kripke =
KS (’aavar -> ’aaworld -> bool)




| (meet) (’apn Princ) (’apn Princ)
| (quoting) (’apn Princ) (’apn Princ) ;
IntLevel = iLab ’il | il ’apn ;





` 8 Intp Jfn ilmap slmap.
imapKS (KS Intp Jfn ilmap slmap) = ilmap
[intpKS_def]
` 8 Intp Jfn ilmap slmap.
intpKS (KS Intp Jfn ilmap slmap) = Intp
[jKS_def]
` 8 Intp Jfn ilmap slmap. jKS (KS Intp Jfn ilmap slmap) = Jfn
[O1_def]
` O1 = PO one_weakorder
[one_weakorder_def]
` 8 x y. one_weakorder x y () T
[po_TY_DEF]
` 9 rep. TYPE_DEFINITION WeakOrder rep
[po_tybij]
` (8 a. PO (repPO a) = a) ^
8 r. WeakOrder r () (repPO (PO r) = r)
[prod_PO_def]
` 8PO1 PO2.
prod_PO PO1 PO2 = PO (RPROD (repPO PO1) (repPO PO2))
[smapKS_def]
` 8 Intp Jfn ilmap slmap.
smapKS (KS Intp Jfn ilmap slmap) = slmap
[Subset_PO_def]
` Subset_PO = PO (✓)
1.3 Theorems
[abs_po11]
` 8 r r 0.
WeakOrder r ) WeakOrder r 0 ) ((PO r = PO r 0) () (r = r 0))
[absPO_fn_onto]




` 8 r s.
antisymmetric r ^ antisymmetric s )








` 8 r. WeakOrder r () 9 a. r = repPO a
[po_bij]
` (8 a. PO (repPO a) = a) ^
8 r. WeakOrder r () (repPO (PO r) = r)
[PO_repPO]
` 8 a. PO (repPO a) = a
[refl_prod_refl]
` 8 r s. reflexive r ^ reflexive s ) reflexive (RPROD r s)
[repPO_iPO_partial_order]
` (8 x. repPO iPO x x) ^
(8 x y. repPO iPO x y ^ repPO iPO y x ) (x = y)) ^
8 x y z. repPO iPO x y ^ repPO iPO y z ) repPO iPO x z
[repPO_O1]
` repPO O1 = one_weakorder
[repPO_prod_PO]
` 8 po1 po2.
repPO (prod_PO po1 po2) = RPROD (repPO po1) (repPO po2)
[repPO_Subset_PO]
` repPO Subset_PO = (✓)
[RPROD_THM]
` 8 r s a b.






` 8 r s. transitive r ^ transitive s ) transitive (RPROD r s)
[WeakOrder_Exists]
` 9R. WeakOrder R
[WO_prod_WO]
` 8 r s. WeakOrder r ^ WeakOrder s ) WeakOrder (RPROD r s)
[WO_repPO]
` 8 r. WeakOrder r () (repPO (PO r) = r)
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` (8Oi Os M . Efn Oi Os M TT = U(:’v)) ^
(8Oi Os M . Efn Oi Os M FF = { }) ^
(8Oi Os M p. Efn Oi Os M (prop p) = intpKS M p) ^
(8Oi Os M f .
Efn Oi Os M (notf f ) = U(:’v) DIFF Efn Oi Os M f ) ^
(8Oi Os M f1 f2.
Efn Oi Os M (f1 andf f2) =
Efn Oi Os M f1 \ Efn Oi Os M f2) ^
(8Oi Os M f1 f2.
Efn Oi Os M (f1 orf f2) =
Efn Oi Os M f1 [ Efn Oi Os M f2) ^
(8Oi Os M f1 f2.
Efn Oi Os M (f1 impf f2) =
U(:’v) DIFF Efn Oi Os M f1 [ Efn Oi Os M f2) ^
(8Oi Os M f1 f2.
Efn Oi Os M (f1 eqf f2) =
(U(:’v) DIFF Efn Oi Os M f1 [ Efn Oi Os M f2) \
(U(:’v) DIFF Efn Oi Os M f2 [ Efn Oi Os M f1)) ^
(8Oi Os M P f .
Efn Oi Os M (P says f ) =
{w | Jext (jKS M ) P w ✓ Efn Oi Os M f }) ^
(8Oi Os M P Q.
Efn Oi Os M (P speaks_for Q) =
6
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if Jext (jKS M ) Q RSUBSET Jext (jKS M ) P then U(:’v)
else { }) ^
(8Oi Os M P f .
Efn Oi Os M (P controls f ) =
U(:’v) DIFF {w | Jext (jKS M ) P w ✓ Efn Oi Os M f } [
Efn Oi Os M f ) ^
(8Oi Os M P Q f .
Efn Oi Os M (reps P Q f ) =
U(:’v) DIFF
{w | Jext (jKS M ) (P quoting Q) w ✓ Efn Oi Os M f } [
{w | Jext (jKS M ) Q w ✓ Efn Oi Os M f }) ^
(8Oi Os M intl1 intl2.
Efn Oi Os M (intl1 domi intl2) =
if repPO Oi (Lifn M intl2) (Lifn M intl1) then U(:’v)
else { }) ^
(8Oi Os M intl2 intl1.
Efn Oi Os M (intl2 eqi intl1) =
(if repPO Oi (Lifn M intl2) (Lifn M intl1) then U(:’v)
else { }) \
if repPO Oi (Lifn M intl1) (Lifn M intl2) then U(:’v)
else { }) ^
(8Oi Os M secl1 secl2.
Efn Oi Os M (secl1 doms secl2) =
if repPO Os (Lsfn M secl2) (Lsfn M secl1) then U(:’v)
else { }) ^
(8Oi Os M secl2 secl1.
Efn Oi Os M (secl2 eqs secl1) =
(if repPO Os (Lsfn M secl2) (Lsfn M secl1) then U(:’v)
else { }) \
if repPO Os (Lsfn M secl1) (Lsfn M secl2) then U(:’v)
else { }) ^
(8Oi Os M numExp1 numExp2.
Efn Oi Os M (numExp1 eqn numExp2) =
if numExp1 = numExp2 then U(:’v) else { }) ^
(8Oi Os M numExp1 numExp2.
Efn Oi Os M (numExp1 lte numExp2) =
if numExp1  numExp2 then U(:’v) else { }) ^
8Oi Os M numExp1 numExp2.
Efn Oi Os M (numExp1 lt numExp2) =
if numExp1 < numExp2 then U(:’v) else { }
[Jext_def]
` (8 J s. Jext J (Name s) = J s) ^
(8 J P1 P2.
Jext J (P1 meet P2) = Jext J P1 RUNION Jext J P2) ^
8 J P1 P2. Jext J (P1 quoting P2) = Jext J P2 O Jext J P1
[Lifn_def]
` (8M l. Lifn M (iLab l) = l) ^




` (8M l. Lsfn M (sLab l) = l) ^
8M name. Lsfn M (sl name) = smapKS M name
2.2 Theorems
[andf_def]
` 8Oi Os M f1 f2.
Efn Oi Os M (f1 andf f2) = Efn Oi Os M f1 \ Efn Oi Os M f2
[controls_def]
` 8Oi Os M P f .
Efn Oi Os M (P controls f ) =
U(:’v) DIFF {w | Jext (jKS M ) P w ✓ Efn Oi Os M f } [
Efn Oi Os M f
[controls_says]
` 8M P f .
Efn Oi Os M (P controls f ) = Efn Oi Os M (P says f impf f )
[domi_def]
` 8Oi Os M intl1 intl2.
Efn Oi Os M (intl1 domi intl2) =
if repPO Oi (Lifn M intl2) (Lifn M intl1) then U(:’v)
else { }
[doms_def]
` 8Oi Os M secl1 secl2.
Efn Oi Os M (secl1 doms secl2) =
if repPO Os (Lsfn M secl2) (Lsfn M secl1) then U(:’v)
else { }
[eqf_def]
` 8Oi Os M f1 f2.
Efn Oi Os M (f1 eqf f2) =
(U(:’v) DIFF Efn Oi Os M f1 [ Efn Oi Os M f2) \
(U(:’v) DIFF Efn Oi Os M f2 [ Efn Oi Os M f1)
[eqf_impf]
` 8M f1 f2.
Efn Oi Os M (f1 eqf f2) =




` 8Oi Os M intl2 intl1.
Efn Oi Os M (intl2 eqi intl1) =
(if repPO Oi (Lifn M intl2) (Lifn M intl1) then U(:’v)
else { }) \
if repPO Oi (Lifn M intl1) (Lifn M intl2) then U(:’v)
else { }
[eqi_domi]
` 8M intL1 intL2.
Efn Oi Os M (intL1 eqi intL2) =
Efn Oi Os M (intL2 domi intL1 andf intL1 domi intL2)
[eqn_def]
` 8Oi Os M numExp1 numExp2.
Efn Oi Os M (numExp1 eqn numExp2) =
if numExp1 = numExp2 then U(:’v) else { }
[eqs_def]
` 8Oi Os M secl2 secl1.
Efn Oi Os M (secl2 eqs secl1) =
(if repPO Os (Lsfn M secl2) (Lsfn M secl1) then U(:’v)
else { }) \
if repPO Os (Lsfn M secl1) (Lsfn M secl2) then U(:’v)
else { }
[eqs_doms]
` 8M secL1 secL2.
Efn Oi Os M (secL1 eqs secL2) =
Efn Oi Os M (secL2 doms secL1 andf secL1 doms secL2)
[FF_def]
` 8Oi Os M . Efn Oi Os M FF = { }
[impf_def]
` 8Oi Os M f1 f2.
Efn Oi Os M (f1 impf f2) =
U(:’v) DIFF Efn Oi Os M f1 [ Efn Oi Os M f2
[lt_def]
` 8Oi Os M numExp1 numExp2.
Efn Oi Os M (numExp1 lt numExp2) =
if numExp1 < numExp2 then U(:’v) else { }
[lte_def]
` 8Oi Os M numExp1 numExp2.
Efn Oi Os M (numExp1 lte numExp2) =




` 8 J P1 P2. Jext J (P1 meet P2) = Jext J P1 RUNION Jext J P2
[name_def]
` 8 J s. Jext J (Name s) = J s
[notf_def]
` 8Oi Os M f . Efn Oi Os M (notf f ) = U(:’v) DIFF Efn Oi Os M f
[orf_def]
` 8Oi Os M f1 f2.
Efn Oi Os M (f1 orf f2) = Efn Oi Os M f1 [ Efn Oi Os M f2
[prop_def]
` 8Oi Os M p. Efn Oi Os M (prop p) = intpKS M p
[quoting_def]
` 8 J P1 P2. Jext J (P1 quoting P2) = Jext J P2 O Jext J P1
[reps_def]
` 8Oi Os M P Q f .
Efn Oi Os M (reps P Q f ) =
U(:’v) DIFF
{w | Jext (jKS M ) (P quoting Q) w ✓ Efn Oi Os M f } [
{w | Jext (jKS M ) Q w ✓ Efn Oi Os M f }
[says_def]
` 8Oi Os M P f .
Efn Oi Os M (P says f ) =
{w | Jext (jKS M ) P w ✓ Efn Oi Os M f }
[speaks_for_def]
` 8Oi Os M P Q.
Efn Oi Os M (P speaks_for Q) =
if Jext (jKS M ) Q RSUBSET Jext (jKS M ) P then U(:’v)
else { }
[TT_def]
` 8Oi Os M . Efn Oi Os M TT = U(:’v)
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` 8M Oi Os f . (M ,Oi,Os) sat f () (Efn Oi Os M f = U(:’world))
3.2 Theorems
[And_Says]
` 8M Oi Os P Q f .
(M ,Oi,Os) sat P meet Q says f eqf P says f andf Q says f
[And_Says_Eq]
` (M ,Oi,Os) sat P meet Q says f ()
(M ,Oi,Os) sat P says f andf Q says f
[and_says_lemma]
` 8M Oi Os P Q f .
(M ,Oi,Os) sat P meet Q says f impf P says f andf Q says f
[Controls_Eq]
` 8M Oi Os P f .
(M ,Oi,Os) sat P controls f () (M ,Oi,Os) sat P says f impf f
[DIFF_UNIV_SUBSET]
` (U(:’a) DIFF s [ t = U(:’a)) () s ✓ t
[domi_antisymmetric]
` 8M Oi Os l1 l2.
(M ,Oi,Os) sat l1 domi l2 )
(M ,Oi,Os) sat l2 domi l1 )
(M ,Oi,Os) sat l1 eqi l2
[domi_reflexive]
` 8M Oi Os l. (M ,Oi,Os) sat l domi l
[domi_transitive]
` 8M Oi Os l1 l2 l3.
(M ,Oi,Os) sat l1 domi l2 )
(M ,Oi,Os) sat l2 domi l3 )
(M ,Oi,Os) sat l1 domi l3
[doms_antisymmetric]
` 8M Oi Os l1 l2.
(M ,Oi,Os) sat l1 doms l2 )
(M ,Oi,Os) sat l2 doms l1 )




` 8M Oi Os l. (M ,Oi,Os) sat l doms l
[doms_transitive]
` 8M Oi Os l1 l2 l3.
(M ,Oi,Os) sat l1 doms l2 )
(M ,Oi,Os) sat l2 doms l3 )
(M ,Oi,Os) sat l1 doms l3
[eqf_and_impf]
` 8M Oi Os f1 f2.
(M ,Oi,Os) sat f1 eqf f2 ()
(M ,Oi,Os) sat (f1 impf f2) andf (f2 impf f1)
[eqf_andf1]
` 8M Oi Os f f 0 g.
(M ,Oi,Os) sat f eqf f 0 )
(M ,Oi,Os) sat f andf g )
(M ,Oi,Os) sat f 0 andf g
[eqf_andf2]
` 8M Oi Os f f 0 g.
(M ,Oi,Os) sat f eqf f 0 )
(M ,Oi,Os) sat g andf f )
(M ,Oi,Os) sat g andf f 0
[eqf_controls]
` 8M Oi Os P f f 0.
(M ,Oi,Os) sat f eqf f 0 )
(M ,Oi,Os) sat P controls f )
(M ,Oi,Os) sat P controls f 0
[eqf_eq]
` (Efn Oi Os M (f1 eqf f2) = U(:’b)) ()
(Efn Oi Os M f1 = Efn Oi Os M f2)
[eqf_eqf1]
` 8M Oi Os f f 0 g.
(M ,Oi,Os) sat f eqf f 0 )
(M ,Oi,Os) sat f eqf g )
(M ,Oi,Os) sat f 0 eqf g
[eqf_eqf2]
` 8M Oi Os f f 0 g.
(M ,Oi,Os) sat f eqf f 0 )
(M ,Oi,Os) sat g eqf f )




` 8M Oi Os f f 0 g.
(M ,Oi,Os) sat f eqf f 0 )
(M ,Oi,Os) sat f impf g )
(M ,Oi,Os) sat f 0 impf g
[eqf_impf2]
` 8M Oi Os f f 0 g.
(M ,Oi,Os) sat f eqf f 0 )
(M ,Oi,Os) sat g impf f )
(M ,Oi,Os) sat g impf f 0
[eqf_notf]
` 8M Oi Os f f 0.
(M ,Oi,Os) sat f eqf f 0 )
(M ,Oi,Os) sat notf f )
(M ,Oi,Os) sat notf f 0
[eqf_orf1]
` 8M Oi Os f f 0 g.
(M ,Oi,Os) sat f eqf f 0 )
(M ,Oi,Os) sat f orf g )
(M ,Oi,Os) sat f 0 orf g
[eqf_orf2]
` 8M Oi Os f f 0 g.
(M ,Oi,Os) sat f eqf f 0 )
(M ,Oi,Os) sat g orf f )
(M ,Oi,Os) sat g orf f 0
[eqf_reps]
` 8M Oi Os P Q f f 0.
(M ,Oi,Os) sat f eqf f 0 )
(M ,Oi,Os) sat reps P Q f )
(M ,Oi,Os) sat reps P Q f 0
[eqf_sat]
` 8M Oi Os f1 f2.
(M ,Oi,Os) sat f1 eqf f2 )
((M ,Oi,Os) sat f1 () (M ,Oi,Os) sat f2)
[eqf_says]
` 8M Oi Os P f f 0.
(M ,Oi,Os) sat f eqf f 0 )
(M ,Oi,Os) sat P says f )




` 8M Oi Os l1 l2.
(M ,Oi,Os) sat l1 eqi l2 ()
(M ,Oi,Os) sat l2 domi l1 andf l1 domi l2
[eqs_Eq]
` 8M Oi Os l1 l2.
(M ,Oi,Os) sat l1 eqs l2 ()
(M ,Oi,Os) sat l2 doms l1 andf l1 doms l2
[Idemp_Speaks_For]
` 8M Oi Os P. (M ,Oi,Os) sat P speaks_for P
[Image_cmp]
` 8R1 R2 R3 u. (R1 O R2) u ✓ R3 () R2 u ✓ {y | R1 y ✓ R3 }
[Image_SUBSET]
` 8R1 R2. R2 RSUBSET R1 ) 8w. R2 w ✓ R1 w
[Image_UNION]
` 8R1 R2 w. (R1 RUNION R2) w = R1 w [ R2 w
[INTER_EQ_UNIV]
` (s \ t = U(:’a)) () (s = U(:’a)) ^ (t = U(:’a))
[Modus_Ponens]
` 8M Oi Os f1 f2.
(M ,Oi,Os) sat f1 )
(M ,Oi,Os) sat f1 impf f2 )
(M ,Oi,Os) sat f2
[Mono_speaks_for]
` 8M Oi Os P P 0 Q Q 0.
(M ,Oi,Os) sat P speaks_for P 0 )
(M ,Oi,Os) sat Q speaks_for Q 0 )
(M ,Oi,Os) sat P quoting Q speaks_for P 0 quoting Q 0
[MP_Says]
` 8M Oi Os P f1 f2.
(M ,Oi,Os) sat
P says (f1 impf f2) impf P says f1 impf P says f2
[Quoting]
` 8M Oi Os P Q f .




` 8M Oi Os P Q f .
(M ,Oi,Os) sat P quoting Q says f ()
(M ,Oi,Os) sat P says Q says f
[reps_def_lemma]
` 8M Oi Os P Q f .
Efn Oi Os M (reps P Q f ) =
Efn Oi Os M (P quoting Q says f impf Q says f )
[Reps_Eq]
` 8M Oi Os P Q f .
(M ,Oi,Os) sat reps P Q f ()
(M ,Oi,Os) sat P quoting Q says f impf Q says f
[sat_allworld]
` 8M f . (M ,Oi,Os) sat f () 8w. w 2 Efn Oi Os M f
[sat_andf_eq_and_sat]
` (M ,Oi,Os) sat f1 andf f2 ()
(M ,Oi,Os) sat f1 ^ (M ,Oi,Os) sat f2
[sat_TT]
` (M ,Oi,Os) sat TT
[Says]
` 8M Oi Os P f . (M ,Oi,Os) sat f ) (M ,Oi,Os) sat P says f
[says_and_lemma]
` 8M Oi Os P Q f .
(M ,Oi,Os) sat P says f andf Q says f impf P meet Q says f
[Speaks_For]
` 8M Oi Os P Q f .
(M ,Oi,Os) sat P speaks_for Q impf P says f impf Q says f
[speaks_for_SUBSET]
` 8R3 R2 R1.
R2 RSUBSET R1 ) 8w. {w | R1 w ✓ R3 } ✓ {w | R2 w ✓ R3 }
[SUBSET_Image_SUBSET]
` 8R1 R2 R3.
(8w1. R2 w1 ✓ R1 w1) )




` 8M Oi Os P Q R.
(M ,Oi,Os) sat P speaks_for Q )
(M ,Oi,Os) sat Q speaks_for R )
(M ,Oi,Os) sat P speaks_for R
[UNIV_DIFF_SUBSET]
` 8R1 R2. R1 ✓ R2 ) (U(:’a) DIFF R1 [ R2 = U(:’a))
[world_and]
` 8M Oi Os f1 f2 w.
w 2 Efn Oi Os M (f1 andf f2) ()
w 2 Efn Oi Os M f1 ^ w 2 Efn Oi Os M f2
[world_eq]
` 8M Oi Os f1 f2 w.
w 2 Efn Oi Os M (f1 eqf f2) ()
(w 2 Efn Oi Os M f1 () w 2 Efn Oi Os M f2)
[world_eqn]
` 8M Oi Os n1 n2 w. w 2 Efn Oi Os m (n1 eqn n2) () (n1 = n2)
[world_F]
` 8M Oi Os w. w /2 Efn Oi Os M FF
[world_imp]
` 8M Oi Os f1 f2 w.
w 2 Efn Oi Os M (f1 impf f2) ()
w 2 Efn Oi Os M f1 ) w 2 Efn Oi Os M f2
[world_lt]
` 8M Oi Os n1 n2 w. w 2 Efn Oi Os m (n1 lt n2) () n1 < n2
[world_lte]
` 8M Oi Os n1 n2 w. w 2 Efn Oi Os m (n1 lte n2) () n1  n2
[world_not]
` 8M Oi Os f w. w 2 Efn Oi Os M (notf f ) () w /2 Efn Oi Os M f
[world_or]
` 8M f1 f2 w.
w 2 Efn Oi Os M (f1 orf f2) ()
w 2 Efn Oi Os M f1 _ w 2 Efn Oi Os M f2
[world_says]
` 8M Oi Os P f w.
w 2 Efn Oi Os M (P says f ) ()
8 v. v 2 Jext (jKS M ) P w ) v 2 Efn Oi Os M f
[world_T]








` 8M Oi Os f1 f2.
(M ,Oi,Os) sat f1 )
(M ,Oi,Os) sat f2 )
(M ,Oi,Os) sat f1 andf f2
[Controls]
` 8M Oi Os P f .
(M ,Oi,Os) sat P says f )
(M ,Oi,Os) sat P controls f )
(M ,Oi,Os) sat f
[Derived_Controls]
` 8M Oi Os P Q f .
(M ,Oi,Os) sat P speaks_for Q )
(M ,Oi,Os) sat Q controls f )
(M ,Oi,Os) sat P controls f
[Derived_Speaks_For]
` 8M Oi Os P Q f .
(M ,Oi,Os) sat P speaks_for Q )
(M ,Oi,Os) sat P says f )
(M ,Oi,Os) sat Q says f
[Disjunction1]
` 8M Oi Os f1 f2. (M ,Oi,Os) sat f1 ) (M ,Oi,Os) sat f1 orf f2
[Disjunction2]
` 8M Oi Os f1 f2. (M ,Oi,Os) sat f2 ) (M ,Oi,Os) sat f1 orf f2
[Disjunctive_Syllogism]
` 8M Oi Os f1 f2.
(M ,Oi,Os) sat f1 orf f2 )
(M ,Oi,Os) sat notf f1 )
(M ,Oi,Os) sat f2
[Double_Negation]




` (M ,Oi,Os) sat c1 eqn n1 )
(M ,Oi,Os) sat c2 eqn n2 )
(M ,Oi,Os) sat n1 eqn n2 )
(M ,Oi,Os) sat c1 eqn c2
[eqn_lt]
` (M ,Oi,Os) sat c1 eqn n1 )
(M ,Oi,Os) sat c2 eqn n2 )
(M ,Oi,Os) sat n1 lt n2 )
(M ,Oi,Os) sat c1 lt c2
[eqn_lte]
` (M ,Oi,Os) sat c1 eqn n1 )
(M ,Oi,Os) sat c2 eqn n2 )
(M ,Oi,Os) sat n1 lte n2 )
(M ,Oi,Os) sat c1 lte c2
[Hypothetical_Syllogism]
` 8M Oi Os f1 f2 f3.
(M ,Oi,Os) sat f1 impf f2 )
(M ,Oi,Os) sat f2 impf f3 )
(M ,Oi,Os) sat f1 impf f3
[il_domi]
` 8M Oi Os P Q l1 l2.
(M ,Oi,Os) sat il P eqi l1 )
(M ,Oi,Os) sat il Q eqi l2 )
(M ,Oi,Os) sat l2 domi l1 )
(M ,Oi,Os) sat il Q domi il P
[INTER_EQ_UNIV]
` 8 s1 s2. (s1 \ s2 = U(:’a)) () (s1 = U(:’a)) ^ (s2 = U(:’a))
[Modus_Tollens]
` 8M Oi Os f1 f2.
(M ,Oi,Os) sat f1 impf f2 )
(M ,Oi,Os) sat notf f2 )
(M ,Oi,Os) sat notf f1
[Rep_Controls_Eq]
` 8M Oi Os A B f .
(M ,Oi,Os) sat reps A B f ()




` 8M Oi Os P Q f .
(M ,Oi,Os) sat reps P Q f )
(M ,Oi,Os) sat P quoting Q says f )
(M ,Oi,Os) sat Q says f
[Reps]
` 8M Oi Os P Q f .
(M ,Oi,Os) sat reps P Q f )
(M ,Oi,Os) sat P quoting Q says f )
(M ,Oi,Os) sat Q controls f )
(M ,Oi,Os) sat f
[Says_Simplification1]
` 8M Oi Os P f1 f2.
(M ,Oi,Os) sat P says (f1 andf f2) ) (M ,Oi,Os) sat P says f1
[Says_Simplification2]
` 8M Oi Os P f1 f2.
(M ,Oi,Os) sat P says (f1 andf f2) ) (M ,Oi,Os) sat P says f2
[Simplification1]
` 8M Oi Os f1 f2. (M ,Oi,Os) sat f1 andf f2 ) (M ,Oi,Os) sat f1
[Simplification2]
` 8M Oi Os f1 f2. (M ,Oi,Os) sat f1 andf f2 ) (M ,Oi,Os) sat f2
[sl_doms]
` 8M Oi Os P Q l1 l2.
(M ,Oi,Os) sat sl P eqs l1 )
(M ,Oi,Os) sat sl Q eqs l2 )
(M ,Oi,Os) sat l2 doms l1 )
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Parent Theories: indexedLists, patternMatches
1.1 Datatypes
command = ESCc escCommand | SLc ’slCommand
escCommand = returnToBase | changeMission | resupply
| reactToContact
escOutput = ReturnToBase | ChangeMission | Resupply
| ReactToContact
escState = RTB | CM | RESUPPLY | RTC
output = ESCo escOutput | SLo ’slOutput
principal = SR ’stateRole
state = ESCs escState | SLs ’slState
1.2 Theorems
[command_distinct_clauses]
` 8 a 0 a. ESCc a 6= SLc a 0
[command_one_one]
` (8 a a 0. (ESCc a = ESCc a 0) () (a = a 0)) ^
8 a a 0. (SLc a = SLc a 0) () (a = a 0)
[escCommand_distinct_clauses]
` returnToBase 6= changeMission ^ returnToBase 6= resupply ^
returnToBase 6= reactToContact ^ changeMission 6= resupply ^
changeMission 6= reactToContact ^ resupply 6= reactToContact
[escOutput_distinct_clauses]
` ReturnToBase 6= ChangeMission ^ ReturnToBase 6= Resupply ^
ReturnToBase 6= ReactToContact ^ ChangeMission 6= Resupply ^
ChangeMission 6= ReactToContact ^ Resupply 6= ReactToContact
[escState_distinct_clauses]
` RTB 6= CM ^ RTB 6= RESUPPLY ^ RTB 6= RTC ^ CM 6= RESUPPLY ^




` 8 a 0 a. ESCo a 6= SLo a 0
[output_one_one]
` (8 a a 0. (ESCo a = ESCo a 0) () (a = a 0)) ^
8 a a 0. (SLo a = SLo a 0) () (a = a 0)
[principal_one_one]
` 8 a a 0. (SR a = SR a 0) () (a = a 0)
[state_distinct_clauses]
` 8 a 0 a. ESCs a 6= SLs a 0
[state_one_one]
` (8 a a 0. (ESCs a = ESCs a 0) () (a = a 0)) ^
8 a a 0. (SLs a = SLs a 0) () (a = a 0)
2 ssm11 Theory




CFG ((’command order, ’principal, ’d, ’e) Form -> bool)
(’state -> (’command order, ’principal, ’d, ’e) Form)
((’command order, ’principal, ’d, ’e) Form list)
((’command order, ’principal, ’d, ’e) Form list) ’state
(’output list)
order = SOME ’command | NONE




(  a0 a1 a2 a3.
8TR0.
(8 a0 a1 a2 a3.
(9 authenticationTest P NS M Oi Os Out s
securityContext stateInterp cmd ins outs.









securityContext ins (NS s (exec cmd))
(Out s (exec cmd)::outs)) ^
authenticationTest (P says prop (SOME cmd)) ^
CFGInterpret (M ,Oi,Os)
(CFG authenticationTest stateInterp
securityContext (P says prop (SOME cmd)::ins)
s outs)) _
(9 authenticationTest P NS M Oi Os Out s
securityContext stateInterp cmd ins outs.
(a0 = (M ,Oi,Os)) ^ (a1 = trap cmd) ^
(a2 =
CFG authenticationTest stateInterp




securityContext ins (NS s (trap cmd))
(Out s (trap cmd)::outs)) ^
authenticationTest (P says prop (SOME cmd)) ^
CFGInterpret (M ,Oi,Os)
(CFG authenticationTest stateInterp
securityContext (P says prop (SOME cmd)::ins)
s outs)) _
(9 authenticationTest NS M Oi Os Out s securityContext
stateInterp cmd x ins outs.
(a0 = (M ,Oi,Os)) ^ (a1 = discard cmd) ^
(a2 =
CFG authenticationTest stateInterp
securityContext (x::ins) s outs) ^
(a3 =
CFG authenticationTest stateInterp
securityContext ins (NS s (discard cmd))




a0 a1 a2 a3) )
TR
0
a0 a1 a2 a3)
2.3 Theorems
[CFGInterpret_def]
` CFGInterpret (M ,Oi,Os)
(CFG authenticationTest stateInterp securityContext
(input::ins) state outputStream) ()
5
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(M ,Oi,Os) satList securityContext ^ (M ,Oi,Os) sat input ^
(M ,Oi,Os) sat stateInterp state
[CFGInterpret_ind]
` 8P.
(8M Oi Os authenticationTest stateInterp securityContext
input ins state outputStream.
P (M ,Oi,Os)
(CFG authenticationTest stateInterp securityContext
(input::ins) state outputStream)) ^
(8 v15 v10 v11 v12 v13 v14.
P v15 (CFG v10 v11 v12 [] v13 v14)) )
8 v v1 v2 v3. P (v,v1,v2) v3
[configuration_one_one]
` 8 a0 a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a 00 a 01 a 02 a 03 a 04 a 05.















0) ^ (a1 = a 01) ^ (a2 = a 02) ^ (a3 = a 03) ^
(a4 = a
0
4) ^ (a5 = a 05)
[order_distinct_clauses]
` 8 a. SOME a 6= NONE
[order_one_one]
` 8 a a 0. (SOME a = SOME a 0) () (a = a 0)
[TR_cases]
` 8 a0 a1 a2 a3.
TR a0 a1 a2 a3 ()
(9 authenticationTest P NS M Oi Os Out s securityContext
stateInterp cmd ins outs.
(a0 = (M ,Oi,Os)) ^ (a1 = exec cmd) ^
(a2 =
CFG authenticationTest stateInterp securityContext
(P says prop (SOME cmd)::ins) s outs) ^
(a3 =
CFG authenticationTest stateInterp securityContext ins
(NS s (exec cmd)) (Out s (exec cmd)::outs)) ^
authenticationTest (P says prop (SOME cmd)) ^
CFGInterpret (M ,Oi,Os)
(CFG authenticationTest stateInterp securityContext
(P says prop (SOME cmd)::ins) s outs)) _
(9 authenticationTest P NS M Oi Os Out s securityContext
stateInterp cmd ins outs.
(a0 = (M ,Oi,Os)) ^ (a1 = trap cmd) ^
(a2 =
CFG authenticationTest stateInterp securityContext




CFG authenticationTest stateInterp securityContext ins
(NS s (trap cmd)) (Out s (trap cmd)::outs)) ^
authenticationTest (P says prop (SOME cmd)) ^
CFGInterpret (M ,Oi,Os)
(CFG authenticationTest stateInterp securityContext
(P says prop (SOME cmd)::ins) s outs)) _
9 authenticationTest NS M Oi Os Out s securityContext
stateInterp cmd x ins outs.
(a0 = (M ,Oi,Os)) ^ (a1 = discard cmd) ^
(a2 =
CFG authenticationTest stateInterp securityContext
(x::ins) s outs) ^
(a3 =
CFG authenticationTest stateInterp securityContext ins
(NS s (discard cmd)) (Out s (discard cmd)::outs)) ^
¬authenticationTest x
[TR_discard_cmd_rule]
` TR (M ,Oi,Os) (discard cmd)
(CFG authenticationTest stateInterp securityContext
(x::ins) s outs)
(CFG authenticationTest stateInterp securityContext ins
(NS s (discard cmd)) (Out s (discard cmd)::outs)) ()
¬authenticationTest x
[TR_EQ_rules_thm]
` (TR (M ,Oi,Os) (exec cmd)
(CFG authenticationTest stateInterp securityContext
(P says prop (SOME cmd)::ins) s outs)
(CFG authenticationTest stateInterp securityContext ins
(NS s (exec cmd)) (Out s (exec cmd)::outs)) ()
authenticationTest (P says prop (SOME cmd)) ^
CFGInterpret (M ,Oi,Os)
(CFG authenticationTest stateInterp securityContext
(P says prop (SOME cmd)::ins) s outs)) ^
(TR (M ,Oi,Os) (trap cmd)
(CFG authenticationTest stateInterp securityContext
(P says prop (SOME cmd)::ins) s outs)
(CFG authenticationTest stateInterp securityContext ins
(NS s (trap cmd)) (Out s (trap cmd)::outs)) ()
authenticationTest (P says prop (SOME cmd)) ^
CFGInterpret (M ,Oi,Os)
(CFG authenticationTest stateInterp securityContext
(P says prop (SOME cmd)::ins) s outs)) ^
(TR (M ,Oi,Os) (discard cmd)
(CFG authenticationTest stateInterp securityContext
(x::ins) s outs)
(CFG authenticationTest stateInterp securityContext ins
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(NS s (discard cmd)) (Out s (discard cmd)::outs)) ()
¬authenticationTest x)
[TR_exec_cmd_rule]




(CFG authenticationTest stateInterp securityContext
(P says prop (SOME cmd)::ins) s outs) )
(M ,Oi,Os) sat prop (SOME cmd)) )
8NS Out M Oi Os.
TR (M ,Oi,Os) (exec cmd)
(CFG authenticationTest stateInterp securityContext
(P says prop (SOME cmd)::ins) s outs)
(CFG authenticationTest stateInterp securityContext ins
(NS s (exec cmd)) (Out s (exec cmd)::outs)) ()
authenticationTest (P says prop (SOME cmd)) ^
CFGInterpret (M ,Oi,Os)
(CFG authenticationTest stateInterp securityContext
(P says prop (SOME cmd)::ins) s outs) ^
(M ,Oi,Os) sat prop (SOME cmd)
[TR_ind]
` 8TR0.
(8 authenticationTest P NS M Oi Os Out s securityContext
stateInterp cmd ins outs.
authenticationTest (P says prop (SOME cmd)) ^
CFGInterpret (M ,Oi,Os)
(CFG authenticationTest stateInterp securityContext
(P says prop (SOME cmd)::ins) s outs) )
TR
0 (M ,Oi,Os) (exec cmd)
(CFG authenticationTest stateInterp securityContext
(P says prop (SOME cmd)::ins) s outs)
(CFG authenticationTest stateInterp securityContext
ins (NS s (exec cmd)) (Out s (exec cmd)::outs))) ^
(8 authenticationTest P NS M Oi Os Out s securityContext
stateInterp cmd ins outs.
authenticationTest (P says prop (SOME cmd)) ^
CFGInterpret (M ,Oi,Os)
(CFG authenticationTest stateInterp securityContext
(P says prop (SOME cmd)::ins) s outs) )
TR
0 (M ,Oi,Os) (trap cmd)
(CFG authenticationTest stateInterp securityContext
(P says prop (SOME cmd)::ins) s outs)
(CFG authenticationTest stateInterp securityContext
ins (NS s (trap cmd)) (Out s (trap cmd)::outs))) ^
(8 authenticationTest NS M Oi Os Out s securityContext





0 (M ,Oi,Os) (discard cmd)
(CFG authenticationTest stateInterp securityContext
(x::ins) s outs)
(CFG authenticationTest stateInterp securityContext
ins (NS s (discard cmd))
(Out s (discard cmd)::outs))) )
8 a0 a1 a2 a3. TR a0 a1 a2 a3 ) TR0 a0 a1 a2 a3
[TR_rules]
` (8 authenticationTest P NS M Oi Os Out s securityContext
stateInterp cmd ins outs.
authenticationTest (P says prop (SOME cmd)) ^
CFGInterpret (M ,Oi,Os)
(CFG authenticationTest stateInterp securityContext
(P says prop (SOME cmd)::ins) s outs) )
TR (M ,Oi,Os) (exec cmd)
(CFG authenticationTest stateInterp securityContext
(P says prop (SOME cmd)::ins) s outs)
(CFG authenticationTest stateInterp securityContext ins
(NS s (exec cmd)) (Out s (exec cmd)::outs))) ^
(8 authenticationTest P NS M Oi Os Out s securityContext
stateInterp cmd ins outs.
authenticationTest (P says prop (SOME cmd)) ^
CFGInterpret (M ,Oi,Os)
(CFG authenticationTest stateInterp securityContext
(P says prop (SOME cmd)::ins) s outs) )
TR (M ,Oi,Os) (trap cmd)
(CFG authenticationTest stateInterp securityContext
(P says prop (SOME cmd)::ins) s outs)
(CFG authenticationTest stateInterp securityContext ins
(NS s (trap cmd)) (Out s (trap cmd)::outs))) ^
8 authenticationTest NS M Oi Os Out s securityContext
stateInterp cmd x ins outs.
¬authenticationTest x )
TR (M ,Oi,Os) (discard cmd)
(CFG authenticationTest stateInterp securityContext
(x::ins) s outs)
(CFG authenticationTest stateInterp securityContext ins
(NS s (discard cmd)) (Out s (discard cmd)::outs))
[TR_strongind]
` 8TR0.
(8 authenticationTest P NS M Oi Os Out s securityContext
stateInterp cmd ins outs.
authenticationTest (P says prop (SOME cmd)) ^
CFGInterpret (M ,Oi,Os)
(CFG authenticationTest stateInterp securityContext




0 (M ,Oi,Os) (exec cmd)
(CFG authenticationTest stateInterp securityContext
(P says prop (SOME cmd)::ins) s outs)
(CFG authenticationTest stateInterp securityContext
ins (NS s (exec cmd)) (Out s (exec cmd)::outs))) ^
(8 authenticationTest P NS M Oi Os Out s securityContext
stateInterp cmd ins outs.
authenticationTest (P says prop (SOME cmd)) ^
CFGInterpret (M ,Oi,Os)
(CFG authenticationTest stateInterp securityContext
(P says prop (SOME cmd)::ins) s outs) )
TR
0 (M ,Oi,Os) (trap cmd)
(CFG authenticationTest stateInterp securityContext
(P says prop (SOME cmd)::ins) s outs)
(CFG authenticationTest stateInterp securityContext
ins (NS s (trap cmd)) (Out s (trap cmd)::outs))) ^
(8 authenticationTest NS M Oi Os Out s securityContext
stateInterp cmd x ins outs.
¬authenticationTest x )
TR
0 (M ,Oi,Os) (discard cmd)
(CFG authenticationTest stateInterp securityContext
(x::ins) s outs)
(CFG authenticationTest stateInterp securityContext
ins (NS s (discard cmd))
(Out s (discard cmd)::outs))) )
8 a0 a1 a2 a3. TR a0 a1 a2 a3 ) TR0 a0 a1 a2 a3
[TR_trap_cmd_rule]




(CFG authenticationTest stateInterp securityContext
(P says prop (SOME cmd)::ins) s outs) )
(M ,Oi,Os) sat prop NONE) )
8NS Out M Oi Os.
TR (M ,Oi,Os) (trap cmd)
(CFG authenticationTest stateInterp securityContext
(P says prop (SOME cmd)::ins) s outs)
(CFG authenticationTest stateInterp securityContext ins
(NS s (trap cmd)) (Out s (trap cmd)::outs)) ()
authenticationTest (P says prop (SOME cmd)) ^
CFGInterpret (M ,Oi,Os)
(CFG authenticationTest stateInterp securityContext
(P says prop (SOME cmd)::ins) s outs) ^
(M ,Oi,Os) sat prop NONE
[TRrule0]
` TR (M ,Oi,Os) (exec cmd)
(CFG authenticationTest stateInterp securityContext
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(P says prop (SOME cmd)::ins) s outs)
(CFG authenticationTest stateInterp securityContext ins
(NS s (exec cmd)) (Out s (exec cmd)::outs)) ()
authenticationTest (P says prop (SOME cmd)) ^
CFGInterpret (M ,Oi,Os)
(CFG authenticationTest stateInterp securityContext
(P says prop (SOME cmd)::ins) s outs)
[TRrule1]
` TR (M ,Oi,Os) (trap cmd)
(CFG authenticationTest stateInterp securityContext
(P says prop (SOME cmd)::ins) s outs)
(CFG authenticationTest stateInterp securityContext ins
(NS s (trap cmd)) (Out s (trap cmd)::outs)) ()
authenticationTest (P says prop (SOME cmd)) ^
CFGInterpret (M ,Oi,Os)
(CFG authenticationTest stateInterp securityContext
(P says prop (SOME cmd)::ins) s outs)
[trType_distinct_clauses]
` (8 a 0 a. discard a 6= trap a 0) ^ (8 a 0 a. discard a 6= exec a 0) ^
8 a 0 a. trap a 6= exec a 0
[trType_one_one]
` (8 a a 0. (discard a = discard a 0) () (a = a 0)) ^
(8 a a 0. (trap a = trap a 0) () (a = a 0)) ^
8 a a 0. (exec a = exec a 0) () (a = a 0)
3 ssm Theory




CFG ((’command option, ’principal, ’d, ’e) Form -> bool)
(’state ->
(’command option, ’principal, ’d, ’e) Form list ->
(’command option, ’principal, ’d, ’e) Form list)
((’command option, ’principal, ’d, ’e) Form list ->
(’command option, ’principal, ’d, ’e) Form list)
((’command option, ’principal, ’d, ’e) Form list list)
’state (’output list)





` 8 elementTest x.
authenticationTest elementTest x ()
FOLDR (  p q. p ^ q) T (MAP elementTest x)
[commandList_def]
` 8 x. commandList x = MAP extractCommand x
[inputList_def]
` 8 xs. inputList xs = MAP extractInput xs
[propCommandList_def]
` 8 x. propCommandList x = MAP extractPropCommand x
[TR_def]
` TR =
(  a0 a1 a2 a3.
8TR0.
(8 a0 a1 a2 a3.
(9 elementTest NS M Oi Os Out s context stateInterp x
ins outs.
(a0 = (M ,Oi,Os)) ^ (a1 = exec (inputList x)) ^
(a2 =
CFG elementTest stateInterp context (x::ins) s
outs) ^
(a3 =
CFG elementTest stateInterp context ins
(NS s (exec (inputList x)))
(Out s (exec (inputList x))::outs)) ^
authenticationTest elementTest x ^
CFGInterpret (M ,Oi,Os)
(CFG elementTest stateInterp context (x::ins) s
outs)) _
(9 elementTest NS M Oi Os Out s context stateInterp x
ins outs.
(a0 = (M ,Oi,Os)) ^ (a1 = trap (inputList x)) ^
(a2 =
CFG elementTest stateInterp context (x::ins) s
outs) ^
(a3 =
CFG elementTest stateInterp context ins
(NS s (trap (inputList x)))
(Out s (trap (inputList x))::outs)) ^
authenticationTest elementTest x ^
CFGInterpret (M ,Oi,Os)




(9 elementTest NS M Oi Os Out s context stateInterp x
ins outs.
(a0 = (M ,Oi,Os)) ^ (a1 = discard (inputList x)) ^
(a2 =
CFG elementTest stateInterp context (x::ins) s
outs) ^
(a3 =
CFG elementTest stateInterp context ins
(NS s (discard (inputList x)))
(Out s (discard (inputList x))::outs)) ^
¬authenticationTest elementTest x) )
TR
0
a0 a1 a2 a3) )
TR
0
a0 a1 a2 a3)
3.3 Theorems
[CFGInterpret_def]
` CFGInterpret (M ,Oi,Os)
(CFG elementTest stateInterp context (x::ins) state
outStream) ()
(M ,Oi,Os) satList context x ^ (M ,Oi,Os) satList x ^
(M ,Oi,Os) satList stateInterp state x
[CFGInterpret_ind]
` 8P.
(8M Oi Os elementTest stateInterp context x ins state
outStream.
P (M ,Oi,Os)
(CFG elementTest stateInterp context (x::ins) state
outStream)) ^
(8 v15 v10 v11 v12 v13 v14.
P v15 (CFG v10 v11 v12 [] v13 v14)) )
8 v v1 v2 v3. P (v,v1,v2) v3
[configuration_one_one]
` 8 a0 a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a 00 a 01 a 02 a 03 a 04 a 05.















0) ^ (a1 = a 01) ^ (a2 = a 02) ^ (a3 = a 03) ^
(a4 = a
0
4) ^ (a5 = a 05)
[extractCommand_def]
` extractCommand (P says prop (SOME cmd)) = cmd
[extractCommand_ind]
` 8P 0.
(8P cmd. P 0 (P says prop (SOME cmd))) ^ P 0 TT ^ P 0 FF ^
(8 v1. P 0 (prop v1)) ^ (8 v3. P 0 (notf v3)) ^
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(8 v6 v7. P 0 (v6 andf v7)) ^ (8 v10 v11. P 0 (v10 orf v11)) ^
(8 v14 v15. P 0 (v14 impf v15)) ^
(8 v18 v19. P 0 (v18 eqf v19)) ^ (8 v129. P 0 (v129 says TT)) ^
(8 v130. P 0 (v130 says FF)) ^
(8 v132. P 0 (v132 says prop NONE)) ^
(8 v133 v66. P 0 (v133 says notf v66)) ^
(8 v134 v69 v70. P 0 (v134 says (v69 andf v70))) ^
(8 v135 v73 v74. P 0 (v135 says (v73 orf v74))) ^
(8 v136 v77 v78. P 0 (v136 says (v77 impf v78))) ^
(8 v137 v81 v82. P 0 (v137 says (v81 eqf v82))) ^
(8 v138 v85 v86. P 0 (v138 says v85 says v86)) ^
(8 v139 v89 v90. P 0 (v139 says v89 speaks_for v90)) ^
(8 v140 v93 v94. P 0 (v140 says v93 controls v94)) ^
(8 v141 v98 v99 v100. P 0 (v141 says reps v98 v99 v100)) ^
(8 v142 v103 v104. P 0 (v142 says v103 domi v104)) ^
(8 v143 v107 v108. P 0 (v143 says v107 eqi v108)) ^
(8 v144 v111 v112. P 0 (v144 says v111 doms v112)) ^
(8 v145 v115 v116. P 0 (v145 says v115 eqs v116)) ^
(8 v146 v119 v120. P 0 (v146 says v119 eqn v120)) ^
(8 v147 v123 v124. P 0 (v147 says v123 lte v124)) ^
(8 v148 v127 v128. P 0 (v148 says v127 lt v128)) ^
(8 v24 v25. P 0 (v24 speaks_for v25)) ^
(8 v28 v29. P 0 (v28 controls v29)) ^
(8 v33 v34 v35. P 0 (reps v33 v34 v35)) ^
(8 v38 v39. P 0 (v38 domi v39)) ^
(8 v42 v43. P 0 (v42 eqi v43)) ^
(8 v46 v47. P 0 (v46 doms v47)) ^
(8 v50 v51. P 0 (v50 eqs v51)) ^
(8 v54 v55. P 0 (v54 eqn v55)) ^
(8 v58 v59. P 0 (v58 lte v59)) ^
(8 v62 v63. P 0 (v62 lt v63)) )
8 v. P 0 v
[extractInput_def]
` extractInput (P says prop x) = x
[extractInput_ind]
` 8P 0.
(8P x. P 0 (P says prop x)) ^ P 0 TT ^ P 0 FF ^
(8 v1. P 0 (prop v1)) ^ (8 v3. P 0 (notf v3)) ^
(8 v6 v7. P 0 (v6 andf v7)) ^ (8 v10 v11. P 0 (v10 orf v11)) ^
(8 v14 v15. P 0 (v14 impf v15)) ^
(8 v18 v19. P 0 (v18 eqf v19)) ^ (8 v129. P 0 (v129 says TT)) ^
(8 v130. P 0 (v130 says FF)) ^
(8 v131 v66. P 0 (v131 says notf v66)) ^
(8 v132 v69 v70. P 0 (v132 says (v69 andf v70))) ^
(8 v133 v73 v74. P 0 (v133 says (v73 orf v74))) ^
(8 v134 v77 v78. P 0 (v134 says (v77 impf v78))) ^
(8 v135 v81 v82. P 0 (v135 says (v81 eqf v82))) ^
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(8 v136 v85 v86. P 0 (v136 says v85 says v86)) ^
(8 v137 v89 v90. P 0 (v137 says v89 speaks_for v90)) ^
(8 v138 v93 v94. P 0 (v138 says v93 controls v94)) ^
(8 v139 v98 v99 v100. P 0 (v139 says reps v98 v99 v100)) ^
(8 v140 v103 v104. P 0 (v140 says v103 domi v104)) ^
(8 v141 v107 v108. P 0 (v141 says v107 eqi v108)) ^
(8 v142 v111 v112. P 0 (v142 says v111 doms v112)) ^
(8 v143 v115 v116. P 0 (v143 says v115 eqs v116)) ^
(8 v144 v119 v120. P 0 (v144 says v119 eqn v120)) ^
(8 v145 v123 v124. P 0 (v145 says v123 lte v124)) ^
(8 v146 v127 v128. P 0 (v146 says v127 lt v128)) ^
(8 v24 v25. P 0 (v24 speaks_for v25)) ^
(8 v28 v29. P 0 (v28 controls v29)) ^
(8 v33 v34 v35. P 0 (reps v33 v34 v35)) ^
(8 v38 v39. P 0 (v38 domi v39)) ^
(8 v42 v43. P 0 (v42 eqi v43)) ^
(8 v46 v47. P 0 (v46 doms v47)) ^
(8 v50 v51. P 0 (v50 eqs v51)) ^
(8 v54 v55. P 0 (v54 eqn v55)) ^
(8 v58 v59. P 0 (v58 lte v59)) ^
(8 v62 v63. P 0 (v62 lt v63)) )
8 v. P 0 v
[extractPropCommand_def]
` extractPropCommand (P says prop (SOME cmd)) = prop (SOME cmd)
[extractPropCommand_ind]
` 8P 0.
(8P cmd. P 0 (P says prop (SOME cmd))) ^ P 0 TT ^ P 0 FF ^
(8 v1. P 0 (prop v1)) ^ (8 v3. P 0 (notf v3)) ^
(8 v6 v7. P 0 (v6 andf v7)) ^ (8 v10 v11. P 0 (v10 orf v11)) ^
(8 v14 v15. P 0 (v14 impf v15)) ^
(8 v18 v19. P 0 (v18 eqf v19)) ^ (8 v129. P 0 (v129 says TT)) ^
(8 v130. P 0 (v130 says FF)) ^
(8 v132. P 0 (v132 says prop NONE)) ^
(8 v133 v66. P 0 (v133 says notf v66)) ^
(8 v134 v69 v70. P 0 (v134 says (v69 andf v70))) ^
(8 v135 v73 v74. P 0 (v135 says (v73 orf v74))) ^
(8 v136 v77 v78. P 0 (v136 says (v77 impf v78))) ^
(8 v137 v81 v82. P 0 (v137 says (v81 eqf v82))) ^
(8 v138 v85 v86. P 0 (v138 says v85 says v86)) ^
(8 v139 v89 v90. P 0 (v139 says v89 speaks_for v90)) ^
(8 v140 v93 v94. P 0 (v140 says v93 controls v94)) ^
(8 v141 v98 v99 v100. P 0 (v141 says reps v98 v99 v100)) ^
(8 v142 v103 v104. P 0 (v142 says v103 domi v104)) ^
(8 v143 v107 v108. P 0 (v143 says v107 eqi v108)) ^
(8 v144 v111 v112. P 0 (v144 says v111 doms v112)) ^
(8 v145 v115 v116. P 0 (v145 says v115 eqs v116)) ^
(8 v146 v119 v120. P 0 (v146 says v119 eqn v120)) ^
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(8 v147 v123 v124. P 0 (v147 says v123 lte v124)) ^
(8 v148 v127 v128. P 0 (v148 says v127 lt v128)) ^
(8 v24 v25. P 0 (v24 speaks_for v25)) ^
(8 v28 v29. P 0 (v28 controls v29)) ^
(8 v33 v34 v35. P 0 (reps v33 v34 v35)) ^
(8 v38 v39. P 0 (v38 domi v39)) ^
(8 v42 v43. P 0 (v42 eqi v43)) ^
(8 v46 v47. P 0 (v46 doms v47)) ^
(8 v50 v51. P 0 (v50 eqs v51)) ^
(8 v54 v55. P 0 (v54 eqn v55)) ^
(8 v58 v59. P 0 (v58 lte v59)) ^
(8 v62 v63. P 0 (v62 lt v63)) )
8 v. P 0 v
[TR_cases]
` 8 a0 a1 a2 a3.
TR a0 a1 a2 a3 ()
(9 elementTest NS M Oi Os Out s context stateInterp x ins
outs.
(a0 = (M ,Oi,Os)) ^ (a1 = exec (inputList x)) ^
(a2 =
CFG elementTest stateInterp context (x::ins) s outs) ^
(a3 =
CFG elementTest stateInterp context ins
(NS s (exec (inputList x)))
(Out s (exec (inputList x))::outs)) ^
authenticationTest elementTest x ^
CFGInterpret (M ,Oi,Os)
(CFG elementTest stateInterp context (x::ins) s
outs)) _
(9 elementTest NS M Oi Os Out s context stateInterp x ins
outs.
(a0 = (M ,Oi,Os)) ^ (a1 = trap (inputList x)) ^
(a2 =
CFG elementTest stateInterp context (x::ins) s outs) ^
(a3 =
CFG elementTest stateInterp context ins
(NS s (trap (inputList x)))
(Out s (trap (inputList x))::outs)) ^
authenticationTest elementTest x ^
CFGInterpret (M ,Oi,Os)
(CFG elementTest stateInterp context (x::ins) s
outs)) _
9 elementTest NS M Oi Os Out s context stateInterp x ins
outs.
(a0 = (M ,Oi,Os)) ^ (a1 = discard (inputList x)) ^
(a2 =




CFG elementTest stateInterp context ins
(NS s (discard (inputList x)))
(Out s (discard (inputList x))::outs)) ^
¬authenticationTest elementTest x
[TR_discard_cmd_rule]
` TR (M ,Oi,Os) (discard (inputList x))
(CFG elementTest stateInterp context (x::ins) s outs)
(CFG elementTest stateInterp context ins
(NS s (discard (inputList x)))
(Out s (discard (inputList x))::outs)) ()
¬authenticationTest elementTest x
[TR_EQ_rules_thm]
` (TR (M ,Oi,Os) (exec (inputList x))
(CFG elementTest stateInterp context (x::ins) s outs)
(CFG elementTest stateInterp context ins
(NS s (exec (inputList x)))
(Out s (exec (inputList x))::outs)) ()
authenticationTest elementTest x ^
CFGInterpret (M ,Oi,Os)
(CFG elementTest stateInterp context (x::ins) s outs)) ^
(TR (M ,Oi,Os) (trap (inputList x))
(CFG elementTest stateInterp context (x::ins) s outs)
(CFG elementTest stateInterp context ins
(NS s (trap (inputList x)))
(Out s (trap (inputList x))::outs)) ()
authenticationTest elementTest x ^
CFGInterpret (M ,Oi,Os)
(CFG elementTest stateInterp context (x::ins) s outs)) ^
(TR (M ,Oi,Os) (discard (inputList x))
(CFG elementTest stateInterp context (x::ins) s outs)
(CFG elementTest stateInterp context ins
(NS s (discard (inputList x)))
(Out s (discard (inputList x))::outs)) ()
¬authenticationTest elementTest x)
[TR_exec_cmd_rule]
` 8 elementTest context stateInterp x ins s outs.
(8M Oi Os.
CFGInterpret (M ,Oi,Os)
(CFG elementTest stateInterp context (x::ins) s
outs) )
(M ,Oi,Os) satList propCommandList x) )
8NS Out M Oi Os.
TR (M ,Oi,Os) (exec (inputList x))
(CFG elementTest stateInterp context (x::ins) s outs)
(CFG elementTest stateInterp context ins
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(NS s (exec (inputList x)))
(Out s (exec (inputList x))::outs)) ()
authenticationTest elementTest x ^
CFGInterpret (M ,Oi,Os)
(CFG elementTest stateInterp context (x::ins) s outs) ^
(M ,Oi,Os) satList propCommandList x
[TR_ind]
` 8TR0.
(8 elementTest NS M Oi Os Out s context stateInterp x ins
outs.
authenticationTest elementTest x ^
CFGInterpret (M ,Oi,Os)
(CFG elementTest stateInterp context (x::ins) s
outs) )
TR
0 (M ,Oi,Os) (exec (inputList x))
(CFG elementTest stateInterp context (x::ins) s outs)
(CFG elementTest stateInterp context ins
(NS s (exec (inputList x)))
(Out s (exec (inputList x))::outs))) ^
(8 elementTest NS M Oi Os Out s context stateInterp x ins
outs.
authenticationTest elementTest x ^
CFGInterpret (M ,Oi,Os)
(CFG elementTest stateInterp context (x::ins) s
outs) )
TR
0 (M ,Oi,Os) (trap (inputList x))
(CFG elementTest stateInterp context (x::ins) s outs)
(CFG elementTest stateInterp context ins
(NS s (trap (inputList x)))
(Out s (trap (inputList x))::outs))) ^
(8 elementTest NS M Oi Os Out s context stateInterp x ins
outs.
¬authenticationTest elementTest x )
TR
0 (M ,Oi,Os) (discard (inputList x))
(CFG elementTest stateInterp context (x::ins) s outs)
(CFG elementTest stateInterp context ins
(NS s (discard (inputList x)))
(Out s (discard (inputList x))::outs))) )
8 a0 a1 a2 a3. TR a0 a1 a2 a3 ) TR0 a0 a1 a2 a3
[TR_rules]
` (8 elementTest NS M Oi Os Out s context stateInterp x ins
outs.
authenticationTest elementTest x ^
CFGInterpret (M ,Oi,Os)
(CFG elementTest stateInterp context (x::ins) s outs) )
TR (M ,Oi,Os) (exec (inputList x))
(CFG elementTest stateInterp context (x::ins) s outs)
18
Theorems SSM THEORY
(CFG elementTest stateInterp context ins
(NS s (exec (inputList x)))
(Out s (exec (inputList x))::outs))) ^
(8 elementTest NS M Oi Os Out s context stateInterp x ins
outs.
authenticationTest elementTest x ^
CFGInterpret (M ,Oi,Os)
(CFG elementTest stateInterp context (x::ins) s outs) )
TR (M ,Oi,Os) (trap (inputList x))
(CFG elementTest stateInterp context (x::ins) s outs)
(CFG elementTest stateInterp context ins
(NS s (trap (inputList x)))
(Out s (trap (inputList x))::outs))) ^
8 elementTest NS M Oi Os Out s context stateInterp x ins outs.
¬authenticationTest elementTest x )
TR (M ,Oi,Os) (discard (inputList x))
(CFG elementTest stateInterp context (x::ins) s outs)
(CFG elementTest stateInterp context ins
(NS s (discard (inputList x)))
(Out s (discard (inputList x))::outs))
[TR_strongind]
` 8TR0.
(8 elementTest NS M Oi Os Out s context stateInterp x ins
outs.
authenticationTest elementTest x ^
CFGInterpret (M ,Oi,Os)
(CFG elementTest stateInterp context (x::ins) s
outs) )
TR
0 (M ,Oi,Os) (exec (inputList x))
(CFG elementTest stateInterp context (x::ins) s outs)
(CFG elementTest stateInterp context ins
(NS s (exec (inputList x)))
(Out s (exec (inputList x))::outs))) ^
(8 elementTest NS M Oi Os Out s context stateInterp x ins
outs.
authenticationTest elementTest x ^
CFGInterpret (M ,Oi,Os)
(CFG elementTest stateInterp context (x::ins) s
outs) )
TR
0 (M ,Oi,Os) (trap (inputList x))
(CFG elementTest stateInterp context (x::ins) s outs)
(CFG elementTest stateInterp context ins
(NS s (trap (inputList x)))
(Out s (trap (inputList x))::outs))) ^
(8 elementTest NS M Oi Os Out s context stateInterp x ins
outs.
¬authenticationTest elementTest x )
TR
0 (M ,Oi,Os) (discard (inputList x))
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(CFG elementTest stateInterp context (x::ins) s outs)
(CFG elementTest stateInterp context ins
(NS s (discard (inputList x)))
(Out s (discard (inputList x))::outs))) )
8 a0 a1 a2 a3. TR a0 a1 a2 a3 ) TR0 a0 a1 a2 a3
[TR_trap_cmd_rule]
` 8 elementTest context stateInterp x ins s outs.
(8M Oi Os.
CFGInterpret (M ,Oi,Os)
(CFG elementTest stateInterp context (x::ins) s
outs) )
(M ,Oi,Os) sat prop NONE) )
8NS Out M Oi Os.
TR (M ,Oi,Os) (trap (inputList x))
(CFG elementTest stateInterp context (x::ins) s outs)
(CFG elementTest stateInterp context ins
(NS s (trap (inputList x)))
(Out s (trap (inputList x))::outs)) ()
authenticationTest elementTest x ^
CFGInterpret (M ,Oi,Os)
(CFG elementTest stateInterp context (x::ins) s outs) ^
(M ,Oi,Os) sat prop NONE
[TRrule0]
` TR (M ,Oi,Os) (exec (inputList x))
(CFG elementTest stateInterp context (x::ins) s outs)
(CFG elementTest stateInterp context ins
(NS s (exec (inputList x)))
(Out s (exec (inputList x))::outs)) ()
authenticationTest elementTest x ^
CFGInterpret (M ,Oi,Os)
(CFG elementTest stateInterp context (x::ins) s outs)
[TRrule1]
` TR (M ,Oi,Os) (trap (inputList x))
(CFG elementTest stateInterp context (x::ins) s outs)
(CFG elementTest stateInterp context ins
(NS s (trap (inputList x)))
(Out s (trap (inputList x))::outs)) ()
authenticationTest elementTest x ^
CFGInterpret (M ,Oi,Os)
(CFG elementTest stateInterp context (x::ins) s outs)
[trType_distinct_clauses]
` (8 a 0 a. discard a 6= trap a 0) ^ (8 a 0 a. discard a 6= exec a 0) ^




` (8 a a 0. (discard a = discard a 0) () (a = a 0)) ^
(8 a a 0. (trap a = trap a 0) () (a = a 0)) ^
8 a a 0. (exec a = exec a 0) () (a = a 0)
4 satList Theory




` 8M Oi Os formList.
(M ,Oi,Os) satList formList ()
FOLDR (  x y. x ^ y) T (MAP (  f . (M ,Oi,Os) sat f ) formList)
4.2 Theorems
[satList_conj]
` 8 l1 l2 M Oi Os.
(M ,Oi,Os) satList l1 ^ (M ,Oi,Os) satList l2 ()
(M ,Oi,Os) satList (l1 ++ l2)
[satList_CONS]
` 8 h t M Oi Os.
(M ,Oi,Os) satList (h::t) ()
(M ,Oi,Os) sat h ^ (M ,Oi,Os) satList t
[satList_nil]
` (M ,Oi,Os) satList []
5 PBTypeIntegrated Theory
Built: 11 June 2018
Parent Theories: OMNIType
5.1 Datatypes
omniCommand = ssmPlanPBComplete | ssmMoveToORPComplete
| ssmConductORPComplete | ssmMoveToPBComplete
| ssmConductPBComplete | invalidOmniCommand
plCommand = crossLD | conductORP | moveToPB | conductPB






slOutput = PlanPB | MoveToORP | ConductORP | MoveToPB
| ConductPB | CompletePB | unAuthenticated
| unAuthorized
slState = PLAN_PB | MOVE_TO_ORP | CONDUCT_ORP | MOVE_TO_PB
| CONDUCT_PB | COMPLETE_PB
stateRole = PlatoonLeader | Omni
5.2 Theorems
[omniCommand_distinct_clauses]
` ssmPlanPBComplete 6= ssmMoveToORPComplete ^
ssmPlanPBComplete 6= ssmConductORPComplete ^
ssmPlanPBComplete 6= ssmMoveToPBComplete ^
ssmPlanPBComplete 6= ssmConductPBComplete ^
ssmPlanPBComplete 6= invalidOmniCommand ^
ssmMoveToORPComplete 6= ssmConductORPComplete ^
ssmMoveToORPComplete 6= ssmMoveToPBComplete ^
ssmMoveToORPComplete 6= ssmConductPBComplete ^
ssmMoveToORPComplete 6= invalidOmniCommand ^
ssmConductORPComplete 6= ssmMoveToPBComplete ^
ssmConductORPComplete 6= ssmConductPBComplete ^
ssmConductORPComplete 6= invalidOmniCommand ^
ssmMoveToPBComplete 6= ssmConductPBComplete ^
ssmMoveToPBComplete 6= invalidOmniCommand ^
ssmConductPBComplete 6= invalidOmniCommand
[plCommand_distinct_clauses]
` crossLD 6= conductORP ^ crossLD 6= moveToPB ^
crossLD 6= conductPB ^ crossLD 6= completePB ^
crossLD 6= incomplete ^ conductORP 6= moveToPB ^
conductORP 6= conductPB ^ conductORP 6= completePB ^
conductORP 6= incomplete ^ moveToPB 6= conductPB ^
moveToPB 6= completePB ^ moveToPB 6= incomplete ^
conductPB 6= completePB ^ conductPB 6= incomplete ^
completePB 6= incomplete
[slCommand_distinct_clauses]
` 8 a 0 a. PL a 6= OMNI a 0
[slCommand_one_one]
` (8 a a 0. (PL a = PL a 0) () (a = a 0)) ^




` PlanPB 6= MoveToORP ^ PlanPB 6= ConductORP ^
PlanPB 6= MoveToPB ^ PlanPB 6= ConductPB ^
PlanPB 6= CompletePB ^ PlanPB 6= unAuthenticated ^
PlanPB 6= unAuthorized ^ MoveToORP 6= ConductORP ^
MoveToORP 6= MoveToPB ^ MoveToORP 6= ConductPB ^
MoveToORP 6= CompletePB ^ MoveToORP 6= unAuthenticated ^
MoveToORP 6= unAuthorized ^ ConductORP 6= MoveToPB ^
ConductORP 6= ConductPB ^ ConductORP 6= CompletePB ^
ConductORP 6= unAuthenticated ^ ConductORP 6= unAuthorized ^
MoveToPB 6= ConductPB ^ MoveToPB 6= CompletePB ^
MoveToPB 6= unAuthenticated ^ MoveToPB 6= unAuthorized ^
ConductPB 6= CompletePB ^ ConductPB 6= unAuthenticated ^
ConductPB 6= unAuthorized ^ CompletePB 6= unAuthenticated ^
CompletePB 6= unAuthorized ^ unAuthenticated 6= unAuthorized
[slState_distinct_clauses]
` PLAN_PB 6= MOVE_TO_ORP ^ PLAN_PB 6= CONDUCT_ORP ^
PLAN_PB 6= MOVE_TO_PB ^ PLAN_PB 6= CONDUCT_PB ^
PLAN_PB 6= COMPLETE_PB ^ MOVE_TO_ORP 6= CONDUCT_ORP ^
MOVE_TO_ORP 6= MOVE_TO_PB ^ MOVE_TO_ORP 6= CONDUCT_PB ^
MOVE_TO_ORP 6= COMPLETE_PB ^ CONDUCT_ORP 6= MOVE_TO_PB ^
CONDUCT_ORP 6= CONDUCT_PB ^ CONDUCT_ORP 6= COMPLETE_PB ^
MOVE_TO_PB 6= CONDUCT_PB ^ MOVE_TO_PB 6= COMPLETE_PB ^
CONDUCT_PB 6= COMPLETE_PB
[stateRole_distinct_clauses]
` PlatoonLeader 6= Omni
6 PBIntegratedDef Theory
Built: 11 June 2018
Parent Theories: PBTypeIntegrated, aclfoundation
6.1 Definitions
[secAuthorization_def]
` 8 xs. secAuthorization xs = secHelper (getOmniCommand xs)
[secContext_def]
` (8 xs.
secContext PLAN_PB xs =
if getOmniCommand xs = ssmPlanPBComplete then
[prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI ssmPlanPBComplete))) impf
Name PlatoonLeader controls
prop (SOME (SLc (PL crossLD)))]
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else [prop NONE]) ^
(8 xs.
secContext MOVE_TO_ORP xs =
if getOmniCommand xs = ssmMoveToORPComplete then
[prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI ssmMoveToORPComplete))) impf
Name PlatoonLeader controls
prop (SOME (SLc (PL conductORP)))]
else [prop NONE]) ^
(8 xs.
secContext CONDUCT_ORP xs =
if getOmniCommand xs = ssmConductORPComplete then
[prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI ssmConductORPComplete))) impf
Name PlatoonLeader controls
prop (SOME (SLc (PL moveToPB)))]
else [prop NONE]) ^
(8 xs.
secContext MOVE_TO_PB xs =
if getOmniCommand xs = ssmConductORPComplete then
[prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI ssmMoveToPBComplete))) impf
Name PlatoonLeader controls
prop (SOME (SLc (PL conductPB)))]
else [prop NONE]) ^
8 xs.
secContext CONDUCT_PB xs =
if getOmniCommand xs = ssmConductPBComplete then
[prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI ssmConductPBComplete))) impf
Name PlatoonLeader controls





[Name Omni controls prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI cmd)))]
6.2 Theorems
[getOmniCommand_def]
` (getOmniCommand [] = invalidOmniCommand) ^
(8 xs cmd.
getOmniCommand
(Name Omni says prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI cmd)))::xs) =
cmd) ^
(8 xs. getOmniCommand (TT::xs) = getOmniCommand xs) ^
(8 xs. getOmniCommand (FF::xs) = getOmniCommand xs) ^
(8 xs v2. getOmniCommand (prop v2::xs) = getOmniCommand xs) ^
(8 xs v3. getOmniCommand (notf v3::xs) = getOmniCommand xs) ^
(8 xs v5 v4.
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getOmniCommand (v4 andf v5::xs) = getOmniCommand xs) ^
(8 xs v7 v6.
getOmniCommand (v6 orf v7::xs) = getOmniCommand xs) ^
(8 xs v9 v8.
getOmniCommand (v8 impf v9::xs) = getOmniCommand xs) ^
(8 xs v11 v10.
getOmniCommand (v10 eqf v11::xs) = getOmniCommand xs) ^
(8 xs v12.
getOmniCommand (v12 says TT::xs) = getOmniCommand xs) ^
(8 xs v12.
getOmniCommand (v12 says FF::xs) = getOmniCommand xs) ^
(8 xs v134.












(Name Omni says prop (SOME (SLc (PL v150)))::xs) =
getOmniCommand xs) ^
(8 xs v68 v136 v135.
getOmniCommand (v135 meet v136 says prop v68::xs) =
getOmniCommand xs) ^
(8 xs v68 v138 v137.
getOmniCommand (v137 quoting v138 says prop v68::xs) =
getOmniCommand xs) ^
(8 xs v69 v12.
getOmniCommand (v12 says notf v69::xs) =
getOmniCommand xs) ^
(8 xs v71 v70 v12.
getOmniCommand (v12 says (v70 andf v71)::xs) =
getOmniCommand xs) ^
(8 xs v73 v72 v12.
getOmniCommand (v12 says (v72 orf v73)::xs) =
getOmniCommand xs) ^
(8 xs v75 v74 v12.
getOmniCommand (v12 says (v74 impf v75)::xs) =
getOmniCommand xs) ^
(8 xs v77 v76 v12.
getOmniCommand (v12 says (v76 eqf v77)::xs) =
getOmniCommand xs) ^
(8 xs v79 v78 v12.




(8 xs v81 v80 v12.
getOmniCommand (v12 says v80 speaks_for v81::xs) =
getOmniCommand xs) ^
(8 xs v83 v82 v12.
getOmniCommand (v12 says v82 controls v83::xs) =
getOmniCommand xs) ^
(8 xs v86 v85 v84 v12.
getOmniCommand (v12 says reps v84 v85 v86::xs) =
getOmniCommand xs) ^
(8 xs v88 v87 v12.
getOmniCommand (v12 says v87 domi v88::xs) =
getOmniCommand xs) ^
(8 xs v90 v89 v12.
getOmniCommand (v12 says v89 eqi v90::xs) =
getOmniCommand xs) ^
(8 xs v92 v91 v12.
getOmniCommand (v12 says v91 doms v92::xs) =
getOmniCommand xs) ^
(8 xs v94 v93 v12.
getOmniCommand (v12 says v93 eqs v94::xs) =
getOmniCommand xs) ^
(8 xs v96 v95 v12.
getOmniCommand (v12 says v95 eqn v96::xs) =
getOmniCommand xs) ^
(8 xs v98 v97 v12.
getOmniCommand (v12 says v97 lte v98::xs) =
getOmniCommand xs) ^
(8 xs v99 v12 v100.
getOmniCommand (v12 says v99 lt v100::xs) =
getOmniCommand xs) ^
(8 xs v15 v14.
getOmniCommand (v14 speaks_for v15::xs) =
getOmniCommand xs) ^
(8 xs v17 v16.
getOmniCommand (v16 controls v17::xs) =
getOmniCommand xs) ^
(8 xs v20 v19 v18.
getOmniCommand (reps v18 v19 v20::xs) =
getOmniCommand xs) ^
(8 xs v22 v21.
getOmniCommand (v21 domi v22::xs) = getOmniCommand xs) ^
(8 xs v24 v23.
getOmniCommand (v23 eqi v24::xs) = getOmniCommand xs) ^
(8 xs v26 v25.
getOmniCommand (v25 doms v26::xs) = getOmniCommand xs) ^
(8 xs v28 v27.
getOmniCommand (v27 eqs v28::xs) = getOmniCommand xs) ^
(8 xs v30 v29.
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getOmniCommand (v29 eqn v30::xs) = getOmniCommand xs) ^
(8 xs v32 v31.
getOmniCommand (v31 lte v32::xs) = getOmniCommand xs) ^
8 xs v34 v33.





P (Name Omni says prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI cmd)))::xs)) ^
(8 xs. P xs ) P (TT::xs)) ^ (8 xs. P xs ) P (FF::xs)) ^
(8 v2 xs. P xs ) P (prop v2::xs)) ^
(8 v3 xs. P xs ) P (notf v3::xs)) ^
(8 v4 v5 xs. P xs ) P (v4 andf v5::xs)) ^
(8 v6 v7 xs. P xs ) P (v6 orf v7::xs)) ^
(8 v8 v9 xs. P xs ) P (v8 impf v9::xs)) ^
(8 v10 v11 xs. P xs ) P (v10 eqf v11::xs)) ^
(8 v12 xs. P xs ) P (v12 says TT::xs)) ^
(8 v12 xs. P xs ) P (v12 says FF::xs)) ^
(8 v134 xs. P xs ) P (Name v134 says prop NONE::xs)) ^
(8 v144 xs.
P xs )
P (Name PlatoonLeader says prop (SOME v144)::xs)) ^
(8 v146 xs.
P xs ) P (Name Omni says prop (SOME (ESCc v146))::xs)) ^
(8 v150 xs.
P xs )
P (Name Omni says prop (SOME (SLc (PL v150)))::xs)) ^
(8 v135 v136 v68 xs.
P xs ) P (v135 meet v136 says prop v68::xs)) ^
(8 v137 v138 v68 xs.
P xs ) P (v137 quoting v138 says prop v68::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v69 xs. P xs ) P (v12 says notf v69::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v70 v71 xs. P xs ) P (v12 says (v70 andf v71)::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v72 v73 xs. P xs ) P (v12 says (v72 orf v73)::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v74 v75 xs. P xs ) P (v12 says (v74 impf v75)::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v76 v77 xs. P xs ) P (v12 says (v76 eqf v77)::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v78 v79 xs. P xs ) P (v12 says v78 says v79::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v80 v81 xs.
P xs ) P (v12 says v80 speaks_for v81::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v82 v83 xs.
P xs ) P (v12 says v82 controls v83::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v84 v85 v86 xs.
P xs ) P (v12 says reps v84 v85 v86::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v87 v88 xs. P xs ) P (v12 says v87 domi v88::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v89 v90 xs. P xs ) P (v12 says v89 eqi v90::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v91 v92 xs. P xs ) P (v12 says v91 doms v92::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v93 v94 xs. P xs ) P (v12 says v93 eqs v94::xs)) ^
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(8 v12 v95 v96 xs. P xs ) P (v12 says v95 eqn v96::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v97 v98 xs. P xs ) P (v12 says v97 lte v98::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v99 v100 xs. P xs ) P (v12 says v99 lt v100::xs)) ^
(8 v14 v15 xs. P xs ) P (v14 speaks_for v15::xs)) ^
(8 v16 v17 xs. P xs ) P (v16 controls v17::xs)) ^
(8 v18 v19 v20 xs. P xs ) P (reps v18 v19 v20::xs)) ^
(8 v21 v22 xs. P xs ) P (v21 domi v22::xs)) ^
(8 v23 v24 xs. P xs ) P (v23 eqi v24::xs)) ^
(8 v25 v26 xs. P xs ) P (v25 doms v26::xs)) ^
(8 v27 v28 xs. P xs ) P (v27 eqs v28::xs)) ^
(8 v29 v30 xs. P xs ) P (v29 eqn v30::xs)) ^
(8 v31 v32 xs. P xs ) P (v31 lte v32::xs)) ^
(8 v33 v34 xs. P xs ) P (v33 lt v34::xs)) )
8 v. P v
[getPlCom_def]
` (getPlCom [] = incomplete) ^
(8 xs cmd. getPlCom (SOME (SLc (PL cmd))::xs) = cmd) ^
(8 xs. getPlCom (NONE::xs) = getPlCom xs) ^
(8 xs v4. getPlCom (SOME (ESCc v4)::xs) = getPlCom xs) ^
8 xs v9. getPlCom (SOME (SLc (OMNI v9))::xs) = getPlCom xs
[getPlCom_ind]
` 8P.
P [] ^ (8 cmd xs. P (SOME (SLc (PL cmd))::xs)) ^
(8 xs. P xs ) P (NONE::xs)) ^
(8 v4 xs. P xs ) P (SOME (ESCc v4)::xs)) ^
(8 v9 xs. P xs ) P (SOME (SLc (OMNI v9))::xs)) )
8 v. P v
7 ssmPBIntegrated Theory
Built: 11 June 2018
Parent Theories: PBIntegratedDef, ssm
7.1 Theorems
[inputOK_cmd_reject_lemma]
` 8 cmd. ¬inputOK (prop (SOME cmd))
[inputOK_def]
` (inputOK (Name PlatoonLeader says prop cmd) () T) ^
(inputOK (Name Omni says prop cmd) () T) ^
(inputOK TT () F) ^ (inputOK FF () F) ^
(inputOK (prop v) () F) ^ (inputOK (notf v1) () F) ^
(inputOK (v2 andf v3) () F) ^ (inputOK (v4 orf v5) () F) ^
(inputOK (v6 impf v7) () F) ^ (inputOK (v8 eqf v9) () F) ^
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(inputOK (v10 says TT) () F) ^ (inputOK (v10 says FF) () F) ^
(inputOK (v133 meet v134 says prop v66) () F) ^
(inputOK (v135 quoting v136 says prop v66) () F) ^
(inputOK (v10 says notf v67) () F) ^
(inputOK (v10 says (v68 andf v69)) () F) ^
(inputOK (v10 says (v70 orf v71)) () F) ^
(inputOK (v10 says (v72 impf v73)) () F) ^
(inputOK (v10 says (v74 eqf v75)) () F) ^
(inputOK (v10 says v76 says v77) () F) ^
(inputOK (v10 says v78 speaks_for v79) () F) ^
(inputOK (v10 says v80 controls v81) () F) ^
(inputOK (v10 says reps v82 v83 v84) () F) ^
(inputOK (v10 says v85 domi v86) () F) ^
(inputOK (v10 says v87 eqi v88) () F) ^
(inputOK (v10 says v89 doms v90) () F) ^
(inputOK (v10 says v91 eqs v92) () F) ^
(inputOK (v10 says v93 eqn v94) () F) ^
(inputOK (v10 says v95 lte v96) () F) ^
(inputOK (v10 says v97 lt v98) () F) ^
(inputOK (v12 speaks_for v13) () F) ^
(inputOK (v14 controls v15) () F) ^
(inputOK (reps v16 v17 v18) () F) ^
(inputOK (v19 domi v20) () F) ^
(inputOK (v21 eqi v22) () F) ^
(inputOK (v23 doms v24) () F) ^
(inputOK (v25 eqs v26) () F) ^ (inputOK (v27 eqn v28) () F) ^
(inputOK (v29 lte v30) () F) ^ (inputOK (v31 lt v32) () F)
[inputOK_ind]
` 8P.
(8 cmd. P (Name PlatoonLeader says prop cmd)) ^
(8 cmd. P (Name Omni says prop cmd)) ^ P TT ^ P FF ^
(8 v. P (prop v)) ^ (8 v1. P (notf v1)) ^
(8 v2 v3. P (v2 andf v3)) ^ (8 v4 v5. P (v4 orf v5)) ^
(8 v6 v7. P (v6 impf v7)) ^ (8 v8 v9. P (v8 eqf v9)) ^
(8 v10. P (v10 says TT)) ^ (8 v10. P (v10 says FF)) ^
(8 v133 v134 v66. P (v133 meet v134 says prop v66)) ^
(8 v135 v136 v66. P (v135 quoting v136 says prop v66)) ^
(8 v10 v67. P (v10 says notf v67)) ^
(8 v10 v68 v69. P (v10 says (v68 andf v69))) ^
(8 v10 v70 v71. P (v10 says (v70 orf v71))) ^
(8 v10 v72 v73. P (v10 says (v72 impf v73))) ^
(8 v10 v74 v75. P (v10 says (v74 eqf v75))) ^
(8 v10 v76 v77. P (v10 says v76 says v77)) ^
(8 v10 v78 v79. P (v10 says v78 speaks_for v79)) ^
(8 v10 v80 v81. P (v10 says v80 controls v81)) ^
(8 v10 v82 v83 v84. P (v10 says reps v82 v83 v84)) ^
(8 v10 v85 v86. P (v10 says v85 domi v86)) ^
(8 v10 v87 v88. P (v10 says v87 eqi v88)) ^
29
SSMPBINTEGRATED THEORY Theorems
(8 v10 v89 v90. P (v10 says v89 doms v90)) ^
(8 v10 v91 v92. P (v10 says v91 eqs v92)) ^
(8 v10 v93 v94. P (v10 says v93 eqn v94)) ^
(8 v10 v95 v96. P (v10 says v95 lte v96)) ^
(8 v10 v97 v98. P (v10 says v97 lt v98)) ^
(8 v12 v13. P (v12 speaks_for v13)) ^
(8 v14 v15. P (v14 controls v15)) ^
(8 v16 v17 v18. P (reps v16 v17 v18)) ^
(8 v19 v20. P (v19 domi v20)) ^
(8 v21 v22. P (v21 eqi v22)) ^
(8 v23 v24. P (v23 doms v24)) ^
(8 v25 v26. P (v25 eqs v26)) ^ (8 v27 v28. P (v27 eqn v28)) ^
(8 v29 v30. P (v29 lte v30)) ^ (8 v31 v32. P (v31 lt v32)) )
8 v. P v
[PBNS_def]
` (PBNS PLAN_PB (exec x) =
if getPlCom x = crossLD then MOVE_TO_ORP else PLAN_PB) ^
(PBNS MOVE_TO_ORP (exec x) =
if getPlCom x = conductORP then CONDUCT_ORP
else MOVE_TO_ORP) ^
(PBNS CONDUCT_ORP (exec x) =
if getPlCom x = moveToPB then MOVE_TO_PB else CONDUCT_ORP) ^
(PBNS MOVE_TO_PB (exec x) =
if getPlCom x = conductPB then CONDUCT_PB else MOVE_TO_PB) ^
(PBNS CONDUCT_PB (exec x) =
if getPlCom x = completePB then COMPLETE_PB
else CONDUCT_PB) ^ (PBNS s (trap v0) = s) ^
(PBNS s (discard v1) = s)
[PBNS_ind]
` 8P.
(8 x. P PLAN_PB (exec x)) ^ (8 x. P MOVE_TO_ORP (exec x)) ^
(8 x. P CONDUCT_ORP (exec x)) ^
(8 x. P MOVE_TO_PB (exec x)) ^ (8 x. P CONDUCT_PB (exec x)) ^
(8 s v0. P s (trap v0)) ^ (8 s v1. P s (discard v1)) ^
(8 v6. P COMPLETE_PB (exec v6)) )
8 v v1. P v v1
[PBOut_def]
` (PBOut PLAN_PB (exec x) =
if getPlCom x = crossLD then MoveToORP else PlanPB) ^
(PBOut MOVE_TO_ORP (exec x) =
if getPlCom x = conductORP then ConductORP else MoveToORP) ^
(PBOut CONDUCT_ORP (exec x) =
if getPlCom x = moveToPB then MoveToORP else ConductORP) ^
(PBOut MOVE_TO_PB (exec x) =
if getPlCom x = conductPB then ConductPB else MoveToPB) ^
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(PBOut CONDUCT_PB (exec x) =
if getPlCom x = completePB then CompletePB else ConductPB) ^
(PBOut s (trap v0) = unAuthorized) ^
(PBOut s (discard v1) = unAuthenticated)
[PBOut_ind]
` 8P.
(8 x. P PLAN_PB (exec x)) ^ (8 x. P MOVE_TO_ORP (exec x)) ^
(8 x. P CONDUCT_ORP (exec x)) ^
(8 x. P MOVE_TO_PB (exec x)) ^ (8 x. P CONDUCT_PB (exec x)) ^
(8 s v0. P s (trap v0)) ^ (8 s v1. P s (discard v1)) ^
(8 v6. P COMPLETE_PB (exec v6)) )
8 v v1. P v v1
[PlatoonLeader_Omni_notDiscard_slCommand_thm]
` 8NS Out M Oi Os.
¬TR (M ,Oi,Os)
(discard
[SOME (SLc (PL plCommand));
SOME (SLc (OMNI omniCommand))])
(CFG inputOK secContext secAuthorization
([Name Omni says prop (SOME (SLc (PL plCommand)));
Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI omniCommand)))]::ins) PLAN_PB
outs)
(CFG inputOK secContext secAuthorization ins
(NS PLAN_PB
(discard
[SOME (SLc (PL plCommand));
SOME (SLc (OMNI omniCommand))]))
(Out PLAN_PB
(discard
[SOME (SLc (PL plCommand));
SOME (SLc (OMNI omniCommand))])::outs))
[PlatoonLeader_PLAN_PB_exec_justified_lemma]





prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI ssmPlanPBComplete)));
Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL crossLD)))]))
(CFG inputOK secContext secAuthorization
([Name Omni says




prop (SOME (SLc (PL crossLD)))]::ins) PLAN_PB outs)





prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI ssmPlanPBComplete)));
Name PlatoonLeader says





prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI ssmPlanPBComplete)));
Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL crossLD)))]))::outs)) ()
authenticationTest inputOK
[Name Omni says
prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI ssmPlanPBComplete)));
Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL crossLD)))] ^
CFGInterpret (M ,Oi,Os)
(CFG inputOK secContext secAuthorization
([Name Omni says
prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI ssmPlanPBComplete)));
Name PlatoonLeader says





prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI ssmPlanPBComplete)));
Name PlatoonLeader says prop (SOME (SLc (PL crossLD)))]
[PlatoonLeader_PLAN_PB_exec_justified_thm]
` 8NS Out M Oi Os.
TR (M ,Oi,Os)
(exec
[SOME (SLc (OMNI ssmPlanPBComplete));
SOME (SLc (PL crossLD))])
(CFG inputOK secContext secAuthorization
([Name Omni says
prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI ssmPlanPBComplete)));
Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL crossLD)))]::ins) PLAN_PB outs)
(CFG inputOK secContext secAuthorization ins
(NS PLAN_PB
(exec
[SOME (SLc (OMNI ssmPlanPBComplete));
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SOME (SLc (PL crossLD))]))
(Out PLAN_PB
(exec
[SOME (SLc (OMNI ssmPlanPBComplete));
SOME (SLc (PL crossLD))])::outs)) ()
authenticationTest inputOK
[Name Omni says
prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI ssmPlanPBComplete)));
Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL crossLD)))] ^
CFGInterpret (M ,Oi,Os)
(CFG inputOK secContext secAuthorization
([Name Omni says
prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI ssmPlanPBComplete)));
Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL crossLD)))]::ins) PLAN_PB
outs) ^
(M ,Oi,Os) satList
[prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI ssmPlanPBComplete)));
prop (SOME (SLc (PL crossLD)))]
[PlatoonLeader_PLAN_PB_exec_lemma]
` 8M Oi Os.
CFGInterpret (M ,Oi,Os)
(CFG inputOK secContext secAuthorization
([Name Omni says
prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI ssmPlanPBComplete)));
Name PlatoonLeader says





prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI ssmPlanPBComplete)));
Name PlatoonLeader says prop (SOME (SLc (PL crossLD)))]
[PlatoonLeader_PLAN_PB_trap_justified_lemma]
` omniCommand 6= ssmPlanPBComplete )
(s = PLAN_PB) )





prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI omniCommand)));
Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL crossLD)))]))
(CFG inputOK secContext secAuthorization




prop (SOME (SLc (PL crossLD)))]::ins) PLAN_PB outs)





prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI omniCommand)));
Name PlatoonLeader says





prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI omniCommand)));
Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL crossLD)))]))::outs)) ()
authenticationTest inputOK
[Name Omni says prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI omniCommand)));
Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL crossLD)))] ^
CFGInterpret (M ,Oi,Os)
(CFG inputOK secContext secAuthorization
([Name Omni says prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI omniCommand)));
Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL crossLD)))]::ins) PLAN_PB
outs) ^ (M ,Oi,Os) sat prop NONE
[PlatoonLeader_PLAN_PB_trap_justified_thm]
` omniCommand 6= ssmPlanPBComplete )
(s = PLAN_PB) )
8NS Out M Oi Os.
TR (M ,Oi,Os)
(trap
[SOME (SLc (OMNI omniCommand));
SOME (SLc (PL crossLD))])
(CFG inputOK secContext secAuthorization
([Name Omni says prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI omniCommand)));
Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL crossLD)))]::ins) PLAN_PB outs)
(CFG inputOK secContext secAuthorization ins
(NS PLAN_PB
(trap
[SOME (SLc (OMNI omniCommand));
SOME (SLc (PL crossLD))]))
(Out PLAN_PB
(trap
[SOME (SLc (OMNI omniCommand));




[Name Omni says prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI omniCommand)));
Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL crossLD)))] ^
CFGInterpret (M ,Oi,Os)
(CFG inputOK secContext secAuthorization
([Name Omni says prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI omniCommand)));
Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL crossLD)))]::ins) PLAN_PB
outs) ^ (M ,Oi,Os) sat prop NONE
[PlatoonLeader_PLAN_PB_trap_lemma]
` omniCommand 6= ssmPlanPBComplete )
(s = PLAN_PB) )
8M Oi Os.
CFGInterpret (M ,Oi,Os)
(CFG inputOK secContext secAuthorization
([Name Omni says prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI omniCommand)));
Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL crossLD)))]::ins) PLAN_PB
outs) )
(M ,Oi,Os) sat prop NONE
8 ssmConductORP Theory




` (conductORPNS CONDUCT_ORP (exec x) =
if getPlCom x = secure then SECURE else CONDUCT_ORP) ^
(conductORPNS SECURE (exec x) =
if getPsgCom x = actionsIn then ACTIONS_IN else SECURE) ^
(conductORPNS ACTIONS_IN (exec x) =
if getPlCom x = withdraw then WITHDRAW else ACTIONS_IN) ^
(conductORPNS WITHDRAW (exec x) =
if getPlCom x = complete then COMPLETE else WITHDRAW) ^
(conductORPNS s (trap x) = s) ^
(conductORPNS s (discard x) = s)
[conductORPNS_ind]
` 8P.
(8 x. P CONDUCT_ORP (exec x)) ^ (8 x. P SECURE (exec x)) ^
(8 x. P ACTIONS_IN (exec x)) ^ (8 x. P WITHDRAW (exec x)) ^
(8 s x. P s (trap x)) ^ (8 s x. P s (discard x)) ^
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(8 v5. P COMPLETE (exec v5)) )
8 v v1. P v v1
[conductORPOut_def]
` (conductORPOut CONDUCT_ORP (exec x) =
if getPlCom x = secure then Secure else ConductORP) ^
(conductORPOut SECURE (exec x) =
if getPsgCom x = actionsIn then ActionsIn else Secure) ^
(conductORPOut ACTIONS_IN (exec x) =
if getPlCom x = withdraw then Withdraw else ActionsIn) ^
(conductORPOut WITHDRAW (exec x) =
if getPlCom x = complete then Complete else Withdraw) ^
(conductORPOut s (trap x) = unAuthorized) ^
(conductORPOut s (discard x) = unAuthenticated)
[conductORPOut_ind]
` 8P.
(8 x. P CONDUCT_ORP (exec x)) ^ (8 x. P SECURE (exec x)) ^
(8 x. P ACTIONS_IN (exec x)) ^ (8 x. P WITHDRAW (exec x)) ^
(8 s x. P s (trap x)) ^ (8 s x. P s (discard x)) ^
(8 v5. P COMPLETE (exec v5)) )
8 v v1. P v v1
[inputOK_cmd_reject_lemma]
` 8 cmd. ¬inputOK (prop (SOME cmd))
[inputOK_def]
` (inputOK (Name PlatoonLeader says prop cmd) () T) ^
(inputOK (Name PlatoonSergeant says prop cmd) () T) ^
(inputOK (Name Omni says prop cmd) () T) ^
(inputOK TT () F) ^ (inputOK FF () F) ^
(inputOK (prop v) () F) ^ (inputOK (notf v1) () F) ^
(inputOK (v2 andf v3) () F) ^ (inputOK (v4 orf v5) () F) ^
(inputOK (v6 impf v7) () F) ^ (inputOK (v8 eqf v9) () F) ^
(inputOK (v10 says TT) () F) ^ (inputOK (v10 says FF) () F) ^
(inputOK (v133 meet v134 says prop v66) () F) ^
(inputOK (v135 quoting v136 says prop v66) () F) ^
(inputOK (v10 says notf v67) () F) ^
(inputOK (v10 says (v68 andf v69)) () F) ^
(inputOK (v10 says (v70 orf v71)) () F) ^
(inputOK (v10 says (v72 impf v73)) () F) ^
(inputOK (v10 says (v74 eqf v75)) () F) ^
(inputOK (v10 says v76 says v77) () F) ^
(inputOK (v10 says v78 speaks_for v79) () F) ^
(inputOK (v10 says v80 controls v81) () F) ^
(inputOK (v10 says reps v82 v83 v84) () F) ^
(inputOK (v10 says v85 domi v86) () F) ^
(inputOK (v10 says v87 eqi v88) () F) ^
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(inputOK (v10 says v89 doms v90) () F) ^
(inputOK (v10 says v91 eqs v92) () F) ^
(inputOK (v10 says v93 eqn v94) () F) ^
(inputOK (v10 says v95 lte v96) () F) ^
(inputOK (v10 says v97 lt v98) () F) ^
(inputOK (v12 speaks_for v13) () F) ^
(inputOK (v14 controls v15) () F) ^
(inputOK (reps v16 v17 v18) () F) ^
(inputOK (v19 domi v20) () F) ^
(inputOK (v21 eqi v22) () F) ^
(inputOK (v23 doms v24) () F) ^
(inputOK (v25 eqs v26) () F) ^ (inputOK (v27 eqn v28) () F) ^
(inputOK (v29 lte v30) () F) ^ (inputOK (v31 lt v32) () F)
[inputOK_ind]
` 8P.
(8 cmd. P (Name PlatoonLeader says prop cmd)) ^
(8 cmd. P (Name PlatoonSergeant says prop cmd)) ^
(8 cmd. P (Name Omni says prop cmd)) ^ P TT ^ P FF ^
(8 v. P (prop v)) ^ (8 v1. P (notf v1)) ^
(8 v2 v3. P (v2 andf v3)) ^ (8 v4 v5. P (v4 orf v5)) ^
(8 v6 v7. P (v6 impf v7)) ^ (8 v8 v9. P (v8 eqf v9)) ^
(8 v10. P (v10 says TT)) ^ (8 v10. P (v10 says FF)) ^
(8 v133 v134 v66. P (v133 meet v134 says prop v66)) ^
(8 v135 v136 v66. P (v135 quoting v136 says prop v66)) ^
(8 v10 v67. P (v10 says notf v67)) ^
(8 v10 v68 v69. P (v10 says (v68 andf v69))) ^
(8 v10 v70 v71. P (v10 says (v70 orf v71))) ^
(8 v10 v72 v73. P (v10 says (v72 impf v73))) ^
(8 v10 v74 v75. P (v10 says (v74 eqf v75))) ^
(8 v10 v76 v77. P (v10 says v76 says v77)) ^
(8 v10 v78 v79. P (v10 says v78 speaks_for v79)) ^
(8 v10 v80 v81. P (v10 says v80 controls v81)) ^
(8 v10 v82 v83 v84. P (v10 says reps v82 v83 v84)) ^
(8 v10 v85 v86. P (v10 says v85 domi v86)) ^
(8 v10 v87 v88. P (v10 says v87 eqi v88)) ^
(8 v10 v89 v90. P (v10 says v89 doms v90)) ^
(8 v10 v91 v92. P (v10 says v91 eqs v92)) ^
(8 v10 v93 v94. P (v10 says v93 eqn v94)) ^
(8 v10 v95 v96. P (v10 says v95 lte v96)) ^
(8 v10 v97 v98. P (v10 says v97 lt v98)) ^
(8 v12 v13. P (v12 speaks_for v13)) ^
(8 v14 v15. P (v14 controls v15)) ^
(8 v16 v17 v18. P (reps v16 v17 v18)) ^
(8 v19 v20. P (v19 domi v20)) ^
(8 v21 v22. P (v21 eqi v22)) ^
(8 v23 v24. P (v23 doms v24)) ^
(8 v25 v26. P (v25 eqs v26)) ^ (8 v27 v28. P (v27 eqn v28)) ^
(8 v29 v30. P (v29 lte v30)) ^ (8 v31 v32. P (v31 lt v32)) )
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8 v. P v
[PlatoonLeader_ACTIONS_IN_exec_justified_lemma]





prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI ssmActionsInComplete)));
Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL withdraw)))]))
(CFG inputOK secContext secAuthorization
([Name Omni says
prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI ssmActionsInComplete)));
Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL withdraw)))]::ins) ACTIONS_IN
outs)






(SOME (SLc (OMNI ssmActionsInComplete)));
Name PlatoonLeader says






(SOME (SLc (OMNI ssmActionsInComplete)));
Name PlatoonLeader says




prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI ssmActionsInComplete)));
Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL withdraw)))] ^
CFGInterpret (M ,Oi,Os)
(CFG inputOK secContext secAuthorization
([Name Omni says
prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI ssmActionsInComplete)));
Name PlatoonLeader says







prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI ssmActionsInComplete)));
Name PlatoonLeader says prop (SOME (SLc (PL withdraw)))]
[PlatoonLeader_ACTIONS_IN_exec_justified_thm]
` 8NS Out M Oi Os.
TR (M ,Oi,Os)
(exec
[SOME (SLc (OMNI ssmActionsInComplete));
SOME (SLc (PL withdraw))])
(CFG inputOK secContext secAuthorization
([Name Omni says
prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI ssmActionsInComplete)));
Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL withdraw)))]::ins) ACTIONS_IN
outs)
(CFG inputOK secContext secAuthorization ins
(NS ACTIONS_IN
(exec
[SOME (SLc (OMNI ssmActionsInComplete));
SOME (SLc (PL withdraw))]))
(Out ACTIONS_IN
(exec
[SOME (SLc (OMNI ssmActionsInComplete));
SOME (SLc (PL withdraw))])::outs)) ()
authenticationTest inputOK
[Name Omni says
prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI ssmActionsInComplete)));
Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL withdraw)))] ^
CFGInterpret (M ,Oi,Os)
(CFG inputOK secContext secAuthorization
([Name Omni says
prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI ssmActionsInComplete)));
Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL withdraw)))]::ins) ACTIONS_IN
outs) ^
(M ,Oi,Os) satList
[prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI ssmActionsInComplete)));
prop (SOME (SLc (PL withdraw)))]
[PlatoonLeader_ACTIONS_IN_exec_lemma]
` 8M Oi Os.
CFGInterpret (M ,Oi,Os)
(CFG inputOK secContext secAuthorization
([Name Omni says
prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI ssmActionsInComplete)));
Name PlatoonLeader says







prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI ssmActionsInComplete)));
Name PlatoonLeader says prop (SOME (SLc (PL withdraw)))]
[PlatoonLeader_ACTIONS_IN_trap_justified_lemma]
` omniCommand 6= ssmActionsInComplete )
(s = ACTIONS_IN) )





prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI omniCommand)));
Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL withdraw)))]))
(CFG inputOK secContext secAuthorization
([Name Omni says prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI omniCommand)));
Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL withdraw)))]::ins) ACTIONS_IN
outs)





prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI omniCommand)));
Name PlatoonLeader says





prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI omniCommand)));
Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL withdraw)))]))::
outs)) ()
authenticationTest inputOK
[Name Omni says prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI omniCommand)));
Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL withdraw)))] ^
CFGInterpret (M ,Oi,Os)
(CFG inputOK secContext secAuthorization
([Name Omni says prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI omniCommand)));
Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL withdraw)))]::ins) ACTIONS_IN




` omniCommand 6= ssmActionsInComplete )
(s = ACTIONS_IN) )
8NS Out M Oi Os.
TR (M ,Oi,Os)
(trap
[SOME (SLc (OMNI omniCommand));
SOME (SLc (PL withdraw))])
(CFG inputOK secContext secAuthorization
([Name Omni says prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI omniCommand)));
Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL withdraw)))]::ins) ACTIONS_IN
outs)
(CFG inputOK secContext secAuthorization ins
(NS ACTIONS_IN
(trap
[SOME (SLc (OMNI omniCommand));
SOME (SLc (PL withdraw))]))
(Out ACTIONS_IN
(trap
[SOME (SLc (OMNI omniCommand));
SOME (SLc (PL withdraw))])::outs)) ()
authenticationTest inputOK
[Name Omni says prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI omniCommand)));
Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL withdraw)))] ^
CFGInterpret (M ,Oi,Os)
(CFG inputOK secContext secAuthorization
([Name Omni says prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI omniCommand)));
Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL withdraw)))]::ins) ACTIONS_IN
outs) ^ (M ,Oi,Os) sat prop NONE
[PlatoonLeader_ACTIONS_IN_trap_lemma]
` omniCommand 6= ssmActionsInComplete )
(s = ACTIONS_IN) )
8M Oi Os.
CFGInterpret (M ,Oi,Os)
(CFG inputOK secContext secAuthorization
([Name Omni says prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI omniCommand)));
Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL withdraw)))]::ins) ACTIONS_IN
outs) )
(M ,Oi,Os) sat prop NONE
[PlatoonLeader_CONDUCT_ORP_exec_secure_justified_thm]
` 8NS Out M Oi Os.
TR (M ,Oi,Os) (exec [SOME (SLc (PL secure))])
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(CFG inputOK secContext secAuthorization
([Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL secure)))]::ins) CONDUCT_ORP
outs)
(CFG inputOK secContext secAuthorization ins
(NS CONDUCT_ORP (exec [SOME (SLc (PL secure))]))
(Out CONDUCT_ORP (exec [SOME (SLc (PL secure))])::
outs)) ()
authenticationTest inputOK
[Name PlatoonLeader says prop (SOME (SLc (PL secure)))] ^
CFGInterpret (M ,Oi,Os)
(CFG inputOK secContext secAuthorization
([Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL secure)))]::ins) CONDUCT_ORP
outs) ^
(M ,Oi,Os) satList [prop (SOME (SLc (PL secure)))]
[PlatoonLeader_CONDUCT_ORP_exec_secure_lemma]
` 8M Oi Os.
CFGInterpret (M ,Oi,Os)
(CFG inputOK secContext secAuthorization
([Name PlatoonLeader says




[Name PlatoonLeader says prop (SOME (SLc (PL secure)))]
[PlatoonSergeant_SECURE_exec_justified_lemma]





prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI ssmSecureComplete)));
Name PlatoonSergeant says
prop (SOME (SLc (PSG actionsIn)))]))
(CFG inputOK secContext secAuthorization
([Name Omni says
prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI ssmSecureComplete)));
Name PlatoonSergeant says
prop (SOME (SLc (PSG actionsIn)))]::ins) SECURE
outs)














prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI ssmSecureComplete)));
Name PlatoonSergeant says




prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI ssmSecureComplete)));
Name PlatoonSergeant says
prop (SOME (SLc (PSG actionsIn)))] ^
CFGInterpret (M ,Oi,Os)
(CFG inputOK secContext secAuthorization
([Name Omni says
prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI ssmSecureComplete)));
Name PlatoonSergeant says





prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI ssmSecureComplete)));
Name PlatoonSergeant says
prop (SOME (SLc (PSG actionsIn)))]
[PlatoonSergeant_SECURE_exec_justified_thm]
` 8NS Out M Oi Os.
TR (M ,Oi,Os)
(exec
[SOME (SLc (OMNI ssmSecureComplete));
SOME (SLc (PSG actionsIn))])
(CFG inputOK secContext secAuthorization
([Name Omni says
prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI ssmSecureComplete)));
Name PlatoonSergeant says
prop (SOME (SLc (PSG actionsIn)))]::ins) SECURE
outs)
(CFG inputOK secContext secAuthorization ins
(NS SECURE
(exec
[SOME (SLc (OMNI ssmSecureComplete));
SOME (SLc (PSG actionsIn))]))
(Out SECURE
(exec
[SOME (SLc (OMNI ssmSecureComplete));
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SOME (SLc (PSG actionsIn))])::outs)) ()
authenticationTest inputOK
[Name Omni says
prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI ssmSecureComplete)));
Name PlatoonSergeant says
prop (SOME (SLc (PSG actionsIn)))] ^
CFGInterpret (M ,Oi,Os)
(CFG inputOK secContext secAuthorization
([Name Omni says
prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI ssmSecureComplete)));
Name PlatoonSergeant says
prop (SOME (SLc (PSG actionsIn)))]::ins) SECURE
outs) ^
(M ,Oi,Os) satList
[prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI ssmSecureComplete)));
prop (SOME (SLc (PSG actionsIn)))]
[PlatoonSergeant_SECURE_exec_lemma]
` 8M Oi Os.
CFGInterpret (M ,Oi,Os)
(CFG inputOK secContext secAuthorization
([Name Omni says
prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI ssmSecureComplete)));
Name PlatoonSergeant says





prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI ssmSecureComplete)));
Name PlatoonSergeant says
prop (SOME (SLc (PSG actionsIn)))]
9 ConductORPType Theory
Built: 11 June 2018
Parent Theories: indexedLists, patternMatches
9.1 Datatypes
omniCommand = ssmSecureComplete | ssmActionsInComplete
| ssmWithdrawComplete | invalidOmniCommand
plCommand = secure | withdraw | complete | plIncomplete







slOutput = ConductORP | Secure | ActionsIn | Withdraw | Complete
| unAuthenticated | unAuthorized
slState = CONDUCT_ORP | SECURE | ACTIONS_IN | WITHDRAW
| COMPLETE
stateRole = PlatoonLeader | PlatoonSergeant | Omni
9.2 Theorems
[omniCommand_distinct_clauses]
` ssmSecureComplete 6= ssmActionsInComplete ^
ssmSecureComplete 6= ssmWithdrawComplete ^
ssmSecureComplete 6= invalidOmniCommand ^
ssmActionsInComplete 6= ssmWithdrawComplete ^
ssmActionsInComplete 6= invalidOmniCommand ^
ssmWithdrawComplete 6= invalidOmniCommand
[plCommand_distinct_clauses]
` secure 6= withdraw ^ secure 6= complete ^
secure 6= plIncomplete ^ withdraw 6= complete ^
withdraw 6= plIncomplete ^ complete 6= plIncomplete
[psgCommand_distinct_clauses]
` actionsIn 6= psgIncomplete
[slCommand_distinct_clauses]
` (8 a 0 a. PL a 6= PSG a 0) ^ (8 a 0 a. PL a 6= OMNI a 0) ^
8 a 0 a. PSG a 6= OMNI a 0
[slCommand_one_one]
` (8 a a 0. (PL a = PL a 0) () (a = a 0)) ^
(8 a a 0. (PSG a = PSG a 0) () (a = a 0)) ^
8 a a 0. (OMNI a = OMNI a 0) () (a = a 0)
[slOutput_distinct_clauses]
` ConductORP 6= Secure ^ ConductORP 6= ActionsIn ^
ConductORP 6= Withdraw ^ ConductORP 6= Complete ^
ConductORP 6= unAuthenticated ^ ConductORP 6= unAuthorized ^
Secure 6= ActionsIn ^ Secure 6= Withdraw ^ Secure 6= Complete ^
Secure 6= unAuthenticated ^ Secure 6= unAuthorized ^
ActionsIn 6= Withdraw ^ ActionsIn 6= Complete ^
ActionsIn 6= unAuthenticated ^ ActionsIn 6= unAuthorized ^
Withdraw 6= Complete ^ Withdraw 6= unAuthenticated ^
Withdraw 6= unAuthorized ^ Complete 6= unAuthenticated ^




` PlatoonLeader 6= PlatoonSergeant ^ PlatoonLeader 6= Omni ^
PlatoonSergeant 6= Omni
[slState_distinct_clauses]
` CONDUCT_ORP 6= SECURE ^ CONDUCT_ORP 6= ACTIONS_IN ^
CONDUCT_ORP 6= WITHDRAW ^ CONDUCT_ORP 6= COMPLETE ^
SECURE 6= ACTIONS_IN ^ SECURE 6= WITHDRAW ^ SECURE 6= COMPLETE ^
ACTIONS_IN 6= WITHDRAW ^ ACTIONS_IN 6= COMPLETE ^
WITHDRAW 6= COMPLETE
10 ConductORPDef Theory
Built: 11 June 2018
Parent Theories: ConductORPType, ssm, OMNIType
10.1 Definitions
[secAuthorization_def]
` 8 xs. secAuthorization xs = secHelper (getOmniCommand xs)
[secContext_def]
` (8 xs.
secContext CONDUCT_ORP xs =
[Name PlatoonLeader controls
prop (SOME (SLc (PL secure)))]) ^
(8 xs.
secContext SECURE xs =
if getOmniCommand xs = ssmSecureComplete then
[prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI ssmSecureComplete))) impf
Name PlatoonSergeant controls
prop (SOME (SLc (PSG actionsIn)))]
else [prop NONE]) ^
(8 xs.
secContext ACTIONS_IN xs =
if getOmniCommand xs = ssmActionsInComplete then
[prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI ssmActionsInComplete))) impf
Name PlatoonLeader controls
prop (SOME (SLc (PL withdraw)))]
else [prop NONE]) ^
8 xs.
secContext WITHDRAW xs =
if getOmniCommand xs = ssmWithdrawComplete then
[prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI ssmWithdrawComplete))) impf
Name PlatoonLeader controls







[Name Omni controls prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI cmd)))]
10.2 Theorems
[getOmniCommand_def]
` (getOmniCommand [] = invalidOmniCommand) ^
(8 xs cmd.
getOmniCommand
(Name Omni says prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI cmd)))::xs) =
cmd) ^
(8 xs. getOmniCommand (TT::xs) = getOmniCommand xs) ^
(8 xs. getOmniCommand (FF::xs) = getOmniCommand xs) ^
(8 xs v2. getOmniCommand (prop v2::xs) = getOmniCommand xs) ^
(8 xs v3. getOmniCommand (notf v3::xs) = getOmniCommand xs) ^
(8 xs v5 v4.
getOmniCommand (v4 andf v5::xs) = getOmniCommand xs) ^
(8 xs v7 v6.
getOmniCommand (v6 orf v7::xs) = getOmniCommand xs) ^
(8 xs v9 v8.
getOmniCommand (v8 impf v9::xs) = getOmniCommand xs) ^
(8 xs v11 v10.
getOmniCommand (v10 eqf v11::xs) = getOmniCommand xs) ^
(8 xs v12.
getOmniCommand (v12 says TT::xs) = getOmniCommand xs) ^
(8 xs v12.
getOmniCommand (v12 says FF::xs) = getOmniCommand xs) ^
(8 xs v134.






















(Name Omni says prop (SOME (SLc (PSG v151)))::xs) =
getOmniCommand xs) ^
(8 xs v68 v136 v135.
getOmniCommand (v135 meet v136 says prop v68::xs) =
getOmniCommand xs) ^
(8 xs v68 v138 v137.
getOmniCommand (v137 quoting v138 says prop v68::xs) =
getOmniCommand xs) ^
(8 xs v69 v12.
getOmniCommand (v12 says notf v69::xs) =
getOmniCommand xs) ^
(8 xs v71 v70 v12.
getOmniCommand (v12 says (v70 andf v71)::xs) =
getOmniCommand xs) ^
(8 xs v73 v72 v12.
getOmniCommand (v12 says (v72 orf v73)::xs) =
getOmniCommand xs) ^
(8 xs v75 v74 v12.
getOmniCommand (v12 says (v74 impf v75)::xs) =
getOmniCommand xs) ^
(8 xs v77 v76 v12.
getOmniCommand (v12 says (v76 eqf v77)::xs) =
getOmniCommand xs) ^
(8 xs v79 v78 v12.
getOmniCommand (v12 says v78 says v79::xs) =
getOmniCommand xs) ^
(8 xs v81 v80 v12.
getOmniCommand (v12 says v80 speaks_for v81::xs) =
getOmniCommand xs) ^
(8 xs v83 v82 v12.
getOmniCommand (v12 says v82 controls v83::xs) =
getOmniCommand xs) ^
(8 xs v86 v85 v84 v12.
getOmniCommand (v12 says reps v84 v85 v86::xs) =
getOmniCommand xs) ^
(8 xs v88 v87 v12.
getOmniCommand (v12 says v87 domi v88::xs) =
getOmniCommand xs) ^
(8 xs v90 v89 v12.
getOmniCommand (v12 says v89 eqi v90::xs) =
getOmniCommand xs) ^
(8 xs v92 v91 v12.
getOmniCommand (v12 says v91 doms v92::xs) =
getOmniCommand xs) ^
(8 xs v94 v93 v12.




(8 xs v96 v95 v12.
getOmniCommand (v12 says v95 eqn v96::xs) =
getOmniCommand xs) ^
(8 xs v98 v97 v12.
getOmniCommand (v12 says v97 lte v98::xs) =
getOmniCommand xs) ^
(8 xs v99 v12 v100.
getOmniCommand (v12 says v99 lt v100::xs) =
getOmniCommand xs) ^
(8 xs v15 v14.
getOmniCommand (v14 speaks_for v15::xs) =
getOmniCommand xs) ^
(8 xs v17 v16.
getOmniCommand (v16 controls v17::xs) =
getOmniCommand xs) ^
(8 xs v20 v19 v18.
getOmniCommand (reps v18 v19 v20::xs) =
getOmniCommand xs) ^
(8 xs v22 v21.
getOmniCommand (v21 domi v22::xs) = getOmniCommand xs) ^
(8 xs v24 v23.
getOmniCommand (v23 eqi v24::xs) = getOmniCommand xs) ^
(8 xs v26 v25.
getOmniCommand (v25 doms v26::xs) = getOmniCommand xs) ^
(8 xs v28 v27.
getOmniCommand (v27 eqs v28::xs) = getOmniCommand xs) ^
(8 xs v30 v29.
getOmniCommand (v29 eqn v30::xs) = getOmniCommand xs) ^
(8 xs v32 v31.
getOmniCommand (v31 lte v32::xs) = getOmniCommand xs) ^
8 xs v34 v33.





P (Name Omni says prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI cmd)))::xs)) ^
(8 xs. P xs ) P (TT::xs)) ^ (8 xs. P xs ) P (FF::xs)) ^
(8 v2 xs. P xs ) P (prop v2::xs)) ^
(8 v3 xs. P xs ) P (notf v3::xs)) ^
(8 v4 v5 xs. P xs ) P (v4 andf v5::xs)) ^
(8 v6 v7 xs. P xs ) P (v6 orf v7::xs)) ^
(8 v8 v9 xs. P xs ) P (v8 impf v9::xs)) ^
(8 v10 v11 xs. P xs ) P (v10 eqf v11::xs)) ^
(8 v12 xs. P xs ) P (v12 says TT::xs)) ^
(8 v12 xs. P xs ) P (v12 says FF::xs)) ^





P (Name PlatoonLeader says prop (SOME v144)::xs)) ^
(8 v144 xs.
P xs )
P (Name PlatoonSergeant says prop (SOME v144)::xs)) ^
(8 v146 xs.
P xs ) P (Name Omni says prop (SOME (ESCc v146))::xs)) ^
(8 v150 xs.
P xs )
P (Name Omni says prop (SOME (SLc (PL v150)))::xs)) ^
(8 v151 xs.
P xs )
P (Name Omni says prop (SOME (SLc (PSG v151)))::xs)) ^
(8 v135 v136 v68 xs.
P xs ) P (v135 meet v136 says prop v68::xs)) ^
(8 v137 v138 v68 xs.
P xs ) P (v137 quoting v138 says prop v68::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v69 xs. P xs ) P (v12 says notf v69::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v70 v71 xs. P xs ) P (v12 says (v70 andf v71)::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v72 v73 xs. P xs ) P (v12 says (v72 orf v73)::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v74 v75 xs. P xs ) P (v12 says (v74 impf v75)::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v76 v77 xs. P xs ) P (v12 says (v76 eqf v77)::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v78 v79 xs. P xs ) P (v12 says v78 says v79::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v80 v81 xs.
P xs ) P (v12 says v80 speaks_for v81::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v82 v83 xs.
P xs ) P (v12 says v82 controls v83::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v84 v85 v86 xs.
P xs ) P (v12 says reps v84 v85 v86::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v87 v88 xs. P xs ) P (v12 says v87 domi v88::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v89 v90 xs. P xs ) P (v12 says v89 eqi v90::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v91 v92 xs. P xs ) P (v12 says v91 doms v92::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v93 v94 xs. P xs ) P (v12 says v93 eqs v94::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v95 v96 xs. P xs ) P (v12 says v95 eqn v96::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v97 v98 xs. P xs ) P (v12 says v97 lte v98::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v99 v100 xs. P xs ) P (v12 says v99 lt v100::xs)) ^
(8 v14 v15 xs. P xs ) P (v14 speaks_for v15::xs)) ^
(8 v16 v17 xs. P xs ) P (v16 controls v17::xs)) ^
(8 v18 v19 v20 xs. P xs ) P (reps v18 v19 v20::xs)) ^
(8 v21 v22 xs. P xs ) P (v21 domi v22::xs)) ^
(8 v23 v24 xs. P xs ) P (v23 eqi v24::xs)) ^
(8 v25 v26 xs. P xs ) P (v25 doms v26::xs)) ^
(8 v27 v28 xs. P xs ) P (v27 eqs v28::xs)) ^
(8 v29 v30 xs. P xs ) P (v29 eqn v30::xs)) ^
(8 v31 v32 xs. P xs ) P (v31 lte v32::xs)) ^
(8 v33 v34 xs. P xs ) P (v33 lt v34::xs)) )




` (getPlCom [] = plIncomplete) ^
(8 xs cmd. getPlCom (SOME (SLc (PL cmd))::xs) = cmd) ^
(8 xs. getPlCom (NONE::xs) = getPlCom xs) ^
(8 xs v4. getPlCom (SOME (ESCc v4)::xs) = getPlCom xs) ^
(8 xs v9. getPlCom (SOME (SLc (PSG v9))::xs) = getPlCom xs) ^
8 xs v10. getPlCom (SOME (SLc (OMNI v10))::xs) = getPlCom xs
[getPlCom_ind]
` 8P.
P [] ^ (8 cmd xs. P (SOME (SLc (PL cmd))::xs)) ^
(8 xs. P xs ) P (NONE::xs)) ^
(8 v4 xs. P xs ) P (SOME (ESCc v4)::xs)) ^
(8 v9 xs. P xs ) P (SOME (SLc (PSG v9))::xs)) ^
(8 v10 xs. P xs ) P (SOME (SLc (OMNI v10))::xs)) )
8 v. P v
[getPsgCom_def]
` (getPsgCom [] = psgIncomplete) ^
(8 xs cmd. getPsgCom (SOME (SLc (PSG cmd))::xs) = cmd) ^
(8 xs. getPsgCom (NONE::xs) = getPsgCom xs) ^
(8 xs v4. getPsgCom (SOME (ESCc v4)::xs) = getPsgCom xs) ^
(8 xs v8. getPsgCom (SOME (SLc (PL v8))::xs) = getPsgCom xs) ^
8 xs v10. getPsgCom (SOME (SLc (OMNI v10))::xs) = getPsgCom xs
[getPsgCom_ind]
` 8P.
P [] ^ (8 cmd xs. P (SOME (SLc (PSG cmd))::xs)) ^
(8 xs. P xs ) P (NONE::xs)) ^
(8 v4 xs. P xs ) P (SOME (ESCc v4)::xs)) ^
(8 v8 xs. P xs ) P (SOME (SLc (PL v8))::xs)) ^
(8 v10 xs. P xs ) P (SOME (SLc (OMNI v10))::xs)) )
8 v. P v
11 ssmConductPB Theory
Built: 10 June 2018
Parent Theories: ConductPBType, ssm11, OMNIType
11.1 Definitions
[secContextConductPB_def]
` 8 plcmd psgcmd incomplete.
secContextConductPB plcmd psgcmd incomplete =
[Name PlatoonLeader controls prop (SOME (SLc (PL plcmd)));
Name PlatoonSergeant controls




prop (SOME (SLc (PSG psgcmd))) impf prop NONE;
Name PlatoonSergeant says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL plcmd))) impf prop NONE]
[ssmConductPBStateInterp_def]
` 8 slState. ssmConductPBStateInterp slState = TT
11.2 Theorems
[authTestConductPB_cmd_reject_lemma]
` 8 cmd. ¬authTestConductPB (prop (SOME cmd))
[authTestConductPB_def]
` (authTestConductPB (Name PlatoonLeader says prop cmd) () T) ^
(authTestConductPB (Name PlatoonSergeant says prop cmd) ()
T) ^ (authTestConductPB TT () F) ^
(authTestConductPB FF () F) ^
(authTestConductPB (prop v) () F) ^
(authTestConductPB (notf v1) () F) ^
(authTestConductPB (v2 andf v3) () F) ^
(authTestConductPB (v4 orf v5) () F) ^
(authTestConductPB (v6 impf v7) () F) ^
(authTestConductPB (v8 eqf v9) () F) ^
(authTestConductPB (v10 says TT) () F) ^
(authTestConductPB (v10 says FF) () F) ^
(authTestConductPB (v133 meet v134 says prop v66) () F) ^
(authTestConductPB (v135 quoting v136 says prop v66) () F) ^
(authTestConductPB (v10 says notf v67) () F) ^
(authTestConductPB (v10 says (v68 andf v69)) () F) ^
(authTestConductPB (v10 says (v70 orf v71)) () F) ^
(authTestConductPB (v10 says (v72 impf v73)) () F) ^
(authTestConductPB (v10 says (v74 eqf v75)) () F) ^
(authTestConductPB (v10 says v76 says v77) () F) ^
(authTestConductPB (v10 says v78 speaks_for v79) () F) ^
(authTestConductPB (v10 says v80 controls v81) () F) ^
(authTestConductPB (v10 says reps v82 v83 v84) () F) ^
(authTestConductPB (v10 says v85 domi v86) () F) ^
(authTestConductPB (v10 says v87 eqi v88) () F) ^
(authTestConductPB (v10 says v89 doms v90) () F) ^
(authTestConductPB (v10 says v91 eqs v92) () F) ^
(authTestConductPB (v10 says v93 eqn v94) () F) ^
(authTestConductPB (v10 says v95 lte v96) () F) ^
(authTestConductPB (v10 says v97 lt v98) () F) ^
(authTestConductPB (v12 speaks_for v13) () F) ^
(authTestConductPB (v14 controls v15) () F) ^
(authTestConductPB (reps v16 v17 v18) () F) ^
(authTestConductPB (v19 domi v20) () F) ^
(authTestConductPB (v21 eqi v22) () F) ^
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(authTestConductPB (v23 doms v24) () F) ^
(authTestConductPB (v25 eqs v26) () F) ^
(authTestConductPB (v27 eqn v28) () F) ^
(authTestConductPB (v29 lte v30) () F) ^
(authTestConductPB (v31 lt v32) () F)
[authTestConductPB_ind]
` 8P.
(8 cmd. P (Name PlatoonLeader says prop cmd)) ^
(8 cmd. P (Name PlatoonSergeant says prop cmd)) ^ P TT ^
P FF ^ (8 v. P (prop v)) ^ (8 v1. P (notf v1)) ^
(8 v2 v3. P (v2 andf v3)) ^ (8 v4 v5. P (v4 orf v5)) ^
(8 v6 v7. P (v6 impf v7)) ^ (8 v8 v9. P (v8 eqf v9)) ^
(8 v10. P (v10 says TT)) ^ (8 v10. P (v10 says FF)) ^
(8 v133 v134 v66. P (v133 meet v134 says prop v66)) ^
(8 v135 v136 v66. P (v135 quoting v136 says prop v66)) ^
(8 v10 v67. P (v10 says notf v67)) ^
(8 v10 v68 v69. P (v10 says (v68 andf v69))) ^
(8 v10 v70 v71. P (v10 says (v70 orf v71))) ^
(8 v10 v72 v73. P (v10 says (v72 impf v73))) ^
(8 v10 v74 v75. P (v10 says (v74 eqf v75))) ^
(8 v10 v76 v77. P (v10 says v76 says v77)) ^
(8 v10 v78 v79. P (v10 says v78 speaks_for v79)) ^
(8 v10 v80 v81. P (v10 says v80 controls v81)) ^
(8 v10 v82 v83 v84. P (v10 says reps v82 v83 v84)) ^
(8 v10 v85 v86. P (v10 says v85 domi v86)) ^
(8 v10 v87 v88. P (v10 says v87 eqi v88)) ^
(8 v10 v89 v90. P (v10 says v89 doms v90)) ^
(8 v10 v91 v92. P (v10 says v91 eqs v92)) ^
(8 v10 v93 v94. P (v10 says v93 eqn v94)) ^
(8 v10 v95 v96. P (v10 says v95 lte v96)) ^
(8 v10 v97 v98. P (v10 says v97 lt v98)) ^
(8 v12 v13. P (v12 speaks_for v13)) ^
(8 v14 v15. P (v14 controls v15)) ^
(8 v16 v17 v18. P (reps v16 v17 v18)) ^
(8 v19 v20. P (v19 domi v20)) ^
(8 v21 v22. P (v21 eqi v22)) ^
(8 v23 v24. P (v23 doms v24)) ^
(8 v25 v26. P (v25 eqs v26)) ^ (8 v27 v28. P (v27 eqn v28)) ^
(8 v29 v30. P (v29 lte v30)) ^ (8 v31 v32. P (v31 lt v32)) )
8 v. P v
[conductPBNS_def]
` (conductPBNS CONDUCT_PB (exec (PL securePB)) = SECURE_PB) ^
(conductPBNS CONDUCT_PB (exec (PL plIncompletePB)) =
CONDUCT_PB) ^
(conductPBNS SECURE_PB (exec (PSG actionsInPB)) =
ACTIONS_IN_PB) ^




(conductPBNS ACTIONS_IN_PB (exec (PL withdrawPB)) =
WITHDRAW_PB) ^
(conductPBNS ACTIONS_IN_PB (exec (PL plIncompletePB)) =
ACTIONS_IN_PB) ^
(conductPBNS WITHDRAW_PB (exec (PL completePB)) =
COMPLETE_PB) ^
(conductPBNS WITHDRAW_PB (exec (PL plIncompletePB)) =
WITHDRAW_PB) ^ (conductPBNS s (trap (PL cmd 0)) = s) ^
(conductPBNS s (trap (PSG cmd)) = s) ^
(conductPBNS s (discard (PL cmd 0)) = s) ^
(conductPBNS s (discard (PSG cmd)) = s)
[conductPBNS_ind]
` 8P.
P CONDUCT_PB (exec (PL securePB)) ^
P CONDUCT_PB (exec (PL plIncompletePB)) ^
P SECURE_PB (exec (PSG actionsInPB)) ^
P SECURE_PB (exec (PSG psgIncompletePB)) ^
P ACTIONS_IN_PB (exec (PL withdrawPB)) ^
P ACTIONS_IN_PB (exec (PL plIncompletePB)) ^
P WITHDRAW_PB (exec (PL completePB)) ^
P WITHDRAW_PB (exec (PL plIncompletePB)) ^
(8 s cmd. P s (trap (PL cmd))) ^
(8 s cmd. P s (trap (PSG cmd))) ^
(8 s cmd. P s (discard (PL cmd))) ^
(8 s cmd. P s (discard (PSG cmd))) ^
P CONDUCT_PB (exec (PL withdrawPB)) ^
P CONDUCT_PB (exec (PL completePB)) ^
(8 v11. P CONDUCT_PB (exec (PSG v11))) ^
(8 v13. P SECURE_PB (exec (PL v13))) ^
P ACTIONS_IN_PB (exec (PL securePB)) ^
P ACTIONS_IN_PB (exec (PL completePB)) ^
(8 v17. P ACTIONS_IN_PB (exec (PSG v17))) ^
P WITHDRAW_PB (exec (PL securePB)) ^
P WITHDRAW_PB (exec (PL withdrawPB)) ^
(8 v20. P WITHDRAW_PB (exec (PSG v20))) ^
(8 v21. P COMPLETE_PB (exec v21)) )
8 v v1. P v v1
[conductPBOut_def]
` (conductPBOut CONDUCT_PB (exec (PL securePB)) = ConductPB) ^
(conductPBOut CONDUCT_PB (exec (PL plIncompletePB)) =
ConductPB) ^
(conductPBOut SECURE_PB (exec (PSG actionsInPB)) =
SecurePB) ^
(conductPBOut SECURE_PB (exec (PSG psgIncompletePB)) =
SecurePB) ^




(conductPBOut ACTIONS_IN_PB (exec (PL plIncompletePB)) =
ActionsInPB) ^
(conductPBOut WITHDRAW_PB (exec (PL completePB)) =
WithdrawPB) ^
(conductPBOut WITHDRAW_PB (exec (PL plIncompletePB)) =
WithdrawPB) ^
(conductPBOut s (trap (PL cmd 0)) = unAuthorized) ^
(conductPBOut s (trap (PSG cmd)) = unAuthorized) ^
(conductPBOut s (discard (PL cmd 0)) = unAuthenticated) ^
(conductPBOut s (discard (PSG cmd)) = unAuthenticated)
[conductPBOut_ind]
` 8P.
P CONDUCT_PB (exec (PL securePB)) ^
P CONDUCT_PB (exec (PL plIncompletePB)) ^
P SECURE_PB (exec (PSG actionsInPB)) ^
P SECURE_PB (exec (PSG psgIncompletePB)) ^
P ACTIONS_IN_PB (exec (PL withdrawPB)) ^
P ACTIONS_IN_PB (exec (PL plIncompletePB)) ^
P WITHDRAW_PB (exec (PL completePB)) ^
P WITHDRAW_PB (exec (PL plIncompletePB)) ^
(8 s cmd. P s (trap (PL cmd))) ^
(8 s cmd. P s (trap (PSG cmd))) ^
(8 s cmd. P s (discard (PL cmd))) ^
(8 s cmd. P s (discard (PSG cmd))) ^
P CONDUCT_PB (exec (PL withdrawPB)) ^
P CONDUCT_PB (exec (PL completePB)) ^
(8 v11. P CONDUCT_PB (exec (PSG v11))) ^
(8 v13. P SECURE_PB (exec (PL v13))) ^
P ACTIONS_IN_PB (exec (PL securePB)) ^
P ACTIONS_IN_PB (exec (PL completePB)) ^
(8 v17. P ACTIONS_IN_PB (exec (PSG v17))) ^
P WITHDRAW_PB (exec (PL securePB)) ^
P WITHDRAW_PB (exec (PL withdrawPB)) ^
(8 v20. P WITHDRAW_PB (exec (PSG v20))) ^
(8 v21. P COMPLETE_PB (exec v21)) )
8 v v1. P v v1
[PlatoonLeader_exec_plCommandPB_justified_thm]
` 8NS Out M Oi Os.
TR (M ,Oi,Os) (exec (SLc (PL plCommand)))
(CFG authTestConductPB ssmConductPBStateInterp
(secContextConductPB plCommand psgCommand incomplete)
(Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL plCommand)))::ins) s outs)
(CFG authTestConductPB ssmConductPBStateInterp
(secContextConductPB plCommand psgCommand incomplete)
ins (NS s (exec (SLc (PL plCommand))))
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(Out s (exec (SLc (PL plCommand)))::outs)) ()
authTestConductPB
(Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL plCommand)))) ^
CFGInterpret (M ,Oi,Os)
(CFG authTestConductPB ssmConductPBStateInterp
(secContextConductPB plCommand psgCommand incomplete)
(Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL plCommand)))::ins) s outs) ^
(M ,Oi,Os) sat prop (SOME (SLc (PL plCommand)))
[PlatoonLeader_plCommandPB_lemma]
` CFGInterpret (M ,Oi,Os)
(CFG authTestConductPB ssmConductPBStateInterp
(secContextConductPB plCommand psgCommand incomplete)
(Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL plCommand)))::ins) s outs) )
(M ,Oi,Os) sat prop (SOME (SLc (PL plCommand)))
[PlatoonSergeant_exec_psgCommandPB_justified_thm]
` 8NS Out M Oi Os.
TR (M ,Oi,Os) (exec (SLc (PSG psgCommand)))
(CFG authTestConductPB ssmConductPBStateInterp
(secContextConductPB plCommand psgCommand incomplete)
(Name PlatoonSergeant says
prop (SOME (SLc (PSG psgCommand)))::ins) s outs)
(CFG authTestConductPB ssmConductPBStateInterp
(secContextConductPB plCommand psgCommand incomplete)
ins (NS s (exec (SLc (PSG psgCommand))))
(Out s (exec (SLc (PSG psgCommand)))::outs)) ()
authTestConductPB
(Name PlatoonSergeant says
prop (SOME (SLc (PSG psgCommand)))) ^
CFGInterpret (M ,Oi,Os)
(CFG authTestConductPB ssmConductPBStateInterp
(secContextConductPB plCommand psgCommand incomplete)
(Name PlatoonSergeant says
prop (SOME (SLc (PSG psgCommand)))::ins) s outs) ^
(M ,Oi,Os) sat prop (SOME (SLc (PSG psgCommand)))
[PlatoonSergeant_psgCommandPB_lemma]
` CFGInterpret (M ,Oi,Os)
(CFG authTestConductPB ssmConductPBStateInterp
(secContextConductPB plCommand psgCommand incomplete)
(Name PlatoonSergeant says
prop (SOME (SLc (PSG psgCommand)))::ins) s outs) )
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12.1 Datatypes
plCommandPB = securePB | withdrawPB | completePB
| plIncompletePB
psgCommandPB = actionsInPB | psgIncompletePB
slCommand = PL plCommandPB | PSG psgCommandPB
slOutput = ConductPB | SecurePB | ActionsInPB | WithdrawPB
| CompletePB | unAuthenticated | unAuthorized
slState = CONDUCT_PB | SECURE_PB | ACTIONS_IN_PB | WITHDRAW_PB
| COMPLETE_PB
stateRole = PlatoonLeader | PlatoonSergeant
12.2 Theorems
[plCommandPB_distinct_clauses]
` securePB 6= withdrawPB ^ securePB 6= completePB ^
securePB 6= plIncompletePB ^ withdrawPB 6= completePB ^
withdrawPB 6= plIncompletePB ^ completePB 6= plIncompletePB
[psgCommandPB_distinct_clauses]
` actionsInPB 6= psgIncompletePB
[slCommand_distinct_clauses]
` 8 a 0 a. PL a 6= PSG a 0
[slCommand_one_one]
` (8 a a 0. (PL a = PL a 0) () (a = a 0)) ^
8 a a 0. (PSG a = PSG a 0) () (a = a 0)
[slOutput_distinct_clauses]
` ConductPB 6= SecurePB ^ ConductPB 6= ActionsInPB ^
ConductPB 6= WithdrawPB ^ ConductPB 6= CompletePB ^
ConductPB 6= unAuthenticated ^ ConductPB 6= unAuthorized ^
SecurePB 6= ActionsInPB ^ SecurePB 6= WithdrawPB ^
SecurePB 6= CompletePB ^ SecurePB 6= unAuthenticated ^
SecurePB 6= unAuthorized ^ ActionsInPB 6= WithdrawPB ^
ActionsInPB 6= CompletePB ^ ActionsInPB 6= unAuthenticated ^
ActionsInPB 6= unAuthorized ^ WithdrawPB 6= CompletePB ^
WithdrawPB 6= unAuthenticated ^ WithdrawPB 6= unAuthorized ^





` PlatoonLeader 6= PlatoonSergeant
[slState_distinct_clauses]
` CONDUCT_PB 6= SECURE_PB ^ CONDUCT_PB 6= ACTIONS_IN_PB ^
CONDUCT_PB 6= WITHDRAW_PB ^ CONDUCT_PB 6= COMPLETE_PB ^
SECURE_PB 6= ACTIONS_IN_PB ^ SECURE_PB 6= WITHDRAW_PB ^
SECURE_PB 6= COMPLETE_PB ^ ACTIONS_IN_PB 6= WITHDRAW_PB ^
ACTIONS_IN_PB 6= COMPLETE_PB ^ WITHDRAW_PB 6= COMPLETE_PB
13 ssmMoveToORP Theory
Built: 10 June 2018





[Name PlatoonLeader controls prop (SOME (SLc cmd))]
[ssmMoveToORPStateInterp_def]
` 8 state. ssmMoveToORPStateInterp state = TT
13.2 Theorems
[authTestMoveToORP_cmd_reject_lemma]
` 8 cmd. ¬authTestMoveToORP (prop (SOME cmd))
[authTestMoveToORP_def]
` (authTestMoveToORP (Name PlatoonLeader says prop cmd) () T) ^
(authTestMoveToORP TT () F) ^ (authTestMoveToORP FF () F) ^
(authTestMoveToORP (prop v) () F) ^
(authTestMoveToORP (notf v1) () F) ^
(authTestMoveToORP (v2 andf v3) () F) ^
(authTestMoveToORP (v4 orf v5) () F) ^
(authTestMoveToORP (v6 impf v7) () F) ^
(authTestMoveToORP (v8 eqf v9) () F) ^
(authTestMoveToORP (v10 says TT) () F) ^
(authTestMoveToORP (v10 says FF) () F) ^
(authTestMoveToORP (v133 meet v134 says prop v66) () F) ^
(authTestMoveToORP (v135 quoting v136 says prop v66) () F) ^
(authTestMoveToORP (v10 says notf v67) () F) ^
(authTestMoveToORP (v10 says (v68 andf v69)) () F) ^
(authTestMoveToORP (v10 says (v70 orf v71)) () F) ^
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(authTestMoveToORP (v10 says (v72 impf v73)) () F) ^
(authTestMoveToORP (v10 says (v74 eqf v75)) () F) ^
(authTestMoveToORP (v10 says v76 says v77) () F) ^
(authTestMoveToORP (v10 says v78 speaks_for v79) () F) ^
(authTestMoveToORP (v10 says v80 controls v81) () F) ^
(authTestMoveToORP (v10 says reps v82 v83 v84) () F) ^
(authTestMoveToORP (v10 says v85 domi v86) () F) ^
(authTestMoveToORP (v10 says v87 eqi v88) () F) ^
(authTestMoveToORP (v10 says v89 doms v90) () F) ^
(authTestMoveToORP (v10 says v91 eqs v92) () F) ^
(authTestMoveToORP (v10 says v93 eqn v94) () F) ^
(authTestMoveToORP (v10 says v95 lte v96) () F) ^
(authTestMoveToORP (v10 says v97 lt v98) () F) ^
(authTestMoveToORP (v12 speaks_for v13) () F) ^
(authTestMoveToORP (v14 controls v15) () F) ^
(authTestMoveToORP (reps v16 v17 v18) () F) ^
(authTestMoveToORP (v19 domi v20) () F) ^
(authTestMoveToORP (v21 eqi v22) () F) ^
(authTestMoveToORP (v23 doms v24) () F) ^
(authTestMoveToORP (v25 eqs v26) () F) ^
(authTestMoveToORP (v27 eqn v28) () F) ^
(authTestMoveToORP (v29 lte v30) () F) ^
(authTestMoveToORP (v31 lt v32) () F)
[authTestMoveToORP_ind]
` 8P.
(8 cmd. P (Name PlatoonLeader says prop cmd)) ^ P TT ^
P FF ^ (8 v. P (prop v)) ^ (8 v1. P (notf v1)) ^
(8 v2 v3. P (v2 andf v3)) ^ (8 v4 v5. P (v4 orf v5)) ^
(8 v6 v7. P (v6 impf v7)) ^ (8 v8 v9. P (v8 eqf v9)) ^
(8 v10. P (v10 says TT)) ^ (8 v10. P (v10 says FF)) ^
(8 v133 v134 v66. P (v133 meet v134 says prop v66)) ^
(8 v135 v136 v66. P (v135 quoting v136 says prop v66)) ^
(8 v10 v67. P (v10 says notf v67)) ^
(8 v10 v68 v69. P (v10 says (v68 andf v69))) ^
(8 v10 v70 v71. P (v10 says (v70 orf v71))) ^
(8 v10 v72 v73. P (v10 says (v72 impf v73))) ^
(8 v10 v74 v75. P (v10 says (v74 eqf v75))) ^
(8 v10 v76 v77. P (v10 says v76 says v77)) ^
(8 v10 v78 v79. P (v10 says v78 speaks_for v79)) ^
(8 v10 v80 v81. P (v10 says v80 controls v81)) ^
(8 v10 v82 v83 v84. P (v10 says reps v82 v83 v84)) ^
(8 v10 v85 v86. P (v10 says v85 domi v86)) ^
(8 v10 v87 v88. P (v10 says v87 eqi v88)) ^
(8 v10 v89 v90. P (v10 says v89 doms v90)) ^
(8 v10 v91 v92. P (v10 says v91 eqs v92)) ^
(8 v10 v93 v94. P (v10 says v93 eqn v94)) ^
(8 v10 v95 v96. P (v10 says v95 lte v96)) ^
(8 v10 v97 v98. P (v10 says v97 lt v98)) ^
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(8 v12 v13. P (v12 speaks_for v13)) ^
(8 v14 v15. P (v14 controls v15)) ^
(8 v16 v17 v18. P (reps v16 v17 v18)) ^
(8 v19 v20. P (v19 domi v20)) ^
(8 v21 v22. P (v21 eqi v22)) ^
(8 v23 v24. P (v23 doms v24)) ^
(8 v25 v26. P (v25 eqs v26)) ^ (8 v27 v28. P (v27 eqn v28)) ^
(8 v29 v30. P (v29 lte v30)) ^ (8 v31 v32. P (v31 lt v32)) )
8 v. P v
[moveToORPNS_def]
` (moveToORPNS MOVE_TO_ORP (exec (SLc pltForm)) = PLT_FORM) ^
(moveToORPNS MOVE_TO_ORP (exec (SLc incomplete)) =
MOVE_TO_ORP) ^
(moveToORPNS PLT_FORM (exec (SLc pltMove)) = PLT_MOVE) ^
(moveToORPNS PLT_FORM (exec (SLc incomplete)) = PLT_FORM) ^
(moveToORPNS PLT_MOVE (exec (SLc pltSecureHalt)) =
PLT_SECURE_HALT) ^
(moveToORPNS PLT_MOVE (exec (SLc incomplete)) = PLT_MOVE) ^
(moveToORPNS PLT_SECURE_HALT (exec (SLc complete)) =
COMPLETE) ^
(moveToORPNS PLT_SECURE_HALT (exec (SLc incomplete)) =
PLT_SECURE_HALT) ^ (moveToORPNS s (trap (SLc cmd)) = s) ^
(moveToORPNS s (discard (SLc cmd)) = s)
[moveToORPNS_ind]
` 8P.
P MOVE_TO_ORP (exec (SLc pltForm)) ^
P MOVE_TO_ORP (exec (SLc incomplete)) ^
P PLT_FORM (exec (SLc pltMove)) ^
P PLT_FORM (exec (SLc incomplete)) ^
P PLT_MOVE (exec (SLc pltSecureHalt)) ^
P PLT_MOVE (exec (SLc incomplete)) ^
P PLT_SECURE_HALT (exec (SLc complete)) ^
P PLT_SECURE_HALT (exec (SLc incomplete)) ^
(8 s cmd. P s (trap (SLc cmd))) ^
(8 s cmd. P s (discard (SLc cmd))) ^
(8 s v6. P s (discard (ESCc v6))) ^
(8 s v9. P s (trap (ESCc v9))) ^
(8 v12. P MOVE_TO_ORP (exec (ESCc v12))) ^
P MOVE_TO_ORP (exec (SLc pltMove)) ^
P MOVE_TO_ORP (exec (SLc pltSecureHalt)) ^
P MOVE_TO_ORP (exec (SLc complete)) ^
(8 v15. P PLT_FORM (exec (ESCc v15))) ^
P PLT_FORM (exec (SLc pltForm)) ^
P PLT_FORM (exec (SLc pltSecureHalt)) ^
P PLT_FORM (exec (SLc complete)) ^
(8 v18. P PLT_MOVE (exec (ESCc v18))) ^
P PLT_MOVE (exec (SLc pltForm)) ^
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P PLT_MOVE (exec (SLc pltMove)) ^
P PLT_MOVE (exec (SLc complete)) ^
(8 v21. P PLT_SECURE_HALT (exec (ESCc v21))) ^
P PLT_SECURE_HALT (exec (SLc pltForm)) ^
P PLT_SECURE_HALT (exec (SLc pltMove)) ^
P PLT_SECURE_HALT (exec (SLc pltSecureHalt)) ^
(8 v23. P COMPLETE (exec v23)) )
8 v v1. P v v1
[moveToORPOut_def]
` (moveToORPOut MOVE_TO_ORP (exec (SLc pltForm)) = PLTForm) ^
(moveToORPOut MOVE_TO_ORP (exec (SLc incomplete)) =
MoveToORP) ^
(moveToORPOut PLT_FORM (exec (SLc pltMove)) = PLTMove) ^
(moveToORPOut PLT_FORM (exec (SLc incomplete)) = PLTForm) ^
(moveToORPOut PLT_MOVE (exec (SLc pltSecureHalt)) =
PLTSecureHalt) ^
(moveToORPOut PLT_MOVE (exec (SLc incomplete)) = PLTMove) ^
(moveToORPOut PLT_SECURE_HALT (exec (SLc complete)) =
Complete) ^
(moveToORPOut PLT_SECURE_HALT (exec (SLc incomplete)) =
PLTSecureHalt) ^
(moveToORPOut s (trap (SLc cmd)) = unAuthorized) ^
(moveToORPOut s (discard (SLc cmd)) = unAuthenticated)
[moveToORPOut_ind]
` 8P.
P MOVE_TO_ORP (exec (SLc pltForm)) ^
P MOVE_TO_ORP (exec (SLc incomplete)) ^
P PLT_FORM (exec (SLc pltMove)) ^
P PLT_FORM (exec (SLc incomplete)) ^
P PLT_MOVE (exec (SLc pltSecureHalt)) ^
P PLT_MOVE (exec (SLc incomplete)) ^
P PLT_SECURE_HALT (exec (SLc complete)) ^
P PLT_SECURE_HALT (exec (SLc incomplete)) ^
(8 s cmd. P s (trap (SLc cmd))) ^
(8 s cmd. P s (discard (SLc cmd))) ^
(8 s v6. P s (discard (ESCc v6))) ^
(8 s v9. P s (trap (ESCc v9))) ^
(8 v12. P MOVE_TO_ORP (exec (ESCc v12))) ^
P MOVE_TO_ORP (exec (SLc pltMove)) ^
P MOVE_TO_ORP (exec (SLc pltSecureHalt)) ^
P MOVE_TO_ORP (exec (SLc complete)) ^
(8 v15. P PLT_FORM (exec (ESCc v15))) ^
P PLT_FORM (exec (SLc pltForm)) ^
P PLT_FORM (exec (SLc pltSecureHalt)) ^
P PLT_FORM (exec (SLc complete)) ^
(8 v18. P PLT_MOVE (exec (ESCc v18))) ^
P PLT_MOVE (exec (SLc pltForm)) ^
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P PLT_MOVE (exec (SLc pltMove)) ^
P PLT_MOVE (exec (SLc complete)) ^
(8 v21. P PLT_SECURE_HALT (exec (ESCc v21))) ^
P PLT_SECURE_HALT (exec (SLc pltForm)) ^
P PLT_SECURE_HALT (exec (SLc pltMove)) ^
P PLT_SECURE_HALT (exec (SLc pltSecureHalt)) ^
(8 v23. P COMPLETE (exec v23)) )
8 v v1. P v v1
[PlatoonLeader_exec_slCommand_justified_thm]
` 8NS Out M Oi Os.
TR (M ,Oi,Os) (exec (SLc slCommand))
(CFG authTestMoveToORP ssmMoveToORPStateInterp
(secContextMoveToORP slCommand)




(NS s (exec (SLc slCommand)))
(Out s (exec (SLc slCommand))::outs)) ()
authTestMoveToORP




(Name PlatoonLeader says prop (SOME (SLc slCommand))::
ins) s outs) ^
(M ,Oi,Os) sat prop (SOME (SLc slCommand))
[PlatoonLeader_slCommand_lemma]
` CFGInterpret (M ,Oi,Os)
(CFG authTestMoveToORP ssmMoveToORPStateInterp
(secContextMoveToORP slCommand)
(Name PlatoonLeader says prop (SOME (SLc slCommand))::
ins) s outs) )
(M ,Oi,Os) sat prop (SOME (SLc slCommand))
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14.1 Datatypes




slOutput = MoveToORP | PLTForm | PLTMove | PLTSecureHalt
| Complete | unAuthorized | unAuthenticated





` pltForm 6= pltMove ^ pltForm 6= pltSecureHalt ^
pltForm 6= complete ^ pltForm 6= incomplete ^
pltMove 6= pltSecureHalt ^ pltMove 6= complete ^
pltMove 6= incomplete ^ pltSecureHalt 6= complete ^
pltSecureHalt 6= incomplete ^ complete 6= incomplete
[slOutput_distinct_clauses]
` MoveToORP 6= PLTForm ^ MoveToORP 6= PLTMove ^
MoveToORP 6= PLTSecureHalt ^ MoveToORP 6= Complete ^
MoveToORP 6= unAuthorized ^ MoveToORP 6= unAuthenticated ^
PLTForm 6= PLTMove ^ PLTForm 6= PLTSecureHalt ^
PLTForm 6= Complete ^ PLTForm 6= unAuthorized ^
PLTForm 6= unAuthenticated ^ PLTMove 6= PLTSecureHalt ^
PLTMove 6= Complete ^ PLTMove 6= unAuthorized ^
PLTMove 6= unAuthenticated ^ PLTSecureHalt 6= Complete ^
PLTSecureHalt 6= unAuthorized ^
PLTSecureHalt 6= unAuthenticated ^ Complete 6= unAuthorized ^
Complete 6= unAuthenticated ^ unAuthorized 6= unAuthenticated
[slState_distinct_clauses]
` MOVE_TO_ORP 6= PLT_FORM ^ MOVE_TO_ORP 6= PLT_MOVE ^
MOVE_TO_ORP 6= PLT_SECURE_HALT ^ MOVE_TO_ORP 6= COMPLETE ^
PLT_FORM 6= PLT_MOVE ^ PLT_FORM 6= PLT_SECURE_HALT ^
PLT_FORM 6= COMPLETE ^ PLT_MOVE 6= PLT_SECURE_HALT ^
PLT_MOVE 6= COMPLETE ^ PLT_SECURE_HALT 6= COMPLETE
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` 8 state. ssmMoveToPBStateInterp state = TT
15.2 Theorems
[authTestMoveToPB_cmd_reject_lemma]
` 8 cmd. ¬authTestMoveToPB (prop (SOME cmd))
[authTestMoveToPB_def]
` (authTestMoveToPB (Name PlatoonLeader says prop cmd) () T) ^
(authTestMoveToPB TT () F) ^ (authTestMoveToPB FF () F) ^
(authTestMoveToPB (prop v) () F) ^
(authTestMoveToPB (notf v1) () F) ^
(authTestMoveToPB (v2 andf v3) () F) ^
(authTestMoveToPB (v4 orf v5) () F) ^
(authTestMoveToPB (v6 impf v7) () F) ^
(authTestMoveToPB (v8 eqf v9) () F) ^
(authTestMoveToPB (v10 says TT) () F) ^
(authTestMoveToPB (v10 says FF) () F) ^
(authTestMoveToPB (v133 meet v134 says prop v66) () F) ^
(authTestMoveToPB (v135 quoting v136 says prop v66) () F) ^
(authTestMoveToPB (v10 says notf v67) () F) ^
(authTestMoveToPB (v10 says (v68 andf v69)) () F) ^
(authTestMoveToPB (v10 says (v70 orf v71)) () F) ^
(authTestMoveToPB (v10 says (v72 impf v73)) () F) ^
(authTestMoveToPB (v10 says (v74 eqf v75)) () F) ^
(authTestMoveToPB (v10 says v76 says v77) () F) ^
(authTestMoveToPB (v10 says v78 speaks_for v79) () F) ^
(authTestMoveToPB (v10 says v80 controls v81) () F) ^
(authTestMoveToPB (v10 says reps v82 v83 v84) () F) ^
(authTestMoveToPB (v10 says v85 domi v86) () F) ^
(authTestMoveToPB (v10 says v87 eqi v88) () F) ^
(authTestMoveToPB (v10 says v89 doms v90) () F) ^
(authTestMoveToPB (v10 says v91 eqs v92) () F) ^
(authTestMoveToPB (v10 says v93 eqn v94) () F) ^
(authTestMoveToPB (v10 says v95 lte v96) () F) ^
(authTestMoveToPB (v10 says v97 lt v98) () F) ^
(authTestMoveToPB (v12 speaks_for v13) () F) ^
(authTestMoveToPB (v14 controls v15) () F) ^
(authTestMoveToPB (reps v16 v17 v18) () F) ^
(authTestMoveToPB (v19 domi v20) () F) ^
(authTestMoveToPB (v21 eqi v22) () F) ^
(authTestMoveToPB (v23 doms v24) () F) ^
(authTestMoveToPB (v25 eqs v26) () F) ^
(authTestMoveToPB (v27 eqn v28) () F) ^
(authTestMoveToPB (v29 lte v30) () F) ^





(8 cmd. P (Name PlatoonLeader says prop cmd)) ^ P TT ^
P FF ^ (8 v. P (prop v)) ^ (8 v1. P (notf v1)) ^
(8 v2 v3. P (v2 andf v3)) ^ (8 v4 v5. P (v4 orf v5)) ^
(8 v6 v7. P (v6 impf v7)) ^ (8 v8 v9. P (v8 eqf v9)) ^
(8 v10. P (v10 says TT)) ^ (8 v10. P (v10 says FF)) ^
(8 v133 v134 v66. P (v133 meet v134 says prop v66)) ^
(8 v135 v136 v66. P (v135 quoting v136 says prop v66)) ^
(8 v10 v67. P (v10 says notf v67)) ^
(8 v10 v68 v69. P (v10 says (v68 andf v69))) ^
(8 v10 v70 v71. P (v10 says (v70 orf v71))) ^
(8 v10 v72 v73. P (v10 says (v72 impf v73))) ^
(8 v10 v74 v75. P (v10 says (v74 eqf v75))) ^
(8 v10 v76 v77. P (v10 says v76 says v77)) ^
(8 v10 v78 v79. P (v10 says v78 speaks_for v79)) ^
(8 v10 v80 v81. P (v10 says v80 controls v81)) ^
(8 v10 v82 v83 v84. P (v10 says reps v82 v83 v84)) ^
(8 v10 v85 v86. P (v10 says v85 domi v86)) ^
(8 v10 v87 v88. P (v10 says v87 eqi v88)) ^
(8 v10 v89 v90. P (v10 says v89 doms v90)) ^
(8 v10 v91 v92. P (v10 says v91 eqs v92)) ^
(8 v10 v93 v94. P (v10 says v93 eqn v94)) ^
(8 v10 v95 v96. P (v10 says v95 lte v96)) ^
(8 v10 v97 v98. P (v10 says v97 lt v98)) ^
(8 v12 v13. P (v12 speaks_for v13)) ^
(8 v14 v15. P (v14 controls v15)) ^
(8 v16 v17 v18. P (reps v16 v17 v18)) ^
(8 v19 v20. P (v19 domi v20)) ^
(8 v21 v22. P (v21 eqi v22)) ^
(8 v23 v24. P (v23 doms v24)) ^
(8 v25 v26. P (v25 eqs v26)) ^ (8 v27 v28. P (v27 eqn v28)) ^
(8 v29 v30. P (v29 lte v30)) ^ (8 v31 v32. P (v31 lt v32)) )
8 v. P v
[moveToPBNS_def]
` (moveToPBNS MOVE_TO_PB (exec (SLc pltForm)) = PLT_FORM) ^
(moveToPBNS MOVE_TO_PB (exec (SLc incomplete)) =
MOVE_TO_PB) ^
(moveToPBNS PLT_FORM (exec (SLc pltMove)) = PLT_MOVE) ^
(moveToPBNS PLT_FORM (exec (SLc incomplete)) = PLT_FORM) ^
(moveToPBNS PLT_MOVE (exec (SLc pltHalt)) = PLT_HALT) ^
(moveToPBNS PLT_MOVE (exec (SLc incomplete)) = PLT_MOVE) ^
(moveToPBNS PLT_HALT (exec (SLc complete)) = COMPLETE) ^
(moveToPBNS PLT_HALT (exec (SLc incomplete)) = PLT_HALT) ^
(moveToPBNS s (trap (SLc cmd)) = s) ^





P MOVE_TO_PB (exec (SLc pltForm)) ^
P MOVE_TO_PB (exec (SLc incomplete)) ^
P PLT_FORM (exec (SLc pltMove)) ^
P PLT_FORM (exec (SLc incomplete)) ^
P PLT_MOVE (exec (SLc pltHalt)) ^
P PLT_MOVE (exec (SLc incomplete)) ^
P PLT_HALT (exec (SLc complete)) ^
P PLT_HALT (exec (SLc incomplete)) ^
(8 s cmd. P s (trap (SLc cmd))) ^
(8 s cmd. P s (discard (SLc cmd))) ^
(8 s v6. P s (discard (ESCc v6))) ^
(8 s v9. P s (trap (ESCc v9))) ^
(8 v12. P MOVE_TO_PB (exec (ESCc v12))) ^
P MOVE_TO_PB (exec (SLc pltMove)) ^
P MOVE_TO_PB (exec (SLc pltHalt)) ^
P MOVE_TO_PB (exec (SLc complete)) ^
(8 v15. P PLT_FORM (exec (ESCc v15))) ^
P PLT_FORM (exec (SLc pltForm)) ^
P PLT_FORM (exec (SLc pltHalt)) ^
P PLT_FORM (exec (SLc complete)) ^
(8 v18. P PLT_MOVE (exec (ESCc v18))) ^
P PLT_MOVE (exec (SLc pltForm)) ^
P PLT_MOVE (exec (SLc pltMove)) ^
P PLT_MOVE (exec (SLc complete)) ^
(8 v21. P PLT_HALT (exec (ESCc v21))) ^
P PLT_HALT (exec (SLc pltForm)) ^
P PLT_HALT (exec (SLc pltMove)) ^
P PLT_HALT (exec (SLc pltHalt)) ^
(8 v23. P COMPLETE (exec v23)) )
8 v v1. P v v1
[moveToPBOut_def]
` (moveToPBOut MOVE_TO_PB (exec (SLc pltForm)) = PLTForm) ^
(moveToPBOut MOVE_TO_PB (exec (SLc incomplete)) = MoveToPB) ^
(moveToPBOut PLT_FORM (exec (SLc pltMove)) = PLTMove) ^
(moveToPBOut PLT_FORM (exec (SLc incomplete)) = PLTForm) ^
(moveToPBOut PLT_MOVE (exec (SLc pltHalt)) = PLTHalt) ^
(moveToPBOut PLT_MOVE (exec (SLc incomplete)) = PLTMove) ^
(moveToPBOut PLT_HALT (exec (SLc complete)) = Complete) ^
(moveToPBOut PLT_HALT (exec (SLc incomplete)) = PLTHalt) ^
(moveToPBOut s (trap (SLc cmd)) = unAuthorized) ^
(moveToPBOut s (discard (SLc cmd)) = unAuthenticated)
[moveToPBOut_ind]
` 8P.
P MOVE_TO_PB (exec (SLc pltForm)) ^
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P MOVE_TO_PB (exec (SLc incomplete)) ^
P PLT_FORM (exec (SLc pltMove)) ^
P PLT_FORM (exec (SLc incomplete)) ^
P PLT_MOVE (exec (SLc pltHalt)) ^
P PLT_MOVE (exec (SLc incomplete)) ^
P PLT_HALT (exec (SLc complete)) ^
P PLT_HALT (exec (SLc incomplete)) ^
(8 s cmd. P s (trap (SLc cmd))) ^
(8 s cmd. P s (discard (SLc cmd))) ^
(8 s v6. P s (discard (ESCc v6))) ^
(8 s v9. P s (trap (ESCc v9))) ^
(8 v12. P MOVE_TO_PB (exec (ESCc v12))) ^
P MOVE_TO_PB (exec (SLc pltMove)) ^
P MOVE_TO_PB (exec (SLc pltHalt)) ^
P MOVE_TO_PB (exec (SLc complete)) ^
(8 v15. P PLT_FORM (exec (ESCc v15))) ^
P PLT_FORM (exec (SLc pltForm)) ^
P PLT_FORM (exec (SLc pltHalt)) ^
P PLT_FORM (exec (SLc complete)) ^
(8 v18. P PLT_MOVE (exec (ESCc v18))) ^
P PLT_MOVE (exec (SLc pltForm)) ^
P PLT_MOVE (exec (SLc pltMove)) ^
P PLT_MOVE (exec (SLc complete)) ^
(8 v21. P PLT_HALT (exec (ESCc v21))) ^
P PLT_HALT (exec (SLc pltForm)) ^
P PLT_HALT (exec (SLc pltMove)) ^
P PLT_HALT (exec (SLc pltHalt)) ^
(8 v23. P COMPLETE (exec v23)) )
8 v v1. P v v1
[PlatoonLeader_exec_slCommand_justified_thm]
` 8NS Out M Oi Os.
TR (M ,Oi,Os) (exec (SLc slCommand))
(CFG authTestMoveToPB ssmMoveToPBStateInterp
(secContextMoveToPB slCommand)




(NS s (exec (SLc slCommand)))
(Out s (exec (SLc slCommand))::outs)) ()
authTestMoveToPB




(Name PlatoonLeader says prop (SOME (SLc slCommand))::
ins) s outs) ^




` CFGInterpret (M ,Oi,Os)
(CFG authTestMoveToPB ssmMoveToPBStateInterp
(secContextMoveToPB slCommand)
(Name PlatoonLeader says prop (SOME (SLc slCommand))::
ins) s outs) )
(M ,Oi,Os) sat prop (SOME (SLc slCommand))
16 MoveToPBType Theory
Built: 10 June 2018
Parent Theories: indexedLists, patternMatches
16.1 Datatypes
slCommand = pltForm | pltMove | pltHalt | complete | incomplete
slOutput = MoveToPB | PLTForm | PLTMove | PLTHalt | Complete
| unAuthorized | unAuthenticated




` pltForm 6= pltMove ^ pltForm 6= pltHalt ^ pltForm 6= complete ^
pltForm 6= incomplete ^ pltMove 6= pltHalt ^
pltMove 6= complete ^ pltMove 6= incomplete ^
pltHalt 6= complete ^ pltHalt 6= incomplete ^
complete 6= incomplete
[slOutput_distinct_clauses]
` MoveToPB 6= PLTForm ^ MoveToPB 6= PLTMove ^
MoveToPB 6= PLTHalt ^ MoveToPB 6= Complete ^
MoveToPB 6= unAuthorized ^ MoveToPB 6= unAuthenticated ^
PLTForm 6= PLTMove ^ PLTForm 6= PLTHalt ^ PLTForm 6= Complete ^
PLTForm 6= unAuthorized ^ PLTForm 6= unAuthenticated ^
PLTMove 6= PLTHalt ^ PLTMove 6= Complete ^
PLTMove 6= unAuthorized ^ PLTMove 6= unAuthenticated ^
PLTHalt 6= Complete ^ PLTHalt 6= unAuthorized ^
PLTHalt 6= unAuthenticated ^ Complete 6= unAuthorized ^




` MOVE_TO_PB 6= PLT_FORM ^ MOVE_TO_PB 6= PLT_MOVE ^
MOVE_TO_PB 6= PLT_HALT ^ MOVE_TO_PB 6= COMPLETE ^
PLT_FORM 6= PLT_MOVE ^ PLT_FORM 6= PLT_HALT ^
PLT_FORM 6= COMPLETE ^ PLT_MOVE 6= PLT_HALT ^
PLT_MOVE 6= COMPLETE ^ PLT_HALT 6= COMPLETE
17 ssmPlanPB Theory
Built: 10 June 2018
Parent Theories: PlanPBDef, ssm
17.1 Theorems
[inputOK_def]
` (inputOK (Name PlatoonLeader says prop cmd) () T) ^
(inputOK (Name PlatoonSergeant says prop cmd) () T) ^
(inputOK TT () F) ^ (inputOK FF () F) ^
(inputOK (prop v) () F) ^ (inputOK (notf v1) () F) ^
(inputOK (v2 andf v3) () F) ^ (inputOK (v4 orf v5) () F) ^
(inputOK (v6 impf v7) () F) ^ (inputOK (v8 eqf v9) () F) ^
(inputOK (v10 says TT) () F) ^ (inputOK (v10 says FF) () F) ^
(inputOK (v133 meet v134 says prop v66) () F) ^
(inputOK (v135 quoting v136 says prop v66) () F) ^
(inputOK (v10 says notf v67) () F) ^
(inputOK (v10 says (v68 andf v69)) () F) ^
(inputOK (v10 says (v70 orf v71)) () F) ^
(inputOK (v10 says (v72 impf v73)) () F) ^
(inputOK (v10 says (v74 eqf v75)) () F) ^
(inputOK (v10 says v76 says v77) () F) ^
(inputOK (v10 says v78 speaks_for v79) () F) ^
(inputOK (v10 says v80 controls v81) () F) ^
(inputOK (v10 says reps v82 v83 v84) () F) ^
(inputOK (v10 says v85 domi v86) () F) ^
(inputOK (v10 says v87 eqi v88) () F) ^
(inputOK (v10 says v89 doms v90) () F) ^
(inputOK (v10 says v91 eqs v92) () F) ^
(inputOK (v10 says v93 eqn v94) () F) ^
(inputOK (v10 says v95 lte v96) () F) ^
(inputOK (v10 says v97 lt v98) () F) ^
(inputOK (v12 speaks_for v13) () F) ^
(inputOK (v14 controls v15) () F) ^
(inputOK (reps v16 v17 v18) () F) ^
(inputOK (v19 domi v20) () F) ^
(inputOK (v21 eqi v22) () F) ^
(inputOK (v23 doms v24) () F) ^
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(inputOK (v25 eqs v26) () F) ^ (inputOK (v27 eqn v28) () F) ^
(inputOK (v29 lte v30) () F) ^ (inputOK (v31 lt v32) () F)
[inputOK_ind]
` 8P.
(8 cmd. P (Name PlatoonLeader says prop cmd)) ^
(8 cmd. P (Name PlatoonSergeant says prop cmd)) ^ P TT ^
P FF ^ (8 v. P (prop v)) ^ (8 v1. P (notf v1)) ^
(8 v2 v3. P (v2 andf v3)) ^ (8 v4 v5. P (v4 orf v5)) ^
(8 v6 v7. P (v6 impf v7)) ^ (8 v8 v9. P (v8 eqf v9)) ^
(8 v10. P (v10 says TT)) ^ (8 v10. P (v10 says FF)) ^
(8 v133 v134 v66. P (v133 meet v134 says prop v66)) ^
(8 v135 v136 v66. P (v135 quoting v136 says prop v66)) ^
(8 v10 v67. P (v10 says notf v67)) ^
(8 v10 v68 v69. P (v10 says (v68 andf v69))) ^
(8 v10 v70 v71. P (v10 says (v70 orf v71))) ^
(8 v10 v72 v73. P (v10 says (v72 impf v73))) ^
(8 v10 v74 v75. P (v10 says (v74 eqf v75))) ^
(8 v10 v76 v77. P (v10 says v76 says v77)) ^
(8 v10 v78 v79. P (v10 says v78 speaks_for v79)) ^
(8 v10 v80 v81. P (v10 says v80 controls v81)) ^
(8 v10 v82 v83 v84. P (v10 says reps v82 v83 v84)) ^
(8 v10 v85 v86. P (v10 says v85 domi v86)) ^
(8 v10 v87 v88. P (v10 says v87 eqi v88)) ^
(8 v10 v89 v90. P (v10 says v89 doms v90)) ^
(8 v10 v91 v92. P (v10 says v91 eqs v92)) ^
(8 v10 v93 v94. P (v10 says v93 eqn v94)) ^
(8 v10 v95 v96. P (v10 says v95 lte v96)) ^
(8 v10 v97 v98. P (v10 says v97 lt v98)) ^
(8 v12 v13. P (v12 speaks_for v13)) ^
(8 v14 v15. P (v14 controls v15)) ^
(8 v16 v17 v18. P (reps v16 v17 v18)) ^
(8 v19 v20. P (v19 domi v20)) ^
(8 v21 v22. P (v21 eqi v22)) ^
(8 v23 v24. P (v23 doms v24)) ^
(8 v25 v26. P (v25 eqs v26)) ^ (8 v27 v28. P (v27 eqn v28)) ^
(8 v29 v30. P (v29 lte v30)) ^ (8 v31 v32. P (v31 lt v32)) )
8 v. P v
[planPBNS_def]
` (planPBNS WARNO (exec x) =
if
(getRecon x = [SOME (SLc (PL recon))]) ^
(getTenativePlan x = [SOME (SLc (PL tentativePlan))]) ^
(getReport x = [SOME (SLc (PL report1))]) ^






(planPBNS PLAN_PB (exec x) =
if getPlCom x = receiveMission then RECEIVE_MISSION
else PLAN_PB) ^
(planPBNS RECEIVE_MISSION (exec x) =
if getPlCom x = warno then WARNO else RECEIVE_MISSION) ^
(planPBNS REPORT1 (exec x) =
if getPlCom x = completePlan then COMPLETE_PLAN
else REPORT1) ^
(planPBNS COMPLETE_PLAN (exec x) =
if getPlCom x = opoid then OPOID else COMPLETE_PLAN) ^
(planPBNS OPOID (exec x) =
if getPlCom x = supervise then SUPERVISE else OPOID) ^
(planPBNS SUPERVISE (exec x) =
if getPlCom x = report2 then REPORT2 else SUPERVISE) ^
(planPBNS REPORT2 (exec x) =
if getPlCom x = complete then COMPLETE else REPORT2) ^
(planPBNS s (trap v0) = s) ^ (planPBNS s (discard v1) = s)
[planPBNS_ind]
` 8P.
(8 x. P WARNO (exec x)) ^ (8 x. P PLAN_PB (exec x)) ^
(8 x. P RECEIVE_MISSION (exec x)) ^
(8 x. P REPORT1 (exec x)) ^ (8 x. P COMPLETE_PLAN (exec x)) ^
(8 x. P OPOID (exec x)) ^ (8 x. P SUPERVISE (exec x)) ^
(8 x. P REPORT2 (exec x)) ^ (8 s v0. P s (trap v0)) ^
(8 s v1. P s (discard v1)) ^
(8 v6. P TENTATIVE_PLAN (exec v6)) ^
(8 v7. P INITIATE_MOVEMENT (exec v7)) ^
(8 v8. P RECON (exec v8)) ^ (8 v9. P COMPLETE (exec v9)) )
8 v v1. P v v1
[planPBOut_def]
` (planPBOut WARNO (exec x) =
if
(getRecon x = [SOME (SLc (PL recon))]) ^
(getTenativePlan x = [SOME (SLc (PL tentativePlan))]) ^
(getReport x = [SOME (SLc (PL report1))]) ^




(planPBOut PLAN_PB (exec x) =
if getPlCom x = receiveMission then ReceiveMission
else unAuthorized) ^
(planPBOut RECEIVE_MISSION (exec x) =
if getPlCom x = warno then Warno else unAuthorized) ^
(planPBOut REPORT1 (exec x) =




(planPBOut COMPLETE_PLAN (exec x) =
if getPlCom x = opoid then Opoid else unAuthorized) ^
(planPBOut OPOID (exec x) =
if getPlCom x = supervise then Supervise
else unAuthorized) ^
(planPBOut SUPERVISE (exec x) =
if getPlCom x = report2 then Report2 else unAuthorized) ^
(planPBOut REPORT2 (exec x) =
if getPlCom x = complete then Complete else unAuthorized) ^
(planPBOut s (trap v0) = unAuthorized) ^
(planPBOut s (discard v1) = unAuthenticated)
[planPBOut_ind]
` 8P.
(8 x. P WARNO (exec x)) ^ (8 x. P PLAN_PB (exec x)) ^
(8 x. P RECEIVE_MISSION (exec x)) ^
(8 x. P REPORT1 (exec x)) ^ (8 x. P COMPLETE_PLAN (exec x)) ^
(8 x. P OPOID (exec x)) ^ (8 x. P SUPERVISE (exec x)) ^
(8 x. P REPORT2 (exec x)) ^ (8 s v0. P s (trap v0)) ^
(8 s v1. P s (discard v1)) ^
(8 v6. P TENTATIVE_PLAN (exec v6)) ^
(8 v7. P INITIATE_MOVEMENT (exec v7)) ^
(8 v8. P RECON (exec v8)) ^ (8 v9. P COMPLETE (exec v9)) )
8 v v1. P v v1
[PlatoonLeader_notWARNO_notreport1_exec_plCommand_justified_lemma]
` s 6= WARNO )
plCommand 6= invalidPlCommand )
plCommand 6= report1 )





prop (SOME (SLc (PL plCommand)))]))
(CFG inputOK secContext secContextNull
([Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL plCommand)))]::ins) s outs)
















prop (SOME (SLc (PL plCommand)))] ^
CFGInterpret (M ,Oi,Os)
(CFG inputOK secContext secContextNull
([Name PlatoonLeader says




prop (SOME (SLc (PL plCommand)))]
[PlatoonLeader_notWARNO_notreport1_exec_plCommand_justified_thm]
` s 6= WARNO )
plCommand 6= invalidPlCommand )
plCommand 6= report1 )
8NS Out M Oi Os.
TR (M ,Oi,Os) (exec [SOME (SLc (PL plCommand))])
(CFG inputOK secContext secContextNull
([Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL plCommand)))]::ins) s outs)
(CFG inputOK secContext secContextNull ins
(NS s (exec [SOME (SLc (PL plCommand))]))
(Out s (exec [SOME (SLc (PL plCommand))])::outs)) ()
authenticationTest inputOK
[Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL plCommand)))] ^
CFGInterpret (M ,Oi,Os)
(CFG inputOK secContext secContextNull
([Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL plCommand)))]::ins) s outs) ^
(M ,Oi,Os) satList [prop (SOME (SLc (PL plCommand)))]
[PlatoonLeader_notWARNO_notreport1_exec_plCommand_lemma]
` s 6= WARNO )
plCommand 6= invalidPlCommand )
plCommand 6= report1 )
8M Oi Os.
CFGInterpret (M ,Oi,Os)
(CFG inputOK secContext secContextNull
([Name PlatoonLeader says








` 8NS Out M Oi Os.
¬TR (M ,Oi,Os) (discard [SOME (SLc (PSG psgCommand))])
(CFG inputOK secContext secContextNull
([Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PSG psgCommand)))]::ins) s outs)
(CFG inputOK secContext secContextNull ins
(NS s (discard [SOME (SLc (PSG psgCommand))]))
(Out s (discard [SOME (SLc (PSG psgCommand))])::
outs))
[PlatoonLeader_trap_psgCommand_justified_lemma]





prop (SOME (SLc (PSG psgCommand)))]))
(CFG inputOK secContext secContextNull
([Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PSG psgCommand)))]::ins) s outs)














prop (SOME (SLc (PSG psgCommand)))] ^
CFGInterpret (M ,Oi,Os)
(CFG inputOK secContext secContextNull
([Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PSG psgCommand)))]::ins) s outs) ^
(M ,Oi,Os) sat prop NONE
[PlatoonLeader_trap_psgCommand_lemma]
` 8M Oi Os.
CFGInterpret (M ,Oi,Os)
(CFG inputOK secContext secContextNull
([Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PSG psgCommand)))]::ins) s outs) )









prop (SOME (SLc (PL recon)));
Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL tentativePlan)));
Name PlatoonSergeant says
prop (SOME (SLc (PSG initiateMovement)));
Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL report1)))]))
(CFG inputOK secContext secContextNull
([Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL recon)));
Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL tentativePlan)));
Name PlatoonSergeant says
prop (SOME (SLc (PSG initiateMovement)));
Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL report1)))]::ins) WARNO outs)





prop (SOME (SLc (PL recon)));
Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL tentativePlan)));
Name PlatoonSergeant says
prop (SOME (SLc (PSG initiateMovement)));
Name PlatoonLeader says





prop (SOME (SLc (PL recon)));
Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL tentativePlan)));
Name PlatoonSergeant says
prop (SOME (SLc (PSG initiateMovement)));
Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL report1)))]))::outs)) ()
authenticationTest inputOK
[Name PlatoonLeader says prop (SOME (SLc (PL recon)));
Name PlatoonLeader says




prop (SOME (SLc (PSG initiateMovement)));
Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL report1)))] ^
CFGInterpret (M ,Oi,Os)
(CFG inputOK secContext secContextNull
([Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL recon)));
Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL tentativePlan)));
Name PlatoonSergeant says
prop (SOME (SLc (PSG initiateMovement)));
Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL report1)))]::ins) WARNO outs) ^
(M ,Oi,Os) satList
propCommandList
[Name PlatoonLeader says prop (SOME (SLc (PL recon)));
Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL tentativePlan)));
Name PlatoonSergeant says
prop (SOME (SLc (PSG initiateMovement)));
Name PlatoonLeader says prop (SOME (SLc (PL report1)))]
[PlatoonLeader_WARNO_exec_report1_justified_thm]
` 8NS Out M Oi Os.
TR (M ,Oi,Os)
(exec
[SOME (SLc (PL recon)); SOME (SLc (PL tentativePlan));
SOME (SLc (PSG initiateMovement));
SOME (SLc (PL report1))])
(CFG inputOK secContext secContextNull
([Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL recon)));
Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL tentativePlan)));
Name PlatoonSergeant says
prop (SOME (SLc (PSG initiateMovement)));
Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL report1)))]::ins) WARNO outs)
(CFG inputOK secContext secContextNull ins
(NS WARNO
(exec
[SOME (SLc (PL recon));
SOME (SLc (PL tentativePlan));
SOME (SLc (PSG initiateMovement));
SOME (SLc (PL report1))]))
(Out WARNO
(exec
[SOME (SLc (PL recon));
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SOME (SLc (PL tentativePlan));
SOME (SLc (PSG initiateMovement));
SOME (SLc (PL report1))])::outs)) ()
authenticationTest inputOK
[Name PlatoonLeader says prop (SOME (SLc (PL recon)));
Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL tentativePlan)));
Name PlatoonSergeant says
prop (SOME (SLc (PSG initiateMovement)));
Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL report1)))] ^
CFGInterpret (M ,Oi,Os)
(CFG inputOK secContext secContextNull
([Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL recon)));
Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL tentativePlan)));
Name PlatoonSergeant says
prop (SOME (SLc (PSG initiateMovement)));
Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL report1)))]::ins) WARNO outs) ^
(M ,Oi,Os) satList
[prop (SOME (SLc (PL recon)));
prop (SOME (SLc (PL tentativePlan)));
prop (SOME (SLc (PSG initiateMovement)));
prop (SOME (SLc (PL report1)))]
[PlatoonLeader_WARNO_exec_report1_lemma]
` 8M Oi Os.
CFGInterpret (M ,Oi,Os)
(CFG inputOK secContext secContextNull
([Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL recon)));
Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL tentativePlan)));
Name PlatoonSergeant says
prop (SOME (SLc (PSG initiateMovement)));
Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL report1)))]::ins) WARNO outs) )
(M ,Oi,Os) satList
propCommandList
[Name PlatoonLeader says prop (SOME (SLc (PL recon)));
Name PlatoonLeader says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL tentativePlan)));
Name PlatoonSergeant says
prop (SOME (SLc (PSG initiateMovement)));









prop (SOME (SLc (PL plCommand)))]))
(CFG inputOK secContext secContextNull
([Name PlatoonSergeant says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL plCommand)))]::ins) s outs)














prop (SOME (SLc (PL plCommand)))] ^
CFGInterpret (M ,Oi,Os)
(CFG inputOK secContext secContextNull
([Name PlatoonSergeant says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL plCommand)))]::ins) s outs) ^
(M ,Oi,Os) sat prop NONE
[PlatoonSergeant_trap_plCommand_justified_thm]
` 8NS Out M Oi Os.
TR (M ,Oi,Os) (trap [SOME (SLc (PL plCommand))])
(CFG inputOK secContext secContextNull
([Name PlatoonSergeant says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL plCommand)))]::ins) s outs)
(CFG inputOK secContext secContextNull ins
(NS s (trap [SOME (SLc (PL plCommand))]))
(Out s (trap [SOME (SLc (PL plCommand))])::outs)) ()
authenticationTest inputOK
[Name PlatoonSergeant says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL plCommand)))] ^
CFGInterpret (M ,Oi,Os)
(CFG inputOK secContext secContextNull
([Name PlatoonSergeant says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL plCommand)))]::ins) s outs) ^




` 8M Oi Os.
CFGInterpret (M ,Oi,Os)
(CFG inputOK secContext secContextNull
([Name PlatoonSergeant says
prop (SOME (SLc (PL plCommand)))]::ins) s outs) )
(M ,Oi,Os) sat prop NONE
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18.1 Datatypes
plCommand = receiveMission | warno | tentativePlan | recon
| report1 | completePlan | opoid | supervise | report2
| complete | plIncomplete | invalidPlCommand
psgCommand = initiateMovement | psgIncomplete
| invalidPsgCommand
slCommand = PL plCommand | PSG psgCommand
slOutput = PlanPB | ReceiveMission | Warno | TentativePlan
| InitiateMovement | Recon | Report1 | CompletePlan
| Opoid | Supervise | Report2 | Complete
| unAuthenticated | unAuthorized
slState = PLAN_PB | RECEIVE_MISSION | WARNO | TENTATIVE_PLAN
| INITIATE_MOVEMENT | RECON | REPORT1 | COMPLETE_PLAN
| OPOID | SUPERVISE | REPORT2 | COMPLETE
stateRole = PlatoonLeader | PlatoonSergeant
18.2 Theorems
[plCommand_distinct_clauses]
` receiveMission 6= warno ^ receiveMission 6= tentativePlan ^
receiveMission 6= recon ^ receiveMission 6= report1 ^
receiveMission 6= completePlan ^ receiveMission 6= opoid ^
receiveMission 6= supervise ^ receiveMission 6= report2 ^
receiveMission 6= complete ^ receiveMission 6= plIncomplete ^
receiveMission 6= invalidPlCommand ^ warno 6= tentativePlan ^
warno 6= recon ^ warno 6= report1 ^ warno 6= completePlan ^
warno 6= opoid ^ warno 6= supervise ^ warno 6= report2 ^
warno 6= complete ^ warno 6= plIncomplete ^
warno 6= invalidPlCommand ^ tentativePlan 6= recon ^
tentativePlan 6= report1 ^ tentativePlan 6= completePlan ^
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tentativePlan 6= opoid ^ tentativePlan 6= supervise ^
tentativePlan 6= report2 ^ tentativePlan 6= complete ^
tentativePlan 6= plIncomplete ^
tentativePlan 6= invalidPlCommand ^ recon 6= report1 ^
recon 6= completePlan ^ recon 6= opoid ^ recon 6= supervise ^
recon 6= report2 ^ recon 6= complete ^ recon 6= plIncomplete ^
recon 6= invalidPlCommand ^ report1 6= completePlan ^
report1 6= opoid ^ report1 6= supervise ^ report1 6= report2 ^
report1 6= complete ^ report1 6= plIncomplete ^
report1 6= invalidPlCommand ^ completePlan 6= opoid ^
completePlan 6= supervise ^ completePlan 6= report2 ^
completePlan 6= complete ^ completePlan 6= plIncomplete ^
completePlan 6= invalidPlCommand ^ opoid 6= supervise ^
opoid 6= report2 ^ opoid 6= complete ^ opoid 6= plIncomplete ^
opoid 6= invalidPlCommand ^ supervise 6= report2 ^
supervise 6= complete ^ supervise 6= plIncomplete ^
supervise 6= invalidPlCommand ^ report2 6= complete ^
report2 6= plIncomplete ^ report2 6= invalidPlCommand ^
complete 6= plIncomplete ^ complete 6= invalidPlCommand ^
plIncomplete 6= invalidPlCommand
[psgCommand_distinct_clauses]
` initiateMovement 6= psgIncomplete ^
initiateMovement 6= invalidPsgCommand ^
psgIncomplete 6= invalidPsgCommand
[slCommand_distinct_clauses]
` 8 a 0 a. PL a 6= PSG a 0
[slCommand_one_one]
` (8 a a 0. (PL a = PL a 0) () (a = a 0)) ^
8 a a 0. (PSG a = PSG a 0) () (a = a 0)
[slOutput_distinct_clauses]
` PlanPB 6= ReceiveMission ^ PlanPB 6= Warno ^
PlanPB 6= TentativePlan ^ PlanPB 6= InitiateMovement ^
PlanPB 6= Recon ^ PlanPB 6= Report1 ^ PlanPB 6= CompletePlan ^
PlanPB 6= Opoid ^ PlanPB 6= Supervise ^ PlanPB 6= Report2 ^
PlanPB 6= Complete ^ PlanPB 6= unAuthenticated ^
PlanPB 6= unAuthorized ^ ReceiveMission 6= Warno ^
ReceiveMission 6= TentativePlan ^
ReceiveMission 6= InitiateMovement ^ ReceiveMission 6= Recon ^
ReceiveMission 6= Report1 ^ ReceiveMission 6= CompletePlan ^
ReceiveMission 6= Opoid ^ ReceiveMission 6= Supervise ^
ReceiveMission 6= Report2 ^ ReceiveMission 6= Complete ^
ReceiveMission 6= unAuthenticated ^
ReceiveMission 6= unAuthorized ^ Warno 6= TentativePlan ^
Warno 6= InitiateMovement ^ Warno 6= Recon ^ Warno 6= Report1 ^
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Warno 6= CompletePlan ^ Warno 6= Opoid ^ Warno 6= Supervise ^
Warno 6= Report2 ^ Warno 6= Complete ^
Warno 6= unAuthenticated ^ Warno 6= unAuthorized ^
TentativePlan 6= InitiateMovement ^ TentativePlan 6= Recon ^
TentativePlan 6= Report1 ^ TentativePlan 6= CompletePlan ^
TentativePlan 6= Opoid ^ TentativePlan 6= Supervise ^
TentativePlan 6= Report2 ^ TentativePlan 6= Complete ^
TentativePlan 6= unAuthenticated ^
TentativePlan 6= unAuthorized ^ InitiateMovement 6= Recon ^
InitiateMovement 6= Report1 ^
InitiateMovement 6= CompletePlan ^ InitiateMovement 6= Opoid ^
InitiateMovement 6= Supervise ^ InitiateMovement 6= Report2 ^
InitiateMovement 6= Complete ^
InitiateMovement 6= unAuthenticated ^
InitiateMovement 6= unAuthorized ^ Recon 6= Report1 ^
Recon 6= CompletePlan ^ Recon 6= Opoid ^ Recon 6= Supervise ^
Recon 6= Report2 ^ Recon 6= Complete ^
Recon 6= unAuthenticated ^ Recon 6= unAuthorized ^
Report1 6= CompletePlan ^ Report1 6= Opoid ^
Report1 6= Supervise ^ Report1 6= Report2 ^
Report1 6= Complete ^ Report1 6= unAuthenticated ^
Report1 6= unAuthorized ^ CompletePlan 6= Opoid ^
CompletePlan 6= Supervise ^ CompletePlan 6= Report2 ^
CompletePlan 6= Complete ^ CompletePlan 6= unAuthenticated ^
CompletePlan 6= unAuthorized ^ Opoid 6= Supervise ^
Opoid 6= Report2 ^ Opoid 6= Complete ^
Opoid 6= unAuthenticated ^ Opoid 6= unAuthorized ^
Supervise 6= Report2 ^ Supervise 6= Complete ^
Supervise 6= unAuthenticated ^ Supervise 6= unAuthorized ^
Report2 6= Complete ^ Report2 6= unAuthenticated ^
Report2 6= unAuthorized ^ Complete 6= unAuthenticated ^
Complete 6= unAuthorized ^ unAuthenticated 6= unAuthorized
[slRole_distinct_clauses]
` PlatoonLeader 6= PlatoonSergeant
[slState_distinct_clauses]
` PLAN_PB 6= RECEIVE_MISSION ^ PLAN_PB 6= WARNO ^
PLAN_PB 6= TENTATIVE_PLAN ^ PLAN_PB 6= INITIATE_MOVEMENT ^
PLAN_PB 6= RECON ^ PLAN_PB 6= REPORT1 ^
PLAN_PB 6= COMPLETE_PLAN ^ PLAN_PB 6= OPOID ^
PLAN_PB 6= SUPERVISE ^ PLAN_PB 6= REPORT2 ^
PLAN_PB 6= COMPLETE ^ RECEIVE_MISSION 6= WARNO ^
RECEIVE_MISSION 6= TENTATIVE_PLAN ^
RECEIVE_MISSION 6= INITIATE_MOVEMENT ^
RECEIVE_MISSION 6= RECON ^ RECEIVE_MISSION 6= REPORT1 ^
RECEIVE_MISSION 6= COMPLETE_PLAN ^ RECEIVE_MISSION 6= OPOID ^
RECEIVE_MISSION 6= SUPERVISE ^ RECEIVE_MISSION 6= REPORT2 ^
RECEIVE_MISSION 6= COMPLETE ^ WARNO 6= TENTATIVE_PLAN ^
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WARNO 6= INITIATE_MOVEMENT ^ WARNO 6= RECON ^ WARNO 6= REPORT1 ^
WARNO 6= COMPLETE_PLAN ^ WARNO 6= OPOID ^ WARNO 6= SUPERVISE ^
WARNO 6= REPORT2 ^ WARNO 6= COMPLETE ^
TENTATIVE_PLAN 6= INITIATE_MOVEMENT ^ TENTATIVE_PLAN 6= RECON ^
TENTATIVE_PLAN 6= REPORT1 ^ TENTATIVE_PLAN 6= COMPLETE_PLAN ^
TENTATIVE_PLAN 6= OPOID ^ TENTATIVE_PLAN 6= SUPERVISE ^
TENTATIVE_PLAN 6= REPORT2 ^ TENTATIVE_PLAN 6= COMPLETE ^
INITIATE_MOVEMENT 6= RECON ^ INITIATE_MOVEMENT 6= REPORT1 ^
INITIATE_MOVEMENT 6= COMPLETE_PLAN ^
INITIATE_MOVEMENT 6= OPOID ^ INITIATE_MOVEMENT 6= SUPERVISE ^
INITIATE_MOVEMENT 6= REPORT2 ^ INITIATE_MOVEMENT 6= COMPLETE ^
RECON 6= REPORT1 ^ RECON 6= COMPLETE_PLAN ^ RECON 6= OPOID ^
RECON 6= SUPERVISE ^ RECON 6= REPORT2 ^ RECON 6= COMPLETE ^
REPORT1 6= COMPLETE_PLAN ^ REPORT1 6= OPOID ^
REPORT1 6= SUPERVISE ^ REPORT1 6= REPORT2 ^
REPORT1 6= COMPLETE ^ COMPLETE_PLAN 6= OPOID ^
COMPLETE_PLAN 6= SUPERVISE ^ COMPLETE_PLAN 6= REPORT2 ^
COMPLETE_PLAN 6= COMPLETE ^ OPOID 6= SUPERVISE ^
OPOID 6= REPORT2 ^ OPOID 6= COMPLETE ^ SUPERVISE 6= REPORT2 ^
SUPERVISE 6= COMPLETE ^ REPORT2 6= COMPLETE
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if cmd = report1 then prop NONE
else
Name PlatoonLeader says prop (SOME (SLc (PL cmd))) impf
Name PlatoonLeader controls prop (SOME (SLc (PL cmd)))
[PL_WARNO_Auth_def]
` PL_WARNO_Auth =
prop (SOME (SLc (PL recon))) impf
prop (SOME (SLc (PL tentativePlan))) impf
prop (SOME (SLc (PSG initiateMovement))) impf
Name PlatoonLeader controls prop (SOME (SLc (PL report1)))
[secContext_def]
` 8 s x.
secContext s x =




(getRecon x = [SOME (SLc (PL recon))]) ^
(getTenativePlan x = [SOME (SLc (PL tentativePlan))]) ^
(getReport x = [SOME (SLc (PL report1))]) ^




prop (SOME (SLc (PL recon)));
Name PlatoonLeader controls
prop (SOME (SLc (PL tentativePlan)));
Name PlatoonSergeant controls
prop (SOME (SLc (PSG initiateMovement)))]
else [prop NONE]
else if getPlCom x = invalidPlCommand then [prop NONE]
else [PL_notWARNO_Auth (getPlCom x)]
[secContextNull_def]
` 8 x. secContextNull x = [TT]
19.2 Theorems
[getInitMove_def]




prop (SOME (SLc (PSG initiateMovement)))::xs) =
[SOME (SLc (PSG initiateMovement))]) ^
(8 xs. getInitMove (TT::xs) = getInitMove xs) ^
(8 xs. getInitMove (FF::xs) = getInitMove xs) ^
(8 xs v2. getInitMove (prop v2::xs) = getInitMove xs) ^
(8 xs v3. getInitMove (notf v3::xs) = getInitMove xs) ^
(8 xs v5 v4. getInitMove (v4 andf v5::xs) = getInitMove xs) ^
(8 xs v7 v6. getInitMove (v6 orf v7::xs) = getInitMove xs) ^
(8 xs v9 v8. getInitMove (v8 impf v9::xs) = getInitMove xs) ^
(8 xs v11 v10.
getInitMove (v10 eqf v11::xs) = getInitMove xs) ^
(8 xs v12. getInitMove (v12 says TT::xs) = getInitMove xs) ^
(8 xs v12. getInitMove (v12 says FF::xs) = getInitMove xs) ^
(8 xs v134.


























prop (SOME (SLc (PSG invalidPsgCommand)))::xs) =
getInitMove xs) ^
(8 xs v68 v136 v135.
getInitMove (v135 meet v136 says prop v68::xs) =
getInitMove xs) ^
(8 xs v68 v138 v137.
getInitMove (v137 quoting v138 says prop v68::xs) =
getInitMove xs) ^
(8 xs v69 v12.
getInitMove (v12 says notf v69::xs) = getInitMove xs) ^
(8 xs v71 v70 v12.
getInitMove (v12 says (v70 andf v71)::xs) =
getInitMove xs) ^
(8 xs v73 v72 v12.
getInitMove (v12 says (v72 orf v73)::xs) =
getInitMove xs) ^
(8 xs v75 v74 v12.
getInitMove (v12 says (v74 impf v75)::xs) =
getInitMove xs) ^
(8 xs v77 v76 v12.
getInitMove (v12 says (v76 eqf v77)::xs) =
getInitMove xs) ^
(8 xs v79 v78 v12.
getInitMove (v12 says v78 says v79::xs) =
getInitMove xs) ^
(8 xs v81 v80 v12.
getInitMove (v12 says v80 speaks_for v81::xs) =
getInitMove xs) ^
(8 xs v83 v82 v12.
getInitMove (v12 says v82 controls v83::xs) =
getInitMove xs) ^
(8 xs v86 v85 v84 v12.
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getInitMove (v12 says reps v84 v85 v86::xs) =
getInitMove xs) ^
(8 xs v88 v87 v12.
getInitMove (v12 says v87 domi v88::xs) =
getInitMove xs) ^
(8 xs v90 v89 v12.
getInitMove (v12 says v89 eqi v90::xs) = getInitMove xs) ^
(8 xs v92 v91 v12.
getInitMove (v12 says v91 doms v92::xs) =
getInitMove xs) ^
(8 xs v94 v93 v12.
getInitMove (v12 says v93 eqs v94::xs) = getInitMove xs) ^
(8 xs v96 v95 v12.
getInitMove (v12 says v95 eqn v96::xs) = getInitMove xs) ^
(8 xs v98 v97 v12.
getInitMove (v12 says v97 lte v98::xs) = getInitMove xs) ^
(8 xs v99 v12 v100.
getInitMove (v12 says v99 lt v100::xs) = getInitMove xs) ^
(8 xs v15 v14.
getInitMove (v14 speaks_for v15::xs) = getInitMove xs) ^
(8 xs v17 v16.
getInitMove (v16 controls v17::xs) = getInitMove xs) ^
(8 xs v20 v19 v18.
getInitMove (reps v18 v19 v20::xs) = getInitMove xs) ^
(8 xs v22 v21.
getInitMove (v21 domi v22::xs) = getInitMove xs) ^
(8 xs v24 v23.
getInitMove (v23 eqi v24::xs) = getInitMove xs) ^
(8 xs v26 v25.
getInitMove (v25 doms v26::xs) = getInitMove xs) ^
(8 xs v28 v27.
getInitMove (v27 eqs v28::xs) = getInitMove xs) ^
(8 xs v30 v29.
getInitMove (v29 eqn v30::xs) = getInitMove xs) ^
(8 xs v32 v31.
getInitMove (v31 lte v32::xs) = getInitMove xs) ^







prop (SOME (SLc (PSG initiateMovement)))::xs)) ^
(8 xs. P xs ) P (TT::xs)) ^ (8 xs. P xs ) P (FF::xs)) ^
(8 v2 xs. P xs ) P (prop v2::xs)) ^
(8 v3 xs. P xs ) P (notf v3::xs)) ^
(8 v4 v5 xs. P xs ) P (v4 andf v5::xs)) ^
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(8 v6 v7 xs. P xs ) P (v6 orf v7::xs)) ^
(8 v8 v9 xs. P xs ) P (v8 impf v9::xs)) ^
(8 v10 v11 xs. P xs ) P (v10 eqf v11::xs)) ^
(8 v12 xs. P xs ) P (v12 says TT::xs)) ^
(8 v12 xs. P xs ) P (v12 says FF::xs)) ^
(8 v134 xs. P xs ) P (Name v134 says prop NONE::xs)) ^
(8 v144 xs.
P xs )




















prop (SOME (SLc (PSG invalidPsgCommand)))::xs)) ^
(8 v135 v136 v68 xs.
P xs ) P (v135 meet v136 says prop v68::xs)) ^
(8 v137 v138 v68 xs.
P xs ) P (v137 quoting v138 says prop v68::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v69 xs. P xs ) P (v12 says notf v69::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v70 v71 xs. P xs ) P (v12 says (v70 andf v71)::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v72 v73 xs. P xs ) P (v12 says (v72 orf v73)::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v74 v75 xs. P xs ) P (v12 says (v74 impf v75)::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v76 v77 xs. P xs ) P (v12 says (v76 eqf v77)::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v78 v79 xs. P xs ) P (v12 says v78 says v79::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v80 v81 xs.
P xs ) P (v12 says v80 speaks_for v81::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v82 v83 xs.
P xs ) P (v12 says v82 controls v83::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v84 v85 v86 xs.
P xs ) P (v12 says reps v84 v85 v86::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v87 v88 xs. P xs ) P (v12 says v87 domi v88::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v89 v90 xs. P xs ) P (v12 says v89 eqi v90::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v91 v92 xs. P xs ) P (v12 says v91 doms v92::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v93 v94 xs. P xs ) P (v12 says v93 eqs v94::xs)) ^
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(8 v12 v95 v96 xs. P xs ) P (v12 says v95 eqn v96::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v97 v98 xs. P xs ) P (v12 says v97 lte v98::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v99 v100 xs. P xs ) P (v12 says v99 lt v100::xs)) ^
(8 v14 v15 xs. P xs ) P (v14 speaks_for v15::xs)) ^
(8 v16 v17 xs. P xs ) P (v16 controls v17::xs)) ^
(8 v18 v19 v20 xs. P xs ) P (reps v18 v19 v20::xs)) ^
(8 v21 v22 xs. P xs ) P (v21 domi v22::xs)) ^
(8 v23 v24 xs. P xs ) P (v23 eqi v24::xs)) ^
(8 v25 v26 xs. P xs ) P (v25 doms v26::xs)) ^
(8 v27 v28 xs. P xs ) P (v27 eqs v28::xs)) ^
(8 v29 v30 xs. P xs ) P (v29 eqn v30::xs)) ^
(8 v31 v32 xs. P xs ) P (v31 lte v32::xs)) ^
(8 v33 v34 xs. P xs ) P (v33 lt v34::xs)) )
8 v. P v
[getPlCom_def]
` (getPlCom [] = invalidPlCommand) ^
(8 xs cmd.
getPlCom
(Name PlatoonLeader says prop (SOME (SLc (PL cmd)))::
xs) =
cmd) ^ (8 xs. getPlCom (TT::xs) = getPlCom xs) ^
(8 xs. getPlCom (FF::xs) = getPlCom xs) ^
(8 xs v2. getPlCom (prop v2::xs) = getPlCom xs) ^
(8 xs v3. getPlCom (notf v3::xs) = getPlCom xs) ^
(8 xs v5 v4. getPlCom (v4 andf v5::xs) = getPlCom xs) ^
(8 xs v7 v6. getPlCom (v6 orf v7::xs) = getPlCom xs) ^
(8 xs v9 v8. getPlCom (v8 impf v9::xs) = getPlCom xs) ^
(8 xs v11 v10. getPlCom (v10 eqf v11::xs) = getPlCom xs) ^
(8 xs v12. getPlCom (v12 says TT::xs) = getPlCom xs) ^
(8 xs v12. getPlCom (v12 says FF::xs) = getPlCom xs) ^
(8 xs v134.
getPlCom (Name v134 says prop NONE::xs) = getPlCom xs) ^
(8 xs v146.
getPlCom









(Name PlatoonSergeant says prop (SOME v144)::xs) =
getPlCom xs) ^
(8 xs v68 v136 v135.




(8 xs v68 v138 v137.
getPlCom (v137 quoting v138 says prop v68::xs) =
getPlCom xs) ^
(8 xs v69 v12.
getPlCom (v12 says notf v69::xs) = getPlCom xs) ^
(8 xs v71 v70 v12.
getPlCom (v12 says (v70 andf v71)::xs) = getPlCom xs) ^
(8 xs v73 v72 v12.
getPlCom (v12 says (v72 orf v73)::xs) = getPlCom xs) ^
(8 xs v75 v74 v12.
getPlCom (v12 says (v74 impf v75)::xs) = getPlCom xs) ^
(8 xs v77 v76 v12.
getPlCom (v12 says (v76 eqf v77)::xs) = getPlCom xs) ^
(8 xs v79 v78 v12.
getPlCom (v12 says v78 says v79::xs) = getPlCom xs) ^
(8 xs v81 v80 v12.
getPlCom (v12 says v80 speaks_for v81::xs) =
getPlCom xs) ^
(8 xs v83 v82 v12.
getPlCom (v12 says v82 controls v83::xs) = getPlCom xs) ^
(8 xs v86 v85 v84 v12.
getPlCom (v12 says reps v84 v85 v86::xs) = getPlCom xs) ^
(8 xs v88 v87 v12.
getPlCom (v12 says v87 domi v88::xs) = getPlCom xs) ^
(8 xs v90 v89 v12.
getPlCom (v12 says v89 eqi v90::xs) = getPlCom xs) ^
(8 xs v92 v91 v12.
getPlCom (v12 says v91 doms v92::xs) = getPlCom xs) ^
(8 xs v94 v93 v12.
getPlCom (v12 says v93 eqs v94::xs) = getPlCom xs) ^
(8 xs v96 v95 v12.
getPlCom (v12 says v95 eqn v96::xs) = getPlCom xs) ^
(8 xs v98 v97 v12.
getPlCom (v12 says v97 lte v98::xs) = getPlCom xs) ^
(8 xs v99 v12 v100.
getPlCom (v12 says v99 lt v100::xs) = getPlCom xs) ^
(8 xs v15 v14.
getPlCom (v14 speaks_for v15::xs) = getPlCom xs) ^
(8 xs v17 v16.
getPlCom (v16 controls v17::xs) = getPlCom xs) ^
(8 xs v20 v19 v18.
getPlCom (reps v18 v19 v20::xs) = getPlCom xs) ^
(8 xs v22 v21. getPlCom (v21 domi v22::xs) = getPlCom xs) ^
(8 xs v24 v23. getPlCom (v23 eqi v24::xs) = getPlCom xs) ^
(8 xs v26 v25. getPlCom (v25 doms v26::xs) = getPlCom xs) ^
(8 xs v28 v27. getPlCom (v27 eqs v28::xs) = getPlCom xs) ^
(8 xs v30 v29. getPlCom (v29 eqn v30::xs) = getPlCom xs) ^
(8 xs v32 v31. getPlCom (v31 lte v32::xs) = getPlCom xs) ^








(Name PlatoonLeader says prop (SOME (SLc (PL cmd)))::
xs)) ^ (8 xs. P xs ) P (TT::xs)) ^
(8 xs. P xs ) P (FF::xs)) ^
(8 v2 xs. P xs ) P (prop v2::xs)) ^
(8 v3 xs. P xs ) P (notf v3::xs)) ^
(8 v4 v5 xs. P xs ) P (v4 andf v5::xs)) ^
(8 v6 v7 xs. P xs ) P (v6 orf v7::xs)) ^
(8 v8 v9 xs. P xs ) P (v8 impf v9::xs)) ^
(8 v10 v11 xs. P xs ) P (v10 eqf v11::xs)) ^
(8 v12 xs. P xs ) P (v12 says TT::xs)) ^
(8 v12 xs. P xs ) P (v12 says FF::xs)) ^










prop (SOME (SLc (PSG v151)))::xs)) ^
(8 v144 xs.
P xs )
P (Name PlatoonSergeant says prop (SOME v144)::xs)) ^
(8 v135 v136 v68 xs.
P xs ) P (v135 meet v136 says prop v68::xs)) ^
(8 v137 v138 v68 xs.
P xs ) P (v137 quoting v138 says prop v68::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v69 xs. P xs ) P (v12 says notf v69::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v70 v71 xs. P xs ) P (v12 says (v70 andf v71)::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v72 v73 xs. P xs ) P (v12 says (v72 orf v73)::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v74 v75 xs. P xs ) P (v12 says (v74 impf v75)::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v76 v77 xs. P xs ) P (v12 says (v76 eqf v77)::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v78 v79 xs. P xs ) P (v12 says v78 says v79::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v80 v81 xs.
P xs ) P (v12 says v80 speaks_for v81::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v82 v83 xs.
P xs ) P (v12 says v82 controls v83::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v84 v85 v86 xs.
P xs ) P (v12 says reps v84 v85 v86::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v87 v88 xs. P xs ) P (v12 says v87 domi v88::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v89 v90 xs. P xs ) P (v12 says v89 eqi v90::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v91 v92 xs. P xs ) P (v12 says v91 doms v92::xs)) ^
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(8 v12 v93 v94 xs. P xs ) P (v12 says v93 eqs v94::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v95 v96 xs. P xs ) P (v12 says v95 eqn v96::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v97 v98 xs. P xs ) P (v12 says v97 lte v98::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v99 v100 xs. P xs ) P (v12 says v99 lt v100::xs)) ^
(8 v14 v15 xs. P xs ) P (v14 speaks_for v15::xs)) ^
(8 v16 v17 xs. P xs ) P (v16 controls v17::xs)) ^
(8 v18 v19 v20 xs. P xs ) P (reps v18 v19 v20::xs)) ^
(8 v21 v22 xs. P xs ) P (v21 domi v22::xs)) ^
(8 v23 v24 xs. P xs ) P (v23 eqi v24::xs)) ^
(8 v25 v26 xs. P xs ) P (v25 doms v26::xs)) ^
(8 v27 v28 xs. P xs ) P (v27 eqs v28::xs)) ^
(8 v29 v30 xs. P xs ) P (v29 eqn v30::xs)) ^
(8 v31 v32 xs. P xs ) P (v31 lte v32::xs)) ^
(8 v33 v34 xs. P xs ) P (v33 lt v34::xs)) )
8 v. P v
[getPsgCom_def]
` (getPsgCom [] = invalidPsgCommand) ^
(8 xs cmd.
getPsgCom
(Name PlatoonSergeant says prop (SOME (SLc (PSG cmd)))::
xs) =
cmd) ^ (8 xs. getPsgCom (TT::xs) = getPsgCom xs) ^
(8 xs. getPsgCom (FF::xs) = getPsgCom xs) ^
(8 xs v2. getPsgCom (prop v2::xs) = getPsgCom xs) ^
(8 xs v3. getPsgCom (notf v3::xs) = getPsgCom xs) ^
(8 xs v5 v4. getPsgCom (v4 andf v5::xs) = getPsgCom xs) ^
(8 xs v7 v6. getPsgCom (v6 orf v7::xs) = getPsgCom xs) ^
(8 xs v9 v8. getPsgCom (v8 impf v9::xs) = getPsgCom xs) ^
(8 xs v11 v10. getPsgCom (v10 eqf v11::xs) = getPsgCom xs) ^
(8 xs v12. getPsgCom (v12 says TT::xs) = getPsgCom xs) ^
(8 xs v12. getPsgCom (v12 says FF::xs) = getPsgCom xs) ^
(8 xs v134.
getPsgCom (Name v134 says prop NONE::xs) = getPsgCom xs) ^
(8 xs v144.









(Name PlatoonSergeant says prop (SOME (SLc (PL v150)))::
xs) =
getPsgCom xs) ^
(8 xs v68 v136 v135.




(8 xs v68 v138 v137.
getPsgCom (v137 quoting v138 says prop v68::xs) =
getPsgCom xs) ^
(8 xs v69 v12.
getPsgCom (v12 says notf v69::xs) = getPsgCom xs) ^
(8 xs v71 v70 v12.
getPsgCom (v12 says (v70 andf v71)::xs) = getPsgCom xs) ^
(8 xs v73 v72 v12.
getPsgCom (v12 says (v72 orf v73)::xs) = getPsgCom xs) ^
(8 xs v75 v74 v12.
getPsgCom (v12 says (v74 impf v75)::xs) = getPsgCom xs) ^
(8 xs v77 v76 v12.
getPsgCom (v12 says (v76 eqf v77)::xs) = getPsgCom xs) ^
(8 xs v79 v78 v12.
getPsgCom (v12 says v78 says v79::xs) = getPsgCom xs) ^
(8 xs v81 v80 v12.
getPsgCom (v12 says v80 speaks_for v81::xs) =
getPsgCom xs) ^
(8 xs v83 v82 v12.
getPsgCom (v12 says v82 controls v83::xs) =
getPsgCom xs) ^
(8 xs v86 v85 v84 v12.
getPsgCom (v12 says reps v84 v85 v86::xs) =
getPsgCom xs) ^
(8 xs v88 v87 v12.
getPsgCom (v12 says v87 domi v88::xs) = getPsgCom xs) ^
(8 xs v90 v89 v12.
getPsgCom (v12 says v89 eqi v90::xs) = getPsgCom xs) ^
(8 xs v92 v91 v12.
getPsgCom (v12 says v91 doms v92::xs) = getPsgCom xs) ^
(8 xs v94 v93 v12.
getPsgCom (v12 says v93 eqs v94::xs) = getPsgCom xs) ^
(8 xs v96 v95 v12.
getPsgCom (v12 says v95 eqn v96::xs) = getPsgCom xs) ^
(8 xs v98 v97 v12.
getPsgCom (v12 says v97 lte v98::xs) = getPsgCom xs) ^
(8 xs v99 v12 v100.
getPsgCom (v12 says v99 lt v100::xs) = getPsgCom xs) ^
(8 xs v15 v14.
getPsgCom (v14 speaks_for v15::xs) = getPsgCom xs) ^
(8 xs v17 v16.
getPsgCom (v16 controls v17::xs) = getPsgCom xs) ^
(8 xs v20 v19 v18.
getPsgCom (reps v18 v19 v20::xs) = getPsgCom xs) ^
(8 xs v22 v21. getPsgCom (v21 domi v22::xs) = getPsgCom xs) ^
(8 xs v24 v23. getPsgCom (v23 eqi v24::xs) = getPsgCom xs) ^
(8 xs v26 v25. getPsgCom (v25 doms v26::xs) = getPsgCom xs) ^
(8 xs v28 v27. getPsgCom (v27 eqs v28::xs) = getPsgCom xs) ^
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(8 xs v30 v29. getPsgCom (v29 eqn v30::xs) = getPsgCom xs) ^
(8 xs v32 v31. getPsgCom (v31 lte v32::xs) = getPsgCom xs) ^







prop (SOME (SLc (PSG cmd)))::xs)) ^
(8 xs. P xs ) P (TT::xs)) ^ (8 xs. P xs ) P (FF::xs)) ^
(8 v2 xs. P xs ) P (prop v2::xs)) ^
(8 v3 xs. P xs ) P (notf v3::xs)) ^
(8 v4 v5 xs. P xs ) P (v4 andf v5::xs)) ^
(8 v6 v7 xs. P xs ) P (v6 orf v7::xs)) ^
(8 v8 v9 xs. P xs ) P (v8 impf v9::xs)) ^
(8 v10 v11 xs. P xs ) P (v10 eqf v11::xs)) ^
(8 v12 xs. P xs ) P (v12 says TT::xs)) ^
(8 v12 xs. P xs ) P (v12 says FF::xs)) ^
(8 v134 xs. P xs ) P (Name v134 says prop NONE::xs)) ^
(8 v144 xs.
P xs )










prop (SOME (SLc (PL v150)))::xs)) ^
(8 v135 v136 v68 xs.
P xs ) P (v135 meet v136 says prop v68::xs)) ^
(8 v137 v138 v68 xs.
P xs ) P (v137 quoting v138 says prop v68::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v69 xs. P xs ) P (v12 says notf v69::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v70 v71 xs. P xs ) P (v12 says (v70 andf v71)::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v72 v73 xs. P xs ) P (v12 says (v72 orf v73)::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v74 v75 xs. P xs ) P (v12 says (v74 impf v75)::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v76 v77 xs. P xs ) P (v12 says (v76 eqf v77)::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v78 v79 xs. P xs ) P (v12 says v78 says v79::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v80 v81 xs.
P xs ) P (v12 says v80 speaks_for v81::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v82 v83 xs.
P xs ) P (v12 says v82 controls v83::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v84 v85 v86 xs.
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P xs ) P (v12 says reps v84 v85 v86::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v87 v88 xs. P xs ) P (v12 says v87 domi v88::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v89 v90 xs. P xs ) P (v12 says v89 eqi v90::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v91 v92 xs. P xs ) P (v12 says v91 doms v92::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v93 v94 xs. P xs ) P (v12 says v93 eqs v94::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v95 v96 xs. P xs ) P (v12 says v95 eqn v96::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v97 v98 xs. P xs ) P (v12 says v97 lte v98::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v99 v100 xs. P xs ) P (v12 says v99 lt v100::xs)) ^
(8 v14 v15 xs. P xs ) P (v14 speaks_for v15::xs)) ^
(8 v16 v17 xs. P xs ) P (v16 controls v17::xs)) ^
(8 v18 v19 v20 xs. P xs ) P (reps v18 v19 v20::xs)) ^
(8 v21 v22 xs. P xs ) P (v21 domi v22::xs)) ^
(8 v23 v24 xs. P xs ) P (v23 eqi v24::xs)) ^
(8 v25 v26 xs. P xs ) P (v25 doms v26::xs)) ^
(8 v27 v28 xs. P xs ) P (v27 eqs v28::xs)) ^
(8 v29 v30 xs. P xs ) P (v29 eqn v30::xs)) ^
(8 v31 v32 xs. P xs ) P (v31 lte v32::xs)) ^
(8 v33 v34 xs. P xs ) P (v33 lt v34::xs)) )
8 v. P v
[getRecon_def]
` (getRecon [] = [NONE]) ^
(8 xs.
getRecon
(Name PlatoonLeader says prop (SOME (SLc (PL recon)))::
xs) =
[SOME (SLc (PL recon))]) ^
(8 xs. getRecon (TT::xs) = getRecon xs) ^
(8 xs. getRecon (FF::xs) = getRecon xs) ^
(8 xs v2. getRecon (prop v2::xs) = getRecon xs) ^
(8 xs v3. getRecon (notf v3::xs) = getRecon xs) ^
(8 xs v5 v4. getRecon (v4 andf v5::xs) = getRecon xs) ^
(8 xs v7 v6. getRecon (v6 orf v7::xs) = getRecon xs) ^
(8 xs v9 v8. getRecon (v8 impf v9::xs) = getRecon xs) ^
(8 xs v11 v10. getRecon (v10 eqf v11::xs) = getRecon xs) ^
(8 xs v12. getRecon (v12 says TT::xs) = getRecon xs) ^
(8 xs v12. getRecon (v12 says FF::xs) = getRecon xs) ^
(8 xs v134.
getRecon (Name v134 says prop NONE::xs) = getRecon xs) ^
(8 xs v146.
getRecon




































































(Name PlatoonSergeant says prop (SOME v144)::xs) =
getRecon xs) ^
(8 xs v68 v136 v135.
getRecon (v135 meet v136 says prop v68::xs) =
getRecon xs) ^
(8 xs v68 v138 v137.
getRecon (v137 quoting v138 says prop v68::xs) =
getRecon xs) ^
(8 xs v69 v12.
getRecon (v12 says notf v69::xs) = getRecon xs) ^
(8 xs v71 v70 v12.
getRecon (v12 says (v70 andf v71)::xs) = getRecon xs) ^
(8 xs v73 v72 v12.
getRecon (v12 says (v72 orf v73)::xs) = getRecon xs) ^
(8 xs v75 v74 v12.
getRecon (v12 says (v74 impf v75)::xs) = getRecon xs) ^
(8 xs v77 v76 v12.
getRecon (v12 says (v76 eqf v77)::xs) = getRecon xs) ^
(8 xs v79 v78 v12.
getRecon (v12 says v78 says v79::xs) = getRecon xs) ^
(8 xs v81 v80 v12.
getRecon (v12 says v80 speaks_for v81::xs) =
getRecon xs) ^
(8 xs v83 v82 v12.
getRecon (v12 says v82 controls v83::xs) = getRecon xs) ^
(8 xs v86 v85 v84 v12.
getRecon (v12 says reps v84 v85 v86::xs) = getRecon xs) ^
(8 xs v88 v87 v12.
getRecon (v12 says v87 domi v88::xs) = getRecon xs) ^
(8 xs v90 v89 v12.
getRecon (v12 says v89 eqi v90::xs) = getRecon xs) ^
(8 xs v92 v91 v12.
getRecon (v12 says v91 doms v92::xs) = getRecon xs) ^
(8 xs v94 v93 v12.
getRecon (v12 says v93 eqs v94::xs) = getRecon xs) ^
(8 xs v96 v95 v12.
getRecon (v12 says v95 eqn v96::xs) = getRecon xs) ^
(8 xs v98 v97 v12.
getRecon (v12 says v97 lte v98::xs) = getRecon xs) ^
(8 xs v99 v12 v100.
getRecon (v12 says v99 lt v100::xs) = getRecon xs) ^
(8 xs v15 v14.
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getRecon (v14 speaks_for v15::xs) = getRecon xs) ^
(8 xs v17 v16.
getRecon (v16 controls v17::xs) = getRecon xs) ^
(8 xs v20 v19 v18.
getRecon (reps v18 v19 v20::xs) = getRecon xs) ^
(8 xs v22 v21. getRecon (v21 domi v22::xs) = getRecon xs) ^
(8 xs v24 v23. getRecon (v23 eqi v24::xs) = getRecon xs) ^
(8 xs v26 v25. getRecon (v25 doms v26::xs) = getRecon xs) ^
(8 xs v28 v27. getRecon (v27 eqs v28::xs) = getRecon xs) ^
(8 xs v30 v29. getRecon (v29 eqn v30::xs) = getRecon xs) ^
(8 xs v32 v31. getRecon (v31 lte v32::xs) = getRecon xs) ^







prop (SOME (SLc (PL recon)))::xs)) ^
(8 xs. P xs ) P (TT::xs)) ^ (8 xs. P xs ) P (FF::xs)) ^
(8 v2 xs. P xs ) P (prop v2::xs)) ^
(8 v3 xs. P xs ) P (notf v3::xs)) ^
(8 v4 v5 xs. P xs ) P (v4 andf v5::xs)) ^
(8 v6 v7 xs. P xs ) P (v6 orf v7::xs)) ^
(8 v8 v9 xs. P xs ) P (v8 impf v9::xs)) ^
(8 v10 v11 xs. P xs ) P (v10 eqf v11::xs)) ^
(8 v12 xs. P xs ) P (v12 says TT::xs)) ^
(8 v12 xs. P xs ) P (v12 says FF::xs)) ^



































































prop (SOME (SLc (PSG v151)))::xs)) ^
(8 v144 xs.
P xs )
P (Name PlatoonSergeant says prop (SOME v144)::xs)) ^
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(8 v135 v136 v68 xs.
P xs ) P (v135 meet v136 says prop v68::xs)) ^
(8 v137 v138 v68 xs.
P xs ) P (v137 quoting v138 says prop v68::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v69 xs. P xs ) P (v12 says notf v69::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v70 v71 xs. P xs ) P (v12 says (v70 andf v71)::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v72 v73 xs. P xs ) P (v12 says (v72 orf v73)::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v74 v75 xs. P xs ) P (v12 says (v74 impf v75)::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v76 v77 xs. P xs ) P (v12 says (v76 eqf v77)::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v78 v79 xs. P xs ) P (v12 says v78 says v79::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v80 v81 xs.
P xs ) P (v12 says v80 speaks_for v81::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v82 v83 xs.
P xs ) P (v12 says v82 controls v83::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v84 v85 v86 xs.
P xs ) P (v12 says reps v84 v85 v86::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v87 v88 xs. P xs ) P (v12 says v87 domi v88::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v89 v90 xs. P xs ) P (v12 says v89 eqi v90::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v91 v92 xs. P xs ) P (v12 says v91 doms v92::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v93 v94 xs. P xs ) P (v12 says v93 eqs v94::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v95 v96 xs. P xs ) P (v12 says v95 eqn v96::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v97 v98 xs. P xs ) P (v12 says v97 lte v98::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v99 v100 xs. P xs ) P (v12 says v99 lt v100::xs)) ^
(8 v14 v15 xs. P xs ) P (v14 speaks_for v15::xs)) ^
(8 v16 v17 xs. P xs ) P (v16 controls v17::xs)) ^
(8 v18 v19 v20 xs. P xs ) P (reps v18 v19 v20::xs)) ^
(8 v21 v22 xs. P xs ) P (v21 domi v22::xs)) ^
(8 v23 v24 xs. P xs ) P (v23 eqi v24::xs)) ^
(8 v25 v26 xs. P xs ) P (v25 doms v26::xs)) ^
(8 v27 v28 xs. P xs ) P (v27 eqs v28::xs)) ^
(8 v29 v30 xs. P xs ) P (v29 eqn v30::xs)) ^
(8 v31 v32 xs. P xs ) P (v31 lte v32::xs)) ^
(8 v33 v34 xs. P xs ) P (v33 lt v34::xs)) )
8 v. P v
[getReport_def]




prop (SOME (SLc (PL report1)))::xs) =
[SOME (SLc (PL report1))]) ^
(8 xs. getReport (TT::xs) = getReport xs) ^
(8 xs. getReport (FF::xs) = getReport xs) ^
(8 xs v2. getReport (prop v2::xs) = getReport xs) ^
(8 xs v3. getReport (notf v3::xs) = getReport xs) ^
(8 xs v5 v4. getReport (v4 andf v5::xs) = getReport xs) ^
(8 xs v7 v6. getReport (v6 orf v7::xs) = getReport xs) ^
(8 xs v9 v8. getReport (v8 impf v9::xs) = getReport xs) ^
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(8 xs v11 v10. getReport (v10 eqf v11::xs) = getReport xs) ^
(8 xs v12. getReport (v12 says TT::xs) = getReport xs) ^
(8 xs v12. getReport (v12 says FF::xs) = getReport xs) ^
(8 xs v134.
getReport (Name v134 says prop NONE::xs) = getReport xs) ^
(8 xs v146.
getReport


































































(Name PlatoonSergeant says prop (SOME v144)::xs) =
getReport xs) ^
(8 xs v68 v136 v135.
getReport (v135 meet v136 says prop v68::xs) =
getReport xs) ^
(8 xs v68 v138 v137.
getReport (v137 quoting v138 says prop v68::xs) =
getReport xs) ^
(8 xs v69 v12.
getReport (v12 says notf v69::xs) = getReport xs) ^
(8 xs v71 v70 v12.
getReport (v12 says (v70 andf v71)::xs) = getReport xs) ^
(8 xs v73 v72 v12.
getReport (v12 says (v72 orf v73)::xs) = getReport xs) ^
(8 xs v75 v74 v12.
getReport (v12 says (v74 impf v75)::xs) = getReport xs) ^
(8 xs v77 v76 v12.
getReport (v12 says (v76 eqf v77)::xs) = getReport xs) ^
(8 xs v79 v78 v12.
getReport (v12 says v78 says v79::xs) = getReport xs) ^
(8 xs v81 v80 v12.
getReport (v12 says v80 speaks_for v81::xs) =
getReport xs) ^
(8 xs v83 v82 v12.
getReport (v12 says v82 controls v83::xs) =
getReport xs) ^
(8 xs v86 v85 v84 v12.
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getReport (v12 says reps v84 v85 v86::xs) =
getReport xs) ^
(8 xs v88 v87 v12.
getReport (v12 says v87 domi v88::xs) = getReport xs) ^
(8 xs v90 v89 v12.
getReport (v12 says v89 eqi v90::xs) = getReport xs) ^
(8 xs v92 v91 v12.
getReport (v12 says v91 doms v92::xs) = getReport xs) ^
(8 xs v94 v93 v12.
getReport (v12 says v93 eqs v94::xs) = getReport xs) ^
(8 xs v96 v95 v12.
getReport (v12 says v95 eqn v96::xs) = getReport xs) ^
(8 xs v98 v97 v12.
getReport (v12 says v97 lte v98::xs) = getReport xs) ^
(8 xs v99 v12 v100.
getReport (v12 says v99 lt v100::xs) = getReport xs) ^
(8 xs v15 v14.
getReport (v14 speaks_for v15::xs) = getReport xs) ^
(8 xs v17 v16.
getReport (v16 controls v17::xs) = getReport xs) ^
(8 xs v20 v19 v18.
getReport (reps v18 v19 v20::xs) = getReport xs) ^
(8 xs v22 v21. getReport (v21 domi v22::xs) = getReport xs) ^
(8 xs v24 v23. getReport (v23 eqi v24::xs) = getReport xs) ^
(8 xs v26 v25. getReport (v25 doms v26::xs) = getReport xs) ^
(8 xs v28 v27. getReport (v27 eqs v28::xs) = getReport xs) ^
(8 xs v30 v29. getReport (v29 eqn v30::xs) = getReport xs) ^
(8 xs v32 v31. getReport (v31 lte v32::xs) = getReport xs) ^







prop (SOME (SLc (PL report1)))::xs)) ^
(8 xs. P xs ) P (TT::xs)) ^ (8 xs. P xs ) P (FF::xs)) ^
(8 v2 xs. P xs ) P (prop v2::xs)) ^
(8 v3 xs. P xs ) P (notf v3::xs)) ^
(8 v4 v5 xs. P xs ) P (v4 andf v5::xs)) ^
(8 v6 v7 xs. P xs ) P (v6 orf v7::xs)) ^
(8 v8 v9 xs. P xs ) P (v8 impf v9::xs)) ^
(8 v10 v11 xs. P xs ) P (v10 eqf v11::xs)) ^
(8 v12 xs. P xs ) P (v12 says TT::xs)) ^
(8 v12 xs. P xs ) P (v12 says FF::xs)) ^





































































prop (SOME (SLc (PSG v151)))::xs)) ^
(8 v144 xs.
P xs )
P (Name PlatoonSergeant says prop (SOME v144)::xs)) ^
(8 v135 v136 v68 xs.
P xs ) P (v135 meet v136 says prop v68::xs)) ^
(8 v137 v138 v68 xs.
P xs ) P (v137 quoting v138 says prop v68::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v69 xs. P xs ) P (v12 says notf v69::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v70 v71 xs. P xs ) P (v12 says (v70 andf v71)::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v72 v73 xs. P xs ) P (v12 says (v72 orf v73)::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v74 v75 xs. P xs ) P (v12 says (v74 impf v75)::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v76 v77 xs. P xs ) P (v12 says (v76 eqf v77)::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v78 v79 xs. P xs ) P (v12 says v78 says v79::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v80 v81 xs.
P xs ) P (v12 says v80 speaks_for v81::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v82 v83 xs.
P xs ) P (v12 says v82 controls v83::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v84 v85 v86 xs.
P xs ) P (v12 says reps v84 v85 v86::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v87 v88 xs. P xs ) P (v12 says v87 domi v88::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v89 v90 xs. P xs ) P (v12 says v89 eqi v90::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v91 v92 xs. P xs ) P (v12 says v91 doms v92::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v93 v94 xs. P xs ) P (v12 says v93 eqs v94::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v95 v96 xs. P xs ) P (v12 says v95 eqn v96::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v97 v98 xs. P xs ) P (v12 says v97 lte v98::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v99 v100 xs. P xs ) P (v12 says v99 lt v100::xs)) ^
(8 v14 v15 xs. P xs ) P (v14 speaks_for v15::xs)) ^
(8 v16 v17 xs. P xs ) P (v16 controls v17::xs)) ^
(8 v18 v19 v20 xs. P xs ) P (reps v18 v19 v20::xs)) ^
(8 v21 v22 xs. P xs ) P (v21 domi v22::xs)) ^
(8 v23 v24 xs. P xs ) P (v23 eqi v24::xs)) ^
(8 v25 v26 xs. P xs ) P (v25 doms v26::xs)) ^
(8 v27 v28 xs. P xs ) P (v27 eqs v28::xs)) ^
(8 v29 v30 xs. P xs ) P (v29 eqn v30::xs)) ^
(8 v31 v32 xs. P xs ) P (v31 lte v32::xs)) ^
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(8 v33 v34 xs. P xs ) P (v33 lt v34::xs)) )
8 v. P v
[getTenativePlan_def]




prop (SOME (SLc (PL tentativePlan)))::xs) =
[SOME (SLc (PL tentativePlan))]) ^
(8 xs. getTenativePlan (TT::xs) = getTenativePlan xs) ^
(8 xs. getTenativePlan (FF::xs) = getTenativePlan xs) ^
(8 xs v2.
getTenativePlan (prop v2::xs) = getTenativePlan xs) ^
(8 xs v3.
getTenativePlan (notf v3::xs) = getTenativePlan xs) ^
(8 xs v5 v4.
getTenativePlan (v4 andf v5::xs) = getTenativePlan xs) ^
(8 xs v7 v6.
getTenativePlan (v6 orf v7::xs) = getTenativePlan xs) ^
(8 xs v9 v8.
getTenativePlan (v8 impf v9::xs) = getTenativePlan xs) ^
(8 xs v11 v10.
getTenativePlan (v10 eqf v11::xs) = getTenativePlan xs) ^
(8 xs v12.
getTenativePlan (v12 says TT::xs) = getTenativePlan xs) ^
(8 xs v12.
getTenativePlan (v12 says FF::xs) = getTenativePlan xs) ^
(8 xs v134.










































































(8 xs v68 v136 v135.
getTenativePlan (v135 meet v136 says prop v68::xs) =
getTenativePlan xs) ^
(8 xs v68 v138 v137.
getTenativePlan (v137 quoting v138 says prop v68::xs) =
getTenativePlan xs) ^
(8 xs v69 v12.
getTenativePlan (v12 says notf v69::xs) =
getTenativePlan xs) ^
(8 xs v71 v70 v12.
getTenativePlan (v12 says (v70 andf v71)::xs) =
getTenativePlan xs) ^
(8 xs v73 v72 v12.
getTenativePlan (v12 says (v72 orf v73)::xs) =
getTenativePlan xs) ^
(8 xs v75 v74 v12.
getTenativePlan (v12 says (v74 impf v75)::xs) =
getTenativePlan xs) ^
(8 xs v77 v76 v12.
getTenativePlan (v12 says (v76 eqf v77)::xs) =
getTenativePlan xs) ^
(8 xs v79 v78 v12.
getTenativePlan (v12 says v78 says v79::xs) =
getTenativePlan xs) ^
(8 xs v81 v80 v12.
getTenativePlan (v12 says v80 speaks_for v81::xs) =
getTenativePlan xs) ^
(8 xs v83 v82 v12.
getTenativePlan (v12 says v82 controls v83::xs) =
getTenativePlan xs) ^
(8 xs v86 v85 v84 v12.
getTenativePlan (v12 says reps v84 v85 v86::xs) =
getTenativePlan xs) ^
(8 xs v88 v87 v12.
getTenativePlan (v12 says v87 domi v88::xs) =
getTenativePlan xs) ^
(8 xs v90 v89 v12.
getTenativePlan (v12 says v89 eqi v90::xs) =
getTenativePlan xs) ^
(8 xs v92 v91 v12.
getTenativePlan (v12 says v91 doms v92::xs) =
getTenativePlan xs) ^
(8 xs v94 v93 v12.
getTenativePlan (v12 says v93 eqs v94::xs) =
getTenativePlan xs) ^
(8 xs v96 v95 v12.




(8 xs v98 v97 v12.
getTenativePlan (v12 says v97 lte v98::xs) =
getTenativePlan xs) ^
(8 xs v99 v12 v100.
getTenativePlan (v12 says v99 lt v100::xs) =
getTenativePlan xs) ^
(8 xs v15 v14.
getTenativePlan (v14 speaks_for v15::xs) =
getTenativePlan xs) ^
(8 xs v17 v16.
getTenativePlan (v16 controls v17::xs) =
getTenativePlan xs) ^
(8 xs v20 v19 v18.
getTenativePlan (reps v18 v19 v20::xs) =
getTenativePlan xs) ^
(8 xs v22 v21.
getTenativePlan (v21 domi v22::xs) = getTenativePlan xs) ^
(8 xs v24 v23.
getTenativePlan (v23 eqi v24::xs) = getTenativePlan xs) ^
(8 xs v26 v25.
getTenativePlan (v25 doms v26::xs) = getTenativePlan xs) ^
(8 xs v28 v27.
getTenativePlan (v27 eqs v28::xs) = getTenativePlan xs) ^
(8 xs v30 v29.
getTenativePlan (v29 eqn v30::xs) = getTenativePlan xs) ^
(8 xs v32 v31.
getTenativePlan (v31 lte v32::xs) = getTenativePlan xs) ^
8 xs v34 v33.







prop (SOME (SLc (PL tentativePlan)))::xs)) ^
(8 xs. P xs ) P (TT::xs)) ^ (8 xs. P xs ) P (FF::xs)) ^
(8 v2 xs. P xs ) P (prop v2::xs)) ^
(8 v3 xs. P xs ) P (notf v3::xs)) ^
(8 v4 v5 xs. P xs ) P (v4 andf v5::xs)) ^
(8 v6 v7 xs. P xs ) P (v6 orf v7::xs)) ^
(8 v8 v9 xs. P xs ) P (v8 impf v9::xs)) ^
(8 v10 v11 xs. P xs ) P (v10 eqf v11::xs)) ^
(8 v12 xs. P xs ) P (v12 says TT::xs)) ^
(8 v12 xs. P xs ) P (v12 says FF::xs)) ^





































































prop (SOME (SLc (PSG v151)))::xs)) ^
(8 v144 xs.
P xs )
P (Name PlatoonSergeant says prop (SOME v144)::xs)) ^
(8 v135 v136 v68 xs.
P xs ) P (v135 meet v136 says prop v68::xs)) ^
(8 v137 v138 v68 xs.
P xs ) P (v137 quoting v138 says prop v68::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v69 xs. P xs ) P (v12 says notf v69::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v70 v71 xs. P xs ) P (v12 says (v70 andf v71)::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v72 v73 xs. P xs ) P (v12 says (v72 orf v73)::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v74 v75 xs. P xs ) P (v12 says (v74 impf v75)::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v76 v77 xs. P xs ) P (v12 says (v76 eqf v77)::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v78 v79 xs. P xs ) P (v12 says v78 says v79::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v80 v81 xs.
P xs ) P (v12 says v80 speaks_for v81::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v82 v83 xs.
P xs ) P (v12 says v82 controls v83::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v84 v85 v86 xs.
P xs ) P (v12 says reps v84 v85 v86::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v87 v88 xs. P xs ) P (v12 says v87 domi v88::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v89 v90 xs. P xs ) P (v12 says v89 eqi v90::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v91 v92 xs. P xs ) P (v12 says v91 doms v92::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v93 v94 xs. P xs ) P (v12 says v93 eqs v94::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v95 v96 xs. P xs ) P (v12 says v95 eqn v96::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v97 v98 xs. P xs ) P (v12 says v97 lte v98::xs)) ^
(8 v12 v99 v100 xs. P xs ) P (v12 says v99 lt v100::xs)) ^
(8 v14 v15 xs. P xs ) P (v14 speaks_for v15::xs)) ^
(8 v16 v17 xs. P xs ) P (v16 controls v17::xs)) ^
(8 v18 v19 v20 xs. P xs ) P (reps v18 v19 v20::xs)) ^
(8 v21 v22 xs. P xs ) P (v21 domi v22::xs)) ^
(8 v23 v24 xs. P xs ) P (v23 eqi v24::xs)) ^
(8 v25 v26 xs. P xs ) P (v25 doms v26::xs)) ^
(8 v27 v28 xs. P xs ) P (v27 eqs v28::xs)) ^
(8 v29 v30 xs. P xs ) P (v29 eqn v30::xs)) ^
(8 v31 v32 xs. P xs ) P (v31 lte v32::xs)) ^
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(8 v33 v34 xs. P xs ) P (v33 lt v34::xs)) )
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Parametrizable Secure State Machine
Theories: HOL Script Files
C.1 ssm
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗ Secure S ta te Machine Theory : au then t i ca t i on , au thor i za t i on , and s t a t e ∗)
(∗ i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . ∗)
(∗ Author : Shiu Kai Chin ∗)
(∗ Date : 27 November 2015 ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
structure ssmScr ipt = struct
(∗ ==== In t e r a c t i v e mode ====
app load [" TypeBase " , " ssminfRules " ," l i s tTheo ry " ," optionTheory " ," ac l_infRules " ,
" sa tLis tTheory " ," ssmTheory " ] ;
open TypeBase l i s tTheo ry ssminfRules optionTheory ac l_in fRules sa tLis tTheory ssmTheory
app load [" TypeBase " , " ssminfRules " ," l i s tTheo ry " ," optionTheory " ," ac l_infRules " ,
" sa tLis tTheory " ] ;
open TypeBase l i s tTheo ry ssminfRules optionTheory ac l_in fRules sa tLis tTheory
ssmTheory
==== end i n t e r a c t i v e mode ==== ∗)
open HolKernel boolLib Parse bossLib
open TypeBase l i s tTheo ry optionTheory ssminfRules ac l_in fRu le s satL i s tTheory
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗ crea t e a new theory ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
val _ = new_theory "ssm" ;
(∗                                                                            ∗)
(∗ Define the type o f t r a n s i t i o n : discard , execute , or trap . We d i scard from ∗)
(∗ the input stream those inpu t s t ha t are not o f the form P says command . We ∗)
(∗ execute commands tha t users and supe r v i s o r s are au thor i z ed f o r . We trap ∗)
(∗ commands tha t users are not au thor i z ed to execute . ∗)
(∗                                                                            ∗)
(∗                                                                            ∗)
(∗ In keeping with v i r t u a l machine des ign p r i n c i p l e s as de sc r i b ed by Popek ∗)
(∗ and Goldberg , we add a TRAP in s t r u c t i o n to the commands by users . ∗)
(∗ In e f f e c t , we are LIFTING the commands a v a i l a b l e to users to inc lude the ∗)






d i s ca rd ' cmdl i s t | t rap ' cmdl i s t | exec ' cmdl i st ￿
val t rType_dis t inct_c lauses = d i s t inc t_o f ￿ ￿ : ' cmdl i s t trType ￿￿
val _ = save_thm( " trType_dis t inct_c lauses " , t rType_dis t inct_c lauses )
val trType_one_one = one_one_of ￿ ￿ : ' cmdl i s t trType ￿￿
val _ = save_thm( "trType_one_one" , trType_one_one )
(∗                                                                            ∗)
(∗ Define con f i gu ra t i on to inc lude the s e c u r i t y con tex t w i th in which the ∗)
(∗ inpu t s are eva lua ted . The components are as f o l l ow s : (1) the au then t i ca t i on ∗)
(∗ funct ion , (2) the i n t e p r e t a t i o n o f the s ta t e , (3) the s e c u r i t y context , ∗)




￿ c on f i g u r a t i on =
CFG
( ( ' command option , ' p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form  > bool )
( ( ' s t a t e  > ( 'command option , ' p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t  >
( 'command option , ' p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t ) )
( ( ( ' command option , ' p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t )  >
( ( ' command option , ' p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t ) )
( ( ( ( ' command option , ' p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form) l i s t ) l i s t )
( ' s t a t e )
( ' output l i s t ) ￿
(∗                                                                            ∗)
(∗ Prove one to one p rop e r t i e s o f con f i gu ra t i on ∗)
(∗                                                                            ∗)
val conf iguration_one_one =
one_one_of ￿ ￿ : ( 'command option , ' d , ' e , ' output , ' p r i n c i pa l , ' s t a t e ) con f i gu ra t i on ￿￿
val _ = save_thm( " configuration_one_one " , conf iguration_one_one )
(∗                                                                            ∗)
(∗ The i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f con f i gu ra t i on i s the conjunct ion o f the formulas in ∗)





( (M: ( ' command option , ' b , ' p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e ) Kripke ) , Oi : ' d po , Os : ' e po )
(CFG
( elementTest : ( ' command option , ' p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form  > bool )
( s t a t e I n t e r p : ' s t a t e  > ( ( ' command option , ' p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t )  >
( ( ' command option , ' p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t ) )
( context : ( ( ' command option , ' p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t )  >
( ( ' command option , ' p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t ) )
( ( x : ( ' command option , ' p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t ) : : i n s )
( s t a t e : ' s t a t e )
( outStream : ' output l i s t ) )
=
( (M, Oi , Os) s a tL i s t ( context x ) ) /\
( (M, Oi , Os) s a tL i s t x ) /\
( (M, Oi , Os) s a tL i s t ( s t a t e I n t e r p s t a t e x )) ￿
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗ In the f o l l ow i n g d e f i n i t i o n s o f au then t i ca t ionTes t , extractCommand , and ∗)
(∗ commandList , we im p l i c i t l y assume tha t the only au then t i ca t ed inpu t s are ∗)
(∗ o f the form P says phi , i . e . , we know who i s making statement phi . ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
val authent i cat ionTest_de f =
Def ine
￿ authent i ca t i onTes t
( elementTest : ( ' command option , ' p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form  > bool )
( x : ( ' command option , ' p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t ) =








￿commandList ( x : ( ' command option , ' p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t ) =
MAP extractCommand x ￿ ;
val extractPropCommand_def =
Def ine
￿( extractPropCommand (P says ( prop (SOME cmd ) ) : ( ' command option , ' p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form) =
( ( prop (SOME cmd ) ) : ( ' command option , ' p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form) ) ￿ ;
val propCommandList_def =
Def ine
￿propCommandList ( x : ( ' command option , ' p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t ) =
MAP extractPropCommand x ￿ ;
val extract Input_def =
Def ine
￿ ext rac t Input (P says ( prop x ) : ( ' command option , ' p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form) = x ￿ ;
val inputLi s t_def =
Def ine
￿ i npu tL i s t ( xs : ( ' command option , ' p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t ) =
MAP ext rac t Input xs ￿ ;
(∗                                                                            ∗)
(∗ Define t r an s i t i o n r e l a t i o n among con f i gu ra t i on s . This d e f i n i t i o n i s ∗)
(∗ parameter ized in terms o f next s t a t e t r a n s i t i o n func t ion and output ∗)
(∗ f unc t i on . ∗)
(∗                                                                            ∗)
val (TR_rules , TR_ind , TR_cases ) =
Hol_reln
￿ ( ! ( e lementTest : ( ' command option , ' p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form  > bool )
(NS : ' s t a t e  > ( 'command opt ion l i s t ) trType  > ' s t a t e ) M Oi Os Out ( s : ' s t a t e )
( context : ( ( ' command option , ' p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t )  >
( ( ' command option , ' p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t ) )
( s t a t e I n t e r p : ' s t a t e  > ( 'command option , ' p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t  >
( 'command option , ' p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t )
( x : ( ' command option , ' p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t )
( i n s : ( ' command option , ' p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t l i s t )
( outs : ' output l i s t ) .
( authent i ca t i onTes t elementTest x ) /\
( CFGInterpret (M, Oi , Os)
(CFG elementTest s t a t e I n t e r p context ( x : : i n s ) s outs ) ) ==>
(TR
( (M: ( ' command option , ' b , ' p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e ) Kripke ) , Oi : ' d po , Os : ' e po )
( exec ( i npu tL i s t x ) )
(CFG elementTest s t a t e I n t e r p context ( x : : i n s ) s outs )
(CFG elementTest s t a t e I n t e r p context i n s
(NS s ( exec ( i npu tL i s t x ) ) )
( (Out s ( exec ( i npu tL i s t x ) ) ) : : outs ) ) ) ) /\
( ! ( e lementTest : ( ' command option , ' p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form  > bool )
(NS : ' s t a t e  > ( 'command opt ion l i s t ) trType  > ' s t a t e ) M Oi Os Out ( s : ' s t a t e )
( context : ( ( ' command option , ' p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t )  >
( ( ' command option , ' p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t ) )
( s t a t e I n t e r p : ' s t a t e  > ( 'command option , ' p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t  >
( 'command option , ' p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t )
( x : ( ' command option , ' p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t )
( i n s : ( ' command option , ' p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t l i s t )
( outs : ' output l i s t ) .
( authent i ca t i onTes t elementTest x ) /\
( CFGInterpret (M, Oi , Os)
(CFG elementTest s t a t e I n t e r p context ( x : : i n s ) s outs ) ) ==>
(TR
( (M: ( ' command option , ' b , ' p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e ) Kripke ) , Oi : ' d po , Os : ' e po )
( trap ( i nputL i s t x ) )
(CFG elementTest s t a t e I n t e r p context ( x : : i n s ) s outs )
(CFG elementTest s t a t e I n t e r p context i n s
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(NS s ( trap ( i npu tL i s t x ) ) )
( (Out s ( trap ( i nputL i s t x ) ) ) : : outs ) ) ) ) /\
( ! ( e lementTest : ( ' command option , ' p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form  > bool )
(NS : ' s t a t e  > ( 'command opt ion l i s t ) trType  > ' s t a t e ) M Oi Os Out ( s : ' s t a t e )
( context : ( ( ' command option , ' p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t )  >
( ( ' command option , ' p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t ) )
( s t a t e I n t e r p : ' s t a t e  > ( 'command option , ' p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t  >
( 'command option , ' p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t )
( x : ( ' command option , ' p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t )
( i n s : ( ' command option , ' p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t l i s t )
( outs : ' output l i s t ) .
~( authent i ca t i onTes t elementTest x ) ==>
(TR
( (M: ( ' command option , ' b , ' p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e ) Kripke ) , Oi : ' d po , Os : ' e po )
( d i s ca rd ( i nputL i s t x ) )
(CFG elementTest s t a t e I n t e r p context ( x : : i n s ) s outs )
(CFG elementTest s t a t e I n t e r p context i n s
(NS s ( d i s ca rd ( i npu tL i s t x ) ) )
( (Out s ( d i s ca rd ( i npu tL i s t x ) ) ) : : outs ) ) ) ) ￿
(∗                                                                            ∗)
(∗ S p l i t up TR_rules in to i n d i v i d u a l c l au s e s ∗)
(∗                                                                            ∗)
val [ ru le0 , ru le1 , ru l e 2 ] = CONJUNCTS TR_rules
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗ Prove the converse o f ru le0 , ru le1 , and ru l e2 ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
val TR_lemma0 =




￿￿ exec cmd = y￿￿
( fn th => ASSUME_TAC(REWRITE_RULE[ trType_one_one , t rType_dis t inct_c lauses ] th ) ) THEN
PROVE_TAC[ configuration_one_one , l i s t_11 , t rType_dis t inct_c lauses ] )
val TR_lemma1 =




￿￿ trap cmd = y￿￿
( fn th => ASSUME_TAC(REWRITE_RULE[ trType_one_one , t rType_dis t inct_c lauses ] th ) ) THEN
PROVE_TAC[ configuration_one_one , l i s t_11 , t rType_dis t inct_c lauses ] )
val TR_lemma2 =




￿￿ d i s ca rd ( i nputL i s t x)= y￿￿
( fn th => ASSUME_TAC(REWRITE_RULE[ trType_one_one , t rType_dis t inct_c lauses ] th ) ) THEN
PROVE_TAC[ configuration_one_one , l i s t_11 , t rType_dis t inct_c lauses ] )
val TR_rules_converse =
TAC_PROOF( ( [ ] , f l ip_TR_rules TR_rules ) ,
REWRITE_TAC[TR_lemma0, TR_lemma1, TR_lemma2 ] )
val TR_EQ_rules_thm = TR_EQ_rules TR_rules TR_rules_converse
val _ = save_thm( "TR_EQ_rules_thm" ,TR_EQ_rules_thm)
val [ TRrule0 , TRrule1 , TR_discard_cmd_rule ] = CONJUNCTS TR_EQ_rules_thm
val _ = save_thm( "TRrule0" , TRrule0 )
val _ = save_thm( "TRrule1" , TRrule1 )
val _ = save_thm( "TR_discard_cmd_rule" ,TR_discard_cmd_rule )
(∗                                                                            ∗)
(∗ I f ( CFGInterpret ∗)
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(∗ (M,Oi ,Os) ∗)
(∗ (CFG elementTest s t a t e I n t e r p r e t c e r t L i s t ∗)
(∗ ( (P says ( prop (CMD cmd ) ) ) : : ins ) s outs ) ==> ∗)
(∗ ( (M,Oi ,Os) sa t ( prop (CMD cmd) ) ) ) ∗)
(∗ i s a v a l i d in f e r ence ru le , then execu t ing cmd the exec (CMD cmd) t r an s i t i o n ∗)
(∗ occurs i f and only i f prop (CMD cmd) , elementTest , and ∗)
(∗ CFGInterpret (M,Oi ,Os) ∗)
(∗ (CFG elementTest s t a t e I n t e r p r e t c e r t L i s t (P says prop (CMD cmd ) : : ins ) s outs ) ∗)
(∗ are t rue . ∗)
(∗                                                                            ∗)
val TR_exec_cmd_rule =
TAC_PROOF( ( [ ] ,
￿ ￿ ! e lementTest context s t a t e I n t e r p (x : ( ' command option , ' p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t )
i n s s outs .
( !M Oi Os .
( CFGInterpret
( (M : ( ' command option , 'b , ' p r i n c i pa l , 'd , ' e ) Kripke ) , ( Oi : ' d po ) , (Os : ' e po ) )
(CFG elementTest
( s t a t e I n t e r p : ' s t a t e  > ( 'command option , ' p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t  >
( 'command option , ' p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t ) context
( x : : i n s )
( s : ' s t a t e ) ( outs : ' output l i s t ) ) ) ==>
(M, Oi , Os) s a tL i s t ( propCommandList ( x : ( ' command option , ' p r i n c i pa l , 'd , ' e )Form l i s t ) ) ) ==>
( !NS Out M Oi Os .
TR
( (M : ( ' command option , 'b , ' p r i n c i pa l , 'd , ' e ) Kripke ) , ( Oi : ' d po ) ,
(Os : ' e po ) ) ( exec ( i nputL i s t x ) )
(CFG ( elementTest : ( ' command option , ' p r i n c i pa l , 'd , ' e ) Form  > bool )
( s t a t e I n t e r p : ' s t a t e  > ( 'command option , ' p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t  >
( 'command option , ' p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t )
( context : ( ' command option , ' p r i n c i pa l , 'd , ' e ) Form l i s t  >
( 'command option , ' p r i n c i pa l , 'd , ' e ) Form l i s t )
( x : : i n s )
( s : ' s t a t e ) ( outs : ' output l i s t ) )
(CFG elementTest s t a t e I n t e r p context i n s
( (NS : ' s t a t e  > 'command opt ion l i s t trType  > ' s t a t e ) s ( exec ( i npu tL i s t x ) ) )
(Out s ( exec ( i npu tL i s t x ) ) : : outs ) ) <=>
( authent i ca t i onTes t elementTest x ) /\
( CFGInterpret (M, Oi , Os)
(CFG elementTest s t a t e I n t e r p context ( x : : i n s ) s outs ) ) /\
(M, Oi , Os) s a tL i s t ( propCommandList x )) ￿ ￿) ,





val _ = save_thm( "TR_exec_cmd_rule" ,TR_exec_cmd_rule )
(∗                                                                            ∗)
(∗ I f ( CFGInterpret ∗)
(∗ (M,Oi ,Os) ∗)
(∗ (CFG elementTest s t a t e I n t e r p r e t c e r t L i s t ∗)
(∗ ( (P says ( prop (CMD cmd ) ) ) : : ins ) s outs ) ==> ∗)
(∗ ( (M,Oi ,Os) sa t ( prop TRAP)) ) ∗)
(∗ i s a v a l i d in f e r ence ru le , then execu t ing cmd the trap (CMD cmd) t r an s i t i o n ∗)
(∗ occurs i f and only i f prop TRAP, elementTest , and ∗)
(∗ CFGInterpret (M,Oi ,Os) ∗)
(∗ (CFG elementTest s t a t e I n t e r p r e t c e r t L i s t (P says prop (CMD cmd ) : : ins ) ∗)




( [ ] , ￿ ￿ ! e lementTest context s t a t e I n t e r p (x : ( ' command option , ' p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t )
i n s s outs .
( !M Oi Os .
( CFGInterpret
( (M : ( ' command option , 'b , ' p r i n c i pa l , 'd , ' e ) Kripke ) , ( Oi : ' d po ) , (Os : ' e po ) )
(CFG elementTest
( s t a t e I n t e r p : ' s t a t e  > ( 'command option , ' p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t  >
( 'command option , ' p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t ) context
( x : : i n s )
( s : ' s t a t e ) ( outs : ' output l i s t ) ) ) ==>
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(M, Oi , Os) sa t ( prop NONE) ) ==>
( !NS Out M Oi Os .
TR
( (M : ( ' command option , 'b , ' p r i n c i pa l , 'd , ' e ) Kripke ) , ( Oi : ' d po ) ,
(Os : ' e po ) ) ( trap ( i npu tL i s t x ) )
(CFG ( elementTest : ( ' command option , ' p r i n c i pa l , 'd , ' e ) Form  > bool )
( s t a t e I n t e r p : ' s t a t e  > ( 'command option , ' p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t  >
( 'command option , ' p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t )
( context : ( ' command option , ' p r i n c i pa l , 'd , ' e ) Form l i s t  >
( 'command option , ' p r i n c i pa l , 'd , ' e ) Form l i s t )
( x : : i n s )
( s : ' s t a t e ) ( outs : ' output l i s t ) )
(CFG elementTest s t a t e I n t e r p context i n s
( (NS : ' s t a t e  > 'command opt ion l i s t trType  > ' s t a t e ) s ( trap ( i npu tL i s t x ) ) )
(Out s ( trap ( i nputL i s t x ) ) : : outs ) ) <=>
( authent i ca t i onTes t elementTest x ) /\
( CFGInterpret (M, Oi , Os)
(CFG elementTest s t a t e I n t e r p context ( x : : i n s ) s outs ) ) /\
(M, Oi , Os) sa t ( prop NONE)) ￿ ￿) ,





val _ = save_thm( "TR_trap_cmd_rule" ,TR_trap_cmd_rule )
(∗ ==== s t a r t here ====
==== end here ==== ∗)
val _ = export_theory ( ) ;
val _ = print_theory " " ;
end (∗ s t r u c t u r e ∗)
C.2 satList
(∗                                                                            ∗)
(∗ De f in i t i on o f s a t L i s t f o r con junc t ions o f ACL formulas ∗)
(∗ Author : Shiu Kai Chin ∗)
(∗ Date : 24 July 2014 ∗)
(∗                                                                            ∗)
structure s a t L i s t S c r i p t = struct
(∗ i n t e r a c t i v e mode
app load
[" TypeBase" ," l i s tTheo ry " ," ac l_in fRules " ] ;
∗)
open HolKernel boolLib Parse bossLib
open TypeBase ac l_in fRu le s l i s tTheo ry
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
∗ crea t e a new theory
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
val _ = new_theory " s a tL i s t " ;
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗ Conf igura t ions and p o l i c i e s are represen ted by l i s t s ∗)
(∗ o f formulas in the access con t ro l l o g i c . ∗)
(∗ Previous ly , f o r a formula f in the access con t ro l l o g i c , ∗)
(∗ we u l t ima t e l y i n t e r p r e t e d i t w i th in the con tex t o f a ∗)
(∗ Kripke s t r u c t u r e M and p a r t i a l orders Oi : ' In t po and ∗)
(∗ Os : ' Sec po . This i s represen ted as (M,Oi ,Os) sa t f . ∗)
(∗ The na tura l ex t ens ion i s to i n t e r p r e t a l i s t o f formulas ∗)
(∗ [ f 0 ; . . ; fn ] as a conjunct ion : ∗)
(∗ (M,Oi ,Os) sa t f0 /\ . . . /\ (M,Oi ,Os) sa t fn ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
val _ = s e t_ f i x i t y " s a tL i s t " ( I n f i x r 540 ) ;
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val sa tL i s t_de f =
Def ine
￿((M: ( ' prop , ' world , 'pName , ' Int , ' Sec ) Kripke ) , ( Oi : ' Int po ) , (Os : ' Sec po ) )
s a tL i s t
formList =
FOLDR
(\x y . x /\ y ) T
(MAP
(\ ( f : ( ' prop , 'pName , ' Int , ' Sec )Form ) .
( (M: ( ' prop , ' world , 'pName , ' Int , ' Sec ) Kripke ) ,
Oi : ' Int po , Os : ' Sec po ) sa t f ) formList ) ￿ ;
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗ Proper t i e s o f s a t L i s t ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
val s a tL i s t_n i l =
TAC_PROOF(
( [ ] ,
￿ ￿((M: ( ' prop , ' world , 'pName , ' Int , ' Sec ) Kripke ) , ( Oi : ' Int po ) , (Os : ' Sec po ) ) s a tL i s t [ ] ￿ ￿ ) ,
REWRITE_TAC[ satLi s t_def ,FOLDR,MAP] )
val _ = save_thm( " s a tL i s t_n i l " , s a tL i s t_n i l )
val sa tL i s t_con j =
TAC_PROOF(
( [ ] ,
￿ ￿ ! l 1 l 2 M Oi Os . ( ( (M: ( ' prop , ' world , 'pName , ' Int , ' Sec ) Kripke ) , ( Oi : ' Int po ) , (Os : ' Sec po ) )
s a tL i s t l 1 ) /\
( ( (M: ( ' prop , ' world , 'pName , ' Int , ' Sec ) Kripke ) , ( Oi : ' Int po ) , (Os : ' Sec po ) )
s a tL i s t l 2 ) =
( ( (M: ( ' prop , ' world , 'pName , ' Int , ' Sec ) Kripke ) , ( Oi : ' Int po ) , (Os : ' Sec po ) )
s a tL i s t ( l 1 ++ l2 )) ￿ ￿) ,
Induct THEN
REWRITE_TAC[APPEND, s a tL i s t_n i l ] THEN




REWRITE_TAC[GSYM satL i s t_de f ] THEN
PROVE_TAC[ ] )
val _ = save_thm( " satL i s t_con j " , sa tL i s t_con j )
val satList_CONS =
TAC_PROOF( ( [ ] ,
￿ ￿ !h t M Oi Os . ( ( (M: ( ' prop , ' world , 'pName , ' Int , ' Sec ) Kripke ) , ( Oi : ' Int po ) , (Os : ' Sec po ) )
s a tL i s t (h : : t ) ) =
( ( (M, Oi , Os) sa t h) /\
( ( (M: ( ' prop , ' world , 'pName , ' Int , ' Sec ) Kripke ) , ( Oi : ' Int po ) , (Os : ' Sec po ) )
s a tL i s t t )) ￿ ￿) ,
REPEAT STRIP_TAC THEN





val _ = save_thm( "satList_CONS" , satList_CONS )
val _ = export_theory ( ) ;
val _ = print_theory " " ;
end (∗ s t r u c t u r e ∗)
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Appendix D
Secure State Machine Theories Applied





(∗ Author : Lori Picker ing ∗)
(∗ Date : 10 May 2018 ∗)
(∗ This f i l e i s intended to a l l ow fo r i n t e g r a t i on among the ssms . The idea ∗)
(∗ i s to prov ide an OMNI  l e v e l i n t e g r a t i n g theory , in the sense o f a super  ∗)
(∗ consc ious t ha t knows when each ssm i s complete and prov ides t ha t in f o to ∗)
(∗ higher  l e v e l s t a t e machines . ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
structure OMNIScript = struct
(∗ ==== In t e r a c t i v e Mode =====
app load [" TypeBase" ," l i s tTheo ry " , "optionTheory " ,
"OMNITypeTheory" ,
" ac l_in fRules " ," aclDrulesTheory " ," ac l ru l e sTheory " ] ;
open TypeBase l i s tTheo ry optionTheory
OMNITypeTheory
ac l_in fRules ac lDrulesTheory ac l ru l e sTheory
==== End In t e r a c t i v e Mode ==== ∗)
open HolKernel Parse boolLib bossLib ;
open TypeBase l i s tTheo ry optionTheory
open OMNITypeTheory
open ac l_in fRu le s ac lDrulesTheory ac l ru l e sTheory
val _ = new_theory "OMNI" ;
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗ Define slCommands fo r OMNI. ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗ ==== Area 52 ===========
va l _=
Datatype ￿ s t a t eRo l e = Omni￿
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va l _=





va l omniCommand_distinct_clauses = d i s t inc t_o f ￿ ￿:omniCommand￿￿
va l _= save_thm(" omniCommand_distinct_clauses " ,
omniCommand_distinct_clauses )
va l _=
Datatype ￿slCommand = OMNI omniCommand￿
va l omniAuthentication_def =
Define
￿( omniAuthenticat ion
(Name Omni says prop (cmd : ( ( slCommand command) opt ion ))
: ( ( slCommand command) option , s ta teRo le , 'd , ' e )Form) = T) /\
( omniAuthenticat ion _ = F)￿
va l omniAuthorization_def =
Define
￿( omniAuthorizat ion
(Name Omni con t r o l s prop (cmd : ( ( slCommand command) opt ion ))
: ( ( slCommand command) option , s ta teRo le , 'd , ' e )Form) = T) /\
( omniAuthorizat ion _ = F)￿
This may not be necessary . . . But , i t i s i n t e r e s t i n g . Save f o r a l a t e r time .
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗ Prove tha t ∗)
(∗ Omni says omniCommand ==> omniCommand ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
se t_goa l ( [ ] ,
￿￿(Name Omni says prop (cmd : ( ( slCommand command) opt ion ))
: ( ( slCommand command) option , s ta teRo le , 'd , ' e )Form) ==>
prop (cmd : ( ( slCommand command) opt ion )) ￿ ￿)
va l th1 = ASSUME￿￿(Name Omni says prop (cmd : ( ( slCommand command) opt ion ))
: ( ( slCommand command) option , s ta teRo le , 'd , ' e )Form) = TT￿￿
va l th2 = REWRITE_RULE[ omniAuthentication_def ] th1
========= End Area 52 ==== ∗)
val _= export_theory ( ) ;
end
D.2 TopLevel
D.2.1 PBTypeIntegrated Theory: Type Definitions
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗ PBTypeIntegrated ∗)
(∗ Author : Lori Picker ing ∗)
(∗ Date 12 May 2018 ∗)
(∗ This theory conta ins the type d e f i n i t i o n s f o r ssmPBIntegrated ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
structure PBTypeIntegratedScript = struct
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(∗ ===== In t e r a c t i v e Mode ====
app load [" TypeBase " ]
open TypeBase
==== end I n t e r a c t i v e Mode ==== ∗)
open HolKernel Parse boolLib bossLib ;
open TypeBase OMNITypeTheory
val _= new_theory "PBTypeIntegrated" ;
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗ Define types ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
val _=






val plCommand_distinct_clauses = d i s t inc t_o f ￿ ￿ :plCommand￿￿
val _= save_thm( "plCommand_distinct_clauses " ,
plCommand_distinct_clauses )
val _=






val omniCommand_distinct_clauses = d i s t inc t_o f ￿ ￿ :omniCommand￿￿
val _= save_thm( "omniCommand_distinct_clauses" ,
omniCommand_distinct_clauses )
val _=
Datatype ￿slCommand = PL plCommand
| OMNI omniCommand￿
val slCommand_distinct_clauses = d i s t inc t_o f ￿ ￿ : slCommand￿￿
val _= save_thm( " slCommand_distinct_clauses " ,
slCommand_distinct_clauses )
val slCommand_one_one = one_one_of ￿ ￿ : slCommand￿￿
val _= save_thm( "slCommand_one_one" , slCommand_one_one)
val _=
Datatype ￿ s ta t eRo l e = PlatoonLeader | Omni￿
val s t a t eRo l e_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s = d i s t inc t_o f ￿ ￿ : s tateRole ￿￿
val _= save_thm( " s ta t eRo l e_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s " ,
s t a t eRo l e_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s )
val _=






val s l S t a t e_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s = d i s t inc t_o f ￿ ￿ : s l S t a t e ￿￿
val _ = save_thm( " s l S t a t e_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s " , s l S t a t e_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s )
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val _=








val s lOutput_di s t inc t_c lauses = d i s t inc t_o f ￿ ￿ : slOutput ￿￿
val _ = save_thm( " s lOutput_di s t inc t_c lauses " , s lOutput_di s t inc t_c lauses )
val _= export_theory ( ) ;
end




(∗ Author : Lori Picker ing ∗)
(∗ Date : 7 May 2018 ∗)
(∗ De f i n i t i on s f o r ssmPBIntegratedTheory . ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
structure PBIntegratedDefScr ipt = struct
(∗ ===== In t e r a c t i v e Mode ====
app load [" TypeBase" , " l i s tTheo ry " ," optionTheory " ,
" u a vU t i l i t i e s " ,
"OMNITypeTheory" ,
"PBIntegratedDefTheory " ," PBTypeIntegratedTheory " ] ;
open TypeBase l i s tTheo ry optionTheory
aclsemanticsTheory ac l foundat ionTheory
u a vU t i l i t i e s
OMNITypeTheory
PBIntegratedDefTheory PBTypeIntegratedTheory
==== end I n t e r a c t i v e Mode ==== ∗)
open HolKernel Parse boolLib bossLib ;
open TypeBase l i s tTheo ry optionTheory
open u a vU t i l i t i e s
open OMNITypeTheory PBTypeIntegratedTheory
val _ = new_theory "PBIntegratedDef " ;
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)




( getPlCom ( [ ] : ( ( slCommand command) opt ion ) l i s t )
= incomplete : plCommand) /\
( getPlCom (SOME (SLc (PL cmd ) ) : ( slCommand command) opt ion : : xs )
= cmd : plCommand) /\
( getPlCom (_: : ( xs : ( slCommand command) opt ion l i s t ) )
= ( getPlCom xs )) ￿
(∗                                                                            ∗)
(∗ s t a t e I n t e r p r e t a t i on func t ion ∗)
(∗                                                                            ∗)
(∗ This func t i on doesn ' t do anything but i s necessary to s p e c i a l i z e o ther ∗)
(∗ theorems . ∗)
(∗                                                                            ∗)
(∗
va l secContextNul l_def = Define ￿
secContext ( x : ( ( slCommand command) option , s ta teRo le , 'd , ' e )Form l i s t ) =
[ (Name Omni) con t r o l s prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI omniCommand) ) )
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: ( ( slCommand command) option , s ta teRo le , 'd , ' e )Form] ￿
∗)
val secHe lper =
Define ￿
( secHe lper (cmd : omniCommand) =
[ (Name Omni) c on t r o l s prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI (cmd : omniCommand ) ) ) ) ] ) ￿
val getOmniCommand_def =
Define ￿
(getOmniCommand ( [ ] : ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form l i s t )
= invalidOmniCommand : omniCommand) /\
(getOmniCommand ( ( (Name Omni) says prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI cmd ) ) ) ) : : xs )
= (cmd : omniCommand) ) /\
(getOmniCommand ( ( x : ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form ) : : xs )
= (getOmniCommand xs )) ￿
val secAuthor i zat ion_def =
Define ￿
( s e cAuthor i za t i on ( xs : ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t )
= secHe lper (getOmniCommand xs ) ) ￿
val secContext_def =
Define ￿
( secContext (PLAN_PB) ( xs : ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form l i s t ) =
i f ( ( getOmniCommand xs ) = ssmPlanPBComplete : omniCommand)
then
[ ( prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI ( ssmPlanPBComplete ) ) ) )
: ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form) impf
(Name PlatoonLeader ) c on t r o l s prop (SOME (SLc (PL crossLD ) ) )
: ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form ]
else [ prop NONE: ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form ] ) /\
( secContext (MOVE_TO_ORP) ( xs : ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form l i s t ) =
i f (getOmniCommand xs = ssmMoveToORPComplete )
then
[ prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI (ssmMoveToORPComplete ) ) ) ) impf
(Name PlatoonLeader ) c on t r o l s prop (SOME (SLc (PL conductORP ) ) ) ]
else [ prop NONE] ) /\
( secContext (CONDUCT_ORP) ( xs : ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form l i s t ) =
i f (getOmniCommand xs = ssmConductORPComplete )
then
[ prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI ( ssmConductORPComplete ) ) ) ) impf
(Name PlatoonLeader ) c on t r o l s prop (SOME (SLc (PL moveToPB ) ) ) ]
else [ prop NONE] ) /\
( secContext (MOVE_TO_PB) ( xs : ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form l i s t ) =
i f (getOmniCommand xs = ssmConductORPComplete )
then
[ prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI ( ssmMoveToPBComplete ) ) ) ) impf
(Name PlatoonLeader ) c on t r o l s prop (SOME (SLc (PL conductPB ) ) ) ]
else [ prop NONE] ) /\
( secContext (CONDUCT_PB) ( xs : ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form l i s t ) =
i f (getOmniCommand xs = ssmConductPBComplete )
then
[ prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI ( ssmConductPBComplete ) ) ) ) impf
(Name PlatoonLeader ) c on t r o l s prop (SOME (SLc (PL completePB ) ) ) ]
else [ prop NONE]) ￿
(∗ ===== Area 52 ====
==== End Area 52 ==== ∗)
val _= export_theory ( ) ;
end
D.2.3 ssmPlanPBIntegrated Theory: Theorems
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗ ssmPBIntegratedTheory ∗)
(∗ Author : Lori Picker ing ∗)
(∗ Date : 7 May 2018 ∗)
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(∗ This theory aims to i n t e g r a t e the topLeve l ssm with the s u b l e v e l ssms . I t ∗)
(∗ does t h i s by adding a cond i t i on to the s e c u r i t y con tex t . In pa r t i cu l a r , ∗)
(∗ i t r e qu i r e s t ha t the "COMPLETE" s t a t e in the subLeve l ssm must preceede ∗)
(∗ t r a n s i t i o n to the next s t a t e at the topLeve . I . e . , ∗)
(∗ planPBComplete ==> ∗)
(∗ PlatoonLeader con t r o l s crossLD . ∗)
(∗ In the ssmPlanPB ssm , the l a s t s t a t e i s COMPLETE. This i s reached when the ∗)
(∗ the appropr ia te au t ho r i t y says complete and the t r a n s i t i o n i s made . ∗)
(∗ Note t ha t f o l l ow i n g the ACL, i f P says x and P con t r o l s x , then x . ∗)
(∗ Therefore , i t i s not necessary f o r anyone to say x at the topLeve l , because ∗)
(∗ i t i s a l ready proved at the lower l e v e l . ∗)
(∗ However , i n d i c a t i n g t ha t at the topLeve l remains something to workout . ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
structure ssmPBIntegratedScr ipt = struct
(∗ ===== In t e r a c t i v e Mode ====
app load [" TypeBase" , " l i s tTheo ry " ," optionTheory " ," l i s t S y n t a x " ,
" ac l_in fRules " ," aclDrulesTheory " ," ac l ru l e sTheory " ,
" ac lsemanticsTheory " , " ac l foundat ionTheory " ,
" sa tLis tTheory " ," ssmTheory " ," ssminfRules " ," u a vU t i l i t i e s " ,
"OMNITypeTheory" , "PBTypeIntegratedTheory " ," PBIntegratedDefTheory " ,
"ssmPBIntegratedTheory " ] ;
open TypeBase l i s tTheo ry optionTheory l i s t S y n t a x
ac l_in fRules ac lDrulesTheory ac l ru l e sTheory
aclsemanticsTheory ac l foundat ionTheory
sa tLis tTheory ssmTheory ssminfRules u a vU t i l i t i e s
OMNITypeTheory PBTypeIntegratedTheory PBIntegratedDefTheory
ssmPBIntegratedTheory
==== end I n t e r a c t i v e Mode ==== ∗)
open HolKernel Parse boolLib bossLib ;
open TypeBase l i s tTheo ry optionTheory
open ac l_in fRu le s ac lDrulesTheory ac l ru l e sTheory
open satL i s tTheory ssmTheory ssminfRules u a vU t i l i t i e s
open OMNITypeTheory PBTypeIntegratedTheory PBIntegratedDefTheory
val _ = new_theory " ssmPBIntegrated" ;
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)




(PBNS PLAN_PB ( exec x ) =
i f ( getPlCom x) = crossLD then MOVE_TO_ORP else PLAN_PB) /\
(PBNS MOVE_TO_ORP ( exec x ) =
i f ( getPlCom x) = conductORP then CONDUCT_ORP else MOVE_TO_ORP) /\
(PBNS CONDUCT_ORP ( exec x ) =
i f ( getPlCom x) = moveToPB then MOVE_TO_PB else CONDUCT_ORP) /\
(PBNS MOVE_TO_PB ( exec x ) =
i f ( getPlCom x) = conductPB then CONDUCT_PB else MOVE_TO_PB) /\
(PBNS CONDUCT_PB ( exec x ) =
i f ( getPlCom x) = completePB then COMPLETE_PB else CONDUCT_PB) /\
(PBNS ( s : s l S t a t e ) ( trap _) = s ) /\
(PBNS ( s : s l S t a t e ) ( d i s ca rd _) = s ) ￿
val PBOut_def =
Define ￿
(PBOut PLAN_PB ( exec x ) =
i f ( getPlCom x) = crossLD then MoveToORP else PlanPB) /\
(PBOut MOVE_TO_ORP ( exec x ) =
i f ( getPlCom x) = conductORP then ConductORP else MoveToORP) /\
(PBOut CONDUCT_ORP ( exec x ) =
i f ( getPlCom x) = moveToPB then MoveToORP else ConductORP) /\
(PBOut MOVE_TO_PB ( exec x ) =
i f ( getPlCom x) = conductPB then ConductPB else MoveToPB) /\
(PBOut CONDUCT_PB ( exec x ) =
i f ( getPlCom x) = completePB then CompletePB else ConductPB) /\
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(PBOut ( s : s l S t a t e ) ( trap _) = unAuthorized ) /\
(PBOut ( s : s l S t a t e ) ( d i s ca rd _) = unAuthenticated ) ￿
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)




( inputOK ( ( (Name PlatoonLeader ) says prop (cmd : ( ( slCommand command) opt ion ) ) )
: ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , ' d , ' e )Form) = T) /\
( inputOK ( ( (Name Omni) says prop (cmd : ( ( slCommand command) opt ion ) ) )
: ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , ' d , ' e )Form) = T) /\
( inputOK _ = F) ￿
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗ Prove tha t commands are r e j e c t e d un l e s s t ha t are reques t ed by a proper l y ∗)
(∗ au then t i ca t ed p r i n c i p a l . ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
val inputOK_cmd_reject_lemma =
Q. prove ( ￿ ! cmd . ~(inputOK
( ( prop (SOME cmd) ) ) ) ￿ ,
(PROVE_TAC[ inputOK_def ] ) )
val _= save_thm( "inputOK_cmd_reject_lemma" ,
inputOK_cmd_reject_lemma)
(∗                                                                            ∗)
(∗ Theorem : PlatoonLeader i s au thor i z ed on crossLD i f ∗)




[ ￿ ￿ inputOK : ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form  > bool ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ s e cAuthor i za t i on : ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form l i s t  >
(( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form l i s t ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ secContext : ( s l S t a t e )  >
(( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form l i s t  >
(( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form l i s t ￿ ￿ ,
￿ ￿ [ (Name Omni) says ( prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI ssmPlanPBComplete ) ) ) )
: ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form ;
(Name PlatoonLeader ) says ( prop (SOME (SLc (PL crossLD ) ) ) )
: ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form] ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ i n s : ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form l i s t l i s t ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿(PLAN_PB) ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ outs : s lOutput output l i s t trType l i s t ￿ ￿ ] TR_exec_cmd_rule
val PlatoonLeader_PLAN_PB_exec_lemma =
TAC_PROOF(
( [ ] , f s t ( dest_imp ( conc l thPlanPB ) ) ) ,
REWRITE_TAC[ CFGInterpret_def , secContext_def , secAuthor izat ion_def , secHelper_def ,
propCommandList_def , extractPropCommand_def , inputList_def ,
getOmniCommand_def ,
MAP, extractInput_def , satList_CONS , sa tL i s t_n i l , GSYM satL i s t_con j ] THEN
PROVE_TAC[ Controls , Modus_Ponens ] )




( [ ] , snd ( dest_imp ( conc l thPlanPB ) ) ) ,
PROVE_TAC[ PlatoonLeader_PLAN_PB_exec_lemma , TR_exec_cmd_rule ] )
val _= save_thm( "PlatoonLeader_PLAN_PB_exec_justified_lemma" ,
PlatoonLeader_PLAN_PB_exec_justified_lemma )
val PlatoonLeader_PLAN_PB_exec_justified_thm =
REWRITE_RULE[ inputList_def , extractInput_def , MAP, propCommandList_def ,
extractPropCommand_def , PlatoonLeader_PLAN_PB_exec_lemma ]
PlatoonLeader_PLAN_PB_exec_justified_lemma
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val _= save_thm( "PlatoonLeader_PLAN_PB_exec_justified_thm" ,
PlatoonLeader_PLAN_PB_exec_justified_thm )
(∗                                                                            ∗)
(∗ Theorem : PlatoonLeader i s trapped on crossLD i f ∗)
(∗ s t a t e = PLAN_PB and ∗)




[ ￿ ￿ inputOK : ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form  > bool ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ s e cAuthor i za t i on : ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form l i s t  >
(( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form l i s t ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ secContext : ( s l S t a t e )  >
(( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form l i s t  >
(( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form l i s t ￿ ￿ ,
￿ ￿ [ (Name Omni) says ( prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI omniCommand ) ) ) )
: ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form ;
(Name PlatoonLeader ) says ( prop (SOME (SLc (PL crossLD ) ) ) )
: ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form] ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ i n s : ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form l i s t l i s t ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿(PLAN_PB) ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ outs : s lOutput output l i s t trType l i s t ￿ ￿ ] TR_trap_cmd_rule
val temp2 = f s t ( dest_imp ( conc l thPlanPBTrap ) )
val PlatoonLeader_PLAN_PB_trap_lemma =
TAC_PROOF(
( [ ] ,
Term￿ (~((omniCommand : omniCommand) = ssmPlanPBComplete ) ) ==>
(( s : s l S t a t e ) = PLAN_PB) ==>
^temp2 ￿ ) ,
DISCH_TAC THEN
DISCH_TAC THEN
ASM_REWRITE_TAC[ CFGInterpret_def , secContext_def , secAuthor izat ion_def , secHelper_def ,
propCommandList_def , extractPropCommand_def , inputList_def ,
getOmniCommand_def ,
MAP, extractInput_def , satList_CONS , sa tL i s t_n i l , GSYM satL i s t_con j ] THEN
PROVE_TAC[ Controls , Modus_Ponens ] )
val _= save_thm( "PlatoonLeader_PLAN_PB_trap_lemma" ,
PlatoonLeader_PLAN_PB_trap_lemma)
val temp3 = snd ( dest_imp ( conc l thPlanPBTrap ) )
val PlatoonLeader_PLAN_PB_trap_justified_lemma =
TAC_PROOF(
( [ ] ,
Term￿ (~((omniCommand : omniCommand) = ssmPlanPBComplete ) ) ==>
(( s : s l S t a t e ) = PLAN_PB) ==>
^temp3 ￿ ) ,
DISCH_TAC THEN
DISCH_TAC THEN
PROVE_TAC[ PlatoonLeader_PLAN_PB_trap_lemma , TR_trap_cmd_rule ] )
val _= save_thm( "PlatoonLeader_PLAN_PB_trap_justified_lemma" ,
PlatoonLeader_PLAN_PB_trap_justified_lemma )
val PlatoonLeader_PLAN_PB_trap_justified_thm =




val _= save_thm( "PlatoonLeader_PLAN_PB_trap_justified_thm" ,
PlatoonLeader_PLAN_PB_trap_justified_thm )
(∗                                                                            ∗)
(∗ Theorem : PlatoonLeader i s not d i scarded on omniCommand and ∗)





[ ￿ ￿( e lementTest : ( ' command option , ' p r i n c i pa l , 'd , ' e ) Form  > bool ) ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿( context :
( 'command option , ' p r i n c i pa l , 'd , ' e ) Form l i s t  >
( 'command option , ' p r i n c i pa l , 'd , ' e ) Form l i s t ) ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿( s t a t e I n t e r p :
' s t a t e  >
( 'command option , ' p r i n c i pa l , 'd , ' e ) Form l i s t  >
( 'command option , ' p r i n c i pa l , 'd , ' e ) Form l i s t ) ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿(x : ( ' command option , ' p r i n c i pa l , 'd , ' e ) Form l i s t ) ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿( i n s : ( ' command option , ' p r i n c i pa l , 'd , ' e ) Form l i s t l i s t ) ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿( s : ' s t a t e ) ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿( outs : ' output l i s t ) ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿(NS : ' s t a t e  > 'command opt ion l i s t trType  > ' s t a t e ) ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿(Out : ' s t a t e  > 'command opt ion l i s t trType  > ' output ) ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿(M : ( ' command option , 'b , ' p r i n c i pa l , 'd , ' e ) Kripke ) ￿ ￿ ,




[ ￿ ￿ inputOK : ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form  > bool ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ s e cAuthor i za t i on : ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form l i s t  >
(( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form l i s t ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ secContext : ( s l S t a t e )  >
(( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form l i s t  >
(( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form l i s t ￿ ￿ ,
￿ ￿ [ (Name Omni) says ( prop (SOME (SLc (PL plCommand ) ) ) )
: ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form ;
(Name PlatoonLeader ) says ( prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI omniCommand ) ) ) )
: ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form] ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ i n s : ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form l i s t l i s t ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿(PLAN_PB) ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ outs : s lOutput output l i s t trType l i s t ￿ ￿ ] thgen
val th3d = LIST_BETA_CONV (Term ￿(\p q . p /\ q ) F ( (\ p q . p/\q ) T ((\p q . p /\ q ) T T)) ￿ )
val th3d2 = LIST_BETA_CONV (Term ￿(\p q . p/\q ) T T￿)
val PlatoonLeader_Omni_notDiscard_slCommand_thm =
REWRITE_RULE[ inputList_def , extractInput_def ,
authent icat ionTest_def , MAP, inputOK_def , FOLDR,
th3d , th3d2 ] thPlanPBdiscard
val _= save_thm( "PlatoonLeader_Omni_notDiscard_slCommand_thm" ,
PlatoonLeader_Omni_notDiscard_slCommand_thm)
(∗ ===== Just p l ay ing around with t h i s ====
==== OK, done f o o l i n g around ==== ∗)




D.3.1.1 PlanPBType Theory: Type Definitions
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗ PlanPBType conta ins d e f i n i t i o n s f o r da ta types t ha t are used in ∗)
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(∗ the PlanPB s t a t e machine . ∗)
(∗ Contr ibu tors : ∗)
(∗ Lori Picker ing (HOL implementation ) , ∗)
(∗ Jesse Ha l l ( content exper t ) , ∗)
(∗ Prof . Shiu Kai Chin ( Pr inc ipa l I n v e s t i g a t o r ) . ∗)
(∗ Date crea ted : 4 March 2018 ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
structure PlanPBTypeScript = struct
(∗ ===== In t e r a c t i v e Mode ====
app load [" TypeBase " ] ;
open TypeBase
==== end I n t e r a c t i v e Mode ==== ∗)
open HolKernel Parse boolLib bossLib ;
open TypeBase
val _ = new_theory "PlanPBType" ;
val _= Datatype ￿plCommand = re c e i v eMi s s i on
| warno
| t en ta t i veP lan
| recon
| r epor t1
| completePlan
| opoid
| s upe rv i s e
| r epor t2
| complete
| p l Incomplete
| invalidPlCommand ￿
val plCommand_distinct_clauses = d i s t inc t_o f ￿ ￿ :plCommand￿￿
val _= save_thm( "plCommand_distinct_clauses " , plCommand_distinct_clauses )
val _= Datatype ￿psgCommand = init iateMovement
| psgIncomplete
| invalidPsgCommand ￿
val psgCommand_distinct_clauses = d i s t in c t_o f ￿ ￿ :psgCommand￿￿
val _= save_thm( "psgCommand_distinct_clauses" , psgCommand_distinct_clauses )
val _= Datatype ￿slCommand = PL plCommand
| PSG psgCommand￿
val slCommand_distinct_clauses = d i s t inc t_o f ￿ ￿ : slCommand￿￿
val _= save_thm( " slCommand_distinct_clauses " , slCommand_distinct_clauses )
val slCommand_one_one = one_one_of ￿ ￿ : slCommand￿￿
val _= save_thm( "slCommand_one_one" , slCommand_one_one)












val s l S t a t e_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s = d i s t inc t_o f ￿ ￿ : s l S t a t e ￿￿
val _= save_thm( " s l S t a t e_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s " , s l S t a t e_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s )
val _= Datatype ￿ slOutput = PlanPB
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val s lOutput_di s t inc t_c lauses = d i s t inc t_o f ￿ ￿ : slOutput ￿￿
val _= save_thm( " s lOutput_di s t inc t_c lauses " , s lOutput_di s t inc t_c lauses )
val _= Datatype ￿ s ta t eRo l e = PlatoonLeader
| PlatoonSergeant ￿
val s lRo l e_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s = d i s t inc t_o f ￿ ￿ : s tateRole ￿￿
val _= save_thm( " s lRo l e_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s " , s lRo l e_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s )
val _= export_theory ( ) ;
end
D.3.1.2 PlanPBDef Theory: Authentication & Authorization Definitions
structure PlanPBDefScript = struct
(∗ ===== In t e r a c t i v e Mode ====
app load [" TypeBase" , " l i s tTheo ry " ," optionTheory " ,
" u a vU t i l i t i e s " ,
"OMNITypeTheory" , "PlanPBTypeTheory " ] ;
open TypeBase l i s tTheo ry optionTheory
aclsemanticsTheory ac l foundat ionTheory
u a vU t i l i t i e s
OMNITypeTheory PlanPBTypeTheory
==== end I n t e r a c t i v e Mode ==== ∗)
open HolKernel Parse boolLib bossLib ;
open TypeBase l i s tTheo ry optionTheory
open u a vU t i l i t i e s
open OMNITypeTheory PlanPBTypeTheory
val _ = new_theory "PlanPBDef" ;
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗ S t u f f ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗                                                                            ∗)
(∗ s t a t e I n t e r p r e t a t i on func t ion ∗)
(∗                                                                            ∗)
(∗ This func t i on doesn ' t do anything but i s necessary to s p e c i a l i z e o ther ∗)
(∗ theorems . ∗)
val secContextNul l_def = Def ine ￿
secContextNul l ( x : ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form l i s t ) =
[ (TT: ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form) ] ￿
(∗                                                                            ∗)
(∗ Secur i t y con tex t ∗)
(∗                                                                            ∗)
(∗ mimick Prof . Chin ' s C2_L1R1_RB_Auth_def ∗)
val PL_WARNO_Auth_def = Def ine ￿
PL_WARNO_Auth =
^( impfTermList
[ ￿ ￿( prop (SOME (SLc (PL recon ) ) ) )
: ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form￿ ￿ ,
￿￿( prop (SOME (SLc (PL tenta t i veP lan ) ) ) )
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: ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form￿ ￿ ,
￿￿( prop (SOME (SLc (PSG init iateMovement ) ) ) )
: ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form￿ ￿ ,
￿￿(Name PlatoonLeader ) c on t r o l s prop (SOME (SLc (PL repor t1 ) ) )
: ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form￿ ￿ ]
￿ ￿ : ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form￿￿)￿
val PL_notWARNO_Auth_def = Def ine ￿
PL_notWARNO_Auth (cmd : plCommand) =
i f (cmd = repor t1 ) (∗ repor t1 e x i t s WARNO s t a t e ∗)
then
( prop NONE) : ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form
else
( (Name PlatoonLeader ) says ( prop (SOME (SLc (PL cmd ) ) )
: ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form) impf
( ( (Name PlatoonLeader ) c on t r o l s prop (SOME (SLc (PL cmd ) ) ) )
: ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form) ) ￿
(∗ Make a func t ion to check f o r e lements in the l i s t ∗)
val getRecon_def = Def ine ￿
( getRecon ( [ ] : ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form l i s t ) =
[NONE] ) /\
( getRecon ( (Name PlatoonLeader ) says ( prop (SOME (SLc (PL recon ) ) ) )
: ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form : : xs )
= [SOME (SLc (PL recon ) ) : ( slCommand command) opt ion ] ) /\
( getRecon (_: : xs ) = getRecon xs ) ￿
val getTenativePlan_def = Def ine ￿
( getTenat ivePlan ( [ ] : ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form l i s t ) =
[NONE] ) /\
( getTenat ivePlan ( (Name PlatoonLeader ) says ( prop (SOME (SLc (PL tenta t i veP lan ) ) ) )
: ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form : : xs )
= [SOME (SLc (PL tenta t i v eP lan ) ) : ( slCommand command) opt ion ] ) /\
( getTenat ivePlan (_: : xs ) = getTenat ivePlan xs ) ￿
val getReport_def = Def ine ￿
( getReport ( [ ] : ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form l i s t ) =
[NONE] ) /\
( getReport ( ( (Name PlatoonLeader ) says ( prop (SOME (SLc (PL repor t1 ) ) ) ) )
: ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form : : xs )
= [SOME (SLc (PL repor t1 ) ) : ( slCommand command) opt ion ] ) /\
( getReport (_: : xs ) = getReport xs ) ￿
val getInitMove_def = Def ine ￿
( getInitMove ( [ ] : ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form l i s t ) =
[NONE] ) /\
( getInitMove ( ( (Name PlatoonSergeant ) says ( prop (SOME (SLc (PSG init iateMovement ) ) ) ) )
: ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form : : xs )
= [SOME (SLc (PSG init iateMovement ) ) : ( slCommand command) opt ion ] ) /\
( getInitMove (_: : xs ) = getInitMove xs ) ￿
val getPlCom_def = Def ine ￿
( getPlCom ( [ ] : ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form l i s t ) =
invalidPlCommand )
/\
( getPlCom ( ( (Name PlatoonLeader ) says ( prop (SOME (SLc (PL cmd ) ) ) ) )
: ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form : : xs ) =
cmd)
/\
( getPlCom (_: : xs ) = getPlCom xs ) ￿
val getPsgCom_def = Def ine ￿
( getPsgCom ( [ ] : ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form l i s t ) =
invalidPsgCommand )
/\
( getPsgCom ( ( (Name PlatoonSergeant ) says ( prop (SOME (SLc (PSG cmd ) ) ) ) )
: ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form : : xs ) =
cmd)
/\
( getPsgCom (_: : xs ) = getPsgCom xs ) ￿
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val secContext_def = Def ine ￿
secContext ( s : s l S t a t e ) ( x : ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form l i s t ) =
i f ( s = WARNO) then
( i f ( getRecon x = [SOME (SLc (PL recon ) )
: ( slCommand command) opt ion ] ) /\
( getTenat ivePlan x = [SOME (SLc (PL tenta t i veP lan ) )
: ( slCommand command) opt ion ] ) /\
( getReport x = [SOME (SLc (PL repor t1 ) )
: ( slCommand command) opt ion ] ) /\
( getInitMove x = [SOME (SLc (PSG init iateMovement ) )
: ( slCommand command) opt ion ] )
then [
PL_WARNO_Auth
: ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form ;
(Name PlatoonLeader ) c on t r o l s prop (SOME (SLc (PL recon ) ) ) ;
(Name PlatoonLeader ) c on t r o l s prop (SOME (SLc (PL tenta t i v eP lan ) ) ) ;
(Name PlatoonSergeant ) c on t r o l s prop (SOME (SLc (PSG init iateMovement ) ) ) ]
else [ ( prop NONE) : ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form ] )
else i f ( ( getPlCom x) = invalidPlCommand )
then [ ( prop NONE) : ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form ]
else [PL_notWARNO_Auth ( getPlCom x ) ] ￿
(∗ ==== Back up copy ====
(∗ Test theorem fo r EmitTeX pr in t i n g . ∗)
va l testTheorem = ASSUME￿￿T=T￿￿
va l _= save_thm(" testTheorem " , testTheorem )
==== End back up copy ==== ∗)
val _= export_theory ( ) ;
end
D.3.1.3 ssmPlanPB Theory: Theorems
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗ ssmPlanPB de s c r i b e s the secure s t a t e machine der i ved from the PLAN_PB ∗)
(∗ s t a t e at the top  l e v e l . This i s the f i r s t secure s t a t e machine to use the ∗)
(∗ new ssm parameter i zab l e secure s t a t e machine . ∗)
(∗ Contr ibu tors : Lori Picker ing (HOL Implementation ) ∗)
(∗ Jesse Nathanie l Ha l l ( s u b j e c t matter ) ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
structure ssmPlanPBScript = struct
(∗ ===== In t e r a c t i v e Mode ====
app load [" TypeBase" , " l i s tTheo ry " ," optionTheory " ," l i s t S y n t a x " ,
" ac l_in fRules " ," aclDrulesTheory " ," ac l ru l e sTheory " ,
" ac lsemanticsTheory " , " ac l foundat ionTheory " ,
" sa tLis tTheory " ," ssmTheory " ," ssminfRules " ," u a vU t i l i t i e s " ,
"OMNITypeTheory" , "PlanPBTypeTheory" ,"PlanPBDefTheory " ,
"ssmPlanPBTheory " ] ;
open TypeBase l i s tTheo ry optionTheory l i s t S y n t a x
ac l_in fRules ac lDrulesTheory ac l ru l e sTheory
aclsemanticsTheory ac l foundat ionTheory
sa tLis tTheory ssmTheory ssminfRules u a vU t i l i t i e s
OMNITypeTheory PlanPBTypeTheory PlanPBDefTheory
ssmPlanPBTheory
==== end I n t e r a c t i v e Mode ==== ∗)
open HolKernel Parse boolLib bossLib ;
open TypeBase l i s tTheo ry optionTheory
open ac l_in fRu le s ac lDrulesTheory ac l ru l e sTheory
open satL i s tTheory ssmTheory ssminfRules u a vU t i l i t i e s
open OMNITypeTheory PlanPBTypeTheory PlanPBDefTheory
val _ = new_theory "ssmPlanPB" ;
(∗                                                                            ∗)
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(∗ Define the next s t a t e & next output f unc t i on s f o r the s t a t e machine . ∗)
(∗                                                                            ∗)
val planPBNS_def = Def ine ￿
(planPBNS WARNO ( exec x ) =
i f ( ( getRecon x = [SOME (SLc (PL recon ) ) ] ) /\
( getTenat ivePlan x = [SOME (SLc (PL tenta t i veP lan ) ) ] ) /\
( getReport x = [SOME (SLc (PL repor t1 ) ) ] ) /\
( getInitMove x = [SOME (SLc (PSG init iateMovement ) ) ] ) )
then REPORT1
else WARNO) /\
(planPBNS PLAN_PB ( exec x ) = i f ( getPlCom x = rec e i v eMi s s i on )
then RECEIVE_MISSION else PLAN_PB) /\
(planPBNS RECEIVE_MISSION ( exec x ) = i f ( getPlCom x = warno )
then WARNO else RECEIVE_MISSION) /\
(planPBNS REPORT1 ( exec x ) = i f ( getPlCom x = completePlan )
then COMPLETE_PLAN else REPORT1) /\
(planPBNS COMPLETE_PLAN ( exec x ) = i f ( getPlCom x = opoid )
then OPOID else COMPLETE_PLAN) /\
(planPBNS OPOID ( exec x ) = i f ( getPlCom x = supe rv i s e )
then SUPERVISE else OPOID) /\
(planPBNS SUPERVISE ( exec x ) = i f ( getPlCom x = repor t2 )
then REPORT2 else SUPERVISE) /\
(planPBNS REPORT2 ( exec x ) = i f ( getPlCom x = complete )
then COMPLETE else REPORT2) /\
(planPBNS ( s : s l S t a t e ) ( trap _) = s ) /\
(planPBNS ( s : s l S t a t e ) ( d i s ca rd _) = s ) ￿
val planPBOut_def = Def ine ￿
( planPBOut WARNO ( exec x ) =
i f ( ( getRecon x = [SOME (SLc (PL recon ) ) ] ) /\
( getTenat ivePlan x = [SOME (SLc (PL tenta t i veP lan ) ) ] ) /\
( getReport x = [SOME (SLc (PL repor t1 ) ) ] ) /\
( getInitMove x = [SOME (SLc (PSG init iateMovement ) ) ] ) )
then Report1
else unAuthorized ) /\
(planPBOut PLAN_PB ( exec x ) = i f ( getPlCom x = rec e i v eMi s s i on )
then Rece iveMiss ion else unAuthorized ) /\
(planPBOut RECEIVE_MISSION ( exec x ) = i f ( getPlCom x = warno )
then Warno else unAuthorized ) /\
(planPBOut REPORT1 ( exec x ) = i f ( getPlCom x = completePlan )
then CompletePlan else unAuthorized ) /\
(planPBOut COMPLETE_PLAN ( exec x ) = i f ( getPlCom x = opoid )
then Opoid else unAuthorized ) /\
(planPBOut OPOID ( exec x ) = i f ( getPlCom x = supe rv i s e )
then Superv i s e else unAuthorized ) /\
(planPBOut SUPERVISE ( exec x ) = i f ( getPlCom x = repor t2 )
then Report2 else unAuthorized ) /\
(planPBOut REPORT2 ( exec x ) = i f ( getPlCom x = complete )
then Complete else unAuthorized ) /\
(planPBOut ( s : s l S t a t e ) ( trap _) = unAuthorized ) /\
(planPBOut ( s : s l S t a t e ) ( d i s ca rd _) = unAuthenticated ) ￿
(∗                                                                            ∗)
(∗ inputOK : au then t i c a t i on t e s t func t i on ∗)
(∗                                                                            ∗)
val inputOK_def = Def ine
￿( inputOK
( ( (Name PlatoonLeader ) says ( prop (cmd : ( ( slCommand command) opt ion ) ) ) )
: ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form) = T) /\
( inputOK
( ( (Name PlatoonSergeant ) says ( prop (cmd : ( ( slCommand command) opt ion ) ) ) )
: ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form) = T) /\
( inputOK _ = F) ￿
(∗ Any unauthor ized command i s r e j e c t e d ∗)
val inputOK_cmd_reject_lemma =
TAC_PROOF(
( [ ] ,
￿ ￿ !cmd . ~(inputOK
( ( prop (SOME cmd ) ) : ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form)) ￿ ￿) ,
PROVE_TAC[ inputOK_def ] )
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(∗                                                                            ∗)
(∗ Theorem : PlatoonLeader i s au thor i z ed on any plCommand ∗)
(∗ i f f not in WARNO s t a t e and ∗)
(∗ the plCommand i s not repor t1 . ∗)
(∗                                                                            ∗)
(∗ Helper func t i on s ∗)
val th1 =
ISPECL
[ ￿ ￿ inputOK : ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form  > bool ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ secContextNul l : ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form l i s t  >
(( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form l i s t ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ secContext : ( s l S t a t e )  >
(( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form l i s t  >
(( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form l i s t ￿ ￿ ,
￿ ￿ [ ( (Name PlatoonLeader ) says ( prop (SOME (SLc (PL plCommand ) ) ) ) )
: ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form] ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ i n s : ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form l i s t l i s t ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿( s : s l S t a t e ) ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ outs : s lOutput output l i s t trType l i s t ￿ ￿ ] TR_exec_cmd_rule




( [ ] ,
Term ￿(~(( s : s l S t a t e ) = WARNO)) ==>
(~((plCommand : plCommand) = invalidPlCommand ) ) ==>





[ CFGInterpret_def , secContext_def , secContextNull_def ,
getRecon_def , getTenativePlan_def , getReport_def , getInitMove_def ,
getPlCom_def , getPsgCom_def , PL_notWARNO_Auth_def ,
inputList_def , extractInput_def , MAP,
propCommandList_def , extractPropCommand_def , satList_CONS ,
sa tL i s t_n i l , GSYM satL i s t_con j ]
THEN
PROVE_TAC[ Controls , Modus_Ponens ] )
val _= save_thm ( "PlatoonLeader_notWARNO_notreport1_exec_plCommand_lemma" ,
PlatoonLeader_notWARNO_notreport1_exec_plCommand_lemma)
(∗ he l p e r func t i on s ∗)




( [ ] ,
Term ￿(~(( s : s l S t a t e ) = WARNO)) ==>
(~((plCommand : plCommand) = invalidPlCommand ) ) ==>







val _= save_thm ( "PlatoonLeader_notWARNO_notreport1_exec_plCommand_justified_lemma" ,
PlatoonLeader_notWARNO_notreport1_exec_plCommand_justified_lemma )
(∗ Main theorem ∗)
val PlatoonLeader_notWARNO_notreport1_exec_plCommand_justified_thm =
REWRITE_RULE
[ propCommandList_def , inputList_def , extractPropCommand_def ,
extractInput_def , MAP] PlatoonLeader_notWARNO_notreport1_exec_plCommand_justified_lemma
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val _= save_thm( "PlatoonLeader_notWARNO_notreport1_exec_plCommand_justified_thm" ,
PlatoonLeader_notWARNO_notreport1_exec_plCommand_justified_thm )
(∗                                                                            ∗)
(∗ PlatoonLeader i s au thor i z ed on any repor t1 i f t h i s i s the WARNO s t a t e and ∗)
(∗ PlatoonLeader says recon /\ ∗)
(∗ PlatoonLeader says t en t a t i v eP l an /\ ∗)
(∗ PlatoonSergeant says ini t iateMovement /\ ∗)




[ ￿ ￿ inputOK : ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form  > bool ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ secContextNul l : ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form l i s t  >
(( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form l i s t ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ secContext : ( s l S t a t e )  >
(( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form l i s t  >
(( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form l i s t ￿ ￿ ,
￿ ￿ [ (Name PlatoonLeader ) says ( prop (SOME (SLc (PL recon ) ) ) )
: ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form ;
(Name PlatoonLeader ) says ( prop (SOME (SLc (PL tenta t i v eP lan ) ) ) )
: ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form ;
(Name PlatoonSergeant ) says ( prop (SOME (SLc (PSG init iateMovement ) ) ) )
: ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form ;
(Name PlatoonLeader ) says ( prop (SOME (SLc (PL repor t1 ) ) ) )
: ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form] ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ i n s : ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form l i s t l i s t ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿(WARNO) ￿ ￿ ,




( [ ] , f s t ( dest_imp ( conc l th1w ) ) ) ,
ASM_REWRITE_TAC
[ CFGInterpret_def , secContextNull_def , secContext_def ,
propCommandList_def , MAP, extractPropCommand_def ,
satList_CONS , sa tL i s t_n i l , GSYM satList_conj ,
getRecon_def , getTenativePlan_def , getReport_def , getInitMove_def ,
getPlCom_def , getPsgCom_def , PL_WARNO_Auth_def]
THEN
PROVE_TAC[ Controls , Modus_Ponens ] )









val _= save_thm( "PlatoonLeader_WARNO_exec_report1_justified_lemma" ,
PlatoonLeader_WARNO_exec_report1_justified_lemma )
val th23 = REWRITE_RULE
[ PlatoonLeader_WARNO_exec_report1_lemma ,
PlatoonLeader_WARNO_exec_report1_justified_lemma ] th1w
(∗ Main theorem ∗)
val PlatoonLeader_WARNO_exec_report1_justified_thm =
REWRITE_RULE
[ propCommandList_def , inputList_def , extractPropCommand_def ,
extractInput_def , MAP]
PlatoonLeader_WARNO_exec_report1_justified_lemma




(∗ Theorem : PlatoonLeader i s not d i scarded any psgCommand . ∗)
(∗ Note t ha t t h i s i s j u s t meant to demonstrate the au then t i ca t ed inpu t s are ∗)
(∗ not d i scarded . Instead , they shou ld be trapped . This i s because o f how ∗)
(∗ how the inputOK ( au then t i ca t i on ) was de f ined . Note , t h i s proof would a l s o ∗)
(∗ be v a l i d f o r PlatoonLeader on any plCommand . I t i s not necessary to prove ∗)
(∗ t h i s . ∗)
(∗                                                                            ∗)
(∗ Should we put t h i s GENL in the TR_discard_cmd_rule? ∗)
val th1d =
GENL
[ ￿ ￿( e lementTest : ( ' command option , ' p r i n c i pa l , 'd , ' e ) Form  > bool ) ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿( context :
( 'command option , ' p r i n c i pa l , 'd , ' e ) Form l i s t  >
( 'command option , ' p r i n c i pa l , 'd , ' e ) Form l i s t ) ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿( s t a t e I n t e r p :
' s t a t e  >
( 'command option , ' p r i n c i pa l , 'd , ' e ) Form l i s t  >
( 'command option , ' p r i n c i pa l , 'd , ' e ) Form l i s t ) ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿(x : ( ' command option , ' p r i n c i pa l , 'd , ' e ) Form l i s t ) ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿( i n s : ( ' command option , ' p r i n c i pa l , 'd , ' e ) Form l i s t l i s t ) ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿( s : ' s t a t e ) ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿( outs : ' output l i s t ) ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿(NS : ' s t a t e  > 'command opt ion l i s t trType  > ' s t a t e ) ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿(Out : ' s t a t e  > 'command opt ion l i s t trType  > ' output ) ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿(M : ( ' command option , 'b , ' p r i n c i pa l , 'd , ' e ) Kripke ) ￿ ￿ ,




[ ￿ ￿ inputOK : ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form  > bool ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ secContextNul l : ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form l i s t  >
(( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form l i s t ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ secContext : ( s l S t a t e )  >
(( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form l i s t  >
(( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form l i s t ￿ ￿ ,
￿ ￿ [ (Name PlatoonLeader ) says ( prop (SOME (SLc (PSG psgCommand ) ) ) )
: ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form] ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ i n s : ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form l i s t l i s t ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿( s : s l S t a t e ) ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ outs : s lOutput output l i s t trType l i s t ￿ ￿ ] th1d
val th3d = LIST_BETA_CONV (Term ￿(\p q . p /\ q ) F ( (\ p q . p/\q ) T ((\p q . p /\ q ) T T)) ￿ )
val th3d2 = LIST_BETA_CONV (Term ￿(\p q . p/\q ) T T￿)
val PlatoonLeader_psgCommand_notDiscard_thm = REWRITE_RULE
[ inputList_def , extractInput_def , authent icat ionTest_def , MAP,
inputOK_def , FOLDR, th3d , th3d2 ] th2d
val _= save_thm( "PlatoonLeader_psgCommand_notDiscard_thm" ,
PlatoonLeader_psgCommand_notDiscard_thm )
(∗                                                                            ∗)




[ ￿ ￿ inputOK : ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form  > bool ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ secContextNul l : ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form l i s t  >
(( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form l i s t ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ secContext : ( s l S t a t e )  >
(( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form l i s t  >
(( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form l i s t ￿ ￿ ,
￿ ￿ [ (Name PlatoonLeader ) says ( prop (SOME (SLc (PSG psgCommand ) ) ) )
: ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form] ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ i n s : ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form l i s t l i s t ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿( s : s l S t a t e ) ￿ ￿ ,





( [ ] ,
f s t ( dest_imp ( conc l th1t ) ) ) ,
ASM_REWRITE_TAC
[ CFGInterpret_def , inputOK_def , secContext_def , secContextNul l_def ]
THEN
ASM_REWRITE_TAC
[ getRecon_def , getTenativePlan_def , getReport_def , getInitMove_def ,
getPlCom_def , satList_CONS , sa tL i s t_n i l , GSYM satL i s t_con j ]
THEN
ASM_REWRITE_TAC
[NOT_NONE_SOME,NOT_SOME_NONE, SOME_11, l i s t_11 ,
slCommand_one_one , slCommand_distinct_clauses ,





PROVE_TAC[ satList_CONS , s a tL i s t_n i l ] )




( [ ] ,
snd ( dest_imp ( conc l th1t ) ) ) ,
PROVE_TAC
[ PlatoonLeader_trap_psgCommand_lemma , TR_trap_cmd_rule ] )




[ propCommandList_def , inputList_def , extractPropCommand_def ,
extractInput_def , MAP]
PlatoonLeader_trap_psgCommand_justified_lemma
val _= save_thm( "PlatoonLeader_trap_psgCommand_justified_lemma" ,
PlatoonLeader_trap_psgCommand_justified_lemma )
(∗                                                                            ∗)
(∗ Theorem : PlatoonSergeant i s trapped on any plCommand . ∗)
(∗                                                                            ∗)
val th1t t =
ISPECL
[ ￿ ￿ inputOK : ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form  > bool ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ secContextNul l : ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form l i s t  >
(( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form l i s t ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ secContext : ( s l S t a t e )  >
(( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form l i s t  >
(( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form l i s t ￿ ￿ ,
￿ ￿ [ (Name PlatoonSergeant ) says ( prop (SOME (SLc (PL plCommand ) ) ) )
: ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form] ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ i n s : ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form l i s t l i s t ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿( s : s l S t a t e ) ￿ ￿ ,




( [ ] ,
f s t ( dest_imp ( conc l th1t t ) ) ) ,
ASM_REWRITE_TAC
[ CFGInterpret_def , inputOK_def , secContext_def , secContextNul l_def ]
THEN
ASM_REWRITE_TAC
[ getRecon_def , getTenativePlan_def , getReport_def , getInitMove_def ,




[NOT_NONE_SOME,NOT_SOME_NONE, SOME_11, l i s t_11 ,
slCommand_one_one , slCommand_distinct_clauses ,





PROVE_TAC[ satList_CONS , s a tL i s t_n i l ] )




( [ ] ,
snd ( dest_imp ( conc l th1t t ) ) ) ,
PROVE_TAC
[ PlatoonSergeant_trap_plCommand_lemma , TR_trap_cmd_rule ] )




[ propCommandList_def , inputList_def , extractPropCommand_def ,
extractInput_def , MAP]
PlatoonSergeant_trap_plCommand_justified_lemma
val _= save_thm( "PlatoonSergeant_trap_plCommand_justified_thm" ,
PlatoonSergeant_trap_plCommand_justified_thm )
(∗ ==== Star t t e s t i n g here ====
==== End Test ing Here ==== ∗)
val _ = export_theory ( ) ;
end
D.3.2 ssmMoveToORP
D.3.2.1 MoveToORPType Theory: Type Definitions & Authentication &
Authorization Definitions
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗ MoveToORPType conta ins d e f i n i t i o n s f o r da ta types t ha t are used in ∗)
(∗ the MoveToORP s t a t e machine . ∗)
(∗ Contr ibu tors : ∗)
(∗ Lori Picker ing (HOL implementation ) , ∗)
(∗ Jesse Ha l l ( content exper t ) , ∗)
(∗ Prof . Shiu Kai Chin ( Pr inc ipa l I n v e s t i g a t o r ) . ∗)
(∗ Date crea ted : 19 June 2017 ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
structure MoveToORPScript = struct
(∗ ===== In t e r a c t i v e Mode ====
app load [" TypeBase " ]
open TypeBase
==== end I n t e r a c t i v e Mode ==== ∗)
open HolKernel Parse boolLib bossLib ;
open TypeBase
val _ = new_theory "MoveToORPType" ;
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(∗                                                                            ∗)
(∗ slcommand , s l S t a t e , s lOutput , and s ta t eRo l e ∗)
(∗                                                                            ∗)
val _=
Datatype ￿slCommand = pltForm
| pltMove
| p l tSecureHa l t
| complete
| incomplete ￿
val slCommand_distinct_clauses = d i s t inc t_o f ￿ ￿ : slCommand￿￿
val _ = save_thm( " slCommand_distinct_clauses " , slCommand_distinct_clauses )
val _=





val s l S t a t e_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s = d i s t inc t_o f ￿ ￿ : s l S t a t e ￿￿
val _ = save_thm( " s l S t a t e_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s " , s l S t a t e_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s )
val _=







val s lOutput_di s t inc t_c lauses = d i s t inc t_o f ￿ ￿ : slOutput ￿￿
val _ = save_thm( " s lOutput_di s t inc t_c lauses " , s lOutput_di s t inc t_c lauses )
val _=
Datatype ￿ s ta t eRo l e = PlatoonLeader ￿
val _ = export_theory ( ) ;
end
D.3.2.2 ssmMoveToORP Theory: Theorems
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗ ssmMoveToORP de f i n e s a sub  l e v e l s t a t e machine f o r the pa t r o l base . ∗)
(∗ Each s ta t e , save f o r the end s t a t e s , has sub  l e v e l s t a t e machines , and ∗)
(∗ some have sub sub  l e v e l s t a t e machines . These are implemented in separa te ∗)
(∗ t h e o r i e s . ∗)
(∗ Contr ibu tors : ∗)
(∗ Lori Picker ing (HOL implementation ) , ∗)
(∗ Jesse Ha l l ( content exper t ) , ∗)
(∗ Prof . Shiu Kai Chin ( Pr inc ipa l I n v e s t i g a t o r ) . ∗)
(∗ Date crea ted : 19 June 2017 ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
structure ssmMoveToORPScript = struct
(∗ ===== In t e r a c t i v e Mode ====
app load [" TypeBase " , " l i s tTheo ry " ," optionTheory " ,
" ac l_in fRules " ," aclDrulesTheory " ," ac l ru l e sTheory " ,
" sa tLis tTheory " ," ssm11Theory " ," ssminfRules " ,
"OMNITypeTheory" , "MoveToORPTypeTheory " ] ;
open TypeBase l i s tTheo ry optionTheory
ac l_in fRules ac lDrulesTheory ac l ru l e sTheory
sa tLis tTheory ssm11Theory ssminfRules
OMNITypeTheory MoveToORPTypeTheory
ssmMoveToORPTheory
==== end I n t e r a c t i v e Mode ==== ∗)
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open HolKernel Parse boolLib bossLib ;
open TypeBase l i s tTheo ry optionTheory
open ac l_in fRu le s ac lDrulesTheory ac l ru l e sTheory
open satL i s tTheory ssm11Theory ssminfRules
open OMNITypeTheory MoveToORPTypeTheory
val _ = new_theory "ssmMoveToORP" ;
(∗                                                                            ∗)





(∗ execu t ing ∗)
(moveToORPNS MOVE_TO_ORP ( exec ( SLc pltForm ) ) = PLT_FORM) /\
(moveToORPNS MOVE_TO_ORP ( exec ( SLc incomplete ) ) = MOVE_TO_ORP) /\
(moveToORPNS PLT_FORM ( exec ( SLc pltMove ) ) = PLT_MOVE) /\
(moveToORPNS PLT_FORM ( exec ( SLc incomplete ) ) = PLT_FORM) /\
(moveToORPNS PLT_MOVE ( exec ( SLc p l tSecureHa l t ) ) = PLT_SECURE_HALT) /\
(moveToORPNS PLT_MOVE ( exec ( SLc incomplete ) ) = PLT_MOVE) /\
(moveToORPNS PLT_SECURE_HALT ( exec ( SLc complete ) ) = COMPLETE) /\
(moveToORPNS PLT_SECURE_HALT ( exec ( SLc incomplete ) ) = PLT_SECURE_HALT) /\
(∗ t rapp ing ∗)
(moveToORPNS ( s : s l S t a t e ) ( trap (SLc (cmd : slCommand ) ) ) = s ) /\
(∗ d i s ca rd ing ∗)
(moveToORPNS ( s : s l S t a t e ) ( d i s ca rd (SLc (cmd : slCommand ) ) ) = s ) ￿
(∗                                                                            ∗)





(∗ execu t ing ∗)
(moveToORPOut MOVE_TO_ORP ( exec ( SLc pltForm ) ) = PLTForm) /\
(moveToORPOut MOVE_TO_ORP ( exec ( SLc incomplete ) ) = MoveToORP) /\
(moveToORPOut PLT_FORM ( exec ( SLc pltMove ) ) = PLTMove) /\
(moveToORPOut PLT_FORM ( exec ( SLc incomplete ) ) = PLTForm) /\
(moveToORPOut PLT_MOVE ( exec ( SLc p l tSecureHa l t ) ) = PLTSecureHalt ) /\
(moveToORPOut PLT_MOVE ( exec ( SLc incomplete ) ) = PLTMove) /\
(moveToORPOut PLT_SECURE_HALT ( exec ( SLc complete ) ) = Complete ) /\
(moveToORPOut PLT_SECURE_HALT ( exec ( SLc incomplete ) ) = PLTSecureHalt ) /\
(∗ t rapp ing ∗)
(moveToORPOut ( s : s l S t a t e ) ( trap (SLc (cmd : slCommand ) ) ) = unAuthorized ) /\
(∗ d i s ca rd ing ∗)
(moveToORPOut ( s : s l S t a t e ) ( d i s ca rd ( SLc (cmd : slCommand ) ) ) = unAuthenticated ) ￿
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)





( (Name PlatoonLeader ) says ( prop (cmd : ( slCommand command) order ) )
: ( ( slCommand command) order , s tateRole , ' d , ' e )Form) = T) /\
(authTestMoveToORP _= F) ￿
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗ " Sta te I n t e r p r e t a t i on : t h i s i s the t r i v i a l assumption TT, as the machine ∗)




￿ssmMoveToORPStateInterp ( s t a t e : s l S t a t e s t a t e ) =
(TT: ( ( slCommand command) order , s tateRole , ' d , ' e )Form) ￿
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
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(∗ "A theorem showing commands wi thout a p r i n c i p a l are r e j e c t e d ."  Prof ∗)




( [ ] ,
￿ ￿ !cmd . ~(authTestMoveToORP
( ( prop (SOME cmd ) ) : ( ( slCommand command) order , s tateRole , ' d , ' e )Form)) ￿ ￿) ,
PROVE_TAC[ authTestMoveToORP_def ] )
val _ = save_thm( "authTestMoveToORP_cmd_reject_lemma" ,
authTestMoveToORP_cmd_reject_lemma)
(∗                                                                            ∗)
(∗ s ecur i t yCon tex t d e f i n i t i o n : PlatoonLeader au thor i z ed on any slCommand ∗)





[ ( (Name PlatoonLeader ) c on t r o l s
( prop (SOME (SLc cmd ) ) ) )
: ( ( slCommand command) order , s tateRole , ' d , ' e )Form] ￿
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)




( [ ] ,





( ( (Name PlatoonLeader ) says ( prop (SOME (SLc slCommand ) ) ) ) : : i n s )
( s : s l S t a t e s t a t e )
( outs : ( s lOutput output ) l i s t ) ) ==>
((M, Oi , Os) sa t ( prop (SOME (SLc slCommand ) ) ) ) ￿ ￿ ) ,
REWRITE_TAC[ CFGInterpret_def , secContextMoveToORP_def , ssmMoveToORPStateInterp_def ,
satList_CONS , sa tL i s t_n i l , sat_TT ] THEN
PROVE_TAC[ Contro l s ] )
val _ = save_thm( "PlatoonLeader_slCommand_lemma" ,
PlatoonLeader_slCommand_lemma )
(∗                                                                            ∗)
(∗ exec slCommand occurs i f and only i f PlatoonLeaders ' s command i s ∗)






[ ￿ ￿authTestMoveToORP : ( ( slCommand command) order , s tateRole , ' d , ' e )Form  > bool ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿(secContextMoveToORP slCommand ) : ( ( slCommand command) order , s tateRole , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ssmMoveToORPStateInterp : ( s l S t a t e s t a t e ) >
(( slCommand command) order , s tateRole , ' d , ' e )Form￿ ￿ ,
￿￿Name PlatoonLeader ￿￿ ,￿￿SLc slCommand : ( slCommand command) ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ i n s : ( ( slCommand command) order , s tateRole , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ s : ( s l S t a t e s t a t e ) ￿ ￿ , ￿ ￿ outs : ( s lOutput output ) l i s t ￿ ￿ ]
TR_exec_cmd_rule
in
TAC_PROOF( ( [ ] ,
￿ ￿ ! (NS : ( s l S t a t e s t a t e )  > (slCommand command) trType  > ( s l S t a t e s t a t e ) )
(Out : ( s l S t a t e s t a t e )  > (slCommand command) trType  > ( slOutput output ) )
(M : ( ( slCommand command) order , 'b , s tateRole , 'd , ' e ) Kripke )
(Oi : ' d po )
(Os : ' e po ) .
TR (M, Oi , Os) ( exec ( SLc slCommand ) : ( ( slCommand command) trType ) )
(CFG
(authTestMoveToORP
: ( ( slCommand command) order , s tateRole , 'd , ' e ) Form  > bool )
( ssmMoveToORPStateInterp : ( s l S t a t e s t a t e )
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 > (( slCommand command) order , s tateRole , 'd , ' e ) Form)
( ( secContextMoveToORP slCommand)
: ( ( slCommand command) order , s tateRole , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t )
(Name PlatoonLeader says
( prop (SOME (SLc slCommand ) : ( slCommand command) order ) :
( ( slCommand command) order , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form ) : :
( i n s : ( ( slCommand command) order , s tateRole , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t ) )
( s : ( s l S t a t e s t a t e ) )
( outs : ( s lOutput output ) l i s t ) )
(CFG
(authTestMoveToORP
: ( ( slCommand command) order , s tateRole , 'd , ' e ) Form  > bool )
( ssmMoveToORPStateInterp : ( s l S t a t e s t a t e )
 > (( slCommand command) order , s tateRole , 'd , ' e ) Form)
( ( secContextMoveToORP slCommand)
: ( ( slCommand command) order , s tateRole , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t )
i n s
(NS
( s : ( s l S t a t e s t a t e ) )
( exec ( SLc slCommand ) : ( ( slCommand command) trType ) ) )
(Out
( s : ( s l S t a t e s t a t e ) )




( prop (SOME (SLc slCommand ) : ( slCommand command) order ) :
( ( slCommand command) order , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form) )
/\
CFGInterpret (M, Oi , Os)
(CFG
(authTestMoveToORP
: ( ( slCommand command) order , s tateRole , 'd , ' e ) Form  > bool )
( ssmMoveToORPStateInterp : ( s l S t a t e s t a t e )
 > (( slCommand command) order , s tateRole , 'd , ' e ) Form)
( ( secContextMoveToORP slCommand)
: ( ( slCommand command) order , s tateRole , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t )
(Name PlatoonLeader says
( prop (SOME (SLc slCommand ) : ( slCommand command) order ) :
( ( slCommand command) order , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form ) : :
( i n s : ( ( slCommand command) order , s tateRole , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t ) )
( s : ( s l S t a t e s t a t e ) )
( outs : ( s lOutput output ) l i s t ) )
/\
(M, Oi , Os) sa t
( prop (SOME (SLc slCommand ) : ( slCommand command) order ) :
( ( slCommand command) order , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form) ￿ ￿) ,





(∗ ==== Test ing Here ====
==== End Test ing Here ==== ∗)
val _ = export_theory ( ) ;
end
D.3.3 ssmConductORP
D.3.3.1 ConductORPType Theory: Type Definitions
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
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(∗ ConductORPType conta ins d e f i n i t i o n s f o r da ta types t ha t are used in ∗)
(∗ the conductORP s t a t e machine ssmConductORP . ∗)
(∗ Contr ibu tors : ∗)
(∗ Lori Picker ing (HOL implementation ) , ∗)
(∗ Jesse Ha l l ( content exper t ) , ∗)
(∗ Prof . Shiu Kai Chin ( Pr inc ipa l I n v e s t i g a t o r ) . ∗)
(∗ Date crea ted : 16 June 2017 ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
structure ConductORPTypeScript = struct
(∗ ===== In t e r a c t i v e Mode ====
app load [" TypeBase " ] ;
open TypeBase
==== end I n t e r a c t i v e Mode ==== ∗)
open HolKernel Parse boolLib bossLib ;
open TypeBase
val _ = new_theory "ConductORPType" ;
(∗                                                                            ∗)
(∗ slcommand , s l S t a t e , s lOutput , and s ta t eRo l e ∗)
(∗                                                                            ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗commands ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
val _=
Datatype ￿plCommand = secure
| withdraw
| complete
| p l Incomplete ￿
val plCommand_distinct_clauses = d i s t inc t_o f ￿ ￿ :plCommand￿￿
val _ = save_thm( "plCommand_distinct_clauses " , plCommand_distinct_clauses )
val _=
Datatype ￿psgCommand = ac t i on s In
| psgIncomplete ￿
val psgCommand_distinct_clauses = d i s t in c t_o f ￿ ￿ :psgCommand￿￿
val _ = save_thm( "psgCommand_distinct_clauses" , psgCommand_distinct_clauses )
val _=




val omniCommand_distinct_clauses = d i s t inc t_o f ￿ ￿ :omniCommand￿￿
val _ = save_thm( "omniCommand_distinct_clauses" , omniCommand_distinct_clauses )
val _=
Datatype ￿slCommand = PL plCommand
| PSG psgCommand
| OMNI omniCommand￿
val slCommand_distinct_clauses = d i s t inc t_o f ￿ ￿ : slCommand￿￿
val _ = save_thm( " slCommand_distinct_clauses " , slCommand_distinct_clauses )
val slCommand_one_one = one_one_of ￿ ￿ : slCommand￿￿
val _ = save_thm( "slCommand_one_one" , slCommand_one_one)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ s t a t e s ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
val _=





val s l S t a t e_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s = d i s t inc t_o f ￿ ￿ : s l S t a t e ￿￿
val _ = save_thm( " s l S t a t e_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s " , s l S t a t e_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s )
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ output ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
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val _=







val s lOutput_di s t inc t_c lauses = d i s t inc t_o f ￿ ￿ : slOutput ￿￿
val _ = save_thm( " s lOutput_di s t inc t_c lauses " , s lOutput_di s t inc t_c lauses )
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ p r i n c i p a l s ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
val _=
Datatype ￿ s ta t eRo l e = PlatoonLeader
| PlatoonSergeant
| Omni￿
val s lRo l e_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s = d i s t inc t_o f ￿ ￿ : s tateRole ￿￿
val _ = save_thm( " s lRo l e_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s " , s lRo l e_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s )
val _ = export_theory ( ) ;
end




(∗ Author : Lori Picker ing ∗)
(∗ Date : 11 August 2018 ∗)
(∗ De f i n i t i on s f o r ssmConductORPDef ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
structure ConductORPDefScript = struct
(∗ ===== In t e r a c t i v e Mode ====
app load [" TypeBase " , " l i s tTheo ry " ," optionTheory " ,
" ac l_in fRules " ," aclDrulesTheory " ," ac l ru l e sTheory " ,
" sa tLis tTheory " ," ssmTheory " ," ssminfRules " ,
"OMNITypeTheory" , "ConductORPTypeTheory " ] ;
"ssmConductORPTheory " ] ;
open TypeBase l i s tTheo ry optionTheory
ac l_in fRules ac lDrulesTheory ac l ru l e sTheory
sa tLis tTheory ssmTheory ssminfRules
OMNITypeTheory ConductORPTypeTheory
ssmConductORPTheory
==== end I n t e r a c t i v e Mode ==== ∗)
open HolKernel Parse boolLib bossLib ;
open TypeBase l i s tTheo ry optionTheory
open ac l_in fRu le s ac lDrulesTheory ac l ru l e sTheory
open satL i s tTheory ssmTheory ssminfRules
open OMNITypeTheory ConductORPTypeTheory
val _= new_theory "ConductORPDef" ;
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)




( getPlCom ( [ ] : ( ( slCommand command) opt ion ) l i s t )
= pl Incomplete : plCommand) /\
( getPlCom (SOME (SLc (PL cmd ) ) : ( slCommand command) opt ion : : xs )
= cmd : plCommand) /\
( getPlCom (_: : ( xs : ( slCommand command) opt ion l i s t ) )
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= (getPlCom xs )) ￿
val getPsgCom_def =
Define ￿
( getPsgCom ( [ ] : ( ( slCommand command) opt ion ) l i s t )
= psgIncomplete : psgCommand) /\
( getPsgCom (SOME (SLc (PSG cmd ) ) : ( slCommand command) opt ion : : xs )
= cmd : psgCommand) /\
( getPsgCom (_: : ( xs : ( slCommand command) opt ion l i s t ) )
= ( getPsgCom xs )) ￿
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗ s e c u r i t y context , non s ta t e dependent . ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
val secHe lper =
Define ￿
( secHe lper (cmd : omniCommand) =
[ (Name Omni) c on t r o l s prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI (cmd : omniCommand ) ) ) ) ] ) ￿
val getOmniCommand_def =
Define ￿
(getOmniCommand ( [ ] : ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form l i s t )
= invalidOmniCommand : omniCommand) /\
(getOmniCommand ( ( (Name Omni) says prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI cmd ) ) ) ) : : xs )
= (cmd : omniCommand) ) /\
(getOmniCommand ( ( x : ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form ) : : xs )
= (getOmniCommand xs )) ￿
val secAuthor i zat ion_def =
Define ￿
( s e cAuthor i za t i on ( xs : ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t )
= secHe lper (getOmniCommand xs ) ) ￿
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)




( secContext (CONDUCT_ORP) ( xs : ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t ) =
[ (Name PlatoonLeader ) c on t r o l s prop (SOME (SLc (PL secure ) ) )
: ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , ' d , ' e )Form ] ) /\
( secContext (SECURE) ( xs : ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t ) =
i f ( ( getOmniCommand xs ) = ssmSecureComplete : omniCommand)
then
[ ( prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI ssmSecureComplete ) ) )
: ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , ' d , ' e )Form) impf
(Name PlatoonSergeant ) c on t r o l s prop (SOME (SLc (PSG ac t i on s In ) ) )
: ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , ' d , ' e )Form ]
else [ prop NONE] ) /\
( secContext (ACTIONS_IN) ( xs : ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t ) =
i f ( ( getOmniCommand xs ) = ssmActionsInComplete )
then
[ ( prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI ssmActionsInComplete ) ) )
: ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , ' d , ' e )Form) impf
(Name PlatoonLeader ) c on t r o l s prop (SOME (SLc (PL withdraw ) ) )
: ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , ' d , ' e )Form ]
else [ prop NONE] ) /\
( secContext (WITHDRAW) ( xs : ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t ) =
i f ( ( getOmniCommand xs ) = ssmWithdrawComplete )
then
[ ( prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI ssmWithdrawComplete ) ) )
: ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , ' d , ' e )Form) impf
(Name PlatoonLeader ) c on t r o l s prop (SOME (SLc (PL complete ) ) )
: ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , ' d , ' e )Form ]
else [ prop NONE]) ￿
val _= export_theory ( ) ;
end
355
D.3.3.3 ssmConductORP Theory: Theorems
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗ ssmConductORP de f i n e s the ConductORP sub  l e v e l s t a t e machine f o r the ∗)
(∗ pa t r o l base . ∗)
(∗ Each s ta t e , save f o r the end s t a t e s , has a sub  l e v e l s t a t e machine , and ∗)
(∗ some have sub sub  l e v e l s t a t e machines . These are implemented in separa te ∗)
(∗ t h e o r i e s . ∗)
(∗ Author : Lori Picker ing in c o l l a b o r a t i o n with Jesse Nathanie l Ha l l ∗)
(∗ Date : 16 July 2017 ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
structure ssmConductORPScript = struct
(∗ ===== In t e r a c t i v e Mode ====
app load [" TypeBase " , " l i s tTheo ry " ," optionTheory " ,
" ac l_in fRules " ," aclDrulesTheory " ," ac l ru l e sTheory " ,
" sa tLis tTheory " ," ssmTheory " ," ssminfRules " ,
"OMNITypeTheory" ,
"ConductORPTypeTheory" , "ConductORPDefTheory" ,
"ssmConductORPTheory " ] ;
open TypeBase l i s tTheo ry optionTheory
ac l_in fRules ac lDrulesTheory ac l ru l e sTheory




==== end I n t e r a c t i v e Mode ==== ∗)
open HolKernel Parse boolLib bossLib ;
open TypeBase l i s tTheo ry optionTheory
open ac l_in fRu le s ac lDrulesTheory ac l ru l e sTheory
open satL i s tTheory ssmTheory ssminfRules
open OMNITypeTheory ConductORPTypeTheory ConductORPDefTheory
val _ = new_theory "ssmConductORP" ;
(∗                                                                            ∗)





( conductORPNS CONDUCT_ORP ( exec x ) =
i f ( getPlCom x) = secure then SECURE else CONDUCT_ORP) /\
(conductORPNS SECURE ( exec x ) =
i f ( getPsgCom x) = ac t i on s In then ACTIONS_IN else SECURE) /\
(conductORPNS ACTIONS_IN ( exec x ) =
i f ( getPlCom x) = withdraw then WITHDRAW else ACTIONS_IN) /\
(conductORPNS WITHDRAW ( exec x ) =
i f ( getPlCom x) = complete then COMPLETE else WITHDRAW) /\
(∗ t rapp ing ∗)
( conductORPNS ( s : s l S t a t e ) ( trap x ) = s ) /\
(∗ d i s ca rd ing ∗)
( conductORPNS ( s : s l S t a t e ) ( d i s ca rd x ) = s ) ￿
(∗                                                                            ∗)





( conductORPOut CONDUCT_ORP ( exec x ) =
i f ( getPlCom x) = secure then Secure else ConductORP) /\
( conductORPOut SECURE ( exec x ) =
i f ( getPsgCom x) = ac t i on s In then Act ionsIn else Secure ) /\
( conductORPOut ACTIONS_IN ( exec x ) =
i f ( getPlCom x) = withdraw then Withdraw else Act ionsIn ) /\
( conductORPOut WITHDRAW ( exec x ) =
i f ( getPlCom x) = complete then Complete else Withdraw) /\
(∗ t rapp ing ∗)
( conductORPOut ( s : s l S t a t e ) ( trap x ) = unAuthorized ) /\
(∗ d i s ca rd ing ∗)
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( conductORPOut ( s : s l S t a t e ) ( d i s ca rd x ) = unAuthenticated ) ￿
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)





( (Name PlatoonLeader ) says ( prop (cmd : ( slCommand command) opt ion ) )
: ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , ' d , ' e )Form) = T) /\
( inputOK
( (Name PlatoonSergeant ) says ( prop (cmd : ( slCommand command) opt ion ) )
: ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , ' d , ' e )Form) = T) /\
( inputOK
( (Name Omni) says ( prop (cmd : ( slCommand command) opt ion ) )
: ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , ' d , ' e )Form) = T) /\
( inputOK _= F) ￿
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗ "A theorem showing commands wi thout a p r i n c i p a l are r e j e c t e d ."  Prof ∗)




( [ ] ,
￿ ￿ !cmd . ~(inputOK
( ( prop (SOME cmd ) ) : ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , ' d , ' e )Form)) ￿ ￿) ,
PROVE_TAC[ inputOK_def ] )
val _ = save_thm( "inputOK_cmd_reject_lemma" ,
inputOK_cmd_reject_lemma)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)




[ ￿ ￿ inputOK : ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form  > bool ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ s e cAuthor i za t i on : ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form l i s t  >
(( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form l i s t ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ secContext : ( s l S t a t e )  >
(( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form l i s t  >
(( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form l i s t ￿ ￿ ,
￿ ￿ [ ( (Name PlatoonLeader ) says ( prop (SOME (SLc (PL secure ) ) ) ) )
: ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form] ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ i n s : ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form l i s t l i s t ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿(CONDUCT_ORP) ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ outs : s lOutput output l i s t trType l i s t ￿ ￿ ] TR_exec_cmd_rule
val temp = f s t ( dest_imp ( conc l th1 ) )
val PlatoonLeader_CONDUCT_ORP_exec_secure_lemma =
TAC_PROOF(
( [ ] ,
f s t ( dest_imp ( conc l th1 ) ) ) ,
REWRITE_TAC
[ CFGInterpret_def , secContext_def , secAuthor izat ion_def ,
getOmniCommand_def ,
inputList_def , extractInput_def , MAP,
propCommandList_def , extractPropCommand_def , satList_CONS ,
sa tL i s t_n i l , GSYM satL i s t_con j ] THEN
PROVE_TAC[ Contro l s ] )




( [ ] , snd ( dest_imp ( conc l th1 ) ) ) ,
PROVE_TAC[ PlatoonLeader_CONDUCT_ORP_exec_secure_lemma , TR_exec_cmd_rule ] )
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val _= save_thm( "PlatoonLeader_CONDUCT_ORP_exec_secure_justified_thm" ,
PlatoonLeader_CONDUCT_ORP_exec_secure_justified_thm)
val PlatoonLeader_CONDUCT_ORP_exec_secure_justified_thm =
REWRITE_RULE[ inputList_def , extractInput_def , MAP, propCommandList_def ,
extractPropCommand_def , PlatoonLeader_CONDUCT_ORP_exec_secure_lemma ]
PlatoonLeader_CONDUCT_ORP_exec_secure_justified_thm
val _= save_thm( "PlatoonLeader_CONDUCT_ORP_exec_secure_justified_thm" ,
PlatoonLeader_CONDUCT_ORP_exec_secure_justified_thm)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗ PlatoonSergeant i s j u s t i f i e d on ac t i ons In i f ∗)




[ ￿ ￿ inputOK : ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form  > bool ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ s e cAuthor i za t i on : ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form l i s t  >
(( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form l i s t ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ secContext : ( s l S t a t e )  >
(( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form l i s t  >
(( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form l i s t ￿ ￿ ,
￿ ￿ [ (Name Omni) says ( prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI ssmSecureComplete ) ) ) )
: ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form ;
(Name PlatoonSergeant ) says ( prop (SOME (SLc (PSG ac t i on s In ) ) ) )
: ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form] ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ i n s : ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form l i s t l i s t ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿(SECURE) ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ outs : s lOutput output l i s t trType l i s t ￿ ￿ ] TR_exec_cmd_rule
val PlatoonSergeant_SECURE_exec_lemma =
TAC_PROOF(
( [ ] , f s t ( dest_imp ( conc l th1 ) ) ) ,
REWRITE_TAC[ CFGInterpret_def , secContext_def , secAuthor izat ion_def , secHelper_def ,
propCommandList_def , extractPropCommand_def , inputList_def ,
getOmniCommand_def ,
MAP, extractInput_def , satList_CONS , sa tL i s t_n i l , GSYM satL i s t_con j ] THEN
PROVE_TAC[ Controls , Modus_Ponens ] )




( [ ] , snd ( dest_imp ( conc l th1 ) ) ) ,
PROVE_TAC[ PlatoonSergeant_SECURE_exec_lemma , TR_exec_cmd_rule ] )
val _= save_thm( "PlatoonSergeant_SECURE_exec_justified_lemma" ,
PlatoonSergeant_SECURE_exec_justified_lemma )
val PlatoonSergeant_SECURE_exec_justified_thm =
REWRITE_RULE[ inputList_def , extractInput_def , MAP, propCommandList_def ,
extractPropCommand_def , PlatoonSergeant_SECURE_exec_lemma ]
PlatoonSergeant_SECURE_exec_justified_lemma
val _= save_thm( "PlatoonSergeant_SECURE_exec_justified_thm" ,
PlatoonSergeant_SECURE_exec_justified_thm )
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗ PlatoonLeader i s j u s t i f i e d on withdraw i f ∗)




[ ￿ ￿ inputOK : ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form  > bool ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ s e cAuthor i za t i on : ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form l i s t  >
(( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form l i s t ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ secContext : ( s l S t a t e )  >
(( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form l i s t  >
(( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form l i s t ￿ ￿ ,
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￿ ￿ [ (Name Omni) says ( prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI ssmActionsInComplete ) ) ) )
: ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form ;
(Name PlatoonLeader ) says ( prop (SOME (SLc (PL withdraw ) ) ) )
: ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form] ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ i n s : ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form l i s t l i s t ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿(ACTIONS_IN) ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ outs : s lOutput output l i s t trType l i s t ￿ ￿ ] TR_exec_cmd_rule
val PlatoonLeader_ACTIONS_IN_exec_lemma =
TAC_PROOF(
( [ ] , f s t ( dest_imp ( conc l th1 ) ) ) ,
REWRITE_TAC[ CFGInterpret_def , secContext_def , secAuthor izat ion_def , secHelper_def ,
propCommandList_def , extractPropCommand_def , inputList_def ,
getOmniCommand_def ,
MAP, extractInput_def , satList_CONS , sa tL i s t_n i l , GSYM satL i s t_con j ]
THEN
PROVE_TAC[ Controls , Modus_Ponens ] )




( [ ] , snd ( dest_imp ( conc l th1 ) ) ) ,
PROVE_TAC[ PlatoonLeader_ACTIONS_IN_exec_lemma , TR_exec_cmd_rule ] )
val _= save_thm( "PlatoonLeader_ACTIONS_IN_exec_justified_lemma" ,
PlatoonLeader_ACTIONS_IN_exec_justified_lemma )
val PlatoonLeader_ACTIONS_IN_exec_justified_thm =
REWRITE_RULE[ inputList_def , extractInput_def , MAP, propCommandList_def ,
extractPropCommand_def , PlatoonLeader_ACTIONS_IN_exec_lemma ]
PlatoonLeader_ACTIONS_IN_exec_justified_lemma
val _= save_thm( "PlatoonLeader_ACTIONS_IN_exec_justified_thm" ,
PlatoonLeader_ACTIONS_IN_exec_justified_thm )
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗ PlatoonLeader i s trapped on withdraw i f ∗)




[ ￿ ￿ inputOK : ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form  > bool ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ s e cAuthor i za t i on : ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form l i s t  >
(( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form l i s t ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ secContext : ( s l S t a t e )  >
(( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form l i s t  >
(( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form l i s t ￿ ￿ ,
￿ ￿ [ (Name Omni) says ( prop (SOME (SLc (OMNI omniCommand ) ) ) )
: ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form ;
(Name PlatoonLeader ) says ( prop (SOME (SLc (PL withdraw ) ) ) )
: ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form] ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ i n s : ( ( slCommand command) option , s tateRole , 'd , ' e )Form l i s t l i s t ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿(ACTIONS_IN) ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ outs : s lOutput output l i s t trType l i s t ￿ ￿ ] TR_trap_cmd_rule
val temp2 = f s t ( dest_imp ( conc l thTrap ) )
val PlatoonLeader_ACTIONS_IN_trap_lemma =
TAC_PROOF(
( [ ] ,
Term￿ (~((omniCommand : omniCommand) = ssmActionsInComplete ) ) ==>
(( s : s l S t a t e ) = ACTIONS_IN) ==>
^temp2 ￿ ) ,
DISCH_TAC THEN
DISCH_TAC THEN
ASM_REWRITE_TAC[ CFGInterpret_def , secContext_def , secAuthor izat ion_def ,
secHelper_def ,
propCommandList_def , extractPropCommand_def , inputList_def ,
getOmniCommand_def ,
MAP, extractInput_def , satList_CONS , sa tL i s t_n i l , GSYM satL i s t_con j ] THEN
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PROVE_TAC[ Controls , Modus_Ponens ] )
val _= save_thm( "PlatoonLeader_ACTIONS_IN_trap_lemma" ,
PlatoonLeader_ACTIONS_IN_trap_lemma)
val temp3 = snd ( dest_imp ( conc l thTrap ) )
val PlatoonLeader_ACTIONS_IN_trap_justified_lemma =
TAC_PROOF(
( [ ] ,
Term￿ (~((omniCommand : omniCommand) = ssmActionsInComplete ) ) ==>
(( s : s l S t a t e ) = ACTIONS_IN) ==>
^temp3 ￿ ) ,
DISCH_TAC THEN
DISCH_TAC THEN
PROVE_TAC[ PlatoonLeader_ACTIONS_IN_trap_lemma , TR_trap_cmd_rule ] )
val _= save_thm( "PlatoonLeader_ACTIONS_IN_trap_justified_lemma" ,
PlatoonLeader_ACTIONS_IN_trap_justified_lemma )
val PlatoonLeader_ACTIONS_IN_trap_justified_thm =




val _= save_thm( "PlatoonLeader_ACTIONS_IN_trap_justified_thm" ,
PlatoonLeader_ACTIONS_IN_trap_justified_thm )
(∗ ===== In t e r a c t i v e Mode =====
===== In t e r a c t i v e Mode ===== ∗)
val _ = export_theory ( ) ;
end
D.3.4 ssmMoveToPB
D.3.4.1 MoveToPBType Theory: Type Definitions
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗ pro j ec tTypesScr ip t . sml ∗)
(∗ Date : 1 August 2018 ∗)
(∗ Author : Assured Things by Design : Lori Picker ing , Keara Hi l l , and Keaten ∗)
(∗ Stokke ∗)
(∗ Descr ip t ion : This f i l e conta ins the data type d e f i n i t i o n s f o r the pro jec t ' s ∗)
(∗ secure s t a t e machine : p r i n c i pa l s , commands , s t a t e s , and outputs . I t a l s o ∗)
(∗ conta ins the d i s t i n c t n e s s and one to oneness theorems . ∗)
(∗ Projec t Descr ip t ion : ssmMoveToPB. ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
structure pro j e c tTypesSc r ip t = struct
open HolKernel Parse boolLib bossLib TypeBase
val _= new_theory " pro jectTypes " ;
val _= Datatype ￿platoonLeaderCom
= form
| move
| s ecureHa l t
￿





























(∗ Theorems to prove d i s t i n c t n e s s and one to one . ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
val p r i n c i p a l_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s = d i s t in c t_o f ￿ ￿ : p r i n c i pa l ￿￿
val _= save_thm( " p r i n c i p a l_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s " ,
p r i n c i p a l_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s )
val platoonLeaderCom_dist inct_clauses = d i s t in c t_o f ￿ ￿ : platoonLeaderCom ￿￿
val _= save_thm( "platoonLeaderCom_dist inct_clauses " ,
platoonLeaderCom_dist inct_clauses )
val omniCom_distinct_clauses = d i s t inc t_o f ￿ ￿ :omniCom￿￿
val _= save_thm( "omniCom_distinct_clauses " ,
omniCom_distinct_clauses )
val commands_distinct_clauses = d i s t in c t_o f ￿ ￿ : commands￿￿
val _= save_thm( " commands_distinct_clauses " ,
commands_distinct_clauses )
val s t a t e_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s = d i s t inc t_o f ￿ ￿ : s ta te ￿￿
val _= save_thm( " s t a t e_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s " ,
s t a t e_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s )
val output_di s t inc t_c lauses = d i s t in c t_o f ￿ ￿ : output ￿￿
val _= save_thm( " output_di s t inc t_c lauses " ,
output_di s t inc t_c lauses )
val commands_one_one = one_one_of ￿ ￿ : commands￿￿
val _= save_thm( "commands_one_one" ,
commands_one_one)
val _= export_theory ( ) ;
end
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗ p r o j e c t U t i l i t i e s S c r i p t . sml ∗)
(∗ Date : 1 August 2018 ∗)
(∗ Author : Assured Things by Design : Lori Picker ing , Keara Hi l l , and Keaten ∗)
(∗ Stokke ∗)
(∗ Descr ip t ion : This f i l e conta ins the data type d e f i n i t i o n s f o r the pro jec t ' s ∗)
(∗ secure s t a t e machine : p r i n c i pa l s , commands , s t a t e s , and outputs . I t a l s o ∗)
(∗ conta ins the d i s t i n c t n e s s and one to oneness theorems . ∗)
(∗ Projec t Descr ip t ion : ssmMoveToPB. ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
structure p r o j e c t U t i l i t i e s S c r i p t = struct
open HolKernel Parse boolLib bossLib TypeBase TypeBase l i s tTheo ry optionTheory
open ac l_in fRu le s ac l ru l e sTheory ac lDrulesTheory satL i s tTheory
open projectTypesTheory
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val _= new_theory " p r o j e c t U t i l i t i e s " ;
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗ Functions f o r e x t r a c t i n g commands from input stream . ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
val getPlatoonLeaderCOM_def = Def ine ￿
( getPlatoonLeaderCOM ( [ ] : commands opt ion l i s t ) = (NONE: commands opt ion ) )
/\
( getPlatoonLeaderCOM (( SOME (PlatoonLeaderCOM cmd ) ) : : xs ) =
( SOME (PlatoonLeaderCOM cmd) ) )
/\
( getPlatoonLeaderCOM (_: : xs ) = getPlatoonLeaderCOM xs ) ￿
val getOmniCOM_def = Def ine ￿
(getOmniCOM ( [ ] : commands opt ion l i s t ) = (NONE: commands opt ion ) )
/\
(getOmniCOM (( SOME (OmniCOM cmd ) ) : : xs ) =
( SOME (OmniCOM cmd) ) )
/\
(getOmniCOM (_: : xs ) = getOmniCOM xs ) ￿
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗ Functions f o r e x t r a c t i n g commands from input l i s t . ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
val getPlatoonLeaderCOMx_def = Def ine ￿
( getPlatoonLeaderCOMx ( [ ] : ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t ) = NONE)
/\
( getPlatoonLeaderCOMx ( ( (Name PlatoonLeader ) says ( prop (SOME (PlatoonLeaderCOM cmd ) ) ) ) : : xs ) =
(SOME (PlatoonLeaderCOM cmd : commands ) ) )
/\
( getPlatoonLeaderCOMx (_: : xs ) = getPlatoonLeaderCOMx xs ) ￿
val getOmniCOMx_def = Def ine ￿
(getOmniCOMx ( [ ] : ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t ) = NONE)
/\
(getOmniCOMx ( ( (Name Omni) says ( prop (SOME (OmniCOM cmd ) ) ) ) : : xs ) =
(SOME (OmniCOM cmd : commands ) ) )
/\
(getOmniCOMx (_: : xs ) = getOmniCOMx xs ) ￿
val _= export_theory ( ) ;
end
D.3.4.2 MoveToPBDef Theory: Authentication & Authorization
Definitions
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗ projectSMScript . sml ∗)
(∗ Date : 1 August 2018 ∗)
(∗ Author : Assured Things by Design : Lori Picker ing , Keara Hi l l , and Keaten ∗)
(∗ Stokke ∗)
(∗ Descr ip t ion : This f i l e conta ins the data type d e f i n i t i o n s f o r the pro jec t ' s ∗)
(∗ secure s t a t e machine ' s next s t a t e and next output f unc t i on s . ∗)
(∗ Projec t Descr ip t ion : ssmMoveToPB. ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
structure projectSMScr ipt = struct
open HolKernel Parse boolLib bossLib TypeBase TypeBase l i s tTheo ry optionTheory
open ac l_in fRu le s ac l ru l e sTheory ac lDrulesTheory satL i s tTheory ssmTheory
open s sminfRules projectTypesTheory p r o j e c tU t i l i t i e sTh e o r y
val _= new_theory "projectSM" ;
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗ Next s t a t e func t i on . ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
val NS_def = Define ￿
(NS MOVE_TO_PB ( exec x ) =
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(NS FORM ( exec x ) =




(NS MOVE ( exec x ) =




(NS ( s : s t a t e ) ( trap _) = s ) /\
(NS ( s : s t a t e ) ( d i s ca rd _) = s ) ￿
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗ Next output func t i on . ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
val NS_def = Define ￿
(NOut MOVE_TO_PB ( exec x ) =




(NOut FORM ( exec x ) =




(NOut MOVE ( exec x ) =




(NOut ( s : s t a t e ) ( trap _) = UnAuthorized ) /\
(NOut ( s : s t a t e ) ( d i s ca rd _) = UnAuthenticated ) ￿
val _= export_theory ( ) ;
end
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗ p r o j e c t S e cu r i t y S c r i p t . sml ∗)
(∗ Date : 1 August 2018 ∗)
(∗ Author : Assured Things by Design : Lori Picker ing , Keara Hi l l , and Keaten ∗)
(∗ Stokke ∗)
(∗ Descr ip t ion : This f i l e conta ins the s e c u r i t y p o l i c y ( s ta t e dependent ∗)
(∗ au thor i za t i on , g l o b a l au t ho r i z a t i on ) and au then t i ca t i on po l i c y . ∗)
(∗ Projec t Descr ip t ion : ssmMoveToPB. ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
structure p r o j e c t S e c u r i t y S c r i p t = struct
open HolKernel Parse boolLib bossLib TypeBase TypeBase l i s tTheo ry optionTheory
open ac l_in fRu le s ac l ru l e sTheory ac lDrulesTheory satL i s tTheory ssmTheory
open s sminfRules projectTypesTheory p r o j e c tU t i l i t i e sTh e o r y
val _= new_theory " p r o j e c t S e cu r i t y " ;
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗ Authent ica t ion d e f i n i t i o n s . ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
val authent i ca t ion_de f = Def ine ￿
( au then t i c a t i on
( ( (Name PlatoonLeader ) says ( prop (SOME (PlatoonLeaderCOM (x : platoonLeaderCom ) ) ) ) )
: ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form) = T) /\
( au then t i c a t i on
( ( (Name Omni) says ( prop (SOME (OmniCOM (x : omniCom ) ) ) ) )
: ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form) = T) /\
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( au then t i c a t i on _ = F) ￿
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗ s ta teAuth d e f i n i t i o n s . ∗)
(∗ A sta t e dependent s e c u r i t y con tex t . ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
val stateAuth_def = Define ￿
stateAuth ( s : s t a t e ) ( x : ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t ) =
i f ( s = MOVE_TO_PB)
then
i f
( getPlatoonLeaderCOMx x = SOME (PlatoonLeaderCOM form ) )
then
[ (Name PlatoonLeader ) c on t r o l s ( prop (SOME (PlatoonLeaderCOM form ) ) )
: ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form ]
else
[ prop NONE: ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form ]
else
i f ( s = FORM)
then
i f
( getPlatoonLeaderCOMx x = SOME (PlatoonLeaderCOM move ) )
then
[ (Name PlatoonLeader ) c on t r o l s ( prop (SOME (PlatoonLeaderCOM move ) ) )
: ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form ]
else
[ prop NONE: ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form ]
else
i f ( s = MOVE)
then
i f
( getPlatoonLeaderCOMx x = SOME (PlatoonLeaderCOM secureHa l t ) )
then
[ (Name PlatoonLeader ) c on t r o l s ( prop (SOME (PlatoonLeaderCOM secureHa l t ) ) )
: ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form ]
else
[ prop NONE: ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form ]
else
[ prop NONE: ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form] ￿
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗ g loba lAuth d e f i n i t i o n s . ∗)
(∗ A g l o b a l s e c u r i t y con tex t . ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
val globalAuth_def = Def ine ￿
globalAuth (x : ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t ) =
[TT: ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form ]
￿
val _= export_theory ( ) ;
end
D.3.4.3 ssmMoveToPB Theory: Theorems
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗ pro jec tAssuranceExecScr ip t . sml ∗)
(∗ Date : 1 August 2018 ∗)
(∗ Author : Assured Things by Design : Lori Picker ing , Keara Hi l l , and Keaten ∗)
(∗ Stokke ∗)
(∗ Descr ip t ion : This f i l e conta ins the proo f s f o r complete mediation . In ∗)
(∗ pa r t i cu l a r , t h e se proo f s prove t ha t a t r a n s i t i o n i s executed i f and only ∗)
(∗ i f the input i s au then t i ca t ed and au thor i z ed . ∗)
(∗ Projec t Descr ip t ion : ssmMoveToPB. ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
structure pro j ec tAssuranceExecScr ip t = struct
open HolKernel Parse boolLib bossLib TypeBase TypeBase l i s tTheo ry optionTheory
open ac l_in fRu le s ac l ru l e sTheory ac lDrulesTheory satL i s tTheory ssmTheory
open s sminfRules projectTypesTheory p r o j e c tU t i l i t i e sTh e o r y pro j e c tSecur i tyTheory
open satL i s tTheory bossLib
val _= new_theory " projectAssuranceExec " ;
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(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗ Sta te : MOVE_TO_PB ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗                                                                            ∗)
(∗ Execute t r a s i t i o n j u s t i f i e d : ∗)
(∗ MOVE_TO_PB   > FORM ∗)
(∗                                                                            ∗)
val he lpe r1 = ISPECL
[
￿￿ au then t i c a t i on : ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form  > bool ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿globalAuth : ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t  >
(commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ stateAuth : s t a t e  >
(commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t  >
(commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t ￿ ￿ ,
￿ ￿ [ (Name PlatoonLeader ) says ( prop (SOME (PlatoonLeaderCOM form ) ) )
: ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form] ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ i n s : ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t l i s t ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿MOVE_TO_PB￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ outs : commands opt ion l i s t trType l i s t ￿￿
] TR_exec_cmd_rule
val he lpe r2 = f s t ( dest_imp ( conc l he lpe r1 ) )
val MOVE_TO_PB_exec_form_lemma1 =
TAC_PROOF(
( [ ] , he lpe r2 ) ,
REWRITE_TAC[
CFGInterpret_def , globalAuth_def , stateAuth_def , getPlatoonLeaderCOM_def ,
getOmniCOM_def , getPlatoonLeaderCOMx_def , getOmniCOMx_def , inputList_def ,
extractInput_def , MAP, propCommandList_def , extractPropCommand_def ,
satList_CONS , sa tL i s t_n i l ,
GSYM satL i s t_con j ]
THEN
REWRITE_TAC[
NOT_NONE_SOME, NOT_SOME_NONE, SOME_11, s t a t e_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s ,
output_dis t inct_c lauses , commands_distinct_clauses ,
p r i n c i pa l_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s , platoonLeaderCom_dist inct_clauses ,
omniCom_distinct_clauses , commands_one_one ,
GSYM sta t e_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s ,
GSYM output_dist inct_c lauses ,
GSYM commands_distinct_clauses ,
GSYM pr in c i pa l_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s ,




satList_CONS , s a tL i s t_n i l ]
THEN
PROVE_TAC[
Controls , Modus_Ponens ]
)
val _= save_thm( "MOVE_TO_PB_exec_form_lemma1" ,
MOVE_TO_PB_exec_form_lemma1)
val he lpe r3 = snd ( dest_imp ( conc l he lpe r1 ) )
val MOVE_TO_PB_exec_form_lemma2 =
TAC_PROOF(










propCommandList_def , inputList_def , extractPropCommand_def , extractInput_def ,
MAP
] MOVE_TO_PB_exec_form_lemma2
val _= save_thm( "MOVE_TO_PB_exec_form_thm" ,
MOVE_TO_PB_exec_form_thm)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗ Sta te : FORM ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗                                                                            ∗)
(∗ Execute t r a s i t i o n j u s t i f i e d : ∗)
(∗ FORM   > MOVE ∗)
(∗                                                                            ∗)
val he lpe r1 = ISPECL
[
￿￿ au then t i c a t i on : ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form  > bool ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿globalAuth : ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t  >
(commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ stateAuth : s t a t e  >
(commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t  >
(commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t ￿ ￿ ,
￿ ￿ [ (Name PlatoonLeader ) says ( prop (SOME (PlatoonLeaderCOM move ) ) )
: ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form] ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ i n s : ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t l i s t ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿FORM￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ outs : commands opt ion l i s t trType l i s t ￿￿
] TR_exec_cmd_rule
val he lpe r2 = f s t ( dest_imp ( conc l he lpe r1 ) )
val FORM_exec_move_lemma1 =
TAC_PROOF(
( [ ] , he lpe r2 ) ,
REWRITE_TAC[
CFGInterpret_def , globalAuth_def , stateAuth_def , getPlatoonLeaderCOM_def ,
getOmniCOM_def , getPlatoonLeaderCOMx_def , getOmniCOMx_def , inputList_def ,
extractInput_def , MAP, propCommandList_def , extractPropCommand_def ,
satList_CONS , sa tL i s t_n i l ,
GSYM satL i s t_con j ]
THEN
REWRITE_TAC[
NOT_NONE_SOME, NOT_SOME_NONE, SOME_11, s t a t e_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s ,
output_dis t inct_c lauses , commands_distinct_clauses ,
p r i n c i pa l_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s , platoonLeaderCom_dist inct_clauses ,
omniCom_distinct_clauses , commands_one_one ,
GSYM sta t e_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s ,
GSYM output_dist inct_c lauses ,
GSYM commands_distinct_clauses ,
GSYM pr in c i pa l_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s ,




satList_CONS , s a tL i s t_n i l ]
THEN
PROVE_TAC[
Controls , Modus_Ponens ]
)
val _= save_thm( "FORM_exec_move_lemma1" ,
FORM_exec_move_lemma1)
val he lpe r3 = snd ( dest_imp ( conc l he lpe r1 ) )
val FORM_exec_move_lemma2 =
TAC_PROOF(










propCommandList_def , inputList_def , extractPropCommand_def , extractInput_def ,
MAP
] FORM_exec_move_lemma2
val _= save_thm( "FORM_exec_move_thm" ,
FORM_exec_move_thm)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗ Sta te : MOVE ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗                                                                            ∗)
(∗ Execute t r a s i t i o n j u s t i f i e d : ∗)
(∗ MOVE   > SECURE_HALT ∗)
(∗                                                                            ∗)
val he lpe r1 = ISPECL
[
￿￿ au then t i c a t i on : ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form  > bool ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿globalAuth : ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t  >
(commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ stateAuth : s t a t e  >
(commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t  >
(commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t ￿ ￿ ,
￿ ￿ [ (Name PlatoonLeader ) says ( prop (SOME (PlatoonLeaderCOM secureHa l t ) ) )
: ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form] ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ i n s : ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t l i s t ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿MOVE￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ outs : commands opt ion l i s t trType l i s t ￿￿
] TR_exec_cmd_rule
val he lpe r2 = f s t ( dest_imp ( conc l he lpe r1 ) )
val MOVE_exec_secureHalt_lemma1 =
TAC_PROOF(
( [ ] , he lpe r2 ) ,
REWRITE_TAC[
CFGInterpret_def , globalAuth_def , stateAuth_def , getPlatoonLeaderCOM_def ,
getOmniCOM_def , getPlatoonLeaderCOMx_def , getOmniCOMx_def , inputList_def ,
extractInput_def , MAP, propCommandList_def , extractPropCommand_def ,
satList_CONS , sa tL i s t_n i l ,
GSYM satL i s t_con j ]
THEN
REWRITE_TAC[
NOT_NONE_SOME, NOT_SOME_NONE, SOME_11, s t a t e_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s ,
output_dis t inct_c lauses , commands_distinct_clauses ,
p r i n c i pa l_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s , platoonLeaderCom_dist inct_clauses ,
omniCom_distinct_clauses , commands_one_one ,
GSYM sta t e_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s ,
GSYM output_dist inct_c lauses ,
GSYM commands_distinct_clauses ,
GSYM pr in c i pa l_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s ,




satList_CONS , s a tL i s t_n i l ]
THEN
PROVE_TAC[
Controls , Modus_Ponens ]
)
val _= save_thm( "MOVE_exec_secureHalt_lemma1" ,
MOVE_exec_secureHalt_lemma1)
367
val he lpe r3 = snd ( dest_imp ( conc l he lpe r1 ) )
val MOVE_exec_secureHalt_lemma2 =
TAC_PROOF(









propCommandList_def , inputList_def , extractPropCommand_def , extractInput_def ,
MAP
] MOVE_exec_secureHalt_lemma2
val _= save_thm( "MOVE_exec_secureHalt_thm" ,
MOVE_exec_secureHalt_thm)
val _= export_theory ( ) ;
end
D.3.5 ssmConductPB
D.3.5.1 ConductPBType Theory: Type Definitions
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗ pro j ec tTypesScr ip t . sml ∗)
(∗ Date : 1 August 2018 ∗)
(∗ Author : Assured Things by Design : Lori Picker ing , Keara Hi l l , and Keaten ∗)
(∗ Stokke ∗)
(∗ Descr ip t ion : This f i l e conta ins the data type d e f i n i t i o n s f o r the pro jec t ' s ∗)
(∗ secure s t a t e machine : p r i n c i pa l s , commands , s t a t e s , and outputs . I t a l s o ∗)
(∗ conta ins the d i s t i n c t n e s s and one to oneness theorems . ∗)
(∗ Projec t Descr ip t ion : ssmConductPB . ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
structure pro j e c tTypesSc r ip t = struct
open HolKernel Parse boolLib bossLib TypeBase
val _= new_theory " pro jectTypes " ;





val _= Datatype ￿platoonSergeantCom
= ac t i on s In
| psgNA
￿
































(∗ Theorems to prove d i s t i n c t n e s s and one to one . ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
val p r i n c i p a l_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s = d i s t in c t_o f ￿ ￿ : p r i n c i pa l ￿￿
val _= save_thm( " p r i n c i p a l_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s " ,
p r i n c i p a l_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s )
val platoonLeaderCom_dist inct_clauses = d i s t in c t_o f ￿ ￿ : platoonLeaderCom ￿￿
val _= save_thm( "platoonLeaderCom_dist inct_clauses " ,
platoonLeaderCom_dist inct_clauses )
val platoonSergeantCom_dist inct_clauses = d i s t in c t_o f ￿ ￿ : platoonSergeantCom ￿￿
val _= save_thm( " platoonSergeantCom_dist inct_clauses " ,
p latoonSergeantCom_dist inct_clauses )
val omniCom_distinct_clauses = d i s t inc t_o f ￿ ￿ :omniCom￿￿
val _= save_thm( "omniCom_distinct_clauses " ,
omniCom_distinct_clauses )
val commands_distinct_clauses = d i s t in c t_o f ￿ ￿ : commands￿￿
val _= save_thm( " commands_distinct_clauses " ,
commands_distinct_clauses )
val s t a t e_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s = d i s t inc t_o f ￿ ￿ : s ta te ￿￿
val _= save_thm( " s t a t e_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s " ,
s t a t e_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s )
val output_di s t inc t_c lauses = d i s t in c t_o f ￿ ￿ : output ￿￿
val _= save_thm( " output_di s t inc t_c lauses " ,
output_di s t inc t_c lauses )
val commands_one_one = one_one_of ￿ ￿ : commands￿￿
val _= save_thm( "commands_one_one" ,
commands_one_one)
val _= export_theory ( ) ;
end
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗ p r o j e c t U t i l i t i e s S c r i p t . sml ∗)
(∗ Date : 1 August 2018 ∗)
(∗ Author : Assured Things by Design : Lori Picker ing , Keara Hi l l , and Keaten ∗)
(∗ Stokke ∗)
(∗ Descr ip t ion : This f i l e conta ins the data type d e f i n i t i o n s f o r the pro jec t ' s ∗)
(∗ secure s t a t e machine : p r i n c i pa l s , commands , s t a t e s , and outputs . I t a l s o ∗)
(∗ conta ins the d i s t i n c t n e s s and one to oneness theorems . ∗)
(∗ Projec t Descr ip t ion : ssmConductPB . ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
structure p r o j e c t U t i l i t i e s S c r i p t = struct
open HolKernel Parse boolLib bossLib TypeBase TypeBase l i s tTheo ry optionTheory
open ac l_in fRu le s ac l ru l e sTheory ac lDrulesTheory satL i s tTheory
open projectTypesTheory
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val _= new_theory " p r o j e c t U t i l i t i e s " ;
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗ Functions f o r e x t r a c t i n g commands from input stream . ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
val getPlatoonLeaderCOM_def = Def ine ￿
( getPlatoonLeaderCOM ( [ ] : commands opt ion l i s t ) = (NONE: commands opt ion ) )
/\
( getPlatoonLeaderCOM (( SOME (PlatoonLeaderCOM cmd ) ) : : xs ) =
( SOME (PlatoonLeaderCOM cmd) ) )
/\
( getPlatoonLeaderCOM (_: : xs ) = getPlatoonLeaderCOM xs ) ￿
val getPlatoonSergeantCOM_def = Def ine ￿
( getPlatoonSergeantCOM ( [ ] : commands opt ion l i s t ) = (NONE: commands opt ion ) )
/\
( getPlatoonSergeantCOM (( SOME ( PlatoonSergeantCOM cmd ) ) : : xs ) =
( SOME ( PlatoonSergeantCOM cmd) ) )
/\
( getPlatoonSergeantCOM (_: : xs ) = getPlatoonSergeantCOM xs ) ￿
val getOmniCOM_def = Def ine ￿
(getOmniCOM ( [ ] : commands opt ion l i s t ) = (NONE: commands opt ion ) )
/\
(getOmniCOM (( SOME (OmniCOM cmd ) ) : : xs ) =
( SOME (OmniCOM cmd) ) )
/\
(getOmniCOM (_: : xs ) = getOmniCOM xs ) ￿
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗ Functions f o r e x t r a c t i n g commands from input l i s t . ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
val getPlatoonLeaderCOMx_def = Def ine ￿
( getPlatoonLeaderCOMx ( [ ] : ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t ) = NONE)
/\
( getPlatoonLeaderCOMx ( ( (Name PlatoonLeader ) says ( prop (SOME (PlatoonLeaderCOM cmd ) ) ) ) : : xs ) =
(SOME (PlatoonLeaderCOM cmd : commands ) ) )
/\
( getPlatoonLeaderCOMx (_: : xs ) = getPlatoonLeaderCOMx xs ) ￿
val getPlatoonSergeantCOMx_def = Def ine ￿
( getPlatoonSergeantCOMx ( [ ] : ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t ) = NONE)
/\
( getPlatoonSergeantCOMx ( ( (Name PlatoonSergeant ) says ( prop (SOME ( PlatoonSergeantCOM cmd ) ) ) ) : : xs ) =
(SOME ( PlatoonSergeantCOM cmd : commands ) ) )
/\
( getPlatoonSergeantCOMx (_: : xs ) = getPlatoonSergeantCOMx xs ) ￿
val getOmniCOMx_def = Def ine ￿
(getOmniCOMx ( [ ] : ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t ) = NONE)
/\
(getOmniCOMx ( ( (Name Omni) says ( prop (SOME (OmniCOM cmd ) ) ) ) : : xs ) =
(SOME (OmniCOM cmd : commands ) ) )
/\
(getOmniCOMx (_: : xs ) = getOmniCOMx xs ) ￿
val _= export_theory ( ) ;
end
D.3.5.2 ConductPBDef Theory: Authentication & Authorization
Definitions
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗ projectSMScript . sml ∗)
(∗ Date : 1 August 2018 ∗)
(∗ Author : Assured Things by Design : Lori Picker ing , Keara Hi l l , and Keaten ∗)
(∗ Stokke ∗)
(∗ Descr ip t ion : This f i l e conta ins the data type d e f i n i t i o n s f o r the pro jec t ' s ∗)
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(∗ secure s t a t e machine ' s next s t a t e and next output f unc t i on s . ∗)
(∗ Projec t Descr ip t ion : ssmConductPB . ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
structure projectSMScr ipt = struct
open HolKernel Parse boolLib bossLib TypeBase TypeBase l i s tTheo ry optionTheory
open ac l_in fRu le s ac l ru l e sTheory ac lDrulesTheory satL i s tTheory ssmTheory
open s sminfRules projectTypesTheory p r o j e c tU t i l i t i e sTh e o r y
val _= new_theory "projectSM" ;
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗ Next s t a t e func t i on . ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
val NS_def = Define ￿
(NS CONDUCT_PB ( exec x ) =




(NS SECURE ( exec x ) =




(NS ACTIONS_IN ( exec x ) =




(NS WITHDRAW ( exec x ) =




(NS ( s : s t a t e ) ( trap _) = s ) /\
(NS ( s : s t a t e ) ( d i s ca rd _) = s ) ￿
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗ Next output func t i on . ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
val NS_def = Define ￿
(NOut CONDUCT_PB ( exec x ) =




(NOut SECURE ( exec x ) =




(NOut ACTIONS_IN ( exec x ) =




(NOut WITHDRAW ( exec x ) =




(NOut ( s : s t a t e ) ( trap _) = UnAuthorized ) /\
(NOut ( s : s t a t e ) ( d i s ca rd _) = UnAuthenticated ) ￿




(∗ p r o j e c t S e cu r i t y S c r i p t . sml ∗)
(∗ Date : 1 August 2018 ∗)
(∗ Author : Assured Things by Design : Lori Picker ing , Keara Hi l l , and Keaten ∗)
(∗ Stokke ∗)
(∗ Descr ip t ion : This f i l e conta ins the s e c u r i t y p o l i c y ( s ta t e dependent ∗)
(∗ au thor i za t i on , g l o b a l au t ho r i z a t i on ) and au then t i ca t i on po l i c y . ∗)
(∗ Projec t Descr ip t ion : ssmConductPB . ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
structure p r o j e c t S e c u r i t y S c r i p t = struct
open HolKernel Parse boolLib bossLib TypeBase TypeBase l i s tTheo ry optionTheory
open ac l_in fRu le s ac l ru l e sTheory ac lDrulesTheory satL i s tTheory ssmTheory
open s sminfRules projectTypesTheory p r o j e c tU t i l i t i e sTh e o r y
val _= new_theory " p r o j e c t S e cu r i t y " ;
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗ Authent ica t ion d e f i n i t i o n s . ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
val authent i ca t ion_de f = Def ine ￿
( au then t i c a t i on
( ( (Name PlatoonLeader ) says ( prop (SOME (PlatoonLeaderCOM (x : platoonLeaderCom ) ) ) ) )
: ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form) = T) /\
( au then t i c a t i on
( ( (Name PlatoonSergeant ) says ( prop (SOME ( PlatoonSergeantCOM (x : platoonSergeantCom ) ) ) ) )
: ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form) = T) /\
( au then t i c a t i on
( ( (Name Omni) says ( prop (SOME (OmniCOM (x : omniCom ) ) ) ) )
: ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form) = T) /\
( au then t i c a t i on _ = F) ￿
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗ s ta teAuth d e f i n i t i o n s . ∗)
(∗ A sta t e dependent s e c u r i t y con tex t . ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
val stateAuth_def = Define ￿
stateAuth ( s : s t a t e ) ( x : ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t ) =
i f ( s = CONDUCT_PB)
then
i f
( getPlatoonLeaderCOMx x = SOME (PlatoonLeaderCOM secure ) )
then
[ (Name PlatoonLeader ) c on t r o l s ( prop (SOME (PlatoonLeaderCOM secure ) ) )
: ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form ]
else
[ prop NONE: ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form ]
else
i f ( s = SECURE)
then
i f
( getPlatoonSergeantCOMx x = SOME ( PlatoonSergeantCOM ac t i on s In ) )
then
[ (Name PlatoonSergeant ) c on t r o l s ( prop (SOME ( PlatoonSergeantCOM ac t i on s In ) ) )
: ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form ]
else
[ prop NONE: ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form ]
else
i f ( s = ACTIONS_IN)
then
i f
( getPlatoonLeaderCOMx x = SOME (PlatoonLeaderCOM withdraw ) )
then
[ (Name PlatoonLeader ) c on t r o l s ( prop (SOME (PlatoonLeaderCOM withdraw ) ) )
: ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form ]
else
[ prop NONE: ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form ]
else
i f ( s = WITHDRAW)
then
i f
( getPlatoonLeaderCOMx x = SOME (PlatoonLeaderCOM complete ) )
then
[ (Name PlatoonLeader ) c on t r o l s ( prop (SOME (PlatoonLeaderCOM complete ) ) )
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: ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form ]
else
[ prop NONE: ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form ]
else
[ prop NONE: ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form] ￿
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗ g loba lAuth d e f i n i t i o n s . ∗)
(∗ A g l o b a l s e c u r i t y con tex t . ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
val globalAuth_def = Def ine ￿
globalAuth (x : ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t ) =
[TT: ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form ]
￿
val _= export_theory ( ) ;
end
D.3.5.3 ssmConductPB Theory: Theorems
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗ pro jec tAssuranceExecScr ip t . sml ∗)
(∗ Date : 1 August 2018 ∗)
(∗ Author : Assured Things by Design : Lori Picker ing , Keara Hi l l , and Keaten ∗)
(∗ Stokke ∗)
(∗ Descr ip t ion : This f i l e conta ins the proo f s f o r complete mediation . In ∗)
(∗ pa r t i cu l a r , t h e se proo f s prove t ha t a t r a n s i t i o n i s executed i f and only ∗)
(∗ i f the input i s au then t i ca t ed and au thor i z ed . ∗)
(∗ Projec t Descr ip t ion : ssmConductPB . ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
structure pro j ec tAssuranceExecScr ip t = struct
open HolKernel Parse boolLib bossLib TypeBase TypeBase l i s tTheo ry optionTheory
open ac l_in fRu le s ac l ru l e sTheory ac lDrulesTheory satL i s tTheory ssmTheory
open s sminfRules projectTypesTheory p r o j e c tU t i l i t i e sTh e o r y pro j e c tSecur i tyTheory
open satL i s tTheory bossLib
val _= new_theory " projectAssuranceExec " ;
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗ Sta te : CONDUCT_PB ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗                                                                            ∗)
(∗ Execute t r a s i t i o n j u s t i f i e d : ∗)
(∗ CONDUCT_PB   > SECURE ∗)
(∗                                                                            ∗)
val he lpe r1 = ISPECL
[
￿￿ au then t i c a t i on : ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form  > bool ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿globalAuth : ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t  >
(commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ stateAuth : s t a t e  >
(commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t  >
(commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t ￿ ￿ ,
￿ ￿ [ (Name PlatoonLeader ) says ( prop (SOME (PlatoonLeaderCOM secure ) ) )
: ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form] ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ i n s : ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t l i s t ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿CONDUCT_PB￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ outs : commands opt ion l i s t trType l i s t ￿￿
] TR_exec_cmd_rule
val he lpe r2 = f s t ( dest_imp ( conc l he lpe r1 ) )
val CONDUCT_PB_exec_secure_lemma1 =
TAC_PROOF(
( [ ] , he lpe r2 ) ,
REWRITE_TAC[
CFGInterpret_def , globalAuth_def , stateAuth_def , getPlatoonLeaderCOM_def ,
getPlatoonSergeantCOM_def , getOmniCOM_def , getPlatoonLeaderCOMx_def ,
getPlatoonSergeantCOMx_def , getOmniCOMx_def , inputList_def , extractInput_def ,
MAP, propCommandList_def , extractPropCommand_def , satList_CONS , sa tL i s t_n i l ,




NOT_NONE_SOME, NOT_SOME_NONE, SOME_11, s t a t e_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s ,
output_dis t inct_c lauses , commands_distinct_clauses ,
p r i n c i pa l_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s , platoonLeaderCom_dist inct_clauses ,
platoonSergeantCom_dist inct_clauses , omniCom_distinct_clauses ,
commands_one_one ,
GSYM sta t e_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s ,
GSYM output_dist inct_c lauses ,
GSYM commands_distinct_clauses ,
GSYM pr in c i pa l_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s ,
GSYM platoonLeaderCom_dist inct_clauses ,




satList_CONS , s a tL i s t_n i l ]
THEN
PROVE_TAC[
Controls , Modus_Ponens ]
)
val _= save_thm( "CONDUCT_PB_exec_secure_lemma1" ,
CONDUCT_PB_exec_secure_lemma1)
val he lpe r3 = snd ( dest_imp ( conc l he lpe r1 ) )
val CONDUCT_PB_exec_secure_lemma2 =
TAC_PROOF(









propCommandList_def , inputList_def , extractPropCommand_def , extractInput_def ,
MAP
] CONDUCT_PB_exec_secure_lemma2
val _= save_thm( "CONDUCT_PB_exec_secure_thm" ,
CONDUCT_PB_exec_secure_thm)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗ Sta te : SECURE ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗                                                                            ∗)
(∗ Execute t r a s i t i o n j u s t i f i e d : ∗)
(∗ SECURE   > ACTIONS_IN ∗)
(∗                                                                            ∗)
val he lpe r1 = ISPECL
[
￿￿ au then t i c a t i on : ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form  > bool ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿globalAuth : ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t  >
(commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ stateAuth : s t a t e  >
(commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t  >
(commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t ￿ ￿ ,
￿ ￿ [ (Name PlatoonSergeant ) says ( prop (SOME ( PlatoonSergeantCOM ac t i on s In ) ) )
: ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form] ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ i n s : ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t l i s t ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿SECURE￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ outs : commands opt ion l i s t trType l i s t ￿￿
] TR_exec_cmd_rule




( [ ] , he lpe r2 ) ,
REWRITE_TAC[
CFGInterpret_def , globalAuth_def , stateAuth_def , getPlatoonLeaderCOM_def ,
getPlatoonSergeantCOM_def , getOmniCOM_def , getPlatoonLeaderCOMx_def ,
getPlatoonSergeantCOMx_def , getOmniCOMx_def , inputList_def , extractInput_def ,
MAP, propCommandList_def , extractPropCommand_def , satList_CONS , sa tL i s t_n i l ,
GSYM satL i s t_con j ]
THEN
REWRITE_TAC[
NOT_NONE_SOME, NOT_SOME_NONE, SOME_11, s t a t e_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s ,
output_dis t inct_c lauses , commands_distinct_clauses ,
p r i n c i pa l_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s , platoonLeaderCom_dist inct_clauses ,
platoonSergeantCom_dist inct_clauses , omniCom_distinct_clauses ,
commands_one_one ,
GSYM sta t e_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s ,
GSYM output_dist inct_c lauses ,
GSYM commands_distinct_clauses ,
GSYM pr in c i pa l_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s ,
GSYM platoonLeaderCom_dist inct_clauses ,




satList_CONS , s a tL i s t_n i l ]
THEN
PROVE_TAC[
Controls , Modus_Ponens ]
)
val _= save_thm( "SECURE_exec_actionsIn_lemma1" ,
SECURE_exec_actionsIn_lemma1 )
val he lpe r3 = snd ( dest_imp ( conc l he lpe r1 ) )
val SECURE_exec_actionsIn_lemma2 =
TAC_PROOF(









propCommandList_def , inputList_def , extractPropCommand_def , extractInput_def ,
MAP
] SECURE_exec_actionsIn_lemma2
val _= save_thm( "SECURE_exec_actionsIn_thm" ,
SECURE_exec_actionsIn_thm)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗ Sta te : ACTIONS_IN ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗                                                                            ∗)
(∗ Execute t r a s i t i o n j u s t i f i e d : ∗)
(∗ ACTIONS_IN   > WITHDRAW ∗)
(∗                                                                            ∗)
val he lpe r1 = ISPECL
[
￿￿ au then t i c a t i on : ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form  > bool ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿globalAuth : ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t  >
(commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ stateAuth : s t a t e  >
375
( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t  >
(commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t ￿ ￿ ,
￿ ￿ [ (Name PlatoonLeader ) says ( prop (SOME (PlatoonLeaderCOM withdraw ) ) )
: ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form] ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ i n s : ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t l i s t ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ACTIONS_IN￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ outs : commands opt ion l i s t trType l i s t ￿￿
] TR_exec_cmd_rule
val he lpe r2 = f s t ( dest_imp ( conc l he lpe r1 ) )
val ACTIONS_IN_exec_withdraw_lemma1 =
TAC_PROOF(
( [ ] , he lpe r2 ) ,
REWRITE_TAC[
CFGInterpret_def , globalAuth_def , stateAuth_def , getPlatoonLeaderCOM_def ,
getPlatoonSergeantCOM_def , getOmniCOM_def , getPlatoonLeaderCOMx_def ,
getPlatoonSergeantCOMx_def , getOmniCOMx_def , inputList_def , extractInput_def ,
MAP, propCommandList_def , extractPropCommand_def , satList_CONS , sa tL i s t_n i l ,
GSYM satL i s t_con j ]
THEN
REWRITE_TAC[
NOT_NONE_SOME, NOT_SOME_NONE, SOME_11, s t a t e_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s ,
output_dis t inct_c lauses , commands_distinct_clauses ,
p r i n c i pa l_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s , platoonLeaderCom_dist inct_clauses ,
platoonSergeantCom_dist inct_clauses , omniCom_distinct_clauses ,
commands_one_one ,
GSYM sta t e_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s ,
GSYM output_dist inct_c lauses ,
GSYM commands_distinct_clauses ,
GSYM pr in c i pa l_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s ,
GSYM platoonLeaderCom_dist inct_clauses ,




satList_CONS , s a tL i s t_n i l ]
THEN
PROVE_TAC[
Controls , Modus_Ponens ]
)
val _= save_thm( "ACTIONS_IN_exec_withdraw_lemma1" ,
ACTIONS_IN_exec_withdraw_lemma1)
val he lpe r3 = snd ( dest_imp ( conc l he lpe r1 ) )
val ACTIONS_IN_exec_withdraw_lemma2 =
TAC_PROOF(









propCommandList_def , inputList_def , extractPropCommand_def , extractInput_def ,
MAP
] ACTIONS_IN_exec_withdraw_lemma2
val _= save_thm( "ACTIONS_IN_exec_withdraw_thm" ,
ACTIONS_IN_exec_withdraw_thm)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)




(∗ Execute t r a s i t i o n j u s t i f i e d : ∗)
(∗ WITHDRAW   > COMPLETE ∗)
(∗                                                                            ∗)
val he lpe r1 = ISPECL
[
￿￿ au then t i c a t i on : ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form  > bool ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿globalAuth : ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t  >
(commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ stateAuth : s t a t e  >
(commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t  >
(commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t ￿ ￿ ,
￿ ￿ [ (Name PlatoonLeader ) says ( prop (SOME (PlatoonLeaderCOM complete ) ) )
: ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form] ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ i n s : ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t l i s t ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿WITHDRAW￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ outs : commands opt ion l i s t trType l i s t ￿￿
] TR_exec_cmd_rule
val he lpe r2 = f s t ( dest_imp ( conc l he lpe r1 ) )
val WITHDRAW_exec_complete_lemma1 =
TAC_PROOF(
( [ ] , he lpe r2 ) ,
REWRITE_TAC[
CFGInterpret_def , globalAuth_def , stateAuth_def , getPlatoonLeaderCOM_def ,
getPlatoonSergeantCOM_def , getOmniCOM_def , getPlatoonLeaderCOMx_def ,
getPlatoonSergeantCOMx_def , getOmniCOMx_def , inputList_def , extractInput_def ,
MAP, propCommandList_def , extractPropCommand_def , satList_CONS , sa tL i s t_n i l ,
GSYM satL i s t_con j ]
THEN
REWRITE_TAC[
NOT_NONE_SOME, NOT_SOME_NONE, SOME_11, s t a t e_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s ,
output_dis t inct_c lauses , commands_distinct_clauses ,
p r i n c i pa l_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s , platoonLeaderCom_dist inct_clauses ,
platoonSergeantCom_dist inct_clauses , omniCom_distinct_clauses ,
commands_one_one ,
GSYM sta t e_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s ,
GSYM output_dist inct_c lauses ,
GSYM commands_distinct_clauses ,
GSYM pr in c i pa l_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s ,
GSYM platoonLeaderCom_dist inct_clauses ,




satList_CONS , s a tL i s t_n i l ]
THEN
PROVE_TAC[
Controls , Modus_Ponens ]
)
val _= save_thm( "WITHDRAW_exec_complete_lemma1" ,
WITHDRAW_exec_complete_lemma1)
val he lpe r3 = snd ( dest_imp ( conc l he lpe r1 ) )
val WITHDRAW_exec_complete_lemma2 =
TAC_PROOF(













val _= save_thm( "WITHDRAW_exec_complete_thm" ,
WITHDRAW_exec_complete_thm)




D.4.1.1 SecureHaltType Theory: Type Definitions
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗ pro j ec tTypesScr ip t . sml ∗)
(∗ Date : 1 August 2018 ∗)
(∗ Author : Assured Things by Design : Lori Picker ing , Keara Hi l l , and Keaten ∗)
(∗ Stokke ∗)
(∗ Descr ip t ion : This f i l e conta ins the data type d e f i n i t i o n s f o r the pro jec t ' s ∗)
(∗ secure s t a t e machine : p r i n c i pa l s , commands , s t a t e s , and outputs . I t a l s o ∗)
(∗ conta ins the d i s t i n c t n e s s and one to oneness theorems . ∗)
(∗ Projec t Descr ip t ion : ssmSecureHalt . ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
structure pro j e c tTypesSc r ip t = struct
open HolKernel Parse boolLib bossLib TypeBase
val _= new_theory " pro jectTypes " ;





































(∗ Theorems to prove d i s t i n c t n e s s and one to one . ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
val p r i n c i p a l_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s = d i s t in c t_o f ￿ ￿ : p r i n c i pa l ￿￿
val _= save_thm( " p r i n c i p a l_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s " ,
p r i n c i p a l_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s )
val platoonLeaderCom_dist inct_clauses = d i s t in c t_o f ￿ ￿ : platoonLeaderCom ￿￿
val _= save_thm( "platoonLeaderCom_dist inct_clauses " ,
platoonLeaderCom_dist inct_clauses )
val omniCom_distinct_clauses = d i s t inc t_o f ￿ ￿ :omniCom￿￿
val _= save_thm( "omniCom_distinct_clauses " ,
omniCom_distinct_clauses )
val commands_distinct_clauses = d i s t in c t_o f ￿ ￿ : commands￿￿
val _= save_thm( " commands_distinct_clauses " ,
commands_distinct_clauses )
val s t a t e_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s = d i s t inc t_o f ￿ ￿ : s ta te ￿￿
val _= save_thm( " s t a t e_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s " ,
s t a t e_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s )
val output_di s t inc t_c lauses = d i s t in c t_o f ￿ ￿ : output ￿￿
val _= save_thm( " output_di s t inc t_c lauses " ,
output_di s t inc t_c lauses )
val commands_one_one = one_one_of ￿ ￿ : commands￿￿
val _= save_thm( "commands_one_one" ,
commands_one_one)
val _= export_theory ( ) ;
end
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗ p r o j e c t U t i l i t i e s S c r i p t . sml ∗)
(∗ Date : 1 August 2018 ∗)
(∗ Author : Assured Things by Design : Lori Picker ing , Keara Hi l l , and Keaten ∗)
(∗ Stokke ∗)
(∗ Descr ip t ion : This f i l e conta ins the data type d e f i n i t i o n s f o r the pro jec t ' s ∗)
(∗ secure s t a t e machine : p r i n c i pa l s , commands , s t a t e s , and outputs . I t a l s o ∗)
(∗ conta ins the d i s t i n c t n e s s and one to oneness theorems . ∗)
(∗ Projec t Descr ip t ion : ssmSecureHalt . ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
structure p r o j e c t U t i l i t i e s S c r i p t = struct
open HolKernel Parse boolLib bossLib TypeBase TypeBase l i s tTheo ry optionTheory
open ac l_in fRu le s ac l ru l e sTheory ac lDrulesTheory satL i s tTheory
open projectTypesTheory
val _= new_theory " p r o j e c t U t i l i t i e s " ;
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗ Functions f o r e x t r a c t i n g commands from input stream . ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
val getPlatoonLeaderCOM_def = Def ine ￿
( getPlatoonLeaderCOM ( [ ] : commands opt ion l i s t ) = (NONE: commands opt ion ) )
/\
( getPlatoonLeaderCOM (( SOME (PlatoonLeaderCOM cmd ) ) : : xs ) =
( SOME (PlatoonLeaderCOM cmd) ) )
/\
( getPlatoonLeaderCOM (_: : xs ) = getPlatoonLeaderCOM xs ) ￿
val getOmniCOM_def = Def ine ￿
(getOmniCOM ( [ ] : commands opt ion l i s t ) = (NONE: commands opt ion ) )
/\
(getOmniCOM (( SOME (OmniCOM cmd ) ) : : xs ) =
( SOME (OmniCOM cmd) ) )
/\
(getOmniCOM (_: : xs ) = getOmniCOM xs ) ￿
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(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗ Functions f o r e x t r a c t i n g commands from input l i s t . ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
val getPlatoonLeaderCOMx_def = Def ine ￿
( getPlatoonLeaderCOMx ( [ ] : ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t ) = NONE)
/\
( getPlatoonLeaderCOMx ( ( (Name PlatoonLeader ) says ( prop (SOME (PlatoonLeaderCOM cmd ) ) ) ) : : xs ) =
(SOME (PlatoonLeaderCOM cmd : commands ) ) )
/\
( getPlatoonLeaderCOMx (_: : xs ) = getPlatoonLeaderCOMx xs ) ￿
val getOmniCOMx_def = Def ine ￿
(getOmniCOMx ( [ ] : ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t ) = NONE)
/\
(getOmniCOMx ( ( (Name Omni) says ( prop (SOME (OmniCOM cmd ) ) ) ) : : xs ) =
(SOME (OmniCOM cmd : commands ) ) )
/\
(getOmniCOMx (_: : xs ) = getOmniCOMx xs ) ￿
val _= export_theory ( ) ;
end
D.4.1.2 SecureHaltDef Theory: Authentication & Authorization
Definitions
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗ projectSMScript . sml ∗)
(∗ Date : 1 August 2018 ∗)
(∗ Author : Assured Things by Design : Lori Picker ing , Keara Hi l l , and Keaten ∗)
(∗ Stokke ∗)
(∗ Descr ip t ion : This f i l e conta ins the data type d e f i n i t i o n s f o r the pro jec t ' s ∗)
(∗ secure s t a t e machine ' s next s t a t e and next output f unc t i on s . ∗)
(∗ Projec t Descr ip t ion : ssmSecureHalt . ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
structure projectSMScr ipt = struct
open HolKernel Parse boolLib bossLib TypeBase TypeBase l i s tTheo ry optionTheory
open ac l_in fRu le s ac l ru l e sTheory ac lDrulesTheory satL i s tTheory ssmTheory
open s sminfRules projectTypesTheory p r o j e c tU t i l i t i e sTh e o r y
val _= new_theory "projectSM" ;
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗ Next s t a t e func t i on . ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
val NS_def = Define ￿
(NS SECURE_HALT ( exec x ) =




(NS SECURE ( exec x ) =




(NS ORP_RECON ( exec x ) =




(NS WITHDRAW ( exec x ) =




(NS ( s : s t a t e ) ( trap _) = s ) /\
(NS ( s : s t a t e ) ( d i s ca rd _) = s ) ￿
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(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗ Next output func t i on . ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
val NS_def = Define ￿
(NOut SECURE_HALT ( exec x ) =




(NOut SECURE ( exec x ) =




(NOut ORP_RECON ( exec x ) =




(NOut WITHDRAW ( exec x ) =




(NOut ( s : s t a t e ) ( trap _) = UnAuthorized ) /\
(NOut ( s : s t a t e ) ( d i s ca rd _) = UnAuthenticated ) ￿
val _= export_theory ( ) ;
end
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗ p r o j e c t S e cu r i t y S c r i p t . sml ∗)
(∗ Date : 1 August 2018 ∗)
(∗ Author : Assured Things by Design : Lori Picker ing , Keara Hi l l , and Keaten ∗)
(∗ Stokke ∗)
(∗ Descr ip t ion : This f i l e conta ins the s e c u r i t y p o l i c y ( s ta t e dependent ∗)
(∗ au thor i za t i on , g l o b a l au t ho r i z a t i on ) and au then t i ca t i on po l i c y . ∗)
(∗ Projec t Descr ip t ion : ssmSecureHalt . ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
structure p r o j e c t S e c u r i t y S c r i p t = struct
open HolKernel Parse boolLib bossLib TypeBase TypeBase l i s tTheo ry optionTheory
open ac l_in fRu le s ac l ru l e sTheory ac lDrulesTheory satL i s tTheory ssmTheory
open s sminfRules projectTypesTheory p r o j e c tU t i l i t i e sTh e o r y
val _= new_theory " p r o j e c t S e cu r i t y " ;
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗ Authent ica t ion d e f i n i t i o n s . ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
val authent i ca t ion_de f = Def ine ￿
( au then t i c a t i on
( ( (Name PlatoonLeader ) says ( prop (SOME (PlatoonLeaderCOM (x : platoonLeaderCom ) ) ) ) )
: ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form) = T) /\
( au then t i c a t i on
( ( (Name Omni) says ( prop (SOME (OmniCOM (x : omniCom ) ) ) ) )
: ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form) = T) /\
( au then t i c a t i on _ = F) ￿
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗ s ta teAuth d e f i n i t i o n s . ∗)
(∗ A sta t e dependent s e cu r i t y con tex t . ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
val stateAuth_def = Define ￿
stateAuth ( s : s t a t e ) ( x : ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t ) =




( getPlatoonLeaderCOMx x = SOME (PlatoonLeaderCOM secure ) )
then
[ (Name PlatoonLeader ) c on t r o l s ( prop (SOME (PlatoonLeaderCOM secure ) ) )
: ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form ]
else
[ prop NONE: ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form ]
else
i f ( s = SECURE)
then
i f
( getPlatoonLeaderCOMx x = SOME (PlatoonLeaderCOM orpRecon ) )
then
[ (Name PlatoonLeader ) c on t r o l s ( prop (SOME (PlatoonLeaderCOM orpRecon ) ) )
: ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form ]
else
[ prop NONE: ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form ]
else
i f ( s = ORP_RECON)
then
i f
( getPlatoonLeaderCOMx x = SOME (PlatoonLeaderCOM withdraw ) )
then
[ (Name PlatoonLeader ) c on t r o l s ( prop (SOME (PlatoonLeaderCOM withdraw ) ) )
: ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form ]
else
[ prop NONE: ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form ]
else
i f ( s = WITHDRAW)
then
i f
( getPlatoonLeaderCOMx x = SOME (PlatoonLeaderCOM complete ) )
then
[ (Name PlatoonLeader ) c on t r o l s ( prop (SOME (PlatoonLeaderCOM complete ) ) )
: ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form ]
else
[ prop NONE: ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form ]
else
[ prop NONE: ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form] ￿
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗ g loba lAuth d e f i n i t i o n s . ∗)
(∗ A g l o b a l s e c u r i t y con tex t . ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
val globalAuth_def = Def ine ￿
globalAuth (x : ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t ) =
[TT: ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form ]
￿
val _= export_theory ( ) ;
end
D.4.1.3 ssmSecureHalt Theory: Theorems
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗ pro jec tAssuranceExecScr ip t . sml ∗)
(∗ Date : 1 August 2018 ∗)
(∗ Author : Assured Things by Design : Lori Picker ing , Keara Hi l l , and Keaten ∗)
(∗ Stokke ∗)
(∗ Descr ip t ion : This f i l e conta ins the proo f s f o r complete mediation . In ∗)
(∗ pa r t i cu l a r , t h e se proo f s prove t ha t a t r a n s i t i o n i s executed i f and only ∗)
(∗ i f the input i s au then t i ca t ed and au thor i z ed . ∗)
(∗ Projec t Descr ip t ion : ssmSecureHalt . ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
structure pro j ec tAssuranceExecScr ip t = struct
open HolKernel Parse boolLib bossLib TypeBase TypeBase l i s tTheo ry optionTheory
open ac l_in fRu le s ac l ru l e sTheory ac lDrulesTheory satL i s tTheory ssmTheory
open s sminfRules projectTypesTheory p r o j e c tU t i l i t i e sTh e o r y pro j e c tSecur i tyTheory
open satL i s tTheory bossLib
val _= new_theory " projectAssuranceExec " ;
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(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗ Sta te : SECURE_HALT ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗                                                                            ∗)
(∗ Execute t r a s i t i o n j u s t i f i e d : ∗)
(∗ SECURE_HALT   > SECURE ∗)
(∗                                                                            ∗)
val he lpe r1 = ISPECL
[
￿￿ au then t i c a t i on : ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form  > bool ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿globalAuth : ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t  >
(commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ stateAuth : s t a t e  >
(commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t  >
(commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t ￿ ￿ ,
￿ ￿ [ (Name PlatoonLeader ) says ( prop (SOME (PlatoonLeaderCOM secure ) ) )
: ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form] ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ i n s : ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t l i s t ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿SECURE_HALT￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ outs : commands opt ion l i s t trType l i s t ￿￿
] TR_exec_cmd_rule
val he lpe r2 = f s t ( dest_imp ( conc l he lpe r1 ) )
val SECURE_HALT_exec_secure_lemma1 =
TAC_PROOF(
( [ ] , he lpe r2 ) ,
REWRITE_TAC[
CFGInterpret_def , globalAuth_def , stateAuth_def , getPlatoonLeaderCOM_def ,
getOmniCOM_def , getPlatoonLeaderCOMx_def , getOmniCOMx_def , inputList_def ,
extractInput_def , MAP, propCommandList_def , extractPropCommand_def ,
satList_CONS , sa tL i s t_n i l ,
GSYM satL i s t_con j ]
THEN
REWRITE_TAC[
NOT_NONE_SOME, NOT_SOME_NONE, SOME_11, s t a t e_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s ,
output_dis t inct_c lauses , commands_distinct_clauses ,
p r i n c i pa l_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s , platoonLeaderCom_dist inct_clauses ,
omniCom_distinct_clauses , commands_one_one ,
GSYM sta t e_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s ,
GSYM output_dist inct_c lauses ,
GSYM commands_distinct_clauses ,
GSYM pr in c i pa l_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s ,




satList_CONS , s a tL i s t_n i l ]
THEN
PROVE_TAC[
Controls , Modus_Ponens ]
)
val _= save_thm( "SECURE_HALT_exec_secure_lemma1" ,
SECURE_HALT_exec_secure_lemma1)
val he lpe r3 = snd ( dest_imp ( conc l he lpe r1 ) )
val SECURE_HALT_exec_secure_lemma2 =
TAC_PROOF(










propCommandList_def , inputList_def , extractPropCommand_def , extractInput_def ,
MAP
] SECURE_HALT_exec_secure_lemma2
val _= save_thm( "SECURE_HALT_exec_secure_thm" ,
SECURE_HALT_exec_secure_thm)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗ Sta te : SECURE ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗                                                                            ∗)
(∗ Execute t r a s i t i o n j u s t i f i e d : ∗)
(∗ SECURE   > ORP_RECON ∗)
(∗                                                                            ∗)
val he lpe r1 = ISPECL
[
￿￿ au then t i c a t i on : ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form  > bool ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿globalAuth : ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t  >
(commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ stateAuth : s t a t e  >
(commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t  >
(commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t ￿ ￿ ,
￿ ￿ [ (Name PlatoonLeader ) says ( prop (SOME (PlatoonLeaderCOM orpRecon ) ) )
: ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form] ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ i n s : ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t l i s t ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿SECURE￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ outs : commands opt ion l i s t trType l i s t ￿￿
] TR_exec_cmd_rule
val he lpe r2 = f s t ( dest_imp ( conc l he lpe r1 ) )
val SECURE_exec_orpRecon_lemma1 =
TAC_PROOF(
( [ ] , he lpe r2 ) ,
REWRITE_TAC[
CFGInterpret_def , globalAuth_def , stateAuth_def , getPlatoonLeaderCOM_def ,
getOmniCOM_def , getPlatoonLeaderCOMx_def , getOmniCOMx_def , inputList_def ,
extractInput_def , MAP, propCommandList_def , extractPropCommand_def ,
satList_CONS , sa tL i s t_n i l ,
GSYM satL i s t_con j ]
THEN
REWRITE_TAC[
NOT_NONE_SOME, NOT_SOME_NONE, SOME_11, s t a t e_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s ,
output_dis t inct_c lauses , commands_distinct_clauses ,
p r i n c i pa l_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s , platoonLeaderCom_dist inct_clauses ,
omniCom_distinct_clauses , commands_one_one ,
GSYM sta t e_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s ,
GSYM output_dist inct_c lauses ,
GSYM commands_distinct_clauses ,
GSYM pr in c i pa l_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s ,




satList_CONS , s a tL i s t_n i l ]
THEN
PROVE_TAC[
Controls , Modus_Ponens ]
)
val _= save_thm( "SECURE_exec_orpRecon_lemma1" ,
SECURE_exec_orpRecon_lemma1)
val he lpe r3 = snd ( dest_imp ( conc l he lpe r1 ) )
val SECURE_exec_orpRecon_lemma2 =
TAC_PROOF(










propCommandList_def , inputList_def , extractPropCommand_def , extractInput_def ,
MAP
] SECURE_exec_orpRecon_lemma2
val _= save_thm( "SECURE_exec_orpRecon_thm" ,
SECURE_exec_orpRecon_thm)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗ Sta te : ORP_RECON ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗                                                                            ∗)
(∗ Execute t r a s i t i o n j u s t i f i e d : ∗)
(∗ ORP_RECON   > WITHDRAW ∗)
(∗                                                                            ∗)
val he lpe r1 = ISPECL
[
￿￿ au then t i c a t i on : ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form  > bool ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿globalAuth : ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t  >
(commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ stateAuth : s t a t e  >
(commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t  >
(commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t ￿ ￿ ,
￿ ￿ [ (Name PlatoonLeader ) says ( prop (SOME (PlatoonLeaderCOM withdraw ) ) )
: ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form] ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ i n s : ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t l i s t ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ORP_RECON￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ outs : commands opt ion l i s t trType l i s t ￿￿
] TR_exec_cmd_rule
val he lpe r2 = f s t ( dest_imp ( conc l he lpe r1 ) )
val ORP_RECON_exec_withdraw_lemma1 =
TAC_PROOF(
( [ ] , he lpe r2 ) ,
REWRITE_TAC[
CFGInterpret_def , globalAuth_def , stateAuth_def , getPlatoonLeaderCOM_def ,
getOmniCOM_def , getPlatoonLeaderCOMx_def , getOmniCOMx_def , inputList_def ,
extractInput_def , MAP, propCommandList_def , extractPropCommand_def ,
satList_CONS , sa tL i s t_n i l ,
GSYM satL i s t_con j ]
THEN
REWRITE_TAC[
NOT_NONE_SOME, NOT_SOME_NONE, SOME_11, s t a t e_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s ,
output_dis t inct_c lauses , commands_distinct_clauses ,
p r i n c i pa l_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s , platoonLeaderCom_dist inct_clauses ,
omniCom_distinct_clauses , commands_one_one ,
GSYM sta t e_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s ,
GSYM output_dist inct_c lauses ,
GSYM commands_distinct_clauses ,
GSYM pr in c i pa l_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s ,




satList_CONS , s a tL i s t_n i l ]
THEN
PROVE_TAC[
Controls , Modus_Ponens ]
)
val _= save_thm( "ORP_RECON_exec_withdraw_lemma1" ,
ORP_RECON_exec_withdraw_lemma1)
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val he lpe r3 = snd ( dest_imp ( conc l he lpe r1 ) )
val ORP_RECON_exec_withdraw_lemma2 =
TAC_PROOF(









propCommandList_def , inputList_def , extractPropCommand_def , extractInput_def ,
MAP
] ORP_RECON_exec_withdraw_lemma2
val _= save_thm( "ORP_RECON_exec_withdraw_thm" ,
ORP_RECON_exec_withdraw_thm)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗ Sta te : WITHDRAW ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗                                                                            ∗)
(∗ Execute t r a s i t i o n j u s t i f i e d : ∗)
(∗ WITHDRAW   > COMPLETE ∗)
(∗                                                                            ∗)
val he lpe r1 = ISPECL
[
￿￿ au then t i c a t i on : ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form  > bool ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿globalAuth : ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t  >
(commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ stateAuth : s t a t e  >
(commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t  >
(commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t ￿ ￿ ,
￿ ￿ [ (Name PlatoonLeader ) says ( prop (SOME (PlatoonLeaderCOM complete ) ) )
: ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form] ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ i n s : ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t l i s t ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿WITHDRAW￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ outs : commands opt ion l i s t trType l i s t ￿￿
] TR_exec_cmd_rule
val he lpe r2 = f s t ( dest_imp ( conc l he lpe r1 ) )
val WITHDRAW_exec_complete_lemma1 =
TAC_PROOF(
( [ ] , he lpe r2 ) ,
REWRITE_TAC[
CFGInterpret_def , globalAuth_def , stateAuth_def , getPlatoonLeaderCOM_def ,
getOmniCOM_def , getPlatoonLeaderCOMx_def , getOmniCOMx_def , inputList_def ,
extractInput_def , MAP, propCommandList_def , extractPropCommand_def ,
satList_CONS , sa tL i s t_n i l ,
GSYM satL i s t_con j ]
THEN
REWRITE_TAC[
NOT_NONE_SOME, NOT_SOME_NONE, SOME_11, s t a t e_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s ,
output_dis t inct_c lauses , commands_distinct_clauses ,
p r i n c i pa l_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s , platoonLeaderCom_dist inct_clauses ,
omniCom_distinct_clauses , commands_one_one ,
GSYM sta t e_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s ,
GSYM output_dist inct_c lauses ,
GSYM commands_distinct_clauses ,
GSYM pr in c i pa l_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s ,








Controls , Modus_Ponens ]
)
val _= save_thm( "WITHDRAW_exec_complete_lemma1" ,
WITHDRAW_exec_complete_lemma1)
val he lpe r3 = snd ( dest_imp ( conc l he lpe r1 ) )
val WITHDRAW_exec_complete_lemma2 =
TAC_PROOF(









propCommandList_def , inputList_def , extractPropCommand_def , extractInput_def ,
MAP
] WITHDRAW_exec_complete_lemma2
val _= save_thm( "WITHDRAW_exec_complete_thm" ,
WITHDRAW_exec_complete_thm)
val _= export_theory ( ) ;
end
D.4.2 ssmORPRecon
D.4.2.1 ORPReconType Theory: Type Definitions
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗ pro j ec tTypesScr ip t . sml ∗)
(∗ Date : 1 August 2018 ∗)
(∗ Author : Assured Things by Design : Lori Picker ing , Keara Hi l l , and Keaten ∗)
(∗ Stokke ∗)
(∗ Descr ip t ion : This f i l e conta ins the data type d e f i n i t i o n s f o r the pro jec t ' s ∗)
(∗ secure s t a t e machine : p r i n c i pa l s , commands , s t a t e s , and outputs . I t a l s o ∗)
(∗ conta ins the d i s t i n c t n e s s and one to oneness theorems . ∗)
(∗ Projec t Descr ip t ion : ssmORPRecon . ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
structure pro j e c tTypesSc r ip t = struct
open HolKernel Parse boolLib bossLib TypeBase
val _= new_theory " pro jectTypes " ;










































(∗ Theorems to prove d i s t i n c t n e s s and one to one . ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
val p r i n c i p a l_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s = d i s t in c t_o f ￿ ￿ : p r i n c i pa l ￿￿
val _= save_thm( " p r i n c i p a l_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s " ,
p r i n c i p a l_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s )
val platoonLeaderCom_dist inct_clauses = d i s t in c t_o f ￿ ￿ : platoonLeaderCom ￿￿
val _= save_thm( "platoonLeaderCom_dist inct_clauses " ,
platoonLeaderCom_dist inct_clauses )
val omniCom_distinct_clauses = d i s t inc t_o f ￿ ￿ :omniCom￿￿
val _= save_thm( "omniCom_distinct_clauses " ,
omniCom_distinct_clauses )
val commands_distinct_clauses = d i s t in c t_o f ￿ ￿ : commands￿￿
val _= save_thm( " commands_distinct_clauses " ,
commands_distinct_clauses )
val s t a t e_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s = d i s t inc t_o f ￿ ￿ : s ta te ￿￿
val _= save_thm( " s t a t e_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s " ,
s t a t e_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s )
val output_di s t inc t_c lauses = d i s t in c t_o f ￿ ￿ : output ￿￿
val _= save_thm( " output_di s t inc t_c lauses " ,
output_di s t inc t_c lauses )
val commands_one_one = one_one_of ￿ ￿ : commands￿￿
val _= save_thm( "commands_one_one" ,
commands_one_one)
val _= export_theory ( ) ;
end
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗ p r o j e c t U t i l i t i e s S c r i p t . sml ∗)
(∗ Date : 1 August 2018 ∗)
(∗ Author : Assured Things by Design : Lori Picker ing , Keara Hi l l , and Keaten ∗)
(∗ Stokke ∗)
(∗ Descr ip t ion : This f i l e conta ins the data type d e f i n i t i o n s f o r the pro jec t ' s ∗)
(∗ secure s t a t e machine : p r i n c i pa l s , commands , s t a t e s , and outputs . I t a l s o ∗)
(∗ conta ins the d i s t i n c t n e s s and one to oneness theorems . ∗)
(∗ Projec t Descr ip t ion : ssmORPRecon . ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
structure p r o j e c t U t i l i t i e s S c r i p t = struct
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open HolKernel Parse boolLib bossLib TypeBase TypeBase l i s tTheo ry optionTheory
open ac l_in fRu le s ac l ru l e sTheory ac lDrulesTheory satL i s tTheory
open projectTypesTheory
val _= new_theory " p r o j e c t U t i l i t i e s " ;
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗ Functions f o r e x t r a c t i n g commands from input stream . ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
val getPlatoonLeaderCOM_def = Def ine ￿
( getPlatoonLeaderCOM ( [ ] : commands opt ion l i s t ) = (NONE: commands opt ion ) )
/\
( getPlatoonLeaderCOM (( SOME (PlatoonLeaderCOM cmd ) ) : : xs ) =
( SOME (PlatoonLeaderCOM cmd) ) )
/\
( getPlatoonLeaderCOM (_: : xs ) = getPlatoonLeaderCOM xs ) ￿
val getOmniCOM_def = Def ine ￿
(getOmniCOM ( [ ] : commands opt ion l i s t ) = (NONE: commands opt ion ) )
/\
(getOmniCOM (( SOME (OmniCOM cmd ) ) : : xs ) =
( SOME (OmniCOM cmd) ) )
/\
(getOmniCOM (_: : xs ) = getOmniCOM xs ) ￿
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗ Functions f o r e x t r a c t i n g commands from input l i s t . ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
val getPlatoonLeaderCOMx_def = Def ine ￿
( getPlatoonLeaderCOMx ( [ ] : ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t ) = NONE)
/\
( getPlatoonLeaderCOMx ( ( (Name PlatoonLeader ) says ( prop (SOME (PlatoonLeaderCOM cmd ) ) ) ) : : xs ) =
(SOME (PlatoonLeaderCOM cmd : commands ) ) )
/\
( getPlatoonLeaderCOMx (_: : xs ) = getPlatoonLeaderCOMx xs ) ￿
val getOmniCOMx_def = Def ine ￿
(getOmniCOMx ( [ ] : ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t ) = NONE)
/\
(getOmniCOMx ( ( (Name Omni) says ( prop (SOME (OmniCOM cmd ) ) ) ) : : xs ) =
(SOME (OmniCOM cmd : commands ) ) )
/\
(getOmniCOMx (_: : xs ) = getOmniCOMx xs ) ￿
val _= export_theory ( ) ;
end
D.4.2.2 ORPReconDef Theory: Authentication & Authorization
Definitions
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗ projectSMScript . sml ∗)
(∗ Date : 1 August 2018 ∗)
(∗ Author : Assured Things by Design : Lori Picker ing , Keara Hi l l , and Keaten ∗)
(∗ Stokke ∗)
(∗ Descr ip t ion : This f i l e conta ins the data type d e f i n i t i o n s f o r the pro jec t ' s ∗)
(∗ secure s t a t e machine ' s next s t a t e and next output f unc t i on s . ∗)
(∗ Projec t Descr ip t ion : ssmORPRecon . ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
structure projectSMScr ipt = struct
open HolKernel Parse boolLib bossLib TypeBase TypeBase l i s tTheo ry optionTheory
open ac l_in fRu le s ac l ru l e sTheory ac lDrulesTheory satL i s tTheory ssmTheory
open s sminfRules projectTypesTheory p r o j e c tU t i l i t i e sTh e o r y
val _= new_theory "projectSM" ;
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
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(∗ Next s t a t e func t i on . ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
val NS_def = Define ￿
(NS ORP_RECON ( exec x ) =




(NS CONTINGENCY_PLAN ( exec x ) =




(NS MOVE_TO_ORP ( exec x ) =




(NS CONDUCT_ORP ( exec x ) =




(NS FORM_ST ( exec x ) =




(NS RETURN_TO_UNIT ( exec x ) =




(NS ( s : s t a t e ) ( trap _) = s ) /\
(NS ( s : s t a t e ) ( d i s ca rd _) = s ) ￿
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗ Next output func t i on . ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
val NS_def = Define ￿
(NOut ORP_RECON ( exec x ) =




(NOut CONTINGENCY_PLAN ( exec x ) =




(NOut MOVE_TO_ORP ( exec x ) =




(NOut CONDUCT_ORP ( exec x ) =




(NOut FORM_ST ( exec x ) =




(NOut RETURN_TO_UNIT ( exec x ) =




(NOut ( s : s t a t e ) ( trap _) = UnAuthorized ) /\
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(NOut ( s : s t a t e ) ( d i s ca rd _) = UnAuthenticated ) ￿
val _= export_theory ( ) ;
end
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗ p r o j e c t S e cu r i t y S c r i p t . sml ∗)
(∗ Date : 1 August 2018 ∗)
(∗ Author : Assured Things by Design : Lori Picker ing , Keara Hi l l , and Keaten ∗)
(∗ Stokke ∗)
(∗ Descr ip t ion : This f i l e conta ins the s e c u r i t y p o l i c y ( s ta t e dependent ∗)
(∗ au thor i za t i on , g l o b a l au t ho r i z a t i on ) and au then t i ca t i on po l i c y . ∗)
(∗ Projec t Descr ip t ion : ssmORPRecon . ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
structure p r o j e c t S e c u r i t y S c r i p t = struct
open HolKernel Parse boolLib bossLib TypeBase TypeBase l i s tTheo ry optionTheory
open ac l_in fRu le s ac l ru l e sTheory ac lDrulesTheory satL i s tTheory ssmTheory
open s sminfRules projectTypesTheory p r o j e c tU t i l i t i e sTh e o r y
val _= new_theory " p r o j e c t S e cu r i t y " ;
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗ Authent ica t ion d e f i n i t i o n s . ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
val authent i ca t ion_de f = Def ine ￿
( au then t i c a t i on
( ( (Name PlatoonLeader ) says ( prop (SOME (PlatoonLeaderCOM (x : platoonLeaderCom ) ) ) ) )
: ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form) = T) /\
( au then t i c a t i on
( ( (Name Omni) says ( prop (SOME (OmniCOM (x : omniCom ) ) ) ) )
: ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form) = T) /\
( au then t i c a t i on _ = F) ￿
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗ s ta teAuth d e f i n i t i o n s . ∗)
(∗ A sta t e dependent s e c u r i t y con tex t . ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
val stateAuth_def = Define ￿
stateAuth ( s : s t a t e ) ( x : ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t ) =
i f ( s = ORP_RECON)
then
i f
( getPlatoonLeaderCOMx x = SOME (PlatoonLeaderCOM contingencyPlan ) )
then
[ (Name PlatoonLeader ) c on t r o l s ( prop (SOME (PlatoonLeaderCOM contingencyPlan ) ) )
: ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form ]
else
[ prop NONE: ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form ]
else
i f ( s = CONTINGENCY_PLAN)
then
i f
( getPlatoonLeaderCOMx x = SOME (PlatoonLeaderCOM moveToORP) )
then
[ (Name PlatoonLeader ) c on t r o l s ( prop (SOME (PlatoonLeaderCOM moveToORP) ) )
: ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form ]
else
[ prop NONE: ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form ]
else
i f ( s = MOVE_TO_ORP)
then
i f
( getPlatoonLeaderCOMx x = SOME (PlatoonLeaderCOM conductORP ) )
then
[ (Name PlatoonLeader ) c on t r o l s ( prop (SOME (PlatoonLeaderCOM conductORP ) ) )
: ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form ]
else
[ prop NONE: ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form ]
else




( getPlatoonLeaderCOMx x = SOME (PlatoonLeaderCOM formST ) )
then
[ (Name PlatoonLeader ) c on t r o l s ( prop (SOME (PlatoonLeaderCOM formST ) ) )
: ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form ]
else
[ prop NONE: ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form ]
else
i f ( s = FORM_ST)
then
i f
( getPlatoonLeaderCOMx x = SOME (PlatoonLeaderCOM returnToUnit ) )
then
[ (Name PlatoonLeader ) c on t r o l s ( prop (SOME (PlatoonLeaderCOM returnToUnit ) ) )
: ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form ]
else
[ prop NONE: ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form ]
else
i f ( s = RETURN_TO_UNIT)
then
i f
( getPlatoonLeaderCOMx x = SOME (PlatoonLeaderCOM complete ) )
then
[ (Name PlatoonLeader ) c on t r o l s ( prop (SOME (PlatoonLeaderCOM complete ) ) )
: ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form ]
else
[ prop NONE: ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form ]
else
[ prop NONE: ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form] ￿
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗ g loba lAuth d e f i n i t i o n s . ∗)
(∗ A g l o b a l s e c u r i t y con tex t . ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
val globalAuth_def = Def ine ￿
globalAuth (x : ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t ) =
[TT: ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form ]
￿
val _= export_theory ( ) ;
end
D.4.2.3 ssmORPRecon Theory: Theorems
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗ pro jec tAssuranceExecScr ip t . sml ∗)
(∗ Date : 1 August 2018 ∗)
(∗ Author : Assured Things by Design : Lori Picker ing , Keara Hi l l , and Keaten ∗)
(∗ Stokke ∗)
(∗ Descr ip t ion : This f i l e conta ins the proo f s f o r complete mediation . In ∗)
(∗ pa r t i cu l a r , t h e se proo f s prove t ha t a t r a n s i t i o n i s executed i f and only ∗)
(∗ i f the input i s au then t i ca t ed and au thor i z ed . ∗)
(∗ Projec t Descr ip t ion : ssmORPRecon . ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
structure pro j ec tAssuranceExecScr ip t = struct
open HolKernel Parse boolLib bossLib TypeBase TypeBase l i s tTheo ry optionTheory
open ac l_in fRu le s ac l ru l e sTheory ac lDrulesTheory satL i s tTheory ssmTheory
open s sminfRules projectTypesTheory p r o j e c tU t i l i t i e sTh e o r y pro j e c tSecur i tyTheory
open satL i s tTheory bossLib
val _= new_theory " projectAssuranceExec " ;
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗ Sta te : ORP_RECON ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗                                                                            ∗)
(∗ Execute t r a s i t i o n j u s t i f i e d : ∗)
(∗ ORP_RECON   > CONTINGENCY_PLAN ∗)
(∗                                                                            ∗)
val he lpe r1 = ISPECL
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[
￿￿ au then t i c a t i on : ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form  > bool ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿globalAuth : ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t  >
(commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ stateAuth : s t a t e  >
(commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t  >
(commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t ￿ ￿ ,
￿ ￿ [ (Name PlatoonLeader ) says ( prop (SOME (PlatoonLeaderCOM contingencyPlan ) ) )
: ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form] ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ i n s : ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t l i s t ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ORP_RECON￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ outs : commands opt ion l i s t trType l i s t ￿￿
] TR_exec_cmd_rule
val he lpe r2 = f s t ( dest_imp ( conc l he lpe r1 ) )
val ORP_RECON_exec_contingencyPlan_lemma1 =
TAC_PROOF(
( [ ] , he lpe r2 ) ,
REWRITE_TAC[
CFGInterpret_def , globalAuth_def , stateAuth_def , getPlatoonLeaderCOM_def ,
getOmniCOM_def , getPlatoonLeaderCOMx_def , getOmniCOMx_def , inputList_def ,
extractInput_def , MAP, propCommandList_def , extractPropCommand_def ,
satList_CONS , sa tL i s t_n i l ,
GSYM satL i s t_con j ]
THEN
REWRITE_TAC[
NOT_NONE_SOME, NOT_SOME_NONE, SOME_11, s t a t e_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s ,
output_dis t inct_c lauses , commands_distinct_clauses ,
p r i n c i pa l_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s , platoonLeaderCom_dist inct_clauses ,
omniCom_distinct_clauses , commands_one_one ,
GSYM sta t e_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s ,
GSYM output_dist inct_c lauses ,
GSYM commands_distinct_clauses ,
GSYM pr in c i pa l_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s ,




satList_CONS , s a tL i s t_n i l ]
THEN
PROVE_TAC[
Controls , Modus_Ponens ]
)
val _= save_thm( "ORP_RECON_exec_contingencyPlan_lemma1" ,
ORP_RECON_exec_contingencyPlan_lemma1)
val he lpe r3 = snd ( dest_imp ( conc l he lpe r1 ) )
val ORP_RECON_exec_contingencyPlan_lemma2 =
TAC_PROOF(









propCommandList_def , inputList_def , extractPropCommand_def , extractInput_def ,
MAP
] ORP_RECON_exec_contingencyPlan_lemma2




(∗ Sta te : CONTINGENCY_PLAN ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗                                                                            ∗)
(∗ Execute t r a s i t i o n j u s t i f i e d : ∗)
(∗ CONTINGENCY_PLAN   > MOVE_TO_ORP ∗)
(∗                                                                            ∗)
val he lpe r1 = ISPECL
[
￿￿ au then t i c a t i on : ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form  > bool ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿globalAuth : ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t  >
(commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ stateAuth : s t a t e  >
(commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t  >
(commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t ￿ ￿ ,
￿ ￿ [ (Name PlatoonLeader ) says ( prop (SOME (PlatoonLeaderCOM moveToORP) ) )
: ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form] ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ i n s : ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t l i s t ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿CONTINGENCY_PLAN￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ outs : commands opt ion l i s t trType l i s t ￿￿
] TR_exec_cmd_rule
val he lpe r2 = f s t ( dest_imp ( conc l he lpe r1 ) )
val CONTINGENCY_PLAN_exec_moveToORP_lemma1 =
TAC_PROOF(
( [ ] , he lpe r2 ) ,
REWRITE_TAC[
CFGInterpret_def , globalAuth_def , stateAuth_def , getPlatoonLeaderCOM_def ,
getOmniCOM_def , getPlatoonLeaderCOMx_def , getOmniCOMx_def , inputList_def ,
extractInput_def , MAP, propCommandList_def , extractPropCommand_def ,
satList_CONS , sa tL i s t_n i l ,
GSYM satL i s t_con j ]
THEN
REWRITE_TAC[
NOT_NONE_SOME, NOT_SOME_NONE, SOME_11, s t a t e_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s ,
output_dis t inct_c lauses , commands_distinct_clauses ,
p r i n c i pa l_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s , platoonLeaderCom_dist inct_clauses ,
omniCom_distinct_clauses , commands_one_one ,
GSYM sta t e_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s ,
GSYM output_dist inct_c lauses ,
GSYM commands_distinct_clauses ,
GSYM pr in c i pa l_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s ,




satList_CONS , s a tL i s t_n i l ]
THEN
PROVE_TAC[
Controls , Modus_Ponens ]
)
val _= save_thm( "CONTINGENCY_PLAN_exec_moveToORP_lemma1" ,
CONTINGENCY_PLAN_exec_moveToORP_lemma1)
val he lpe r3 = snd ( dest_imp ( conc l he lpe r1 ) )
val CONTINGENCY_PLAN_exec_moveToORP_lemma2 =
TAC_PROOF(










propCommandList_def , inputList_def , extractPropCommand_def , extractInput_def ,
MAP
] CONTINGENCY_PLAN_exec_moveToORP_lemma2
val _= save_thm( "CONTINGENCY_PLAN_exec_moveToORP_thm" ,
CONTINGENCY_PLAN_exec_moveToORP_thm)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗ Sta te : MOVE_TO_ORP ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗                                                                            ∗)
(∗ Execute t r a s i t i o n j u s t i f i e d : ∗)
(∗ MOVE_TO_ORP   > CONDUCT_ORP ∗)
(∗                                                                            ∗)
val he lpe r1 = ISPECL
[
￿￿ au then t i c a t i on : ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form  > bool ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿globalAuth : ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t  >
(commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ stateAuth : s t a t e  >
(commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t  >
(commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t ￿ ￿ ,
￿ ￿ [ (Name PlatoonLeader ) says ( prop (SOME (PlatoonLeaderCOM conductORP ) ) )
: ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form] ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ i n s : ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t l i s t ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿MOVE_TO_ORP￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ outs : commands opt ion l i s t trType l i s t ￿￿
] TR_exec_cmd_rule
val he lpe r2 = f s t ( dest_imp ( conc l he lpe r1 ) )
val MOVE_TO_ORP_exec_conductORP_lemma1 =
TAC_PROOF(
( [ ] , he lpe r2 ) ,
REWRITE_TAC[
CFGInterpret_def , globalAuth_def , stateAuth_def , getPlatoonLeaderCOM_def ,
getOmniCOM_def , getPlatoonLeaderCOMx_def , getOmniCOMx_def , inputList_def ,
extractInput_def , MAP, propCommandList_def , extractPropCommand_def ,
satList_CONS , sa tL i s t_n i l ,
GSYM satL i s t_con j ]
THEN
REWRITE_TAC[
NOT_NONE_SOME, NOT_SOME_NONE, SOME_11, s t a t e_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s ,
output_dis t inct_c lauses , commands_distinct_clauses ,
p r i n c i pa l_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s , platoonLeaderCom_dist inct_clauses ,
omniCom_distinct_clauses , commands_one_one ,
GSYM sta t e_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s ,
GSYM output_dist inct_c lauses ,
GSYM commands_distinct_clauses ,
GSYM pr in c i pa l_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s ,




satList_CONS , s a tL i s t_n i l ]
THEN
PROVE_TAC[
Controls , Modus_Ponens ]
)
val _= save_thm( "MOVE_TO_ORP_exec_conductORP_lemma1" ,
MOVE_TO_ORP_exec_conductORP_lemma1)
val he lpe r3 = snd ( dest_imp ( conc l he lpe r1 ) )
val MOVE_TO_ORP_exec_conductORP_lemma2 =
TAC_PROOF(










propCommandList_def , inputList_def , extractPropCommand_def , extractInput_def ,
MAP
] MOVE_TO_ORP_exec_conductORP_lemma2
val _= save_thm( "MOVE_TO_ORP_exec_conductORP_thm" ,
MOVE_TO_ORP_exec_conductORP_thm)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗ Sta te : CONDUCT_ORP ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗                                                                            ∗)
(∗ Execute t r a s i t i o n j u s t i f i e d : ∗)
(∗ CONDUCT_ORP   > FORM_ST ∗)
(∗                                                                            ∗)
val he lpe r1 = ISPECL
[
￿￿ au then t i c a t i on : ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form  > bool ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿globalAuth : ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t  >
(commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ stateAuth : s t a t e  >
(commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t  >
(commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t ￿ ￿ ,
￿ ￿ [ (Name PlatoonLeader ) says ( prop (SOME (PlatoonLeaderCOM formST ) ) )
: ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form] ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ i n s : ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t l i s t ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿CONDUCT_ORP￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ outs : commands opt ion l i s t trType l i s t ￿￿
] TR_exec_cmd_rule
val he lpe r2 = f s t ( dest_imp ( conc l he lpe r1 ) )
val CONDUCT_ORP_exec_formST_lemma1 =
TAC_PROOF(
( [ ] , he lpe r2 ) ,
REWRITE_TAC[
CFGInterpret_def , globalAuth_def , stateAuth_def , getPlatoonLeaderCOM_def ,
getOmniCOM_def , getPlatoonLeaderCOMx_def , getOmniCOMx_def , inputList_def ,
extractInput_def , MAP, propCommandList_def , extractPropCommand_def ,
satList_CONS , sa tL i s t_n i l ,
GSYM satL i s t_con j ]
THEN
REWRITE_TAC[
NOT_NONE_SOME, NOT_SOME_NONE, SOME_11, s t a t e_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s ,
output_dis t inct_c lauses , commands_distinct_clauses ,
p r i n c i pa l_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s , platoonLeaderCom_dist inct_clauses ,
omniCom_distinct_clauses , commands_one_one ,
GSYM sta t e_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s ,
GSYM output_dist inct_c lauses ,
GSYM commands_distinct_clauses ,
GSYM pr in c i pa l_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s ,




satList_CONS , s a tL i s t_n i l ]
THEN
PROVE_TAC[
Controls , Modus_Ponens ]
)
val _= save_thm( "CONDUCT_ORP_exec_formST_lemma1" ,
CONDUCT_ORP_exec_formST_lemma1)
396
val he lpe r3 = snd ( dest_imp ( conc l he lpe r1 ) )
val CONDUCT_ORP_exec_formST_lemma2 =
TAC_PROOF(









propCommandList_def , inputList_def , extractPropCommand_def , extractInput_def ,
MAP
] CONDUCT_ORP_exec_formST_lemma2
val _= save_thm( "CONDUCT_ORP_exec_formST_thm" ,
CONDUCT_ORP_exec_formST_thm)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗ Sta te : FORM_ST ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗                                                                            ∗)
(∗ Execute t r a s i t i o n j u s t i f i e d : ∗)
(∗ FORM_ST   > RETURN_TO_UNIT ∗)
(∗                                                                            ∗)
val he lpe r1 = ISPECL
[
￿￿ au then t i c a t i on : ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form  > bool ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿globalAuth : ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t  >
(commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ stateAuth : s t a t e  >
(commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t  >
(commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t ￿ ￿ ,
￿ ￿ [ (Name PlatoonLeader ) says ( prop (SOME (PlatoonLeaderCOM returnToUnit ) ) )
: ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form] ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ i n s : ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t l i s t ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿FORM_ST￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ outs : commands opt ion l i s t trType l i s t ￿￿
] TR_exec_cmd_rule
val he lpe r2 = f s t ( dest_imp ( conc l he lpe r1 ) )
val FORM_ST_exec_returnToUnit_lemma1 =
TAC_PROOF(
( [ ] , he lpe r2 ) ,
REWRITE_TAC[
CFGInterpret_def , globalAuth_def , stateAuth_def , getPlatoonLeaderCOM_def ,
getOmniCOM_def , getPlatoonLeaderCOMx_def , getOmniCOMx_def , inputList_def ,
extractInput_def , MAP, propCommandList_def , extractPropCommand_def ,
satList_CONS , sa tL i s t_n i l ,
GSYM satL i s t_con j ]
THEN
REWRITE_TAC[
NOT_NONE_SOME, NOT_SOME_NONE, SOME_11, s t a t e_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s ,
output_dis t inct_c lauses , commands_distinct_clauses ,
p r i n c i pa l_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s , platoonLeaderCom_dist inct_clauses ,
omniCom_distinct_clauses , commands_one_one ,
GSYM sta t e_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s ,
GSYM output_dist inct_c lauses ,
GSYM commands_distinct_clauses ,
GSYM pr in c i pa l_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s ,








Controls , Modus_Ponens ]
)
val _= save_thm( "FORM_ST_exec_returnToUnit_lemma1" ,
FORM_ST_exec_returnToUnit_lemma1)
val he lpe r3 = snd ( dest_imp ( conc l he lpe r1 ) )
val FORM_ST_exec_returnToUnit_lemma2 =
TAC_PROOF(









propCommandList_def , inputList_def , extractPropCommand_def , extractInput_def ,
MAP
] FORM_ST_exec_returnToUnit_lemma2
val _= save_thm( "FORM_ST_exec_returnToUnit_thm" ,
FORM_ST_exec_returnToUnit_thm)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗ Sta te : RETURN_TO_UNIT ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗                                                                            ∗)
(∗ Execute t r a s i t i o n j u s t i f i e d : ∗)
(∗ RETURN_TO_UNIT   > COMPLETE ∗)
(∗                                                                            ∗)
val he lpe r1 = ISPECL
[
￿￿ au then t i c a t i on : ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form  > bool ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿globalAuth : ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t  >
(commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ stateAuth : s t a t e  >
(commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t  >
(commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t ￿ ￿ ,
￿ ￿ [ (Name PlatoonLeader ) says ( prop (SOME (PlatoonLeaderCOM complete ) ) )
: ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form] ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ i n s : ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t l i s t ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿RETURN_TO_UNIT￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ outs : commands opt ion l i s t trType l i s t ￿￿
] TR_exec_cmd_rule
val he lpe r2 = f s t ( dest_imp ( conc l he lpe r1 ) )
val RETURN_TO_UNIT_exec_complete_lemma1 =
TAC_PROOF(
( [ ] , he lpe r2 ) ,
REWRITE_TAC[
CFGInterpret_def , globalAuth_def , stateAuth_def , getPlatoonLeaderCOM_def ,
getOmniCOM_def , getPlatoonLeaderCOMx_def , getOmniCOMx_def , inputList_def ,
extractInput_def , MAP, propCommandList_def , extractPropCommand_def ,
satList_CONS , sa tL i s t_n i l ,
GSYM satL i s t_con j ]
THEN
REWRITE_TAC[
NOT_NONE_SOME, NOT_SOME_NONE, SOME_11, s t a t e_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s ,
output_dis t inct_c lauses , commands_distinct_clauses ,
p r i n c i pa l_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s , platoonLeaderCom_dist inct_clauses ,
omniCom_distinct_clauses , commands_one_one ,
GSYM sta t e_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s ,
GSYM output_dist inct_c lauses ,
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GSYM commands_distinct_clauses ,
GSYM pr in c i pa l_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s ,




satList_CONS , s a tL i s t_n i l ]
THEN
PROVE_TAC[
Controls , Modus_Ponens ]
)
val _= save_thm( "RETURN_TO_UNIT_exec_complete_lemma1" ,
RETURN_TO_UNIT_exec_complete_lemma1)
val he lpe r3 = snd ( dest_imp ( conc l he lpe r1 ) )
val RETURN_TO_UNIT_exec_complete_lemma2 =
TAC_PROOF(









propCommandList_def , inputList_def , extractPropCommand_def , extractInput_def ,
MAP
] RETURN_TO_UNIT_exec_complete_lemma2
val _= save_thm( "RETURN_TO_UNIT_exec_complete_thm" ,
RETURN_TO_UNIT_exec_complete_thm)
val _= export_theory ( ) ;
end
D.4.3 ssmMoveToORP4L
D.4.3.1 MoveToORP4LType Theory: Type Definitions
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗ pro j ec tTypesScr ip t . sml ∗)
(∗ Date : 1 August 2018 ∗)
(∗ Author : Assured Things by Design : Lori Picker ing , Keara Hi l l , and Keaten ∗)
(∗ Stokke ∗)
(∗ Descr ip t ion : This f i l e conta ins the data type d e f i n i t i o n s f o r the pro jec t ' s ∗)
(∗ secure s t a t e machine : p r i n c i pa l s , commands , s t a t e s , and outputs . I t a l s o ∗)
(∗ conta ins the d i s t i n c t n e s s and one to oneness theorems . ∗)
(∗ Projec t Descr ip t ion : ssmMoveToORP4L. ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
structure pro j e c tTypesSc r ip t = struct
open HolKernel Parse boolLib bossLib TypeBase
val _= new_theory " pro jectTypes " ;
val _= Datatype ￿platoonLeaderCom
= formRT
| rtMove

































(∗ Theorems to prove d i s t i n c t n e s s and one to one . ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
val p r i n c i p a l_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s = d i s t in c t_o f ￿ ￿ : p r i n c i pa l ￿￿
val _= save_thm( " p r i n c i p a l_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s " ,
p r i n c i p a l_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s )
val platoonLeaderCom_dist inct_clauses = d i s t in c t_o f ￿ ￿ : platoonLeaderCom ￿￿
val _= save_thm( "platoonLeaderCom_dist inct_clauses " ,
platoonLeaderCom_dist inct_clauses )
val omniCom_distinct_clauses = d i s t inc t_o f ￿ ￿ :omniCom￿￿
val _= save_thm( "omniCom_distinct_clauses " ,
omniCom_distinct_clauses )
val commands_distinct_clauses = d i s t in c t_o f ￿ ￿ : commands￿￿
val _= save_thm( " commands_distinct_clauses " ,
commands_distinct_clauses )
val s t a t e_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s = d i s t inc t_o f ￿ ￿ : s ta te ￿￿
val _= save_thm( " s t a t e_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s " ,
s t a t e_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s )
val output_di s t inc t_c lauses = d i s t in c t_o f ￿ ￿ : output ￿￿
val _= save_thm( " output_di s t inc t_c lauses " ,
output_di s t inc t_c lauses )
val commands_one_one = one_one_of ￿ ￿ : commands￿￿
val _= save_thm( "commands_one_one" ,
commands_one_one)
val _= export_theory ( ) ;
end
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗ p r o j e c t U t i l i t i e s S c r i p t . sml ∗)
(∗ Date : 1 August 2018 ∗)
(∗ Author : Assured Things by Design : Lori Picker ing , Keara Hi l l , and Keaten ∗)
(∗ Stokke ∗)
(∗ Descr ip t ion : This f i l e conta ins the data type d e f i n i t i o n s f o r the pro jec t ' s ∗)
(∗ secure s t a t e machine : p r i n c i pa l s , commands , s t a t e s , and outputs . I t a l s o ∗)
(∗ conta ins the d i s t i n c t n e s s and one to oneness theorems . ∗)
(∗ Projec t Descr ip t ion : ssmMoveToORP4L. ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
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structure p r o j e c t U t i l i t i e s S c r i p t = struct
open HolKernel Parse boolLib bossLib TypeBase TypeBase l i s tTheo ry optionTheory
open ac l_in fRu le s ac l ru l e sTheory ac lDrulesTheory satL i s tTheory
open projectTypesTheory
val _= new_theory " p r o j e c t U t i l i t i e s " ;
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗ Functions f o r e x t r a c t i n g commands from input stream . ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
val getPlatoonLeaderCOM_def = Def ine ￿
( getPlatoonLeaderCOM ( [ ] : commands opt ion l i s t ) = (NONE: commands opt ion ) )
/\
( getPlatoonLeaderCOM (( SOME (PlatoonLeaderCOM cmd ) ) : : xs ) =
( SOME (PlatoonLeaderCOM cmd) ) )
/\
( getPlatoonLeaderCOM (_: : xs ) = getPlatoonLeaderCOM xs ) ￿
val getOmniCOM_def = Def ine ￿
(getOmniCOM ( [ ] : commands opt ion l i s t ) = (NONE: commands opt ion ) )
/\
(getOmniCOM (( SOME (OmniCOM cmd ) ) : : xs ) =
( SOME (OmniCOM cmd) ) )
/\
(getOmniCOM (_: : xs ) = getOmniCOM xs ) ￿
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗ Functions f o r e x t r a c t i n g commands from input l i s t . ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
val getPlatoonLeaderCOMx_def = Def ine ￿
( getPlatoonLeaderCOMx ( [ ] : ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t ) = NONE)
/\
( getPlatoonLeaderCOMx ( ( (Name PlatoonLeader ) says ( prop (SOME (PlatoonLeaderCOM cmd ) ) ) ) : : xs ) =
(SOME (PlatoonLeaderCOM cmd : commands ) ) )
/\
( getPlatoonLeaderCOMx (_: : xs ) = getPlatoonLeaderCOMx xs ) ￿
val getOmniCOMx_def = Def ine ￿
(getOmniCOMx ( [ ] : ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t ) = NONE)
/\
(getOmniCOMx ( ( (Name Omni) says ( prop (SOME (OmniCOM cmd ) ) ) ) : : xs ) =
(SOME (OmniCOM cmd : commands ) ) )
/\
(getOmniCOMx (_: : xs ) = getOmniCOMx xs ) ￿
val _= export_theory ( ) ;
end
D.4.3.2 MoveToORP4LDef Theory: Authentication & Authorization
Definitions
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗ projectSMScript . sml ∗)
(∗ Date : 1 August 2018 ∗)
(∗ Author : Assured Things by Design : Lori Picker ing , Keara Hi l l , and Keaten ∗)
(∗ Stokke ∗)
(∗ Descr ip t ion : This f i l e conta ins the data type d e f i n i t i o n s f o r the pro jec t ' s ∗)
(∗ secure s t a t e machine ' s next s t a t e and next output f unc t i on s . ∗)
(∗ Projec t Descr ip t ion : ssmMoveToORP4L. ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
structure projectSMScr ipt = struct
open HolKernel Parse boolLib bossLib TypeBase TypeBase l i s tTheo ry optionTheory
open ac l_in fRu le s ac l ru l e sTheory ac lDrulesTheory satL i s tTheory ssmTheory
open s sminfRules projectTypesTheory p r o j e c tU t i l i t i e sTh e o r y
val _= new_theory "projectSM" ;
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(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗ Next s t a t e func t i on . ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
val NS_def = Define ￿
(NS MOVE_TO_ORP ( exec x ) =




(NS FORM_RT ( exec x ) =




(NS RT_MOVE ( exec x ) =




(NS RT_HALT ( exec x ) =




(NS ( s : s t a t e ) ( trap _) = s ) /\
(NS ( s : s t a t e ) ( d i s ca rd _) = s ) ￿
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗ Next output func t i on . ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
val NS_def = Define ￿
(NOut MOVE_TO_ORP ( exec x ) =




(NOut FORM_RT ( exec x ) =




(NOut RT_MOVE ( exec x ) =




(NOut RT_HALT ( exec x ) =




(NOut ( s : s t a t e ) ( trap _) = UnAuthorized ) /\
(NOut ( s : s t a t e ) ( d i s ca rd _) = UnAuthenticated ) ￿
val _= export_theory ( ) ;
end
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗ p r o j e c t S e cu r i t y S c r i p t . sml ∗)
(∗ Date : 1 August 2018 ∗)
(∗ Author : Assured Things by Design : Lori Picker ing , Keara Hi l l , and Keaten ∗)
(∗ Stokke ∗)
(∗ Descr ip t ion : This f i l e conta ins the s e c u r i t y p o l i c y ( s ta t e dependent ∗)
(∗ au thor i za t i on , g l o b a l au t ho r i z a t i on ) and au then t i ca t i on po l i c y . ∗)
(∗ Projec t Descr ip t ion : ssmMoveToORP4L. ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
structure p r o j e c t S e c u r i t y S c r i p t = struct
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open HolKernel Parse boolLib bossLib TypeBase TypeBase l i s tTheo ry optionTheory
open ac l_in fRu le s ac l ru l e sTheory ac lDrulesTheory satL i s tTheory ssmTheory
open s sminfRules projectTypesTheory p r o j e c tU t i l i t i e sTh e o r y
val _= new_theory " p r o j e c t S e cu r i t y " ;
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗ Authent ica t ion d e f i n i t i o n s . ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
val authent i ca t ion_de f = Def ine ￿
( au then t i c a t i on
( ( (Name PlatoonLeader ) says ( prop (SOME (PlatoonLeaderCOM (x : platoonLeaderCom ) ) ) ) )
: ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form) = T) /\
( au then t i c a t i on
( ( (Name Omni) says ( prop (SOME (OmniCOM (x : omniCom ) ) ) ) )
: ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form) = T) /\
( au then t i c a t i on _ = F) ￿
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗ s ta teAuth d e f i n i t i o n s . ∗)
(∗ A sta t e dependent s e c u r i t y con tex t . ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
val stateAuth_def = Define ￿
stateAuth ( s : s t a t e ) ( x : ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t ) =
i f ( s = MOVE_TO_ORP)
then
i f
( getPlatoonLeaderCOMx x = SOME (PlatoonLeaderCOM formRT) )
then
[ (Name PlatoonLeader ) c on t r o l s ( prop (SOME (PlatoonLeaderCOM formRT ) ) )
: ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form ]
else
[ prop NONE: ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form ]
else
i f ( s = FORM_RT)
then
i f
( getPlatoonLeaderCOMx x = SOME (PlatoonLeaderCOM rtMove ) )
then
[ (Name PlatoonLeader ) c on t r o l s ( prop (SOME (PlatoonLeaderCOM rtMove ) ) )
: ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form ]
else
[ prop NONE: ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form ]
else
i f ( s = RT_MOVE)
then
i f
( getPlatoonLeaderCOMx x = SOME (PlatoonLeaderCOM rtHa l t ) )
then
[ (Name PlatoonLeader ) c on t r o l s ( prop (SOME (PlatoonLeaderCOM rtHa l t ) ) )
: ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form ]
else
[ prop NONE: ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form ]
else
i f ( s = RT_HALT)
then
i f
( getPlatoonLeaderCOMx x = SOME (PlatoonLeaderCOM complete ) )
then
[ (Name PlatoonLeader ) c on t r o l s ( prop (SOME (PlatoonLeaderCOM complete ) ) )
: ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form ]
else
[ prop NONE: ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form ]
else
[ prop NONE: ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form] ￿
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗ g loba lAuth d e f i n i t i o n s . ∗)
(∗ A g l o b a l s e c u r i t y con tex t . ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
val globalAuth_def = Def ine ￿
globalAuth (x : ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t ) =
[TT: ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form ]
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￿
val _= export_theory ( ) ;
end
D.4.3.3 ssmMoveToORP4L Theory: Theorems
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗ pro jec tAssuranceExecScr ip t . sml ∗)
(∗ Date : 1 August 2018 ∗)
(∗ Author : Assured Things by Design : Lori Picker ing , Keara Hi l l , and Keaten ∗)
(∗ Stokke ∗)
(∗ Descr ip t ion : This f i l e conta ins the proo f s f o r complete mediation . In ∗)
(∗ pa r t i cu l a r , t h e se proo f s prove t ha t a t r a n s i t i o n i s executed i f and only ∗)
(∗ i f the input i s au then t i ca t ed and au thor i z ed . ∗)
(∗ Projec t Descr ip t ion : ssmMoveToORP4L. ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
structure pro j ec tAssuranceExecScr ip t = struct
open HolKernel Parse boolLib bossLib TypeBase TypeBase l i s tTheo ry optionTheory
open ac l_in fRu le s ac l ru l e sTheory ac lDrulesTheory satL i s tTheory ssmTheory
open s sminfRules projectTypesTheory p r o j e c tU t i l i t i e sTh e o r y pro j e c tSecur i tyTheory
open satL i s tTheory bossLib
val _= new_theory " projectAssuranceExec " ;
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗ Sta te : MOVE_TO_ORP ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗                                                                            ∗)
(∗ Execute t r a s i t i o n j u s t i f i e d : ∗)
(∗ MOVE_TO_ORP   > FORM_RT ∗)
(∗                                                                            ∗)
val he lpe r1 = ISPECL
[
￿￿ au then t i c a t i on : ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form  > bool ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿globalAuth : ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t  >
(commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ stateAuth : s t a t e  >
(commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t  >
(commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t ￿ ￿ ,
￿ ￿ [ (Name PlatoonLeader ) says ( prop (SOME (PlatoonLeaderCOM formRT ) ) )
: ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form] ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ i n s : ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t l i s t ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿MOVE_TO_ORP￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ outs : commands opt ion l i s t trType l i s t ￿￿
] TR_exec_cmd_rule
val he lpe r2 = f s t ( dest_imp ( conc l he lpe r1 ) )
val MOVE_TO_ORP_exec_formRT_lemma1 =
TAC_PROOF(
( [ ] , he lpe r2 ) ,
REWRITE_TAC[
CFGInterpret_def , globalAuth_def , stateAuth_def , getPlatoonLeaderCOM_def ,
getOmniCOM_def , getPlatoonLeaderCOMx_def , getOmniCOMx_def , inputList_def ,
extractInput_def , MAP, propCommandList_def , extractPropCommand_def ,
satList_CONS , sa tL i s t_n i l ,
GSYM satL i s t_con j ]
THEN
REWRITE_TAC[
NOT_NONE_SOME, NOT_SOME_NONE, SOME_11, s t a t e_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s ,
output_dist inct_c lauses , commands_distinct_clauses ,
p r i n c i pa l_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s , platoonLeaderCom_dist inct_clauses ,
omniCom_distinct_clauses , commands_one_one ,
GSYM sta t e_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s ,
GSYM output_dist inct_c lauses ,
GSYM commands_distinct_clauses ,
GSYM pr in c i pa l_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s ,





satList_CONS , s a tL i s t_n i l ]
THEN
PROVE_TAC[
Controls , Modus_Ponens ]
)
val _= save_thm( "MOVE_TO_ORP_exec_formRT_lemma1" ,
MOVE_TO_ORP_exec_formRT_lemma1)
val he lpe r3 = snd ( dest_imp ( conc l he lpe r1 ) )
val MOVE_TO_ORP_exec_formRT_lemma2 =
TAC_PROOF(









propCommandList_def , inputList_def , extractPropCommand_def , extractInput_def ,
MAP
] MOVE_TO_ORP_exec_formRT_lemma2
val _= save_thm( "MOVE_TO_ORP_exec_formRT_thm" ,
MOVE_TO_ORP_exec_formRT_thm)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗ Sta te : FORM_RT ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗                                                                            ∗)
(∗ Execute t r a s i t i o n j u s t i f i e d : ∗)
(∗ FORM_RT   > RT_MOVE ∗)
(∗                                                                            ∗)
val he lpe r1 = ISPECL
[
￿￿ au then t i c a t i on : ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form  > bool ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿globalAuth : ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t  >
(commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ stateAuth : s t a t e  >
(commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t  >
(commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t ￿ ￿ ,
￿ ￿ [ (Name PlatoonLeader ) says ( prop (SOME (PlatoonLeaderCOM rtMove ) ) )
: ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form] ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ i n s : ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t l i s t ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿FORM_RT￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ outs : commands opt ion l i s t trType l i s t ￿￿
] TR_exec_cmd_rule
val he lpe r2 = f s t ( dest_imp ( conc l he lpe r1 ) )
val FORM_RT_exec_rtMove_lemma1 =
TAC_PROOF(
( [ ] , he lpe r2 ) ,
REWRITE_TAC[
CFGInterpret_def , globalAuth_def , stateAuth_def , getPlatoonLeaderCOM_def ,
getOmniCOM_def , getPlatoonLeaderCOMx_def , getOmniCOMx_def , inputList_def ,
extractInput_def , MAP, propCommandList_def , extractPropCommand_def ,
satList_CONS , sa tL i s t_n i l ,
GSYM satL i s t_con j ]
THEN
REWRITE_TAC[
NOT_NONE_SOME, NOT_SOME_NONE, SOME_11, s t a t e_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s ,
output_dis t inct_c lauses , commands_distinct_clauses ,
p r i n c i pa l_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s , platoonLeaderCom_dist inct_clauses ,
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omniCom_distinct_clauses , commands_one_one ,
GSYM sta t e_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s ,
GSYM output_dist inct_c lauses ,
GSYM commands_distinct_clauses ,
GSYM pr in c i pa l_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s ,




satList_CONS , s a tL i s t_n i l ]
THEN
PROVE_TAC[
Controls , Modus_Ponens ]
)
val _= save_thm( "FORM_RT_exec_rtMove_lemma1" ,
FORM_RT_exec_rtMove_lemma1)
val he lpe r3 = snd ( dest_imp ( conc l he lpe r1 ) )
val FORM_RT_exec_rtMove_lemma2 =
TAC_PROOF(









propCommandList_def , inputList_def , extractPropCommand_def , extractInput_def ,
MAP
] FORM_RT_exec_rtMove_lemma2
val _= save_thm( "FORM_RT_exec_rtMove_thm" ,
FORM_RT_exec_rtMove_thm)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗ Sta te : RT_MOVE ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗                                                                            ∗)
(∗ Execute t r a s i t i o n j u s t i f i e d : ∗)
(∗ RT_MOVE   > RT_HALT ∗)
(∗                                                                            ∗)
val he lpe r1 = ISPECL
[
￿￿ au then t i c a t i on : ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form  > bool ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿globalAuth : ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t  >
(commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ stateAuth : s t a t e  >
(commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t  >
(commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t ￿ ￿ ,
￿ ￿ [ (Name PlatoonLeader ) says ( prop (SOME (PlatoonLeaderCOM rtHa l t ) ) )
: ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form] ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ i n s : ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t l i s t ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿RT_MOVE￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ outs : commands opt ion l i s t trType l i s t ￿￿
] TR_exec_cmd_rule
val he lpe r2 = f s t ( dest_imp ( conc l he lpe r1 ) )
val RT_MOVE_exec_rtHalt_lemma1 =
TAC_PROOF(
( [ ] , he lpe r2 ) ,
REWRITE_TAC[
CFGInterpret_def , globalAuth_def , stateAuth_def , getPlatoonLeaderCOM_def ,
getOmniCOM_def , getPlatoonLeaderCOMx_def , getOmniCOMx_def , inputList_def ,
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extractInput_def , MAP, propCommandList_def , extractPropCommand_def ,
satList_CONS , sa tL i s t_n i l ,
GSYM satL i s t_con j ]
THEN
REWRITE_TAC[
NOT_NONE_SOME, NOT_SOME_NONE, SOME_11, s t a t e_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s ,
output_dis t inct_c lauses , commands_distinct_clauses ,
p r i n c i pa l_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s , platoonLeaderCom_dist inct_clauses ,
omniCom_distinct_clauses , commands_one_one ,
GSYM sta t e_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s ,
GSYM output_dist inct_c lauses ,
GSYM commands_distinct_clauses ,
GSYM pr in c i pa l_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s ,




satList_CONS , s a tL i s t_n i l ]
THEN
PROVE_TAC[
Controls , Modus_Ponens ]
)
val _= save_thm( "RT_MOVE_exec_rtHalt_lemma1" ,
RT_MOVE_exec_rtHalt_lemma1)
val he lpe r3 = snd ( dest_imp ( conc l he lpe r1 ) )
val RT_MOVE_exec_rtHalt_lemma2 =
TAC_PROOF(









propCommandList_def , inputList_def , extractPropCommand_def , extractInput_def ,
MAP
] RT_MOVE_exec_rtHalt_lemma2
val _= save_thm( "RT_MOVE_exec_rtHalt_thm" ,
RT_MOVE_exec_rtHalt_thm)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗ Sta te : RT_HALT ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗                                                                            ∗)
(∗ Execute t r a s i t i o n j u s t i f i e d : ∗)
(∗ RT_HALT   > COMPLETE ∗)
(∗                                                                            ∗)
val he lpe r1 = ISPECL
[
￿￿ au then t i c a t i on : ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form  > bool ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿globalAuth : ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t  >
(commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ stateAuth : s t a t e  >
(commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t  >
(commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t ￿ ￿ ,
￿ ￿ [ (Name PlatoonLeader ) says ( prop (SOME (PlatoonLeaderCOM complete ) ) )
: ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form] ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ i n s : ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t l i s t ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿RT_HALT￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ outs : commands opt ion l i s t trType l i s t ￿￿
] TR_exec_cmd_rule
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val he lpe r2 = f s t ( dest_imp ( conc l he lpe r1 ) )
val RT_HALT_exec_complete_lemma1 =
TAC_PROOF(
( [ ] , he lpe r2 ) ,
REWRITE_TAC[
CFGInterpret_def , globalAuth_def , stateAuth_def , getPlatoonLeaderCOM_def ,
getOmniCOM_def , getPlatoonLeaderCOMx_def , getOmniCOMx_def , inputList_def ,
extractInput_def , MAP, propCommandList_def , extractPropCommand_def ,
satList_CONS , sa tL i s t_n i l ,
GSYM satL i s t_con j ]
THEN
REWRITE_TAC[
NOT_NONE_SOME, NOT_SOME_NONE, SOME_11, s t a t e_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s ,
output_dis t inct_c lauses , commands_distinct_clauses ,
p r i n c i pa l_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s , platoonLeaderCom_dist inct_clauses ,
omniCom_distinct_clauses , commands_one_one ,
GSYM sta t e_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s ,
GSYM output_dist inct_c lauses ,
GSYM commands_distinct_clauses ,
GSYM pr in c i pa l_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s ,




satList_CONS , s a tL i s t_n i l ]
THEN
PROVE_TAC[
Controls , Modus_Ponens ]
)
val _= save_thm( "RT_HALT_exec_complete_lemma1" ,
RT_HALT_exec_complete_lemma1)
val he lpe r3 = snd ( dest_imp ( conc l he lpe r1 ) )
val RT_HALT_exec_complete_lemma2 =
TAC_PROOF(









propCommandList_def , inputList_def , extractPropCommand_def , extractInput_def ,
MAP
] RT_HALT_exec_complete_lemma2
val _= save_thm( "RT_HALT_exec_complete_thm" ,
RT_HALT_exec_complete_thm)
val _= export_theory ( ) ;
end
D.4.4 ssmFormRT
D.4.4.1 FormRTType Theory: Type Definitions
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗ pro j ec tTypesScr ip t . sml ∗)
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(∗ Date : 1 August 2018 ∗)
(∗ Author : Assured Things by Design : Lori Picker ing , Keara Hi l l , and Keaten ∗)
(∗ Stokke ∗)
(∗ Descr ip t ion : This f i l e conta ins the data type d e f i n i t i o n s f o r the pro jec t ' s ∗)
(∗ secure s t a t e machine : p r i n c i pa l s , commands , s t a t e s , and outputs . I t a l s o ∗)
(∗ conta ins the d i s t i n c t n e s s and one to oneness theorems . ∗)
(∗ Projec t Descr ip t ion : ssmFormRT. ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
structure pro j e c tTypesSc r ip t = struct
open HolKernel Parse boolLib bossLib TypeBase
val _= new_theory " pro jectTypes " ;
val _= Datatype ￿squadLeaderCom
= r tPo s i t i o n
| r tOr i en t
| r tA l e r t
| complete
￿



















val _= Datatype ￿output









(∗ Theorems to prove d i s t i n c t n e s s and one to one . ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
val p r i n c i p a l_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s = d i s t in c t_o f ￿ ￿ : p r i n c i pa l ￿￿
val _= save_thm( " p r i n c i p a l_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s " ,
p r i n c i p a l_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s )
val squadLeaderCom_distinct_clauses = d i s t inc t_o f ￿ ￿ : squadLeaderCom ￿￿
val _= save_thm( " squadLeaderCom_distinct_clauses " ,
squadLeaderCom_distinct_clauses )
val omniCom_distinct_clauses = d i s t inc t_o f ￿ ￿ :omniCom￿￿
val _= save_thm( "omniCom_distinct_clauses " ,
omniCom_distinct_clauses )
val commands_distinct_clauses = d i s t in c t_o f ￿ ￿ : commands￿￿
val _= save_thm( " commands_distinct_clauses " ,
commands_distinct_clauses )
val s t a t e_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s = d i s t inc t_o f ￿ ￿ : s ta te ￿￿
val _= save_thm( " s t a t e_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s " ,
s t a t e_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s )
val output_di s t inc t_c lauses = d i s t in c t_o f ￿ ￿ : output ￿￿
val _= save_thm( " output_di s t inc t_c lauses " ,
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output_di s t inc t_c lauses )
val commands_one_one = one_one_of ￿ ￿ : commands￿￿
val _= save_thm( "commands_one_one" ,
commands_one_one)
val _= export_theory ( ) ;
end
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗ p r o j e c t U t i l i t i e s S c r i p t . sml ∗)
(∗ Date : 1 August 2018 ∗)
(∗ Author : Assured Things by Design : Lori Picker ing , Keara Hi l l , and Keaten ∗)
(∗ Stokke ∗)
(∗ Descr ip t ion : This f i l e conta ins the data type d e f i n i t i o n s f o r the pro jec t ' s ∗)
(∗ secure s t a t e machine : p r i n c i pa l s , commands , s t a t e s , and outputs . I t a l s o ∗)
(∗ conta ins the d i s t i n c t n e s s and one to oneness theorems . ∗)
(∗ Projec t Descr ip t ion : ssmFormRT. ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
structure p r o j e c t U t i l i t i e s S c r i p t = struct
open HolKernel Parse boolLib bossLib TypeBase TypeBase l i s tTheo ry optionTheory
open ac l_in fRu le s ac l ru l e sTheory ac lDrulesTheory satL i s tTheory
open projectTypesTheory
val _= new_theory " p r o j e c t U t i l i t i e s " ;
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗ Functions f o r e x t r a c t i n g commands from input stream . ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
val getSquadLeaderCOM_def = Def ine ￿
( getSquadLeaderCOM ( [ ] : commands opt ion l i s t ) = (NONE: commands opt ion ) )
/\
( getSquadLeaderCOM (( SOME (SquadLeaderCOM cmd ) ) : : xs ) =
( SOME (SquadLeaderCOM cmd) ) )
/\
( getSquadLeaderCOM (_: : xs ) = getSquadLeaderCOM xs ) ￿
val getOmniCOM_def = Def ine ￿
(getOmniCOM ( [ ] : commands opt ion l i s t ) = (NONE: commands opt ion ) )
/\
(getOmniCOM (( SOME (OmniCOM cmd ) ) : : xs ) =
( SOME (OmniCOM cmd) ) )
/\
(getOmniCOM (_: : xs ) = getOmniCOM xs ) ￿
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗ Functions f o r e x t r a c t i n g commands from input l i s t . ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
val getSquadLeaderCOMx_def = Def ine ￿
( getSquadLeaderCOMx ( [ ] : ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t ) = NONE)
/\
( getSquadLeaderCOMx ( ( (Name SquadLeader ) says ( prop (SOME (SquadLeaderCOM cmd ) ) ) ) : : xs ) =
(SOME (SquadLeaderCOM cmd : commands ) ) )
/\
( getSquadLeaderCOMx (_: : xs ) = getSquadLeaderCOMx xs ) ￿
val getOmniCOMx_def = Def ine ￿
(getOmniCOMx ( [ ] : ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t ) = NONE)
/\
(getOmniCOMx ( ( (Name Omni) says ( prop (SOME (OmniCOM cmd ) ) ) ) : : xs ) =
(SOME (OmniCOM cmd : commands ) ) )
/\
(getOmniCOMx (_: : xs ) = getOmniCOMx xs ) ￿
val _= export_theory ( ) ;
end
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D.4.4.2 FormRTDef Theory: Authentication & Authorization Definitions
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗ projectSMScript . sml ∗)
(∗ Date : 1 August 2018 ∗)
(∗ Author : Assured Things by Design : Lori Picker ing , Keara Hi l l , and Keaten ∗)
(∗ Stokke ∗)
(∗ Descr ip t ion : This f i l e conta ins the data type d e f i n i t i o n s f o r the pro jec t ' s ∗)
(∗ secure s t a t e machine ' s next s t a t e and next output f unc t i on s . ∗)
(∗ Projec t Descr ip t ion : ssmFormRT. ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
structure projectSMScr ipt = struct
open HolKernel Parse boolLib bossLib TypeBase TypeBase l i s tTheo ry optionTheory
open ac l_in fRu le s ac l ru l e sTheory ac lDrulesTheory satL i s tTheory ssmTheory
open s sminfRules projectTypesTheory p r o j e c tU t i l i t i e sTh e o r y
val _= new_theory "projectSM" ;
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗ Next s t a t e func t i on . ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
val NS_def = Define ￿
(NS RT_FORM ( exec x ) =




(NS RT_POSITION ( exec x ) =




(NS RT_ORIENT ( exec x ) =




(NS RT_ALERT ( exec x ) =




(NS ( s : s t a t e ) ( trap _) = s ) /\
(NS ( s : s t a t e ) ( d i s ca rd _) = s ) ￿
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗ Next output func t i on . ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
val NS_def = Define ￿
(NOut RT_FORM ( exec x ) =
i f ( getSquadLeaderCOM x = SOME (SquadLeaderCOM r tPo s i t i o n ) )
then RtPos i t ion
else NoActionTaken
)/\
(NOut RT_POSITION ( exec x ) =




(NOut RT_ORIENT ( exec x ) =




(NOut RT_ALERT ( exec x ) =




(NOut ( s : s t a t e ) ( trap _) = UnAuthorized ) /\
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(NOut ( s : s t a t e ) ( d i s ca rd _) = UnAuthenticated ) ￿
val _= export_theory ( ) ;
end
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗ p r o j e c t S e cu r i t y S c r i p t . sml ∗)
(∗ Date : 1 August 2018 ∗)
(∗ Author : Assured Things by Design : Lori Picker ing , Keara Hi l l , and Keaten ∗)
(∗ Stokke ∗)
(∗ Descr ip t ion : This f i l e conta ins the s e c u r i t y p o l i c y ( s ta t e dependent ∗)
(∗ au thor i za t i on , g l o b a l au t ho r i z a t i on ) and au then t i ca t i on po l i c y . ∗)
(∗ Projec t Descr ip t ion : ssmFormRT. ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
structure p r o j e c t S e c u r i t y S c r i p t = struct
open HolKernel Parse boolLib bossLib TypeBase TypeBase l i s tTheo ry optionTheory
open ac l_in fRu le s ac l ru l e sTheory ac lDrulesTheory satL i s tTheory ssmTheory
open s sminfRules projectTypesTheory p r o j e c tU t i l i t i e sTh e o r y
val _= new_theory " p r o j e c t S e cu r i t y " ;
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗ Authent ica t ion d e f i n i t i o n s . ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
val authent i ca t ion_de f = Def ine ￿
( au then t i c a t i on
( ( (Name SquadLeader ) says ( prop (SOME (SquadLeaderCOM (x : squadLeaderCom ) ) ) ) )
: ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form) = T) /\
( au then t i c a t i on
( ( (Name Omni) says ( prop (SOME (OmniCOM (x : omniCom ) ) ) ) )
: ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form) = T) /\
( au then t i c a t i on _ = F) ￿
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗ s ta teAuth d e f i n i t i o n s . ∗)
(∗ A sta t e dependent s e c u r i t y con tex t . ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
val stateAuth_def = Define ￿
stateAuth ( s : s t a t e ) ( x : ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t ) =
i f ( s = RT_FORM)
then
i f
( getSquadLeaderCOMx x = SOME (SquadLeaderCOM r tPo s i t i o n ) )
then
[ (Name SquadLeader ) c on t r o l s ( prop (SOME (SquadLeaderCOM r tPo s i t i o n ) ) )
: ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form ]
else
[ prop NONE: ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form ]
else
i f ( s = RT_POSITION)
then
i f
( getSquadLeaderCOMx x = SOME (SquadLeaderCOM rtOr i en t ) )
then
[ (Name SquadLeader ) c on t r o l s ( prop (SOME (SquadLeaderCOM rtOr i en t ) ) )
: ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form ]
else
[ prop NONE: ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form ]
else
i f ( s = RT_ORIENT)
then
i f
( getSquadLeaderCOMx x = SOME (SquadLeaderCOM rtA l e r t ) )
then
[ (Name SquadLeader ) c on t r o l s ( prop (SOME (SquadLeaderCOM rtA l e r t ) ) )
: ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form ]
else
[ prop NONE: ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form ]
else




( getSquadLeaderCOMx x = SOME (SquadLeaderCOM complete ) )
then
[ (Name SquadLeader ) c on t r o l s ( prop (SOME (SquadLeaderCOM complete ) ) )
: ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form ]
else
[ prop NONE: ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form ]
else
[ prop NONE: ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form] ￿
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗ g loba lAuth d e f i n i t i o n s . ∗)
(∗ A g l o b a l s e c u r i t y con tex t . ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
val globalAuth_def = Def ine ￿
globalAuth (x : ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t ) =
[TT: ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form ]
￿
val _= export_theory ( ) ;
end
D.4.4.3 ssmFormRT Theory: Theorems
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗ pro jec tAssuranceExecScr ip t . sml ∗)
(∗ Date : 1 August 2018 ∗)
(∗ Author : Assured Things by Design : Lori Picker ing , Keara Hi l l , and Keaten ∗)
(∗ Stokke ∗)
(∗ Descr ip t ion : This f i l e conta ins the proo f s f o r complete mediation . In ∗)
(∗ pa r t i cu l a r , t h e se proo f s prove t ha t a t r a n s i t i o n i s executed i f and only ∗)
(∗ i f the input i s au then t i ca t ed and au thor i z ed . ∗)
(∗ Projec t Descr ip t ion : ssmFormRT. ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
structure pro j ec tAssuranceExecScr ip t = struct
open HolKernel Parse boolLib bossLib TypeBase TypeBase l i s tTheo ry optionTheory
open ac l_in fRu le s ac l ru l e sTheory ac lDrulesTheory satL i s tTheory ssmTheory
open s sminfRules projectTypesTheory p r o j e c tU t i l i t i e sTh e o r y pro j e c tSecur i tyTheory
open satL i s tTheory bossLib
val _= new_theory " projectAssuranceExec " ;
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗ Sta te : RT_FORM ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗                                                                            ∗)
(∗ Execute t r a s i t i o n j u s t i f i e d : ∗)
(∗ RT_FORM   > RT_POSITION ∗)
(∗                                                                            ∗)
val he lpe r1 = ISPECL
[
￿￿ au then t i c a t i on : ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form  > bool ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿globalAuth : ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t  >
(commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ stateAuth : s t a t e  >
(commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t  >
(commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t ￿ ￿ ,
￿ ￿ [ (Name SquadLeader ) says ( prop (SOME (SquadLeaderCOM r tPo s i t i o n ) ) )
: ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form] ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ i n s : ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t l i s t ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿RT_FORM￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ outs : commands opt ion l i s t trType l i s t ￿￿
] TR_exec_cmd_rule
val he lpe r2 = f s t ( dest_imp ( conc l he lpe r1 ) )
val RT_FORM_exec_rtPosition_lemma1 =
TAC_PROOF(
( [ ] , he lpe r2 ) ,
REWRITE_TAC[
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CFGInterpret_def , globalAuth_def , stateAuth_def , getSquadLeaderCOM_def ,
getOmniCOM_def , getSquadLeaderCOMx_def , getOmniCOMx_def , inputList_def ,
extractInput_def , MAP, propCommandList_def , extractPropCommand_def ,
satList_CONS , sa tL i s t_n i l ,
GSYM satL i s t_con j ]
THEN
REWRITE_TAC[
NOT_NONE_SOME, NOT_SOME_NONE, SOME_11, s t a t e_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s ,
output_dis t inct_c lauses , commands_distinct_clauses ,
p r i n c i pa l_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s , squadLeaderCom_distinct_clauses ,
omniCom_distinct_clauses , commands_one_one ,
GSYM sta t e_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s ,
GSYM output_dist inct_c lauses ,
GSYM commands_distinct_clauses ,





satList_CONS , s a tL i s t_n i l ]
THEN
PROVE_TAC[
Controls , Modus_Ponens ]
)
val _= save_thm( "RT_FORM_exec_rtPosition_lemma1" ,
RT_FORM_exec_rtPosition_lemma1)
val he lpe r3 = snd ( dest_imp ( conc l he lpe r1 ) )
val RT_FORM_exec_rtPosition_lemma2 =
TAC_PROOF(









propCommandList_def , inputList_def , extractPropCommand_def , extractInput_def ,
MAP
] RT_FORM_exec_rtPosition_lemma2
val _= save_thm( "RT_FORM_exec_rtPosition_thm" ,
RT_FORM_exec_rtPosition_thm)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗ Sta te : RT_POSITION ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗                                                                            ∗)
(∗ Execute t r a s i t i o n j u s t i f i e d : ∗)
(∗ RT_POSITION   > RT_ORIENT ∗)
(∗                                                                            ∗)
val he lpe r1 = ISPECL
[
￿￿ au then t i c a t i on : ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form  > bool ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿globalAuth : ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t  >
(commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ stateAuth : s t a t e  >
(commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t  >
(commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t ￿ ￿ ,
￿ ￿ [ (Name SquadLeader ) says ( prop (SOME (SquadLeaderCOM rtOr i en t ) ) )
: ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form] ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ i n s : ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t l i s t ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿RT_POSITION￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ outs : commands opt ion l i s t trType l i s t ￿￿
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] TR_exec_cmd_rule
val he lpe r2 = f s t ( dest_imp ( conc l he lpe r1 ) )
val RT_POSITION_exec_rtOrient_lemma1 =
TAC_PROOF(
( [ ] , he lpe r2 ) ,
REWRITE_TAC[
CFGInterpret_def , globalAuth_def , stateAuth_def , getSquadLeaderCOM_def ,
getOmniCOM_def , getSquadLeaderCOMx_def , getOmniCOMx_def , inputList_def ,
extractInput_def , MAP, propCommandList_def , extractPropCommand_def ,
satList_CONS , sa tL i s t_n i l ,
GSYM satL i s t_con j ]
THEN
REWRITE_TAC[
NOT_NONE_SOME, NOT_SOME_NONE, SOME_11, s t a t e_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s ,
output_dis t inct_c lauses , commands_distinct_clauses ,
p r i n c i pa l_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s , squadLeaderCom_distinct_clauses ,
omniCom_distinct_clauses , commands_one_one ,
GSYM sta t e_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s ,
GSYM output_dist inct_c lauses ,
GSYM commands_distinct_clauses ,





satList_CONS , s a tL i s t_n i l ]
THEN
PROVE_TAC[
Controls , Modus_Ponens ]
)
val _= save_thm( "RT_POSITION_exec_rtOrient_lemma1" ,
RT_POSITION_exec_rtOrient_lemma1)
val he lpe r3 = snd ( dest_imp ( conc l he lpe r1 ) )
val RT_POSITION_exec_rtOrient_lemma2 =
TAC_PROOF(









propCommandList_def , inputList_def , extractPropCommand_def , extractInput_def ,
MAP
] RT_POSITION_exec_rtOrient_lemma2
val _= save_thm( "RT_POSITION_exec_rtOrient_thm" ,
RT_POSITION_exec_rtOrient_thm)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗ Sta te : RT_ORIENT ∗)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)
(∗                                                                            ∗)
(∗ Execute t r a s i t i o n j u s t i f i e d : ∗)
(∗ RT_ORIENT   > RT_ALERT ∗)
(∗                                                                            ∗)
val he lpe r1 = ISPECL
[
￿￿ au then t i c a t i on : ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form  > bool ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿globalAuth : ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t  >
(commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t ￿ ￿ ,
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￿￿ stateAuth : s t a t e  >
(commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t  >
(commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t ￿ ￿ ,
￿ ￿ [ (Name SquadLeader ) says ( prop (SOME (SquadLeaderCOM rtA l e r t ) ) )
: ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form] ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ i n s : ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t l i s t ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿RT_ORIENT￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ outs : commands opt ion l i s t trType l i s t ￿￿
] TR_exec_cmd_rule
val he lpe r2 = f s t ( dest_imp ( conc l he lpe r1 ) )
val RT_ORIENT_exec_rtAlert_lemma1 =
TAC_PROOF(
( [ ] , he lpe r2 ) ,
REWRITE_TAC[
CFGInterpret_def , globalAuth_def , stateAuth_def , getSquadLeaderCOM_def ,
getOmniCOM_def , getSquadLeaderCOMx_def , getOmniCOMx_def , inputList_def ,
extractInput_def , MAP, propCommandList_def , extractPropCommand_def ,
satList_CONS , sa tL i s t_n i l ,
GSYM satL i s t_con j ]
THEN
REWRITE_TAC[
NOT_NONE_SOME, NOT_SOME_NONE, SOME_11, s t a t e_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s ,
output_dis t inct_c lauses , commands_distinct_clauses ,
p r i n c i pa l_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s , squadLeaderCom_distinct_clauses ,
omniCom_distinct_clauses , commands_one_one ,
GSYM sta t e_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s ,
GSYM output_dist inct_c lauses ,
GSYM commands_distinct_clauses ,





satList_CONS , s a tL i s t_n i l ]
THEN
PROVE_TAC[
Controls , Modus_Ponens ]
)
val _= save_thm( "RT_ORIENT_exec_rtAlert_lemma1" ,
RT_ORIENT_exec_rtAlert_lemma1)
val he lpe r3 = snd ( dest_imp ( conc l he lpe r1 ) )
val RT_ORIENT_exec_rtAlert_lemma2 =
TAC_PROOF(









propCommandList_def , inputList_def , extractPropCommand_def , extractInput_def ,
MAP
] RT_ORIENT_exec_rtAlert_lemma2
val _= save_thm( "RT_ORIENT_exec_rtAlert_thm" ,
RT_ORIENT_exec_rtAlert_thm)
(∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗)




(∗ Execute t r a s i t i o n j u s t i f i e d : ∗)
(∗ RT_ALERT   > COMPLETE ∗)
(∗                                                                            ∗)
val he lpe r1 = ISPECL
[
￿￿ au then t i c a t i on : ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form  > bool ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿globalAuth : ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t  >
(commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ stateAuth : s t a t e  >
(commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t  >
(commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t ￿ ￿ ,
￿ ￿ [ (Name SquadLeader ) says ( prop (SOME (SquadLeaderCOM complete ) ) )
: ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form] ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ i n s : ( commands option , p r i n c i pa l , ' d , ' e )Form l i s t l i s t ￿ ￿ ,
￿￿RT_ALERT￿ ￿ ,
￿￿ outs : commands opt ion l i s t trType l i s t ￿￿
] TR_exec_cmd_rule
val he lpe r2 = f s t ( dest_imp ( conc l he lpe r1 ) )
val RT_ALERT_exec_complete_lemma1 =
TAC_PROOF(
( [ ] , he lpe r2 ) ,
REWRITE_TAC[
CFGInterpret_def , globalAuth_def , stateAuth_def , getSquadLeaderCOM_def ,
getOmniCOM_def , getSquadLeaderCOMx_def , getOmniCOMx_def , inputList_def ,
extractInput_def , MAP, propCommandList_def , extractPropCommand_def ,
satList_CONS , sa tL i s t_n i l ,
GSYM satL i s t_con j ]
THEN
REWRITE_TAC[
NOT_NONE_SOME, NOT_SOME_NONE, SOME_11, s t a t e_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s ,
output_dis t inct_c lauses , commands_distinct_clauses ,
p r i n c i pa l_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s , squadLeaderCom_distinct_clauses ,
omniCom_distinct_clauses , commands_one_one ,
GSYM sta t e_d i s t i n c t_c l au s e s ,
GSYM output_dist inct_c lauses ,
GSYM commands_distinct_clauses ,





satList_CONS , s a tL i s t_n i l ]
THEN
PROVE_TAC[
Controls , Modus_Ponens ]
)
val _= save_thm( "RT_ALERT_exec_complete_lemma1" ,
RT_ALERT_exec_complete_lemma1)
val he lpe r3 = snd ( dest_imp ( conc l he lpe r1 ) )
val RT_ALERT_exec_complete_lemma2 =
TAC_PROOF(













val _= save_thm( "RT_ALERT_exec_complete_thm" ,
RT_ALERT_exec_complete_thm)
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